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This thesis considers the historical development of the theory of sovereignty from the 
beginning of the seventeenth century through to the present time. In achieving this it 
considers the contributions made by various theorists throughout this period, viz. Bodin, 
James I, Hobbes, Hale, Bentham, Austin, Dicey, H. L. A. Hart and H. W. R. Wade. It 
continues to analyse the British variant of sovereignty: parliamentary sovereignty, and 
how, and why, this notion has dominated constitutional law in Britain for the past century. 
It argues that the absolute nature of parliamentary sovereignty lacks an historical 
precedent and is principally the product of a particular age and a small number of similarly 
minded theorists. It considers the theoretical underpinnings of the current theory and how 
the courts have employed theoretical arguments, and the contribution they have made to 
the development of the theory. It suggests that the theory of parliamentary sovereignty 
does not reflect the reality of the British political system and that we should consider 
following historical precedent and abandon this theoretical model in favour of one that 
explains our constitutional structure. 
In doing this it suggests that a good starting point for any re-evaluation of the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty would be the work of Bodin and Hale. 
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Chapter One - Introduction 
Objectives of this Thesis 
For over 100 years constitutional lawyers have employed the notion of parliamentary 
sovereignty as the theoretical foundation for much of our constitutional law. Martin 
Loughlin explains this reliance through reference to the ideological standpoint favoured by 
many constitutional theorists throughout this period. Loughlin states: 
The tradition of conservative normativism has ... lived on as the 
dominant 
tradition in public law thought throughout the twentieth century, even though 
the political environment has been transformed. 
He continues to state that, as a result of the dominance of conservative normativism, 
We have fastened on to such ideas as sovereignty, the universal rule of 
ordinary law, and a conception of the rule of law which places the judiciary 
beyond reproach and have tried to re-order the world through this ideological 
ßd. 1 
In the course of this thesis I will explore inter alia the appropriateness of the conservative 
normativist explanation of parliamentary sovereignty, such alternatives to it as may exist 
and the history of the evolution of the theory of sovereignty in order to explain how and 
why the conservative normativist model achieved pre-eminence. In order to do this I shall 
work from a number of premises that: ' 
1. constitutional lawyers use theories as ideological explanations for the existing 
constitutional structure; 
2. constitutional theories, therefore, ought to reflect what happens in practice; 
1 Loughlin (1992) at p. 233. 
Page 1 
3. the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty provides a theoretical explanation for the 
legal relationship between the courts and Parliament; 2 and 
4. this legal relationship reflects the political relationship between these organs of 
government. 
The traditional - conservative normativist - understanding of the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty is based upon A. V. r Dicey's formulations. 3 Subsequent conservative 
normativist theorists, such as Sir William Wade, have amended Dicey's model in order to 
reflect constitutional developments. 4 However, many of the central tenets of Dicey's 
theory remain unaltered in, and form the foundations of, the works of these later 
commentators. Dicey's model of parliamentary sovereignty maintains that the United 
Kingdom (UK) Parliament is sovereign and that this sovereignty is illimitable and 
immutable. This means, in practical terms, that Parliament is vested with unconstrained 
legislative competence and that the other major organs of government, the courts and the 
executive, are subordinate to Parliament. Parliament may delegate authority to any Other 
body it chooses, but must reserve the authority to revoke that delegation at a later time, 
thus the only limitation on Parliament's legislative competence is that it cannot limit its 
own competence. 
If Dicey's theory reflects reality we could expect the following constitutional arrangement 
in the UK: firstly, Parliament is constitutionally preeminent and that the other organs Of. 
government do Parliament's bidding and have no independent authority to act contrary to 
2 Jennings (1959) at p. 49. 
3 See Chapter Three, below at p. 132 et seq. 
See Chapter Four, below at p. 223 et seq, and Chapter SL-. -, below at p. 375 et seq. 
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the will of Parliament. Secondly, that the courts are legally obliged to apply all 
parliamentary legislation, absolutely and literally, and that they do so. Thirdly, Parliament 
would make no attempt to bind its successors as to either the substance of legislation or 
the manner in which it is introduced. However, there are now serious questions over 
whether this Dicean model does reflect what happens in practice in the UK's constitution. 
' 
I will highlight where these questions arise, what disparities between theory and practice 
they are based on, how this affects the use of the Dicean model of sovereignty and what 
alternatives to the Dicean model exist. I will, further, demonstrate that the immutable and 
illimitable elements of Dicey's model are the root cause of any disparities between the 
political reality and Dicean explanations of this reality. I shall, throughout this thesis, 
show that many theorists, pre- and post-Dicey, have accepted the possibility of limited and 
divided sovereignty and that those non-Dicean explanations may be of greater use to 
modern constitutionalists than Dicey's own formulations. 
Further, I shall demonstrate that Dicey, and many of his predecessors and successors, lost 
sight of, or did not recognise the fact that-the constitutional/political settlement is in a 
permanent state of evolution. They failed, therefore, to recognise that the relationship 
between the courts and Parliament is also subject to evolution and that this relationship 
may be affected by changes in the broader political world. Once this evolutionary nature 
is recognised it is impossible to maintain the view that a theory emphasising immutability 
and illimitability can adequately be employed as an explanation of the UK's political 
reality. A changing reality requires a theory that can accommodate development and 
change; something Dicey's formulation fails to do. Further, I shall demonstrate that not 
5 See Chapters Four, Five and Six below. 
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only is the nature of sovereignty changeable, contra Dicey, but that it has actually changed 
since Dicey formulated his theory. 
In addition I shall show that: the authority relied on in support of the Dicean model is not 
as long lived as may be suggested, 
6 that it is not without alternatives,? that it is not as 
logically consistent as may be portrayed and that it might never have explained the UK's 
constitution arrangement! In short, I shall show that the Dicean model of sovereignty is 
an immature doctrine derived from observations of an incomplete democratic system, 
supported by a simplistic legal theory. ' 
Structure of the Argument 
The Introduction outlines certain key arguments and arrangements that form the 
background to the notion of parliamentary sovereignty and explains the relationship 
between theory and practice and the function performed by the one vis-ä-vis the other. 
Chapters Two and Three outline the evolution of the modern notion of sovereignty froth 
the early 1600s to the early 1900s and how it came to convey a specific legal meaning. 
Chapters Four, Five and Six consider the development of parliamentary sovereignty this 
century, concentrating on certain key political developments - break up of Empire, 
membership of European Communities et al. 
6 See Chapter Four, below at pp. 189-192. 
See Chapter Two, below at p. 61, p. 122, Chapter Three, below at p. 141, and Chapter Four, below at 
p. 231 et seq. 
$ See Chapter Three, below at pp184-186. 
See Chapter Three, below at p. 167 et seq. 
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Chapter Seven forms the conclusion to the thesis. It outlines the position today, and 
presents an argument for a new understanding of our constitutional structure, the notion 
of sovereignty, and its place within that structure. It also outlines potential areas for future 
consideration, and how sovereignty may evolve in the forthcoming years. It draws 
together the conclusions from the preceding Chapters and demonstrates that sovereignty is 
a dynamic concept. It will continue to show that the paradigm of immutable and 
illimitable legal sovereignty that emerged as orthodoxy during the nineteenth century is 
merely one stage in the evolution of a wider theory of sovereignty. It will also reinforce 
the argument that sovereignty transcends man-made divisions of subject areas, for 
example law and politics. In doing this it will show that the theory, of sovereignty 
concerns a wider audience than constitutional lawyers alone and that constitutional 
lawyers should look beyond the purely legal in order to fully understand the constitutional 
structure of the UK. The conclusion will suggest that the ideas of Sir John Laws1° 
underpinned by T. R. S Allan's" theoretical model - albeit slightly modified - represent a 
viable explanation for the current constitutional structure and the place of sovereignty 
theory within that structure. 
Theories evolve in response to a variety of different stimuli. The most significant in the 
development of sovereignty theory is the evolution of the political system the theory seeks 
to explain. It is, however, difficult to demonstrate this process in action in relation to 
some of the theorists outlined, particularly those in Chapter Two. The causes of this 
difficulty are, inter alia, the passage of time, a lack of sources detailing the political 
developments in unbiased detail and a lack of detail on the part of the theorists in person 
10 See below at pp. 26-28. 
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tying their works to the events in question. The general influence can be seen in the broad 
arguments the theorists employ - for examples see Hobbes' work. 12 The fact that this 
influence is more obvious in the works of late nineteenth and twentieth century writers is 
reflected in the structure of the arguments employed in Chapters Four, Five and Six. In 
these latter chapters there is far more reference to the exact political events that drove 
theoretical developments. 13 
In Chapter Two, and partly in Chapter Three, there is more reliance on Hegelian dialectic 
to explain the evolution of sovereignty theory. A good example emphasising this Hale's 
work was driven by a clear and strong reaction to Thomas Hobbes Dialogue Between a 
Philosopher and a Student of the Common Law. '4 Although political practice remains the 
principal driver for theoretical evolution, the process of responding to earlier theoretical 
works is. also important in charting how and why certain notions of sovereignty evolved as 
they did. Another clear example of this is Hobbes reacting to the political situation, and 
also to Coke's theorising. " 
Prior to a detailed consideration of the evolution of the theory of sovereignty, it is 
necessary to make some observations about the nature of theories, and how sovereignty'- 
functions as a theory. 
1 See Chapter Seven, below at pp. 425-426. ` 
12 See Chapter Two, below, at p. 105 et seq. 
13 See Chapter Four, below at p. 216 et seq. 
" See Chapter Two, below at p. 127. 
15 See Chapter Two, below at p. 114. 
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The Development of Theory 
Different `Types' of Constitutional Theory 
Reviewing the work of constitutional lawyers, practical and academic, over the past 
hundred years reveals the fact that parliamentary sovereignty has formed an intrinsic part 
of the foundation for their theories. Almost all of the writers and judges involved in public 
law have accepted the constitutional arrangements implied by parliamentary sovereignty, 
and have allowed this formulation to direct their own work. Theorists have widely 
accepted that this doctrine forms the foundation of our system of government, as Dicey 
maintained. 16 This has led theorists away from questions regarding the fundamental nature 
of our constitution. This approach has ignored the following facts: 
1. the jurisprudential basis for such a formulation has been questioned, that 
2. the political situation in existence when Dicey was writing is different to that of today, 
and 
3. the view that Dicey represents the culmination of years of theoretical development is 
patently untrue when one considers the work of prior theorists. 
As McAuslan notes "public lawyers, especially administrative lawyers" have shied away 
from exploring fundamental questions, disavowing the "central importance of theory, 
philosophy and ideology in administrative law. " 17 Public lawyers have been pre-occupied 
with the emergence of a body of administrative law, developed in part to control the 
actions of an executive emerging as the pre-eminent constitutional body. There has been 
little consideration of the impact this emergence has on the traditional foundations of our 
16 See Chapter Three, below at p. 189. 
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constitution. The appropriateness of the foundation theory has not been re-considered. 
New ideas have emerged" and fundamental questions have been posed. However, there 
is still institutional acceptance of the views expressed one hundred years ago, despite their 
manifest deficiencies. It is only recently that wide spread interest in the fundamental aspect 
of public law -has re-emerged as demonstrated in the works of, amongst others, Craig, 
Allan, Allott and Loughlin. 
I shall demonstrate that traditional background theory - personified in the writings of 
Dicey - no longer adequately explains the "political settings and values1'19 underlying the 
government of the United Kingdom, and that reliance upon it perverts understanding of 
the reality. Further, I shall show that there are alternatives to the Dicean notion of 
parliamentary sovereignty, many of which would more effectively explain the 
constitutional system of the UK. Some of these alternatives were formulated subsequent 
to Dicey's death, whilst others date from before he was born. However, the continued 
adherence of some commentators, 20 legal practitioners21 and politicians' to the Dicean 
notion of an absolute sovereignty vested in Parliament represents an impediment to the 
consideration of fundamental constitutional issues in the modern UK. Adherence to these 
notions denies the importance of political and historical context in the evolution of 
constitutional theory. 
" McAuslan (1978) at p. 41. 
'$ See Chapter Four, below at p. 216 et seq. 
19 Harlow (1994) at p. 422. 
10 See Chapter Six, below at pp. 376-377. 
21 See Lord Reid in Pickin v. British Railways Board (1974) AC 265 below at p. 278 and Lord Donaldso., 
in R v. The Secretary of State for Transport, ex pane Factortame below at pp. 357-358. 
See Chapter Six, below at p. 315. 
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The Importance of Studying Theory in the Context of Practice and History 
Considering the development and use of a theory such as that of sovereignty involves a 
number of points that should always be remembered. One of the most significant is that, 
together with the ideas inherent within it, a theory also has "non-theoretical `conditions of 
existence. "'23These non-theoretical conditions of existence often form external stimuli for 
the development of a theory and these external stimuli may explain why a theorist felt 
compelled to write what he did, the approach adopted by the theorist and his attitude 
towards preceding theorists. 24 In the context of constitutional law many of these external 
stimuli are classed as political, and define the theoretical boundaries within which writers 
may work. There are cases where a lateral movement in the understanding of a theory 
occurs, and Mannheim suggests that such movements may occasionally only be explained 
through a consideration of external stimuli. 25 Cotterrell recognises this fact when he states, 
"while ideas have intellectual origins and may exert intellectual influence, these 
relationships and lines of development may be mediated by social factors - the acts of 
people as `social beings. `2' One of the key stimuli in the promulgation of constitutional 
theories is the ideological standpoint of the theorist. A belief in a specific sociological 
arrangement exerts influence over the ideal constitutional arrangement. Different 
ideological beliefs may produce divergent interpretations of the same factual situations, or 
accord them greater or lesser significance. 
`3 Elliott (1987) at pp. 8-9. 
24 See Chapters Two and Three for discussions of external stimuli influencing the works of Bodin, 
Hobbes, Hale, Bentham and Dicey. 
25 Mannheim (1992) at p. 30. 
26 Cotterrell (1989) at p. 18. 
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Related to this point is Merryman's observation, that "in a world organised into sovereign 
states and organisations of states, there are as many legal systems as there are states and 
organisations". Merryman explains that 
differences in legal systems are reflections of the fact that for several centuries the 
world has been divided up into individual states, under intellectual conditions that 
have emphasised the importance of state sovereignty and encouraged a nationalistic 
emphasis on national characteristics and traditions. 27 
Different stimuli, and different ideological standpoints, in different countries will produce 
different constitutional structures, and different theories explaining them. This undermines 
the notion that a single theoretical explanation of a concept as complex as sovereignty 
may be applied to all constitutional systems. 28 At this point the objectives of a jurist and a 
constitutional lawyer may diverge. The former seeks a logically consistent explanation of 
law and legal systems, what Kelsen termed a Pure Theory of Law. 29 The latter seeks an 
explanation of a particular system, and uses theory accordingly. If a theory fails to explain 
a particular system it is of limited use to constitutional lawyers considering that system 
although jurists may retain their interest in it. 
Loughlin uses the simile of a map in order to explain the role of theory in constitutional 
, 
law. He states: "the task of theory is to render explicit and systematic those conceptual 
structures that implicitly shape our views about the subject. 1130 Loughlin continues 
We need to appreciate how certain practices acquire meaning, how particular 
meanings are related to concepts, and how a variety of concepts are linked together 
in structures as theoretical frameworks. This is an interpretative exercise. Having 
identified the main conceptual structures which infuse practices with meaning we' 
'' Merryman (1985) at pp. 1-2. 
`$ Contra Austin. See Chapter Three below at pp. 160-161. 
`9 Kelsen (1967). 
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must assess how these theoretical frameworks relate to the political and social 
realities of the world in which we live. This is to an extent an empirical exercise. 
However, insofar as we should also assess the manner in which these realities have 
changed over time, it is also an historical exercise. Finally, we must examine the 
alternative maps of the conceptual terrain being surveyed and evaluate their rival 
claims. 31 
Using a simile of a map illustrates the importance of relevance. If a map is not accurate it 
may result in users becoming lost. Similarly, if a theory is not accurate it can lead to 
misinterpretation of that which it seeks to explain. It is important, therefore, to employ an 
appropriate map/theory when exploring a specific legal system. Just as some maps are 
intended only to show certain geographical features and not others, - for example a map 
showing inland waterways may not have the road network marked - so some theories are 
only designed to explain certain aspects of the politico-legal system. Other maps are 
designed to reveal far more geographical features, for example road networks, elevations, 
settlements and other aspects of human geography. Similarly some theories have a wider 
application and explain a much broader section of the politico-legal reality. An example of 
the former type of theory is found in the notion of individual ministerial responsibility, this 
notion does not explain the structure of the UK constitution; it merely explains an aspect 0 
of the relationship between a minister and the civil servants who work within his 
department. An example of the latter type of theory is that of parliamentary sovereignty. 
Parliamentary sovereignty does not merely explain the legal relationship between courts 
and legislatures - although it does this as well - it also explains the wider arrangement of 
all the organs of state and their relative roles inter se. 
30 Loughlin (1992) at p. 37. 
31 Loughlin (1992) at p. 38. 
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Just as theories which adequately explain one system may not explain another, so a theory 
which adequately explained a system at a particular point in time may not explain the same 
system at a subsequent point in time, for that system may have evolved into an effectively 
different system. Nineteenth century formulations of Parliamentary sovereignty may have 
adequately explained the British Parliamentary system of the mid to late 1800's, but that is 
no guarantee that they will do so in the late twentieth century. 
32 Critically, most 
constitutional theorists write retrospectively, they seek to explain the system they have 
experienced, not that which is likely to evolve. Few British constitutional theorists have 
been prospective and, due to the nature of law, constitutional lawyers are concerned with 
cases discussing situations that have existed, not necessarily cases that might exist or even 
do exist. However, the political reality is continually changing. Political debates often 
centre on the "ought" as well as the "is" and this represents a clear driver for evolution. 
Johnson notes that "in the conduct of political affairs there must always be some gap 
between constitutional principles or theory, and political practice: what is can never 
coincide exactly with what ought to be. "33 The situation is the same in constitutional law. 
This means that constitutional theory - whose function it is to explain constitutional, leggy 
and political practice - will lag behind the constitutional law, as expressed by the courts 
and legislature and actual political practice. As Johnson notes, "dangers arise ... when the 
gap becomes very wide, and when such constitutional doctrine as there is no longer seems 
to explain very much of what happens. " Johnson explains 
the authority of institutions rests finally on the acceptance of the principles and 
procedures which they express - and a fortiori, their ability to act - only if there is 
some reasonable correspondence between the manner in which they are actually 
32 See Chapter Three on Dicey's relevance to the constitutional structure of the late 1800's, and Chapter 
Four for a consideration of his relevance to the 1900's. 
" Johnson (1977) at p. vii. 
Page 12 
used and the justification which it must always be possible to give for the terms on 
which they-operate. In other words, the theory - or the principle - of the 
institutions must not diverge too far from the reality of how they are used. 34 
This consideration of the manner of the evolution of theory is important: a theory may be 
affected and shaped by changing external stimuli. We should, therefore, continually test it 
against reality to ensure that it adequately maps reality. If it does not it can be either 
disregarded or amended. In order to do this it is essential that a clear understanding of 
how, and why, a theory has evolved is held by all commentators because only then can 
they be aware of the stimuli which caused the promulgation of the theory, and keep watch 
for new stimuli provoking developments. 
Documentary Interpretation 
People conducting historical research should remember that 
"theories and interpretations of the past, however hallowed or long standing, always 
remain mortal and expendable. Facts stand unmoveable, for truth, the Holy Grail of 
all scholars, can only be sought by way of them. "35 
Despite a past event being, by its very nature, immutable, ascertainment of an historical 
truth often proves to be problematic. Determining why something happened often relies 
upon interpreting documents written at the time the event occurred. Such documents may 
take many forms; for lawyers these are obviously books, articles, cases and official 
publications. There is, however, a wider literature consisting of diaries, correspondence 
and unpublished manuscripts, all of which contribute to understanding why, and in what 
way, events took place. 
34 Johnson (1977) at p. viii. 
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Interpreting documents involves recognition that the author frequently writes from a 
particular standpoint: they have their own opinion on the event and that opinion informs 
their account. Frequently a number of different authors write accounts of the same event 
and they often have divergent opinions of the event in question. Researchers need to 
reconcile such accounts, or determine whether one is more authoritative than another is. 
It is only through this process that a viable explanation may be reached. This process is 
complicated by the paucity of original sources that may exist. 36 
An explanation of an event, definitive in the eyes of one researcher, may be illogical and 
unfounded to another. There exist a number of schools of historical thought, based upon 
different ideological perspectives. Such schools of thought may be rigid or loose in 
composition; there may be one or a number of members, and within a particular school of 
thought the members may hold vastly different perspectives. 37 These perspectives may 
change over time becoming unrecognisable from what they were originally. In short, 
`school of thought' is a loose term describing a dynamic grouping of theorists. As 
ideologies emerge and evolve so new schools of thought are created. At the same time 
existing schools develop their ideas and change their standpoint, resulting in changes to 
their explanations. Sometimes such schools of thought wither and die, their explanations 
becoming. discredited and disregarded. 
Membership of one of these schools of these schools of thought frequently involves 
acceptance of a particular theoretical approach to politico-legal situations and events. This 
's Bagley (1972) at pp. 11-12. 
36 See above at p. 5. 
37 See Chapter Three, below at pp. 132-141. 
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often necessitates a particular interpretation of the situations and events. Rather than 
letting events underpin and explain theory, theory is used to explain the events; a clear 
example is the Marxist school of historical interpretation. However, it is cruciäl that events 
and documentary evidence surrounding them are not perverted in order to fit a particular 
theory. It is this temptation that Bagley alludes to. 38 
As different schools of thought emerge and disappear, so historical research can become a 
review of past theories instead of interpretation of the original events. This is a valid 
enterprise in its own right, but it is important not to allow a theory to crystallise in such a 
way as to accord it immutable status: all theories are mortal and m&y be subject to 
disapproval in the light of factual evidence. 39 There is a danger amongst any researchers 
who are not au fait with historical techniques or who ignore aspects of the literature that 
they will misinterpret events and produce ill-founded theories. Equally researchers who 
lose sight of the fact that theories are mortal may force events to fit their theory, when the 
appropriate course of action would be to re-evaluate the validity of their theory. 
As time passes so researchers develop new methods of interpreting documents and events. 
These innovations, in turn, produce new explanations and theories relating to the 
documents interpreted. Such developments may produce a new school of thought, or they 
may transcend such delimitation, and merely be used as an interpretative tool. This process 
should not be underestimated, and neither should the fact "that focusing on a few key 
texts in political [and legal] thought involves tremendous interpretation difficulties. Often 
'$ See above at p. 13. 
39 See above at p. 13. 
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political [and legal] theorists are not consistent and they employ terms whose meanings 
are historically or culturally obscure. "' 
Interpretation of a document may take a number of forms, Baumgold states: 
For understanding of a text itself, as opposed to the function ideas have played in 
history of the ways in which a theory has been received by later audiences, there 
are three principle interpretative approaches: bibliographical interpretations 
emphasise the author's intention in producing a work; textual interpretations focus 
on a work's internal logic; contextual interpretations highlight a work's meaning to 
contemporary readers. 41 
Appreciation of these interpretative methods is of paramount importance. They all add to 
the wider understanding of what happened, why it happened, and how it informed and 
conformed to the emergence of theories used to explain events. At the same time 
consideration of the historical context is important, for it does contribute a great deal of 
background to the views expressed, and the examples employed to explain them. This in 
turn contributes to understanding the writer's objectives that might be more than 
promulgation of a logically consistent theory - as is the case with Bodin, Hobbes, and 
Locke. 
Historical Context 
Any legal event, or publication, should be viewed in the context of the age in which it 
occurred, and the structure of the society in place when it occurred. 42 Legal events, such 
40 Lane (1996) at p. 45. 
41 Baumgold (1988) at p. 21. 
42 Ives (1968) at p. 116. 
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as individual cases, do not exist in isolation; they are frequently informed by surrounding 
politico-social events. 43 
There is a danger that we will use our present knowledge to aid our interpretation of past 
events. As Russell explains, 
A historian must always run the risk of letting hindsight lead him to see evidence 
out of perspective. Those who write the story remembering the ultimate conclusion 
may miss many of the twists and turns which give it suspense along. the way. They 
may even forget that the result was ever in suspense. " . 
Constitutional lawyers, with their essentially Whig interpretation of history, depict the 
events surrounding the Civil War, Restoration and Glorious Revolution as the culmination 
of a prolonged struggle, and as the final step in the emergence of Parliament as the 
supreme governmental and law making body. 45 By doing this they fall into the trap 
outlined by Russell. They allow their `modern' constitutionalism and democratic ideals to 
colour their interpretations not only of events preceding the Glorious Revolution and 
subsequent political settlement, but also of the settlement itself and subsequent events. 
Further, these constitutional lawyers have been guilty of succumbing to the danger 
outlined by Bagley; 46 they have treated a particular interpretation of these events, and 
theories reliant on these interpretations, as immortal and inexpendable. Foremost amongst 
these theories, as Loughlin notes, ' is the notion of sovereignty. By sovereignty we have 
come to mean Whig sovereignty, a notion that emphasises the constitutional pre-eminence 
43 See Chapter Four, below at pp. 273-274. 
44 Russell (1976) at p. 1. 
as Mcllwain (1938) at p. 62. 
46 See above at p. 13. 
47 See above at p. 1. 
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of Parliament, accords it an Austinian definition and which is founded on Hobbes' political 
theory. 49 
Evolution of Sovereignty Theory in Britain 
The assumption is that the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty has evolved in a linear 
fashion. The start of this process is seen to be the Glorious Revolution of 1688 which 
marked Parliament's final victory over the monarchy and which established it in a position 
of dominance over the other organs of government, the executive and the judiciary, °9 This 
is simplistic and ignores the influence of theorists, the impact of non-legal events on the 
evolution of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty and the impact of subsequent 
interpretation, historical and legal, of the actual events, not only of the Revolution itself, 
but also of the years surrounding it. 
Over the past 300 years it is possible to identify two distinct, although broadly defined, 
legal schools of thought on the nature of sovereignty: natural law theory, most clearly 
represented, in Britain, by the Common Law theorists; and analytical 
jurisprudence/positivism. 
Developments in the theory of sovereignty have often resulted from the reaction of one 
theorist, in one school of thought, to the work of another writer from the other school of 
thought. S° Such reactions represent examples of external stimuli. There are a number of 
"$ Mcllwain (1938) at pp. 61,65. 
49 For example see Lord Reid's judgement in British Railways Board v. Pickin 119741 AC 765., belp 
y a; p. 278. 
so See Hegelian dialectic alluded to above at p. 6. 
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clear examples, especially in the early periods of development: Hobbes reacted strongly to 
Coke's constitutional formulations, Hale reacted to Hobbes' ideas' and Bentham was 
stirred to write as a result of his opposition to Blackstone's conception of English law. 
52 
At the same time, there are clear lines of continuity, from Bentham to Austin to Dicey and 
from Coke to Hale to Blackstone, at least that is the popular opinion. 33 Close 
consideration of these lines of continuity and reaction reveal that theorists located by 
modem commentators in the same school of thought often exhibit significant differences 
that are ignored, or portrayed as insignificant. 5" 
Relationship Between Law And Politics 
Division of Law from Politics 
The approach adopted by many of the writers figuring in Chapters Two and Three differs 
from modern theorists in a number of ways, one of the most significant is that the earlier 
writers were less inclined to distinguish between the legal and political worlds. Bodin and 
Hobbes approached the subject of sovereignty in an attempt to resolve what we would, 
today, call political problems. Austin - the quintessential early positivist, and analytical 
jurist - who was attempting to formulate a logically consistent theory of law, was even 
compelled to resort to employing notions of political legitimacy: that sovereignty 
ultimately lay in the electorate. " Bentham's objective was more socio-political than 
Austin's, but not as overtly political as that of Hobbes or Bodin, and he too relied on 
S' See Chapter Two, below, at p. 54 et seq. 52 See Chapter Three, below at p. 132 et seq. 53 Marshall (1971) at p. 34. 
sa See Chapter Three, below at pp. 140-141. 
55 See Chapter Three, below at p. 181. 
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notions of political legitimacy and social fact. 76 However, many modern constitutional 
lawyers believe that the fields of law and politics should be strictly defined and studied in 
isolation from each other. -: 
This "conservative" view is epitomised by Hood-Phillips who stated 
Politics we are told is about power. The current language of political scientists 
refers largely to the question ` where does the power lie? ', and the power they talk 
about is mainly the power to make decisions. This may be a convenient analysis for 
the study of certain aspects of Government, but from a legal point of view the 
emphasis is different. Constitutional law is concerned rather with authority. = 
`Authority' is a more subtle and sophisticated concept than-, power', depending 
not on mere force but on legitimacy or authorisation, that is, on one's being 
appointed, selected or elected and recognised as the person who ought to do this 
or make that decisions' 
Harlow identifies the debate between positivists, arguing for a limitation of public law to 
matters purely legal, and many public lawyers who seek to extend the debate into the 
realms of politics, sociology, economic and scientific theory as defining two different type 
of theory. The positivists seek to limit public law to shallow theory, whilst many modern 
public lawyers, especially functionalists, seek to extend theory into what Harlow terms 
`deep theoryiS' - an example of this is found in the work of Allan. 59 
The emergence of positivism as the predominant jurisprudential theory is regarded as 
responsible for the divorce of the legal and political spheres in much modern, British, 
public law. 6° Although the works of Bentham and Austin are clearly distinguishable from 
56 See Chapter Three, below at p. 140-141. 
S' Hood-Phillips (1970) at p. 1-2. 
58 Harlow (1994) at pp. 423-424. 
59 See Chapter Seven, below at pp. 425-427. 
60 Loughlin (1992) at pp. 230-231. 
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those of Kelsen, Hart and other modern positivists, 61 positivism has its roots in the late 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It is significant that positivism's evolution occurred 
contemporaneously with the Westminster model of representative democracy. Many of the 
ideals inherent within this model of democracy aid continued adherence to positivist 
thought; the clearest of these is the constitutional role of the judiciary. Within the UK 
there is a common view that the judiciary are concerned with matters of law, and do not 
venture into the political world - thus reinforcing the notion that matters of law and 
politics should be divorced, and should remain so. The situation is different, for example, 
in the United States of America (USA) where the judiciary defend the Rights laid down in 
the USA's Constitution and may strike down primary legislation as' unconstitutional. 62 
Many UK commentators, 63 legal figures64 and politicians" would interpret the 
constitutional position of the USA's judiciary as an overtly political role. 
However, statements that the British judiciary does not perform a political function are 
inconsistent with our constitutional history, and deny the fact that many political debates 
spill over into the legal arena. 66 They also deny the significance of judicial review67 (JR). It 
should be remembered that the modern notion of JR has emerged relatively recently 
alongside the evolution of the welfare state and the division of public and private bodies. 
This model is intrinsically linked to the notion of parliamentary sovereignty. Recently 
61 See Chapter Three, below at p. 149. 
62 See Cox (1968). 
63 Le Sueur (1991). 
64 Sir John Donaldson, R. v H. M. Treasury, ex parte Smedley 119851 1 0.8.657, at p. 666. 65 See Chapter Six, below at p. 315. 
66 An obvious example being Unilateral Declaration of Independence (U. D. I. ), see Chapter Four for the 
examples provided by the break-up of the British Empire. Other, more recent and domestic, examples are 
provided in Duport Steels Ltd. v. Sirs (19801 1WLR 147 Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister 
for the Civil Service f 19851 A. C. 374, 
67 See p. 23 below. See also Chapter Six, below at pp. 389-390. 
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there has been an increased inclination to accept that the judiciary does perform a political 
function, through reviewing the legitimacy of public bodies' actions, including those of the 
executive. One fact underlying this increased inclination is that the word "political" is 
capable of conveying more than one meaning. Although this fact has frequently been 
ignored in debates surrounding sovereignty it is increasingly acknowledged, especially by 
the judiciary. " The confusion that has resulted from ignoring this fact has been 
compounded by a propensity for discussions on the separation of powers to concentrate 
on division of function, rather than the notions of checks and balances which originally 
formed the foundations for Montesquieu's formulation. 69 Concentrating on notions such 
as judicial legitimacy and the place of constitutional review within i democratic system 
diverts attention away from the avoidance of arbitrary government. It should never be 
forgotten that many constitutional conflicts have as their object the avoidance of arbitrary 
government, for example those of the seventeenth century. 
The Traditional Judicial Role in the United Kingdom's Constitution 
The traditional perception of the judicial function, vis-c -vis the other organs of 
government is summarised by Baron Parke who stated 
It is the province of the statesman and not the lawyer to discuss, and of the 
legislature to determine, what is the best for the public good and to provide for it 
by the proper enactments. It is the province of the judge to expand the law only 
the written from the statutes, the unwritten or common law from the decisions of 
our predecessors and of our existing courts, from text writers of acknowledged 
authority, and from the principles to be clearly deduced from them by sound 
68 See pp. 25-29. 
69 Barendt (1990) at p. 606. 
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reasoning and just inference - not to speculate upon what is best in his opinion for 
the advantage of the community. 7° 
This essentially denies the courts the role of a merits court. This positioning is. critical in 
understanding the UK constitutional framework. The Judicial function has not emerged as 
the product of a written constitution, rather it has been created through an acceptance of a 
particular constitutional arrangement by the major organs of government: the judiciary 
have, to a large extent, defined their own constitutional role. Judicial reluctance to 
encroach on Parliament's power has been justified by maintaining that any such 
encroachment would jeopardise the independence of the judiciary and the public's belief 
in, and perceptions of, the law's even-handedness. " Other justifications have centred on 
the judiciary's lack. of a popular mandate to question the actions of the popularly elected 
Government. 72 Gilmour, commenting on this latter point, states 
anxious not to offend the executive, the Courts got themselves so entangled in their 
own procedures, frictions and inhibitions that 'the rusty curb of old father antick 
the law' has curbed only itself, not the executive. They have slavishly worshipped 
at the shrine of parliamentary sovereignty. 73 
Gilmour's reference to the relationship between the courts and the executive supports the 
view that the executive now dominates the United Kingdom's constitutional settlement. 
However, despite recognising the significance of the executive, Gilmour persists in 
employing the language of parliamentary sovereignty evidencing how this notion has come 
to be perceived as the foundation of the modern constitutional arrangement. This 
represents a clear example of an acceptance of the modern political reality and the reliance 
on a nineteenth century theory to explain it. Parliamentary sovereignty emphasises the role 
70 Quoted in Greene (1938). 
't Dunort Steels Ltd. v. Sirs 119801 1 W. L. R. 142, per Lord Diplock at p. 157bcd, and Lord Scarman at 
pp. 168-169. 
'2 Le Sueur (1991). 
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of parliament as the dominant organ of government, whereas the modern constitutional 
7a 
system is orientated around the executive. 
The institutional acceptance of the idea that Parliament controls the distribution of 
authority - the notion of ultra vires, underlying much of our administrative law - is firmly 
based on the view that Parliament vests a limited degree of authority to the executive. This 
interpretation ignores the fact that it is the executive that dominates Parliament. The 
executive controls the legislation which vests authority, the legislative timetable, and even 
the voting patterns of the members of parliament, through the medium of the Party 
machinery. For all practical purposes, the executive controls the vesting of authority upon 
itself. There have been examples of governments being defeated, in both Houses of 
Parliament, 75 although these tend to be the exceptions rather than the rule. Equally it is 
true that when a government's majority is small Parliament may exert more control over 
the executive than when it is large, but it is rare for a government's majority to be so small 
as to make them vulnerable. 
It is also relevant that up to now the socio-economic group of mostly white, upper-middle 
class men, who dominate the judiciary, belong to the same `elite' as those which 
dominates the Civil Service and high political office. Sedley recognises this fact. He 
explains that 
by the time Franz Ferdinand fell to an assassin's bullet in Sarajevo, all the upper. 
echelons of the Civil Service were populated by men, a remarkable proportion of 
73 Gilmour (1971) at p. 371. 
70 See Chapter Four, below at p. 212. 
's Such defeats are more common in the House of Lords where the right to sit is not dependent upon Party 
`pleasure'. 
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them with firsts and double firsts, who had shared their schools, universities and 
clubs with the judiciary and the barristers who became the judiciary of the inter-war 
years. With such a background, a new sense of mutual confidence shared by the 
judiciary and the executive was not surprising. Nor were its results. For the very 
period in which judicial invigilation relaxed was the period in which what has been 
called the Victorian Night-Watchman state radically changed its mode. 76 
The socio-economic background of the judiciary" and the `political elite' was broadly 
homogeneous. They possessed a certain coincidence of views, including the ideal nature 
of government. The trust that existed between themselves and the executive was enough 
to persuade the judiciary that the executive could be entrusted with increased power and 
authority to govern, unchecked by legal supervision. There have been exceptions to this 
acceptance, one of the best being Lord Atkin's dissenting judgement in Liversidee v. 
Anderson. 78 where he firmly advocated an active judicial role in the governmental process, 
and hinted at the dangers of unchecked government. 79 
The Modern Judicial Role in the United Kingdom's Constitution 
de Smith once wrote 
Today I am mainly concerned with legal analyses, by judges and others, of 
`unconstitutional' action. My argument is that in general these analyses are 
fundamentally political judgements dressed in legalistic garb. But this argument 
must not be pressed too far. On the whole judges trained in the British Common 
law tradition hanker after that `strict and complete legalism' which Sir Owen Dixon 
commended as the only sure guide to the determination of political disputes set in a 
legal context; and in so far as the narrowly positivist approach can provide a 
satisfactory answer to a problem, it will be eagerly pursued. 80 
76 Sedley (1994) at p. 280. 
" See Appendix C for Griffiths's analysis of the socio-economic background of the senior judiciary since 
1820. 
'$ [19421 A. C. 206. 
79 [19421 A. C. 206 at p. 244-245. 
80 De Smith (1968) at p. 94. 
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There are a number of issues inherent within this quotation: 
1. on occasions, judges make "political" decisions; 
2. that it is only in exceptional circumstances that British judges venture outside strict 
legalism, and 
3. at the time of writing, British judges pursued a "positivist" approach to legal problems 
whenever possible. 
Although, today, there is little doubt over any of these individual issues - although the 
second point is more questionable today than at any other recent times' - they do all 
combine in such a way as to cut to the core of the British constitutional system and the 
theory that underpins it. 
A New, Emerging, Judicial Function 
Sir John Laws, in a series of extra judicial publications, advocates the acceptance of a 
`new' legal order. His thesis is that we should accept the existence of fundamental rights 
which impose limitations upon the legislative competence of the executive and legislative, 
and that the judiciary should be charged with policing these rights, ensuring that they are 
not contravened by the organs of government. He suggests that 
The good constitution has to recognise and entrench a bedrock of rights, based on 
the principle of minimal interference. Good government of any political colour 
must pursue its own vision of the morality of aspiration... . Where its vision cuts 
across the rule of minimal interference, the courts have to say so. 82 
Laws believes that these fundamental rights must be beyond amendment by any public 
body, he maintains that 
81 See Chapter Seven, below at p. 405 et seq. 
82 Laws (1996) at p. 635. 
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the constitution must guarantee by positive law such rights as that of freedom of 
expression ... 
but this requires for its achievement what I may call a higher-order 
law: a law which cannot be abrogated as other laws can, by the passage of a 
statute promoted by a government with the necessary majority in Parliament. 
Otherwise the right is not in the keeping of the constitution at all; it is not a 
guaranteed right; it exists, in point of law at least, only because the government 
chooses to let it exist, whereas in truth no such choice should be open to any 
government. 83 
Laws' premise, that the judiciary should police the fundamental rights, is based on the 
notion that the judiciary already perform a certain political function, and that this function 
is not party political Z4 Laws maintains that this political function centres on the notion of 
judicial review and more particularly the Wednesburv35 principle of irrationality. He 
further maintains that utilising this principle the judiciary are able to introduce such 
legal/policy changes that evolving social and moral concepts require. 86 However, the 
developments in administrative law have been procedural and not substantive. If a system 
emphasising fundamental rights were to evolve, it would be necessary for the courts to 
further develop the principles of public law, perhaps in the direction of testing 
reasonableness. It would also require that the courts, to a degree, become courts of merit, 
reviewing the decisions of public bodies, including the government and Parliament, in a 
much fuller fashion. 
Under such a system, "Ultimate sovereignty rests, ... not with those who wield 
governmental power, but in the conditions under which they are permitted to do so. " 87 In 
33 Laws (1995) at p. 84. 
84 Laws (1995) at pp. 73-74. 
85 Associated Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesburv Corporation 119481 1KB 223, Particularly Lord 
Greene MR at p. 229. 
86 Laws (1993) at p. 63. 
$' Laws (1995) at p. 92. For a similar view, see Bodin, Chapter Two, below at p. 65. 
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other words, under such a system sovereignty would be situated within the constitution. 88 
According to Laws, Simply because the British constitution is not codified does not mean 
that it cannot impose limitations upon the exercise of legislative competence. -T-. R-S. Allan 
agrees with Laws' analysis and has presented a theoretical explanation of why, in a 
modern democracy, there are certain laws, often relating to the nature of the sovereign 
and its competence to amend itself, which the sovereign body cannot amend. 89 Allan's 
model of sovereignty is designed to ensure that tyranny is avoided. This objective has 
been central to much theory formulated prior to Allan: Montesquieu, Locke, Hale, Bodin 
and even Coke were all striving to produce a model of government where g one organ of 
government could not assume to itself tyrannical power. Hobbes, Austin, Dicey, and to a 
degree Bentham, however, formulated models of government where the accretion of 
absolute power was not only possible but also desirable. It is these latter theorists who 
have held sway over UK constitutional theory for the past two centuries. The ideas of 
Laws and Allan give constitutional commentators a starting point for re-formulating those 
theories which underpin our constitutional law and, thereby, produce a model of 
sovereignty capable of explaining our current reality whilst remaining flexible enough to 
allow for future developments. 
The changes in perspective that Laws and Allan advocate reflect a changing attitude in the 
perspective of constitutionalism. The traditional constitutional theorists emphasised the 
rights of the sovereign; 90 the emerging attitude has been to emphasise the rights of the 
citizen. Modern constitutions have been formulated with the objective of protecting 
88 As in the U. S. A. 
89 For a detailed consideration of these ideas see Chapter Seven below, at pp. 425-427. 
90 See Chapter 2. below at p. 66 (Bodin) and p. 108 (Hobbes). 
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citizens' rights. Fundamental rights are now perceived, Laws suggests, as essential for a 
flourishing and continuing democracy. 91 This Laws/ Allan approach does, however, 
require a review of the meaning we attribute to certain terminology. 
Use of Terminology 
In 1987 Hood-Phillips and Jackson stated: "The doctrine of sovereignty in the theory of 
municipal law as opposed to international law, ... 
is now out of fashion, and the continued 
use of the term `sovereignty' ... tends to prejudice discussions of the 
lawmaking power of 
the United Kingdom Parliament. "92 There is, therefore, a good argument for not using the 
term parliamentary sovereignty and for substituting, in its place, thg term legislative 
supremacy. Parliamentary sovereignty, currently, simply means that Parliament is the 
highest law making authority and that the courts will obey any legislative act issued by 
Parliament. 93 
The reason for not using parliamentary sovereignty is that it has come to mean different 
things to different people. Lawyers employ it as a term of art, whilst politicians use it to 
cover a number of ideas. 4 The specific legal meaning attributed to parliamentary 
sovereignty has been further perverted through media use of the term sovereignty. Press 
coverage of European Community/Union matters has often revolved around the - 
`surrender' of sovereignty to European bodies, but has not been specific in its use of the 
term. This has created an indistinct notion of what is meant by sovereignty in a majority 
of the populace. 
91 Laws (1995) at p. 81. 
92 Hood-Phillips and Jackson (1987) at p. 4 1. 93 See Chapter Four, below at p. 207. 
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LItRARY 
WILLS M. L. 
When considering the evolution of the notion of sovereignty it is easy for us to import our 
understanding of this notion into the work of previous theorists. Bodin, Coke, Hobbes, 
and their ilk would not have considered that the British Parliament would eventually 
become sovereign; they would not, necessarily, recognise our current notion of 
parliamentary sovereignty as being related to the notion they discussed. We should not, 
therefore, automatically equate their notion of sovereignty with our notion of 
parliamentary sovereignty. 
This point relates back to the idea of a linear progression from Coke through to today, an 
idea that ignores the obvious breaks and modifications that have occurred in the process. 
Thus whilst Wade states that the United Kingdom lawyers have been brought up believing 
that the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty was promulgated by Coke and Blackstone, 
and that Dicey merely expanded upon it, 95 the reality is not so easy. 
The notion of sovereignty has evolved, in its modern form, through the works of many 
theorists over a number of centuries, and has come to be incorporated into the United 
Kingdom's constitution in a specific form: Parliamentary sovereignty. This incorporation 
has been the product of a number of theorists and a lengthy period of time, although Dicey 
is the most significant figure in this process. 
94 See below in Chapters Five and Six. 
95 Wade (1955) at p. 174. 
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The Theorists Considered within this Thesis 
Introduction 
At this juncture I want to explain the criteria determining which theorists are included in 
this thesis and why others are omitted. When determining those theorists that should be 
included and those that should not I employed a number of broad and simple criteria: 
1. What did the theorist write? 
2. Was it substantially original? 
3. What did it add to their contemporary debate? 
4. What has it added to the longer-term debate? 
5. Does it have any relevance today? 
Some of the theorists included do not satisfy some of the above criteria to the same degree 
as some of those omitted. For example, due to constraints of time and space I have not 
had the opportunity to consider commentators who produced largely unoriginal work but 
who were considered to be leading figures by their contemporaries. Such commentators 
have added little to the longer-term debate in that they have merely re-iterated what 
previous thinkers have said, perhaps in a different and more cogent fashion, but this does 
not add anything to the substance of what was previously said. 
I shall not at this stage deal with the substance of what each theorist said - that will be 
covered in subsequent chapters - except in that it is necessary in order to explain how the 
commentator scores against the above criteria. What I shall concentrate on is what the 
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commentator. has added to the broader debate and what they add to this thesis in terms of 
ideas and solutions to the identified problems. 
Commentators Included Within this Study 
Jean Bodin96 
Bodin has a central part in this thesis: he is the first theorist to be considered and he is the 
last theorist to be mentioned. The reason for this is simple: Bodin's most famous work, 
Six Livres de la Republique (Republique), was one of the first to discuss sovereignty in an 
identifiably "modern" form. Prior to the Republique discussions on sovereignty were 
essentially clerical/religious in nature, emphasising divine influence and authority. 97 Bodin, 
whilst still relying on elements of the traditional clerical notion, emphasised a number of 
the secular aspects of sovereignty. 98 Further, Bodin identified sovereignty as a central 
element in a political system and attempted to analyse what was meant by sovereignty, 
how it could be recognised and where it was located. 
Bodin's work had a considerable impact on his contemporaries, many of them adopted not 
only the nature of sovereignty but also, as a natural consequence, his "modern" approach. 
Many of the theorists considered in this thesis owe a great intellectual debt to Bodin; some 
acknowledge this debt openly99 whilst in some cases it is implicit. '00 
96 See Chapter Two, below at pp. 61-78. 
97 See McRae quote at p. 67. 
98 See Chapter Two, below at p. 67-68. 
9' See Chapter Two, below at p. 107. 
100 See below at pp. 79-84. 
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Although on the cusp of medieval and modern thought Bodin's Republique introduces a 
great many of the principles attached to the modern notion of sovereignty. In this way 
Bodin's Republique represents the ur-text of modern sovereignty. When problems in the 
modern theory are encountered a consideration of how Bodin might have explained them 
is a valuable means of seeking a solution, or at least represents a starting point when 
seeking solutions, to these problems. 
Constitutional lawyers do not refer to Bodin's work and in some cases are unaware of his 
significance to the evolution of sovereignty as a political doctrine. This lack of awareness 
is partly due to the English lawyers' propensity to view 1688 as the starting point for 
discussions of sovereignty. '0' If we are to develop a new theory of sovereignty that is 
capable of explaining the current position we need to move away from this approach and 
look to the broader picture. This should include the work of theorists such as Bodin. 
Bodin's notion of sovereignty is, itself, interesting for another reason: instead of 
portraying sovereign authority as illimitable he accepts that the sovereign operates with 
legally defined boundaries delimiting laws which the sovereign was not empowered to 
alter or abrogate. 1°2 Included within this category of rules, beyond or above the power of 
the sovereign, were rules that affected the very nature of the sovereign103 and some, what 
we may term today inalienable, rights of the citizenry. 
'ol See Chapter Two, below at p. 54 et seq. 102 See Chapter Two, below at p. 71 et seq. 103 See Chapter Two, below, at p. 73. 
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Thus although Bodin appears initially to advocate absolute sovereign power this is a 
simplistic interpretation of what he actually said. Bodin's sovereign was, in fact, 
constrained by laws he could not amend. In addition the sovereign's laws were. 
subordinate to higher order laws1°4 - what we would term higher order legal principles or 
fundamental rights-105 The existence of laws which legally bind the legislature and which 
the legislature cannot itself amend is an idea that has recently been advocated, by T. R. S.. 
-. 
Allan106 and Sir John Laws, 107 in relation to the UK constitution. This fact demonstrates 
that Bodin's work, despite its age, may still be relevant to the questions confronting 
modern theorists. 
James Ilos 
In many ways James is an unusual choice for inclusion in this thesis. Although his beliefs 
formed the bedrock of many absolutist monarchist arguments raised during the 
seventeenth century conflicts he was not original in what he wrote, 109 has not enjoyed 
substantial influence in the field of constitutional law and is not recognised as a 
constitutional theorist. However, James's views on the authority to be vested in a 
sovereign are not wholly dissimilar to those of Dicey. llo James believed that a sovereign 
monarch should be: 
I. able to control all other organs of government; 
2. able to impose his will over that of the other organs of government; and 
3. subject to no legal limitations. "` 
104 See Chapter Two, below at p. 72. 
105 See above at p. 26. 
106 See Chapter Seven below at pp. 425-427. 
107 See above at p. 26. 
108 See Chapter Two, below at p. 79 et seq. 
109 See Chapter Two, below at p. 81. 
110 See Chapter Two, below at p. 61. 
111 See Chapter Two, below at p. 58. 
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There are very clear differences between James and Dicey, not least of which is that Dicey 
identifies Parliament as the absolute sovereign112 and James reserved this status to the 
monarchy (executive). "' However, both are clearly advocating an absolute sovereignty. 
For this reason some of the arguments that were raised in relation to James's model can be 
validly raised in relation to Dicey's model. 
In this way not only are James's views relevant to modern arguments, but so also are the 
counter arguments that were raised in opposition to James's attempts to impose his model 
of government on the other organs of government. The arguments relating to the 
independence of the judiciary and the potential for tyranny should one organ of 
government accrete too much power were present during the seventeenth century have re- 
emerged as relevant to the modern constitutional framework. This is, in the most part, 
due to the constitutional pre-eminence of the Cabinet and the Prime Minister. 
This, in part, justifies the inclusion of Sir Edward Coke who is personally associated with 
many of the arguments ranged against James's model of absolute government. 
Sir Edward Coke'14 
Edward Coke's legal career was chequered. He held many of the highest offices"s and his 
yet his judicial career ended in loss of favour, dismissal and disgrace. He was, 
It` See Chapter Three, below at p. 189 et seq. 113 We should be careful when discussing the nomenclature of the organs of government during James's 
reign as we run the risk of using names which carry great legal and political meaning today, but which 
would have been meaningless to James and his contemporaries. See p. 29 above and Chapter Seven, 
below at pp. 412. 
114 See Chapter Two, below at p. 85 et seq. 
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unquestionably, one of the most important figures in the constitutional conflicts of the 
early seventeenth century. Coke clashed with James I and was a staunch opponent of 
Lord Ellesmere. 116 In clashing with James, Coke played a key role in defining the subject 
matter and principles that were to dominate constitutional conflict throughout the 
seventeenth century. 
Coke's position as a constitutional commentator is difficult to gauge. He did not produce 
a codified work that outlined his view of the constitutional structure and the principles 
that supported it. In order to ascertain Coke's constitutional stance it is necessary to 
consider his Reports. These Reports were a series of case reports,, prepared by Coke 
himself, in which many of the key early seventeenth century constitutional cases are 
reported. Many of these reports were, therefore, subject to Coke's own interpretation and 
bias and, therefore, give an insight into his beliefs. In addition, Coke's Institutes -4 
volumes dealing with aspects of English common law - are a valuable testament to Coke's 
approach to many key issues. These sources are central to our understanding of Coke's 
beliefs. However there are a number of difficulties associated with reliance on these 
works: 
1. They do not give a clear picture of Coke's influence over his contemporaries; 
2. it is not clear how much of what is reported is Coke's interpretation of what happened 
and how much is faithful to the actual facts; 117 and 
3. these sources do not indicate his degree of support for the views they express. 
I' Attorney-General 1594 and Chief Justice of the Common Pleas between 1603 and 1613 and King's 
Bench between 1613 and 1616. 
16 Lord Chancellor. 
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Coke's significance for this thesis lies in what he said regarding the relationships between 
the organs of government inter se. His views come out in a number of high profile cases 
and centre around notions of government constrained by higher order principles of law. ' 8 
In many ways his notions are echoed today in the words of T. R. S. Allan. Thus, Coke's 
formulations may have some relevance to the debate surrounding parliamentary 
sovereignty. 
The most famous of the constitutional cases referred to above is Dr. Bonham's Case"9 - 
which is considered in detail below120 - and the place of Dr. Bonham's Case in the 
evolution of sovereignty theory reflects Coke's influence over the long term debate on 
sovereignty between his active career and modern times. Neither Dr. Bonham's Case in 
particular, nor Coke's works in general, have contributed a significant amount to the 
evolution of constitutional theory over the past 350 years. One of the principal reasons 
for this is the English constitutionalists' attitude towards the Glorious Revolution of 1688 
and their unwillingness to afford precedential value to events that preceded 1688. This 
attitude is short sighted and anti-historical in that it ignores crucial ideas and drivers for 
evolution. Coke's notions can still add something to the modern debate on parliamentary 
sovereignty even though he wrote prior to 1688 for two simple reasons: 
1. that his ideas of higher order law are akin to those ideas of Allan et al and 
2, they provoked responses from many subsequent writers such as Thomas Hobbes. 
1" See Chapter Two, below at p. 85. 18 See below at p. 88. Also see Chapter Two, below at p. 90. 119 8 Co. Rep. 107a. 




Thomas Hobbes was without doubt a brilliant political theorist. '22 His published works 
are replete with original ideas on the structure and purpose of constitutions. One of the 
23 
most famous examples is his notion of sovereignty. 
' 
Hobbes was a contentious figure during his own lifetime. Commentators from all the, 
parties to the political conflicts of the seventeenth century condemned him. 12' It is also 
unclear how influential his ideas were during his own lifetime. Further, Hobbes' theories 
do not, directly, add a great deal to the current debate on the nature of parliamentary 
sovereignty principally due to the obsolescence of the socio-political paradigm he relied 
upon. `u However, his notions of sovereignty and the characteristics of a sovereign body 
have had a profound influence on the development of the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty. This influence has come about because subsequent theorists12' have relied 
heavily on Hobbes' work. 
Hobbes represents an important link between the hybrid medieval/modern ideas of Bodiri 
and the modern positivism of Bentham and Austin. We should be careful not to draw too 
firm a line of similarity between Hobbes and the subsequent theorists because there are 
significant points of divergence in their formulations. '27 However, it is clear that in terms 
121 See Chapter Two, below at p. 103 et seq. 
122 See Chapter Two, below at p. 103. 
123 See Chapter Two, below at p. 111 et seq. 
124 For example, see Chapter Two, below at p. 106. 
125 See Chapter Three, below at p. 143. 
126 See Chapter Three, below at p. 203. 
127 See Chapter Three, below at p. 143. 
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of positivistic ideals the subsequent theorists owed a great intellectual debt to Hobbes and 
held the earlier thinker in great esteem. 123 
In addition, Hobbes' positivism represents an early and clear counter-argument to Coke's 
common law theory. It also prompted Hale to write his Reflections by the Lord Chief 
Justice Hale on Mr. Hobbes his Dialogue of the Lawe. In this work Hale rebuts 
Hobbesian positivism and re-affirms common law theory, albeit in a different form from 
that espoused by Coke. In this way Hobbes is an important figure in the Hegelian 
evolution of theories of sovereignty. 129 It is also possible to see how Hobbes was 
profoundly influenced by the events of his day. 130 Equally, through. a consideration of 
Hobbes' work; we can witness how elements of his theory were shaped by his perception 
of his contemporary political structure. 131 
Sir Matthew Hale 132 
Matthew Hale was acknowledged, both by his contemporaries and by historians, as a great 
common law judge. 133 In addition he has come to be acknowledged as an important legal 
historian who charted the development of the English Common Law. 134 There is, 
however, no evidence that either his contemporaries or subsequent commentators135 
consider Hale to be a great constitutional commentator. 
128 See Chapter Three, below at p. 136. 
''9 See above at p. 6. 
130 See Chapter Two, below at p. 105. 13' See Chapter Two, below at p. 115 et seq. 132 See Chapter Two, below at p. 122. 
"' See Chapter Two, below at p. 122. 134 See Chapter Two, below at p. 124. 13S See Chapter Two, below at p. 123. 
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One of the principle reasons for Hale's lack of standing as a constitutional theorist is that 
some of his most important constitutional works were not published until relatively 
recently. Hale's Reflections by the Lord Chief Justice Hale on Mr. Hobbes his Dialogue 
of the Lawe, his most significant contribution to the debate over the nature of sovereignty, 
was not published until 1921,136 When the contents of this essay are analysed Hale's 
argument appears as a sophisticated and honest adaptation of Bodin's theory to English 
circumstances. Crucially it incorporates the notion of legal limitation imposed by both the 
existence of a legal system itself and by the nature of that legal system. 137 This 
accommodation of limitation is not found in the work of subsequent English 
commentators and therefore Hale's work is sufficiently original to jnerit inclusion in this 
thesis. In addition, Hale's argument is similar to that of Laws138 and Allan139 and, thus, 
apposite to the debates surrounding the modern notion of sovereignty. 
Hale's argument relating to the nature of law and sovereignty was intended to be an 
answer to Hobbes' propositions regarding the nature of the common law. 141 Thus Hale's 
argument forms a clear link in the Hegelian process of theory development. 
Jeremy Bentham 141 
Bentham's inclusion within a thesis on parliamentary sovereignty would, 50 years ago, 
have been considered strange. Bentham has not always been recognised as a significant 
constitutional theorist. 142 His direct contribution to the development of the modern 
Dicean notion of sovereignty has been relatively slight. However, Bentham was 
136 (1921) 39 Law Quarterly Review 296, see Chapter Two, below at p. 126. 
See Chapter Two, below at p. 128. 
See above at pp. 26-28. 
139 See Chapter Seven, below at p. 425-427. 
140 See Chapter Two, below at p. 124. 
141 See Chapter Three, below at p. 141 et seq. 
Page 40 
enormously influential in shaping the ideas of John Austin143 who, in turn, profoundly 
influenced Dicey. 
Bentham's formulations influenced Austin but there were also profound differences 
between them as well. '" It is worth including Bentham in this study in order to assess his 
ideas against those of Austin, for had Bentham's theories formed the foundation of 
parliamentary sovereignty rather than those of Austin the theory might have evolved 
among fundamentally different lines. 
In addition Bentham merits inclusion as the most insightful constitutional commentator of 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Bentham identified a great number of 
the problems that have beset the study of the constitution ever since, for example 
divisibility, limitability and enforcement. Where Bentham identified a problem he often 
proffered a solution that was original and apposite but which was not always fully 
explored. 145 This is particularly so in relation to divided sovereignty, ' limited 
sovereignty147 and enforcement. 148 
Bentham's model of sovereignty is sufficiently different to modern orthodoxy and is, in 
many ways, better able to reconcile unitary sovereign power with the notion of 
government constrained by law than is the traditional Dicean theory. For this reason 
102 See Chapter Three, below at p. 137. 143 See Chapter Three, below at p. 139. 144 See Chapter Three, below at p. 168. 145 See Chapter Three, below, at p. 155. 146 See Chapter Three, below at p. 144. 147 See Chapter Three, below at p. 147. 149 See Chapter Three, below at p. 153. 
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Bentham's theory, like Bodin's theory, could provide a starting point for any re- 
formulation of the modern notions of sovereignty. 
John Austin149 
It is widely acknowledged that John Austin's legal paradigm dominates the field of English 
jurisprudence. '50 It also represents the theoretical basis of Dicey's notion of parliamentary 
sovereignty. ls 1 In this way Austin's work is central not only to the development of 
sovereignty theory but also to the current debate surrounding the continued veracity of the 
Dicean model of sovereignty. This represents the main reason for including Austin in this 
thesis. 
The content of Austin's work is not wholly original, Bentham's formulations were similar 
to those of Austin and both employed the same theoretical model of law: the imperative 
model. Further, there is compelling evidence that not only was Bentham's formulation 
more flexible than Austin's, it could be used to explain constitutional systems that Austin's 
could not, 152 but also that Austin did not understand some of the intricacies of Bentham's 
work153 and did not, therefore, fairly represent Bentham's ideas. 
Austin's ideas represent an important part in the Hegelian development of sovereignty 
theory. There are a number of theorists who clearly influenced the direction Austin's 
work took. Hobbes'54 and Bentham'" were both positive influences over Austin, 
although there were differences between what Hobbes and Austin and Bentham and 
149 See Chapter Three, below, at p. 160 et seq. 
150 See Chapter Three, below at p. 137. 
'S' See Chapter Three, below at p. 188. 
152 See Chapter Three, below at p. 145. 
iss See Chapter Three, below at p. 169. 
134 See Chapter Three, below at p. 168 
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Austin actually said. Blackstone was a negative influence over Austin156 - negative 
influence in this context means someone who provoked a reaction of refutation in the 
subsequent theorist. Equally Austin influenced a number of subsequent theoriits. As 
noted, Dicey owed a great debt to Austin. Austin also figures highly in the works of 
Hart 157 - mainly as a negative influence - and other, modern, English positivists. '" 
Albert Venn Diceyrs9 
As the most celebrated early commentator on the modern constitutional doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty Dicey's inclusion in any discussion of parliamentary sovereignty 
is automatic. Dicey's principles of the rule of law, parliamentary sovereignty and 
constitutional conventions have been the bedrock of most constitutional discussion since 
1885. These three principles are interlocking and inter-dependent and any change in one 
may have profound effects on the others. However due to time and space constraints it is 
only possible, in this thesis, to consider the principle of parliamentary sovereignty. 
Dicey's work forms the background to almost all the theoretical work to emerge this 
century: if the object of a work on sovereignty has not been to support a Dicean approach 
it has, normally, been to debunk Dicey's propositions. Without a detailed understanding 
of Dicey's formulations and the drivers behind his work it is difficult to appreciate the 
arguments advocating an abandonment of Dicean ideals as obsolete. 
iss See Chapter Three, below at p. 169. 156 See Chapter Three, below at p. 142. 15' See Chapter Four, below at p. 231. 15' Raz (1980) 
1 59 See Chapter Three, below at p. 182. 
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In addition to dominating debates on sovereignty since he died, Dicey, as Vinerian 
Professor of Law, was foremost amongst his contemporaries and made a substantial 
contribution to the development of constitutional law during his own lifetime., It is true 
that Dicey's formulations were not particularly novel. 160 However, his articulation, 
although simplistic, 161 was clear and accessible to far more students than any previous 
expression of constitutional law. Further, Dicey, as a prominent university lecturer and 
author of textbooks, influenced the academic development of a huge number of law 
students who were to go on to be judges, lawyers and civil servants. These students 
would be in positions of influence during the early to mid-twentieth century - when the 
modern welfare state was developing - and could only be expectedto employ what they 
had learnt at the feet of Dicey in their shaping of the modern state. 
Although Dicey's model has been subjected to prolonged criticism it still finds support 
from the institutions of government162 - by institutions of government I mean Parliament, 
the executive and the courts - and is specifically protected in modern legislation. 163 
Chapter Seven explores why government institutions protect the Dicean model. 164 The 
alternatives to the Dicean model are considered as the thesis progresses, but they are 
explicitly outlined in Chapters Five, Six and Seven. 
160 See Chapter Three, below at p. 133. 
161 Mount (1992) at p. 58. 
162 See Chapter Four, below at p. 208, and Chapter Sic, below at p. 351 et seq. 
163 See Chapter Six, below at p. 381 et seq. 
164 See Chapter Seven, below at p. 432. 
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Sir William Wade'" 
Sir William Wade has been one of the foremost constitutional theorists of this century. He 
has been publishing works on sovereignty for 50 years and has been the principal modern 
follower of Dicey for this entire time. Wade has endeavoured to adapt Dicey's theory to 
the modern constitutional world. His major work in this endeavour, The Basis of Legal 
Sovereignty, is not only an attempt to relate Dicey's theory to the modern world, but is 
also a direct reply to the theory proposed by the manner and form theorists. '66 Since its 
publication in 1955, The Basis of Legal Sovereignty has been accepted as one of the most 
cogent and forceful refutations of manner and form ideas and the interpretation manner 
and form theorists place on a raft of commonwealth cases. 167 In this way, Wade is not 
only reacting to events in the political arena, 16' but also demonstrates a place in a Hegelian 
dialectic development. 
The Basis of Legal Sovereignty has come to be regarded as a seminal exposition of the 
constitutional reality and has been cited in judicial proceedings169 and parliamentary 
debates170 as setting out the correct constitutional position. From this it is clear that Wade 
has had a profound effect on the contemporary debate surrounding parliamentary 
sovereignty. He has also suggested a possible solution to the difficulties surrounding 
membership of the European Communities and Union. "" It is Wade's detailed 
consideration of legal revolution and how this theory may explain the events surrounding 
165 See Chapter Four, below at p. 223. 
'66 See Chapter Four, below at p. 216. 
167 See Chapter Four, below at p. 249. 
168 See Chapter Four, below at p. 249, and Chapter Six, below at p. 375 et seq. '69 Manuel and Others v. Attorney General [19831 1 Ch. 77 170 See Chapter Five, below at p. 318. 
"' See Chapter Four, below at p. 223, and Chapter Six, below at p. 375 et seq. 
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membership of the communities that represents his most original contribution to the 
debate that forms the subject matter of this thesis. 
In this way, Wade has a bearing on the situation today and should not be omitted from any 
consideration of the constitutional impact of membership of the European Communities. 
In addition, his notion of legal revolution may have an equal bearing on future 
developments emerging out of the new constitutional settlement proposed by the Labour 
government. 
H. LA Hartle 
"H. L. A. Hart was the outstanding English philosopher of law of the twentieth century,,. 173 
Hart is important to this thesis in a number of ways: firstly, he produces a sophisticated 
critique of the Austinian notion of law and sovereignty. 174 Secondly, Hart produced a 
model of law that emphasises the notion of competence to make laws. 17' Thirdly, he 
recognised that constitutional arrangements change and evolve. 176 He also realised that 
these changes need not be "revolutionary" in nature (contra Wade), but may be the 
product of the politico-legal system itself. 
Although still a positivist, Hart produced a theoretical model that could be- applied to the 
UK system. This model enjoys a sophistication lacking in the early English positivists. 177 
It is capable of answering many of the problems that confound earlier models. In addition 
172 See Chapter Four, below at p. 23 1. 
MacCormick (1993) at p. 337. 
174 See Chapter Four, below at p. 231. 
175 See Chapter Four, below at p. 233. 
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to this, Hart produces a logically compelling solution to the reflexive question of self- 
reference and future limitation. 178 For these reasons Härt's formulations present a possible 
explanation for the current developments and, therefore, merit consideration in this thesis. 
Alf Ross'" 
Alf Ross may appear to be yet another odd inclusion. He is included for a very specific 
reason. Ross addresses one of the central tenets of positivist sovereignty: according to 
logic a sovereign body cannot, through self-reference, limit its future actions. 18' This 
logical argument has been present in positivist formulations of sovereignty since Bodin. '81 
11 
The logical impossibility of self-limitation appears to support Dice}i's propositions. 
However Ross purports to solve this "problem" through logical arguments and through 
reference to actual political practice. 182 The logic of Ross's, original, solution is 
compelling and from a constitutional law perspective it certainly allows for evolution. 
This evolution is similar in fashion to Hart's rule of change183 and the manner and form 
theorists' approach to how principles of constitutional law may develop. 184 
Ross has not proved to be an important figure in the debates surrounding the UK notion 
of parliamentary sovereignty. Ross is not referred to, other than in passing, in the major 
works addressing the current UK situation and his ideas are not advanced as a solution to 
16 See Chapter Four, below at p. 237. 
'" See Chapter Three, below. 
"s See Chapter Four, below at p. 239. 
"' See Chapter Four, below at p. 226 . O F 
UNIVERS 
OF BRISTOL tso See Chapter Four, below at p. 228. LIBRARY 
See Chapter Two, below at p. 69. 'sZ See Chapter Four, below at p. 231. WILLS UL 's' See Chapter Four, below at p. 238. 184 See Chapter Four, below at p. 220. 
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the wider issues surrounding parliamentary sovereignty. In addition, Ross's solution does 
not accommodate the notions of Laws'85 and T. R. S. Allan186 that higher order law, law 
that it cannot itself be amended, limits a sovereign. For this reason Ross's solution only 
really works as a patch for the positivist notions of law and may have limited use in the 
constitutional structure of the future where a model emphasising inalienable rights of 
people - both human and socio-economic - may evolve. 
The Theorists Omitted from this Study 
There are a number of candidates for inclusion in a study on sovereignty who did not meet 
my'criteria for actual consideration and who have, therefore been ömitted. Those figures 
that are on the borderline of inclusion include Locke, Montesquieu and Blackstone. I 
have excluded these theorists because I do not have the space to consider their arguments 
and because I feel they have contributed least to the development of the doctrine of 
sovereignty in the United Kingdom. 
Locke 
Locke's major practical contributions to the development of constitutional theory in 
Britain were his brilliant defence of the Glorious Revolution, 18' his "systematic refutation 
of absolutism""' and his contribution to the question of state legitimacy. However, 
Locke's approach, based around the notions of natural justice, equality and freedom, '19 
has a more obvious bearing on the development of the, American Constitution, "' and the 
Iss See above at pp. 26-28. 
186 See Chapter Seven, below at p. 425-427. 
1$' O'Connor (1952) at pp. 205-206, Lane (1996) at p. 31. 
188 Dunn (1969) at p. 48. 
189 Locke (1962) at p. 164. 
190 See Becker (1942) at p. 8. 
Page 48 
principles underpinning it, than it does on the British constitution. The fundamental 
principle underpinning Locke's political philosophy is contractarianism: people agree to a 
limitation of their natural rights in order to derive the benefits of belonging to ä modern 
society"' - for example increased protection for other rights. 
192 This notion is akin to 
Hobbes' contractarian formulation, and a consideration of Locke's variant would not add 
anything to the debate on the evolution of the theory of sovereignty. The strongest 
argument in favour of including Locke is that "the Lockean state is an apparatus of law, 
and its institution may be compared with H. L. A. Hart's conjecture about the creation of 
legal system in The Concept of Law. s193 Although there are similarities between the two 
works, Locke betrays his medieval background when he attributes the highest adjudicative 
power to Parliament. Because of this Locke did not feel obliged, contra his Whig 
contemporaries, to emphasise the independence of the judiciary whom he considered a 
part of the executive branch of government. 194 Another major aspect of Locke's theory 
which would be interesting to consider is his idea of the right of revolution, where the 
government fails to fulfil its legal duty and the authority the individuals vested in the 
government reverts to the individuals. The significance of this idea is that it partly explains 
the issue of legal revolution, 19' allowing for fundamental changes in the personnel as well 
as the system of government. Locke employs the notion of a trust in order to explain this 
notion. The idea is that once the terms of the trust are breached the trust is void and the 
authority given under its terms reverts to the issuer. 196 
191 For a detailed consideration of Locke's use of Contract Theory see Waldron (1994). 192 Lane (1996) at p. 37. 
193 Parry (1978) at p. 112-113. 1 94 Parry (1978) at p. 114. 19 51 See Chapter Four below, at p. 229 and p. 237. X96 Parry (1978) at pp. 139-140. See Locke (1884) at pp. 301-320. 
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It is clear that Locke was intending to create a system where tyranny was not possible, 
particularly tyranny along the lines of the Stuart monarchs, 
197 and arbitrary government 
was avoided. 198 Locke's work was an explicit answer to Filmer's Tory patriarchalism. '99 
What is ironic is that the body Locke viewed as the dominant constitutional organ, 
Parliament, came to exert an absolutism that he would have ardently opposed. Had 
Locke's doctrine been more widely accepted and proved to be as influential as Hobbes' 
came to be, then the nature of our constitutional settlement might be very different to 
what it is today. Unfortunately that did not happen. Locke's arguments, with his reliance 
on the notion of limitation and government within the boundaries of the law20° and 
legitimate revolution, did not accord with the notions of imperative. law that were to 
evolve. As a result, his influence over the development of sovereignty theory has been 
limited. It is for this reason that I am excluding him. It would, as a future project, be 
interesting to compare his notions with those of Hobbes and subsequent theorists and 
emphasise such lines of continuation and divergences as exist between Locke and modem 
positivists such as Hart. 
Blackstone 
The second British figure omitted is Sir William Blackstone. Blackstone is viewed as one 
of the last great "common law" lawyers; his Commentaries on the Laws of England20' is 
invaluable in providing a source of information about Common Law Theory and principles 
and the structure of early English law. However, he contributed very little original thought 
to the subject matter of constitutional law. Blackstone's pronouncements on the nature of 
19' See Locke (1884) at 258-259, on govemment by extemporary decrees, and at p. 296. 
198 Locke (1884) at p. 263. 
19' Dunn (1969) at pp. 44,48. 
200 Locke (1884) Chapter XI at p. 260 et seq. 
201 Published between 1765 and 1769. 
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the constitution and the principles underpinning it are mostly derived from earlier 
theorists, particularly Coke202 and Bracton and rely on an essentially "old fashioned" sense 
of the meaning of constitution. Blackstone employed a Lockean abhorrence of 
absolutism203 and he advocated a balanced constitution of checks and balances to achieve 
this aim. Blackstone's viewv s on the balanced nature of the constitution are reminiscent of 
the Common Law notions of Coke. 204 This view reflected the age in which Blackstone 
wrote; it was a "stagnant age"205 where the traditional social structure had not been 
revolutionised by the industrial revolution and the king still enjoyed a central constitutional 
position. The massive social and constitutional developments that occurred during the 
nineteenth century were still 50 years off and the Commentaries reflect this stability of 
practice by praising it as appropriate and ideal. In addition it appears that Blackstone was 
not attempting to formulate new jurisprudence, he "intended to teach English law to 
laymen. "236 As a result of this the Commentaries are descriptive and not prescriptive or 
censorial in approach. As there is little originality in Blackstone's work I believe that his 
contribution to the debate may be presented as a compiler of other people's ideas. This 
does not warrant Blackstone's inclusion in this thesis. Such an inclusion would constrain 
consideration of theorists who present more original and significant contributions to the 
evolution of theories of sovereignty. One final word about Blackstone is that his work 
does form part of the background to the emergence of early positivism/analytical 
jurisprudence, although again Blackstone merely articulated the notions which primed 
Bentham et al, he was not responsible for their formulation. 207 
20' Hanbury(1950) at pp. 321-322. `03 Hanbury (1956) at p. 321. 
204 See Chapter Two, below at p. 86. 205 Haribury (1950) at p. 320. 
206 Hanbury (1950) at p. 321. 
207 See Chapter Three, below at pp. 141-142. 
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Montesquieu 
Montesquieu, in his De L'Esprit de Lois208 articulated the now famous theory. -of the 
separation of powers. This notion is intimately concerned with constitutional structures 
and the division of constitutional functions amongst the organs of government and, 
ultimately, with legal sovereignty. Although this theory has formed the subject matter of 
an on-going debate concerning the nature of the British constitution, '" his model has been 
far more significant in the development of continental European, civil law, constitutional 
systems than Anglo-Saxon, common law, constitutional systems. 21° Its influence over 
developments in the Anglo-Saxon legal world has been greater in the USA, than in the 
UK. This is mostly due to the existence, in the USA, of a rigid separation of powers 
protected by the terms of the Constitution. Although the issue of the separation of powers 
is significant to the question of the sovereignty of parliament, and the issue of preventing 
arbitrary government, Montesquieu's influence over the development of theories of 
sovereignty in the United Kingdom is limited. Montesquieu followed Locke in his 
opposition to arbitrary government. However, Montesquieu attributed a wider function to 
the judiciary than did Locke. Montesquieu burdened the judiciary with the responsibility 
for protecting liberty. 211 Although he based much of his formulation on his observations 
of the British constitution, there is a strong argument that he misportrayed what he 
observed. Montesquieu arguably presented the British constitution as more democratic 
208 Published in 1748. 
209 The applicability of the doctrine of the separation of powers to the United Kingdom constitution has 
been the subject matter in numerous academic texts, for a representative view of the nature of the debate 
see: Hood-Phillips (1977); Munro. (1981); Barendt (1990); de Smith (1966). 
210 Lane (1996) at pp. 36. 
211 Shklar (1987) at p. 88. 
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than it was212 and due to his own standing, saw feudalism as'a fine oak' rather than an 
inhibition on constitutional and democratic evolution. 213 
r .. 
Again detailed analysis of Montesquieu's influence on the UK constitutional settlement 
and the notion of sovereignty would be an interesting component to subsequent research, 
but must, on the grounds of space and time, be excluded from this study. 
I will now consider the genesis of the "modern" notion of sovereignty, and then proceed 
to consider how it has developed into the contemporary principle of parliamentary 
sovereignty. 
212 Shklar (1987) at pp. 88-89. 
213 Shklar (1987) at pp. 114-115. 
Page 53 
Chapter Two - Seventeenth 
Century Background to Revolution and 
Conditions for Change 
Significance of the Seventeenth Century to English Constitutional Law 
Introduction 
Undoubtedly: 
The years between 1603 and 1714 were perhaps the most decisive in English history... 
[and] during the seventeenth century modern English'society and a modern state began 
to take shape. ' 
The early years in this era witnessed an unprecedented level of conflict between the organs of 
English government: the Crown, Parliament and the Courts. Although this tripartite struggle 
did not explicitly address the notion of sovereignty, the key issues cöncerned the 
governmental function of the various organs, their power, authority and relationship inter Se. 2 
It is important to note that there was not a single issue in this struggle, but rather a number of 
matters, many of which would not be considered to be constitutionally significant today, 
which intimately concerned the interests of the protagonists of the era. 
Salmond represents the traditional legal historian's Whig perspective of seventeenth century 
conflicts when he states: 
... the seventeenth century ... struggle which arose over the respective rights of the 
component parts of this composite Sovereign was settled de facto by a civil war and 
a revolution which negatived any right of legislation claimed for the Crown and 
placed the judiciary in a position of independence. 3 
In a sense this is true, but it is wise not to overstate the significance of the Civil War and the 
events surrounding 1688. For example, the view that "the principle [of Parliamentary 
Hill (1961) at p. 1. 
` Alloff (1979) at p. 86. 
3 Salmond (1966) at p. 166. 
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Sovereignty] was established as a judicial rule as a consequence of the Glorious Revolution 
and subsequent Bill of Rights of 1689"4 is not only unfounded, but employs concepts and 
language which would have been alien to the theorists and protagonists of the era. Fazal's 
view that "the Glorious Revolution of 1688 might have begun the process of political 
supremacy of the House of Commons but it did not establish the unalterable sovereignty of 
the King in Parliament whose legal authority can be traced much further back... "s is far more 
sustainable in the light of the evidence, and recognises the evolution of notions of government 
before, during and after 1688. 
Sommerville asserts that 
Before Civil War broke out in 1642 English political thought was provincial, hide- 
bound and unphilosophical. One major reason for this was the dominance of Sir 
Edward Coke's theory of the ancient constitution. However when war came, 
Englishmen were freed not only from press censorship and from the king's authority, 
but also from the shackles of the intellectual past. A new extremely fertile period of 
political thinking dawned in England. Coke's ideas, although they survived, lost their 
former hold. For the first time rationalism entered political debate. Men were no 
longer willing to accept that an institution or practice should continue simply because 
it was old immemorial, or because it formed part of some mythical ancient 
constitution. ... Political philosophy was born, and with it began the era of political 
debate. ' 
Again this view is simplistic. Prior to 1642 innumerable writers, many of whom were 
expressly concerned with the basis of the political state and the nature of the legal system 
which supported it, were publishing major political works. One has only to look at Smith' 
Norton (1982) at p. 134. 
Fazal (1974) at p. 303. 
6 Sommerville (1986) at p. 249. 7 Sir Thomas Smith De Rupublica Anglorum, written in 1565 and published in 1583. 
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and Bracton. $ Additionally many of Coke's pre-revolution ideas survived, 
for example the 
independence of the judiciary. 
The Whig interpretation of this period's history down plays the significance of pre"Civil War 
and Revolution history, other than as precursory events leading to the drama of the middle 
and late years. This approach is flawed. Russell comments on this fact stating: 
the study of English Parliamentary history of the years 1604-1629 has been so 
dominated by the knowledge that it preceded a Civil War that it is dangerously easy to 
treat it as a mere preface, and not as a story in its own right. It is dangerously easy to 
believe, because the story ended with Parliament in a position to challenge the King 
for supremacy that it was bound to end in this way, and that it was the direction in 
which most of the evidence points. 9 
For this reason it is frequently forgotten that the early years of the seventeenth century were 
dominated as much by a conflict between the Crown and the judiciary, as by the conflicts 
between the Crown and Parliament. This struggle between Crown and Judiciary addressed 
more than judicial independence; it also concerned the constitutional function of the judiciary 
'° and their ability to control executive constitutional function. 
According to the traditional historical interpretations of the period in question Sir Edward 
Coke dominated the judiciary. The conflict between the Crown and the judiciary (often in the 
form of Coke himself) is particularly interesting to this thesis because it represents a conflict 
of doctrine concerning the nature of sovereignty - where sovereignty means the positioning of 
the supreme power in the state, the nature of the relationship between the various organs of 
government and the location of powers of legislative interpretation. It is, perhaps, the only 
Bracton De legibus et Consuetudinib us Angliae published c. 1270. 
Russell (1976) at p. 1. 
10 See below at p. 90. 
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instance where two of the organs of government have expressed fundamentally different 
notions of sovereignty. This conflict was not as long lived, or as well commented on, as that 
between Parliament and the Crown, for, as Aylmer states: 
Coke's dismissal in 1616 ... marks the end of any 
kind of three cornered constitutional 
debates: that is between Crown, Parliament, and Common Law. From then on, Coke's 
attempt to erect the common law into a kind of independent `third force' collapsed. 
Common lawyers either supported the Crown, or they tended to work with the 
parliamentary opposition, as Coke himself did. Further sackings of judges, who 
showed excessive independence - another Chief Justice in 1626 a third in 1634, and 
the suspension of the senior Exchequer judge in 1629 - only, underline this fact. 
Lawyers had to choose one way or the other and those who stayed in the government 
conformed rather more nearly, though not perhaps completely, to Bacon's ideal of 
lions under the throne. " 
This interpretation is contrary to the Whig interpretation that emphasised the alliance between 
common lawyers and Parliament. The reality is that 
Ignoring the Petition of Rights, [the judiciary] retreated on a judicial practice that had 
long preceded Coke, and would out-live him. In a series of judgements beginning in 
1630 with Eliot's habeas corpus and culminating in 1637 with R v. Hamden, they 
consistently found in favour of the King in all doubtful issues on Common law. 12 
In short "the judges declined to accept the role envisaged for them by Coke, of independent 
arbiters between King and Parliament. " 13 Common lawyers obviously had a hand in such 
parliamentary opposition as the Petition of Rights, clearly a document framed by lawyers (it 
uses legal language, conforms to a legal format and relies on legal justifications), whilst later 
documents such as the Grand Remonstrance do not. In the latter document the language is 
overtly `political', the argument is obviously not legal and reflects the opposition's 
abandonment of common law justifications for opposition to the Crown. 
" Aylmer (1963) at p. 56. 
12 Kenyon (1977) at p. 71. 
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Common lawyers viewed the common law courts as the protectors of the ancient 
constitution, but as the seventeenth century progressed it became clear that "the age of the 
Tudors and of the Reformation had ... carried 
[political] practice far ahead of political 
theory ... 
"14 Politico-legal theory relied on notions of the Ancient Constitution, whilst the 
political reality had moved beyond such arrangements. This Ancient Constitution was 
founded on medieval belief in a harmony of powers, an essentially religious conception 
emphasising an organic relationship between the organs of government with no individual 
organ delegating power to any other. Instead, each possessed an inherent authority and 
constitutional function with a strictly delineated area of competenct's Notions of sovereignty 
relied on by James I and, later, Hobbes, that were derived from Bodin's work, explicitly 
challenged this notion of the `Ancient Constitution. Our work, as constitutional historians, is 
to explain this process and consider its impact on subsequent developments. In order to do 
this we must consider the background to the emergence of the English notions of sovereignty. 
Background to Conflict 
The governmental structure inherited by James I was greatly different to that inherited by 
Henry VIII. Although 
The Tudors are celebrated for increasing the power of the Crown; [in fact] their 
period ended with the sovereignty lying not in the King, but in the King in Parliament. 
Aiming at despotism, they fostered parliamentary monarchy; for in the task of breaking 
feudal nobility, expelling the papacy, mastering the Church, and generally extending 
the authority of the throne into the remote corners of the Kingdom the Tudors needed 
the co-operation of the rest of the nation through its leaders the gentry. 16 
13 Kenyon (1977) at p. 7 1. 
Plucknett (1956) at p. 48. 
s Sabine and Thorson (1973) at pp. 415-416. 
16 Williams (1965) at p. 36. 
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The Tudors are often portrayed as successful in comparison to the Stuarts, 
however they 
were responsible for the politico-legal system which the Stuarts inherited and which proved to 
be so prone to conflict. Stone commenting on this, notes that "the Elizabethan political 
support, financial resources, military and administrative power, social cohesion, legal 
subordination, religious unity, [and] control of propaganda, appears to be shot through with 
contradiction and weaknesses. "17 Although the Stuart kings are portrayed as high-handed and 
absolutist, the Tudor monarchs had been equally high-handed1s but had, perhaps, enjoyed the 
service of more capable advisers and supporters. 
A subtle shift had occurred during the Tudor era: Parliament, although still subservient to the 
monarchy - depending upon monarchical acceptance for its continued existence - was 
emerging as a political force founded on the monarch's need for supply. The political 
significance of this is that, 
by the close of the Tudor period members of Parliament, especially those in the House 
of Commons, were very conscious of the role of Parliament in the nation state; and it 
was precisely at this moment that the classes supplying the membership of the 
Commons found themselves in serious disagreement with the Crown on policies of 
great concern to them. '9 
The disagreements between King and Parliament that dominated the seventeenth century did 
not centre on the relative benefits of monarchical or democratic government. The various 
protagonists did not have to deal with "the problems of Divine Right or Parliament 
Sovereignty but with practical problems, the relationships inter se of the major institutions of 
government. s20 
1' Stone (1972) at p. 67. 
l$ Pollock (1961b) at p. 202. 
19 Covell (1962) at p. 282. 
20 Jennings (1959) at p. 157. 
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A changing socio-economic situation and a rising mercantile middle class, demanding 
political, financial and religious rights previously denied them, led to the emergence of "new 
ideas" which posed a challenge to the traditional balance in the constitution. 2' The result was 
a number of small conflicts. Picturing these conflicts as a linear progression towards armed 
insurrection and Revolution is a misportrayal. Members of Parliament no longer wished to 
adhere to the constraints imposed upon them under the Tudor reign; n rather they sought to 
assert themselves in the fields of finance and religion. We should not lose sight of the fact that 
between 1604 and 1610, although there were confrontations between the Crown and 
Parliament, "the king could usually get his way with Parliament if he set his mind to it (and if 
he stayed in London). "23 Further the Crown did not lose a major constitutional case, before 
the courts. 24 
21 Sabine and Thorson (1973) at p. 415. 
22 Covell (1962) at p. 288. 
a Kenyon (1977) at p. 23. Stone (1972) at p. 71. 




Although I am principally interested in the theory of sovereignty in the British context, and 
am looking at events starting in the seventeenth century, I wish to consider, first, the ideas of 
a sixteenth century Frenchman: Jean Bodin. Bodin lived between 1529/30 and 1596 and 
wrote in the context of the contemporary French political situation. However, his work 
forms part of the background theory to the work of James I, Hobbes and Hale. The maturest 
manifestation of Bodin's political philosophy is located in his Six Livres de la Republique25 
(Republique). It is necessary to add that 
to read Bodin's Republic is a far from easy thing to do. He was, apparently, incapable 
of grouping his facts or arranging his arguments in any tolerable order. The plan of the 
book is so confused that one sometimes wonders in reading it, what he thought it was 
all about. 26 
This is not surprising given that there was little understanding of theoretical methodology, 
that the subject matter of the work was poorly understood and that the circumstances 
prompting Bodin to write were, themselves, confused and confusing. 
Despite the obvious deficiencies of the Republique it exerted considerable influence over 
subsequent English thinkers - Mcllwain states "In the period from 1600 to the outbreak of 
civil war there is no political writer cited in England more often or more favourably than Jean 
Bodini27 - and started to do so almost immediately after its publication. 28 
'S Published in 1576, first translated into English in 1606 by Richard Knowlles. 
`6 Allen (1926) at p. 44. 
27 Mcllwain (1950) at p. 2. 
23 C. K. Allen (1958) at p. 250. Mosse (1948) at pp. 75-76. 
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This is not to say that Bodin was the fons et origo of English conceptions of sovereignty, as 
Shepherd claims: 29 for, as King observes, it would be "absurd" to suggest 
that the theory of sovereignty has an objectively specifiable origin as opposed to an 
arbitrarily specifiable origin at all. In the end sovereignty is only a word indicating the 
supremacy of some person or group over others, which logically and by extension may 
imply that no similar supremacy is held by still others over this person or group... 30 
This is important as 
England had already approached a concept of sovereignty before the Republique was 
written ... 
during the sixteenth century we witnessed the growth of the King in 
Parliament as the central pivot of the constitution in which the power to make rules 
was vested; and Christopher St Germain could write in the realm of Henry VIII that `it 
cannot be thought that a statute that is made by the authority of the whole realm will 
recite anything against the truth'. Sir Thomas Smith published his De Republica 
Anglorum in the same year Bodin's Methodus was completed, 1566, and in Smith's 
work we have a setting forth, though as yet not the concise formulation of the King in 
Parliament - the culmination of the whole century of Tudor constitutional thought. 31 
I would add that Smith's comments on the constitutional position and role of Parliament do 
not, necessarily, relate to a sovereign parliament; it is arguable that Smith, like Coke after 
him, was discussing Parliament in its role as the highest court in the land. Smith did not view 
Parliament as a sovereign legislature, or. as the genesis of such a body; such a notion was 
beyond his sixteenth century understanding of the constitution. 
Although it is widely accepted that Bodin influenced English political thought, "the channels 
through which his influence passed into English thought are as yet poorly understood. 2132 
'9 Shepherd (1930) at p. 585. 
30 King (1974) at pp. 52-53. 
31 Mosse (1948) at p. 74. 
32 Mosse (1948) at p. 73. 
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Clearly, such eminent theorists as James I, Hobbes and Sir Robert Filmer relied heavily on 
Bodian conceptions. For example, a consideration of Filmer's work demonstrates that the 
Frenchman profoundly affected him: Filmer published The Necessity of The Absolute Power 
of the King of England By Jean Bodin which cites entire sections of Bodin's Republique. 33 
Similarly James I copied elements of Bodin's work, periodically word for word, and implied 
from Bodin's work a theory of absolutism. Hobbes, despite disagreeing with some of what 
Bodin's ideas, relied upon the Frenchman's work to underpin a lot of his theories. 34 1 should 
say that these comparisons do not mean that I believe Filmer and James I to be as insightful 
and original commentators as Bodin and Hobbes, for they were not, but it does demonstrate 
Bodin's long term impact over the development of English political, thought. There were, 
also, however, significant differences between the subsequent English thinkers and Bodin's 
earlier formulations. 33 
Background to Bodin's Work 
Bodin formulated his ideas in the context of an unstable France that was recovering from a 
series of damaging civil wars, and was locked in a bitter and bloody internal religious 
struggle. Bodin observed the situation to be akin to that of a ship of rocked by a violent 
tempest, and in imminent danger of foundering altogether. As a result of this Bodin became 
"concerned with and frightened by the prospect of civil war. i36 As J. W. Allen observes 
Bodin saw France disorganised by faction and increasingly disordered. On all sides 
irreconcilable views were being expressed as to the nature of the French monarchy, the 
nature of political authority, and the duty of subjects. Bodin set himself to deal with 
" Filmer 1949) at p. 315. 
34 See below at p. 107. 
'S See below at p. 74. 
36 King (1974) at p. 161. 
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every aspect of the problem; and all the questions debated in France at the time 
received personal answers in his Republic. 
37 
Although he has been described as an absolutist, and despite his obvious monarchist 
tendencies, Bodin was not uncritical of the actions and structure of the French governmental 
system. The Republique was, in part, to advance ideas for specific reforms. 38 Events such as 
the St Bartholomew massacre were to profoundly affect Bodin's perspective and prompt him 
to call for toleration and government according to the law. 
During the period in which Bodin wrote, although there was disquiet within France and 
dissatisfaction with aspects of government policy, there existed an established and `mature` 
constitution. Within this constitutional framework there were certain laws, deemed by almost 
all constitutional commentators to be fundamental, and as such binding upon the monarch. As 
McRae notes 
Bodin whilst striving for a logically consistent theory was even more interested in 
having one that was consonant with the actual constitutional structure. Since the 
fundamental laws were so generally accepted, he could not ignore them altogether, but 
he could - and did - restrict them as much as a firmly established constitutional 
tradition would permit. 39 
Bodin's theorising was not, therefore, unbounded, he felt that in order to solve the problems 
of France and restore stability "agreement should be reached on fundamental questions": 40 his 
political theorising was to have a practical application. In this way Bodin's notion of 
11 J. W. Allen (1926) at p. 45. 
38 J. W. Allen (1926) at p. 43. 
39 McRae (1962) at p. A17. 
ao JW Allen (1926) at p. 45. 
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sovereignty was intrinsically linked to his conception of social structure, and his own view of 
the raison d'etre of `the state. 41 
This demonstrates a clear example of a theorist using the political reality to structure a theory 
explaining the "nature of political authority". Bodin was striving to "find some principle of 
order and unity that should reconcile liberty and subjection, define political obligation, and 
satisfy conscience and reason. In his doctrine of sovereignty he imagined he had found what 
was needed. "3Z Whilst doing this Bodin sought to ground his theory in the political system as 
it existed in France. Bodin's intention to create a theory that was not only logically 
consistent, but that also reflected reality, comes out from what he says concerning the Salic 
law and the rules governing taxation. As McRae notes, the broad changes in society required 
broad developments in theory that did actually occur and are, at a general level, obvious from 
what was. written. However, it is difficult to demonstrate clear and specific links between 
political occurrences and what Bodin wrote. This difficulty arises because of the passage of 
time, the complex political situation that existed when Bodin wrote and the lack of unbiased 
sources. To produce a work that addresses these difficulties would require a great deal more 
time and space than is currently available. 
Bodin's Notion of Sovereignty 
Significantly, Bodin did not attempt to create a justification for the existence of the state. 
This is important because it may explain why Bodin could approach sovereignty in a freer 
41 J. W. Allen (1926) at p. 45. 
42 J. W. Allen (1926) at P. 46. 
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fashion than could Hobbes. 43 Bodin, unlike Hobbes, accepted that society was a natural state 
for mankind, " and did not, therefore, have to rely on theories of original contract. Hobbes, 
however, needed to explain how and why man came to be in a state of society and escaped 
from the state of nature. 5 
To describe Bodin's notion of sovereignty in isolation is to "present it in a form in which it 
did not exist in his own mind. "46 However, to do otherwise would require more space than is 
available here. I shall consider his ideas in a context he might understand, but may on 
occasions, through space and time constraints, be forced to stray out of these bounds. 
Bodin states: "Majesty or Sovereignty is the most high, absolute, and perpetual power over 
the citizens and subjects in a Commonwealth. s47 However, his definition has a much wider 
aspect demonstrating its character as background theory: his notion of sovereignty is intrinsic 
to his definition of a commonwealth. Through stating that sovereignty is the "principal and 
most necessary point for the understanding of the nature of a Commonwealth"4 Bodin 
demonstrates his appreciation of the significance the sovereign plays in the notion of 
statehood. Without a sovereign there could be no state structure. In asserting this Bodin was 
breaking new ground, and moving the notion of the state into a form recognisable as 
'modem, 749 and distinct from medieval conceptions of government and statehood. 
Regarding the nature of sovereign power Bodin writes: 
°' See below at p. 71 (Bodin) and p. 118 (Hobbes). 
44 Lewis (1968) at p. 211. 
as Lewis (1968) at p. 208. 
46 J. W. Allen (1926) at p. 60. 
47 Bodin (1962) at p. 84. 
48 Bodin (1962) at p. 84. 
49 J. W. Allen (1926) at p. 59. 
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this power ought to be perpetual, for that it may be, that absolute power over 
the 
subjects may be given to one or many, for a short or certain time, which expired, they 
are no more than subjects themselves: so that whilst they are in their puissant 
authority, they cannot call themselves Sovereign princes, seeing that they are 
but men 
put in trust, and keepers of this sovereign power, until it shall please the people or the 
prince that gave it them to recall it; who always remained seized thereof. 
5° 
Bodin lists nine major marks of sovereigntys' that all sovereigns should possess. However he 
observes that it is the "power to give laws to all his subjects in general, and to every one of 
them in particular, ... without consent of any other greater, equal, or 
less than himself... " that 
is the "chief mark of a sovereign prince. "52 Hobbes echoes this assertion. 53 Elaborating on 
this point, Bodin asserts that 
under this same sovereignty of powers for the giving and abrogating of the law, are 
comprised all the other rights and marks of sovereignty: so that (to speak properly) a 
man may say, that there is but this only mark of sovereign power considering that all 
other the rights thereof are contained in this. 54 
This is a truly great step in the development of sovereignty theory, as McRae recognises, for 
although 
analysis of political supremacy was a common topic of sixteenth century French 
lawyers [a]lmost inevitably they described it in terms of the traditional prerogatives of 
the Crown, a collection of rights of various kinds which might vary not only from state 
to state but even from one French province to another. Bodin was the first to 
emphasise - and only in the Republique for the A'fethodus still approaches the question 
of authority in traditional fashion - that the most fundamental of these rights was the 
power to make laws. " 
50 Bodin (1962) at p. 84. How Bodin would have addressed the idea of a representative democracy is outside 
the scope of this thesis. 
51 Listed in Bodin (1962) between pp. 159 and 177. 
52 Bodin (1962) at p. 159. 
53 See below at p. 111. 
sa Bodin (1962) at p. 161. 
55 McRae (1962) at p. A14, also Shepherd (1930) at p. 585. 
Page 67 
McRae continues to explain why this approach resembles modern political thought: 
In medieval thought the ruler's judicial and administrative functions were more 
important than his role as a legislator. His law making function was hampered and 
to and restricted by the widespread view that all man-made law is supplementary 
consonant with the higher laws of God and nature (see the views of Sir Edward Coke 
for a good example of this in the English system]. Further the concept of social change 
was. virtually absent from medieval thought, but in the sixteenth century, when society 
was changing visibly and rapidly, it was vitally important for the ruler to be able to 
devise new laws to meet rapidly changing situations. The political thought of Bodin 
and others recognises and attempts to meet this need. 56 
In this way Bodin played an important part in sovereignty adopting a secular character and 
emerging as a weapon against clericalism. 
57 
Thus, Bodin believed the sovereign should be perpetual, vested with specific powers and 
absolute. His constitutional model is obviously sovereign-centric. 
Bodin's insistence that the sovereign is "absolute" has led to confusion over what he meant, 
the. Latin version of Republique uses the term "potestas legibus solutd' rather than "puissance 
absolue" which appears in the French version. The latter term is not clearly explored by 
Bodin, and it has been suggested that he did not fully understand, in his own mind, what he 
was discussing. The Latin describes more clearly that 
absolute authority means that the laws of his country do not bind the sovereign, 
whether enacted by himself or by his predecessors. It will easily be seen that this 
freedom from existing law was logically necessary in order to safeguard the main 
56 McRae (1962) at p. A14. 
s' Lewis (1968) at pp. 207-208. also Shepherd (1930) at p. 582. 
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i 
characteristic of sovereignty, the unlimited power of the sovereign to make new laws, 
or to make exceptions to old ones, as he alone saw fit. SB 
This conception is founded on the view that the sovereign is God's representative on Earth. 
Bodin clearly states "nothing upon Earth is greater or higher, next unto God, than the majesty 
of kings and sovereign princes; for they are in sort created his lieutenants for the welfare of 
other men. "59 From this he deduces that 
as the great sovereign God cannot make another God equal unto himself, considering 
that he is of infinite power and greatness, and that there cannot be two infinite things, 
as is by natural demonstrations manifest: so also may we say, that the prince whom we 
have set down as the image of God, cannot make a subject equal unto himself6°. 
This argument is ostensibly the same as that employed by subsequent thinkers - most 
significantly, for this thesis, James I and Thomas Hobbes61 - and is essentially a Medieval 
clerical ideal. It is worth noting that Bodin's mathematical assumptions regarding infinity are 
open to question in the light of developing modern mathematical theory. 62 
As there cannot, according to Bodin, be two sovereign powers in the same system the 
subordinate governmental institutions cannot claim any degree of sovereign power if they are 
subject to oversight by any other body. In this way Bodin `demonstrates' that magistrates 
must be subordinate to a sovereign power. 63 This approach fails to take account of certain 
historical counter-examples, 64 nor does it acknowledge the possibility of divided sovereignty 
along the lines suggested by Bentham, it does not consider the idea that there can be a single 
S$ McRae (1962) at p. A15. 
59 Bodin (1962) at p. 153. 
60 Bodin (1962) at p. 155. 
61 See below at p. 80 (James 1) and p. 115 (Hobbes). 
62 Singh (1997) at p. 100-103. 
63 Bodin (1962) at pp. 154-155. 
64 See Chapter Three, below at p. 147. 
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sovereign, which is constituted by a number of a bodies all vested with different sovereign 
responsibilities. 65 
This view significantly impacts upon the notions of judge-made law. Obviously, from what 
Bodin has said, the judiciary could not be considered to be sovereign legislators, and as these 
sovereigns are the only bodies vested with the authority to make laws applicable to the 
generality of the population the position of customary law must be questioned. Bodin 
expressly addresses these issues stating: 
some man may say, that not only the magistrates have power to make edicts and laws, 
every one according to his authority and jurisdiction, but also that particular men make 
customs, both general and particular. Which customs have almost the force of laws, 
and yet depend not on the judgement or power of the sovereign prince, who as he is 
master of the law, so are particular men masters of, the customs. Whereunto I answer, 
that custom by little and little take force; and in many years by the common consent of 
all or most part; but the law comes forth in a moment and takes strength of him which 
has power to command all; customs creep in sweetly and without force, whereas the 
law is commanded and published with power, yes and oftentimes contrary to the good 
liking of the subjects. ... Moreover the power of the law is much greater than the 
power of custom: for customs are by laws abolished, but not laws by customs; it being 
always in the authority and power of the magistrate to put in execution such laws as 
are by custom almost out of use. ... 
in brief custom hath no force but by sufferance, 
and so long as it pleases the sovereign prince, who may make thereof a law, by putting 
thereunto his own confirmation: whereby it is to be seen, that all the force of laws and 
customs lies in the power of him that has the sovereignty in a Commonwealth. 66 
65 See Chapter Three, below at pp. 153-155. 
66 Bodin (1962) at pp. 161-162. 
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This view would have been anathema to the English common lawyers. 
67 Through its 
inclusion, Bodin further evidences his `modern' approach to the notion of sovereignty. As 
Lewis notes 
The fundamental importance of Bodin's work to political and legal theorists becomes 
apparent once it is understood that the chief difference between the modem and 
contemporary world of law on the one hand and the ancient and medieval systems on 
the other is the modern emphasis on legislation rather than custom as the chief source 
of law. For as long as law was thought of primarily in terms of custom the question of 
authority was not a pressing one; the nature and function of the maker of law hardly 
arose .... 
When legislation becomes the core of a legal system, however, the situation changes 
radically. For legislation is `that source of law which consists in the declaration of legal 
rules by a competent authority'; and with its use there arise the questions as to what 
constitutes authority and what if any limitations are to be put upon it. 68 
Thus, as France was addressing essentially `modern' problems, 69 so its theorists were forced 
to adopt increasingly modern explanations. Bodin was on the cusp of the transition. He was 
wrestling with `modern' ideas, but his theories were still founded on, -`and steeped in, certain 
medieval conceptions: for example the notion that the human sovereign was a reflection of 
the divine sovereign. 
Limited Sovereignty 
Regarding the nature of sovereign power, Bodin asserts that laws made by a predecessor 
cannot bind a successor, that no sovereign may bind himself, 7° that sovereignty may not be 
limited in "power, charge, or time certain, '971 and that 
67 See below at pp. 88-89. 
68 Lewis (1968) at p. 208. 
69 See McRae above at p. 64. 70 Bodin (1962) at pp. 93-94. 
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as they which lend or pawn unto, another their goods, remain still the lords and owners 
thereof: so it is with them, who give unto others power and authority to judge and 
command, be it for a certain time limited, or so great and long time as shall please 
them; they themselves nevertheless continuing still seized of the power and 
jurisdiction, which the other exercise but by way of loan or borrowing... . 
72 
All of these principles are well known to, and accepted by, modern English constitutional 
theory. As Bodin continues, however, elements unknown to, or rather disavowed by, 
subsequent English theorists and lawyers appear. Bodin states, that 
what if a prince by law forbid to kill or steal,, is he not bound to obey his own laws? I 
say that this law is not his, but the law of God and nature, whereunto all princes are 
more strictly bound than their subjects: in such sort as that they cannot be from the 
same exempted, either by Senate, or the people, but that they must be enforced to 
make their appearance before the tribunal seat of almighty God: For God takes a 
straighter account of princes than of others, as the master of wisdom Salomon himself 
has most truly written. '' 
Regarding "the laws of God and nature" Bodin states: 
all princes and people of the world are unto them subject: neither is it in their power to 
impugn them, if will not be guilty of high treason to the divine majesty, making war 
against God; under the greatness of whom all monarchs of the world ought to bear the 
yoke, and to bow their heads in all fear and reverence. Wherefore in that we said the 
sovereign power in a Commonwealth to be free from all laws, concerns nothing the 
laws of God and nature. 74 
This line of thinking is akin to that of the English common lawyers and their assertions on the 
nature of the common law, and demonstrates that Bodin accepted the existence of a priori 
limitations on the sovereign's actions. This exemplifies Bodin's struggle to reconcile his 
medieval beliefs with essentially `modern' positivist ideas concerning law making and 
`legislation'. It is worth noting that this aspect of Bodin's theory bears similarities to Laws' 
" Bodin (1962) at p. 85. 
72 Bodin (1962) at p. 85. 
73 Bodin (1962) at p. 104. 
7' Bodin (1962) at p. 92. 
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arguments, regarding fundamental higher order rights that are beyond the reach of the 
5 and those of T. R. S. Allan. legislature, 7 76 
An interesting but inadequately answered question remains over Bodin's conception of 
natural and divine law: how can such laws be enforced? J. W. Allen states that it is "quite 
clear that [Bodin] views the obligations of the sovereign to obey Natural Law as in no sense a 
legal obligation. There can be no lawful means of compelling the sovereign to obey Divine 
Law. "" Bodin asserts that the magistrate must refuse to obey a sovereign's orders if they 
conflict with natural or divine law, and the magistrate must then be willing to accept the 
consequences. As J. W. Allen acknowledges: 
what consequences could there be? How is the recalcitrant to be punished? An 
order for his punishment would be manifestly unjust, and all would be bound to ignore 
it. Ideally, on the principle laid down by Bodin, an order of the sovereign seen by all 
to be iniquitous could not be carried into effect, nor would punishment for 
disobedience be practically possible, if all did their duty. There is no ground whatever 
for supposing that Bodin would have sought to escape from this conclusion. No more 
than medieval believers in Natural Law, could Bodin believe in a sovereignty strictly 
unlimited. '$ 
Bodin's conception of sovereignty recognised "leges imperir"', or fundamental laws, which by 
their very nature were outside the control of the sovereign. 79 This recognition was based upon 
Bodin's observations of the French constitution where such laws were visibly in place. Bodin 
defines these laws as those "which concern the state of the realm, and the establishing 
thereof; "80 this definition would not appear out of place in interpretations of many modern 
`constitutions'. It could be construed as recognition that sovereigns derive their authority 
'5 See Chapter One. above at pp. 26-23. 
'6 See Chapter Seven, below at pp. 425-427. " J. W. Allen (1926) at p. 54. 78 J. W. Allen (1926) at p. 55. 79 Bodin cites, as an example, the Salic law governing the inheritance of sovereign power in France. Bodin 
(1962) at p. 95, cf Austin (1954) at p. 260. 30 Bodin (1962) at p. 95. 
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from the existence and structure of a defined system of government81- a view applicable to 
many "rigid" constitutions. Bodin elaborates on this point stating, of these fundamental laws, 
"forasmuch as they are annexed and united to the crown, the prince cannot derogate from 
them ...... 
82 The implication is that the office of `prince' is intrinsically linked to these 
fundamental laws and that it would be illogical if he were unilaterally able to change his own 
nature, which was, after all, decreed prior to the incumbent obtaining the position. 83 Bodin 
clearly views the sovereign and sovereignty as existing independent of each other. 
The British Treatment of Bodin's Thesis 
Bodin's ideas undoubtedly exerted influence over subsequent English theorists. Mosse 
recognises: "there can be little doubt that between 1581 and 1606 when Knowlles translated 
the Republique, Bodin's definition of sovereignty had become almost a fact of English 
political thought. v984 However, of all the theorists who discussed the nature of sovereignty, 
and applied it to an English setting, perhaps the one who was closest to Bodin's true theory 
was Matthew Hale. 85 There have been a number of other, faithful, followers. People such as 
Eliot in his De Jure Majestas made frequent references to Bodin and accepted his ideas of 
limitation; Whitelocke made an attempt to incorporate Bodin's ideas within the English 
context and succeeded in including the notion of limitations on the exercise of sovereign 
power. Unfortunately these commentators have not been included within the ranks of great 
constitutional theorists and, as a result, their ideas and interpretations have not been accorded 
the status they deserve. Consideration of Hobbes, Filmer and James I reveal a different 
$ý See T. R. S. Allan's ideas in Chapter Seven below, at pp. 425-427. 
82 Bodin (1962) at p. 94. 
$3 McRae (1962) at p. A17, see T. R. S. Allan's argument in Chapter Seven, below at pp. 425-427 84 Mosse (1958) at p. 82. 
$s See below at p. 128. 
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picture. These later and more theoretically significant figures have accepted much of Bodin's 
work, but have ignored his notion of limitation. 
The key question when considering Bodin's place in the history of English thought, and 
central to this thesis, is: why did the element of limitation fall out of Bodin's theory? Mosse 
explains: 
At first Bodin's definition was rendered faithfully in all essentials; later the element of 
a positive natural law dropped out. The reason for this development is [that]: Bodin's 
idea of sovereignty was assimilated with English conditions and English problems. 
Growth of Parliamentary power in the sixteenth century cut across the barrier of the 
old natural law protecting the people's goods against any kind of arbitrary 
interference. 86 
This may be placing too much significance on the development of parliamentary power 37 and 
ignores Hale's work, but there is certainly truth in it. Aspects of Bodin's theory were dropped 
where it failed to support a specific argument. Importantly this includes the elements of 
limitation, which Hobbes and Filmer ignored completely, 88 or rejected as a contradictio in 
adjecto. 89 Even early writers, such as Raleigh, can be seen to have relied on Bodian notions 
whilst omitting the element of limitation. 90 
Modern approaches emphasise that 
Bodin ends in spite of his' apparent concessions and seeming surrenders, with a strong 
affirmation of the supreme authority of the secular sovereign. There are many things, it 
86 Mosse (1958) at p. 82. 
" See Chapter One, above at p. 16. as Mosse (1958) at p. 79-80. 89 Mcllwain (1938) at p. 72. 
90 Mosse (1948) at pp. 77-50. 
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is true, which the sovereign power ought not do.... But if it does any of these things 
which it ought not do, there is no earthly power capable of calling it to account. 91 
This view has been questioned. Adams-Shepherd regards this approach as an 
"oversimplification", and "untenable". Adams-Shepherd continues to explain that this 
interpretation allows Hobbes's view to be equated with that of Bodin. Adams-Shepherd 
explains that this equation distorts what Bodin said and explains why Hobbes fails to 
adequately address the question of realistic limitations upon the authority of the sovereign. 
Hearnshaw's language is founded in the `ought', but Bodin is more forthright: the tenor of 
Bodin's language is `cannot', implying concrete limitations. 
Hearnshaw's approach is, historically, typical of the English treatment of Bodin and 
encapsulates the manner in which Bodin's work has come to form the background to 
subsequent theorists. However, these subsequent theorists have been guilty of misinterpreting 
what Bodin said and have been too willing to accept a simplistic approach because it accords 
with their ideals and does not therefore require difficult explanations. A process emerges 
whereby later interpreters come to rely upon previous interpretations that have been accepted 
as "definitive" despite manifest weaknesses that are only apparent through careful textual, 
bibliographical and contextual analysis. Thus, previous interpretations colour later 
interpretations despite the latter being vested with more sophisticated methods of analysis. In 
this way a misconception is perpetuated, reflecting the process criticised by Bagley? 
91 Hearnshaw (1924) at pp. 124-125. 
''` See Chapter One above at p. 13. 
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Problems Inherent within Bodin's Theory 
There are some very obvious omissions in Bodin's work. One of the foremost the foremost of 
these is recognised by McRae, who states: 
any theory of political supremacy which could bring about the results desired of 
it 
required a minimum framework of law or custom to determine such questions as the 
location of sovereignty, the nature of sovereignty, and perhaps even the procedure by 
which its will would be expressed93. But Bodin carefully avoids the vexing question of 
who, in turn, is to control or alter this framework. 
94 
According to English common lawyers this task falls to the courts - in many ways it is the 
courts that actively fulfil this role today. 95 However, in a system where the sovereign 
represents the last forum of appeal and there is no legally defined separation of functions or 
powers or where one constitutional organ controls all the others, it Would be difficult to 
locate such a power anywhere except in the sovereign's own good will, self-imposed 
limitations96 and internal limitations. 
Bodin also fails to consider the ramifications of a collegiate sovereign body, for example, how 
do we determine what constitutes a definitive expression of the sovereign's will? 91 However, 
as this is essentially a modern problem and would not be apparent to a sixteenth century 
theorist who has not experienced such a body and who may not even adequately imagine such 
a system, it would be harsh to criticise Bodin for this omission. 
Subsequent English theorists have struggled with the problems of enforcement and collegiate 
will. They have had far more experience than Bodin to draw upon, but they too have failed to 
93 This is not an uncommon omission. See Chapter Three below for a discussion of more theorists grappling 
with this question. 
94 McRae (1962) at p. A17. 
95 See Chapter One, above at p. 26. 
96 See Chapter Three, below at p. 182 et seq. 
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produce persuasive solutions. Had these theorists desisted in treating Bodin as a positivist in 
the Austinian model98 and acknowledged that, to Bodin, the content of some law was as 
important as it source" they might have been able to create a more flexible constitutional 
theory. Shepherd explains that: 
Bodin thought of sovereignty... as a definite legal competence or complex of legal 
prerogatives, limited in its nature [not] as unlimited, arbitrary and legally 
unconstrained and undefined power to command subjects at will [and] it is 
unfortunate that Bodin gives us so little information about this important 
matter, but at any rate the limitations on the French sovereign involved in the Salic 
law and the law against alienation of the domain pertaining to the state seems 
inescapable. 100 
It has often been mooted that Bodin formed the first element in a lineal progression that 
continued through Hobbes to Austin, "' but this view should now be reconsidered. 102 In order 
to do this we need to consider what these subsequent theorists said and why they 'said it. 
9' See above at p. 76. 
98 Lewis (1968) at p. 214. 
" Lewis (1968) at p. 216. 
'0° Shepherd (1930) at p. 588, emphasis added. 
101 Lewis (1968) at p. 214 for a review of the literature. 




In order to fully understand the constitutional conflicts of early seventeenth century England, 
it is necessary to consider the ideological beliefs of James I for they provide the backdrop for 
much of the conflict. James' notion of the constitutional structure was informed and 
dominated by his understanding of monarchy. Despite the teachings of George Buchanan, 
James's childhood tutor, James never accepted the constitutionalism favoured by the Scottish 
Presbyterian Kirk as the natural arrangement of government. '03 With the arrival of Signeur 
d'Aubigny, Emissary of Henry III of France, a `new' constitutional doctrine seized James's 
imagination: "To the son of Mary Stuart the absolutist ideas current, at the Court of Henry III 
were far more congenial than the constitutionalism preached by the Scottish Calvinists. " 104 
The French court was aware of, and affected by Bodin's theory of state and sovereignty, and 
these notions profoundly affected the young King of Scotland: 
A copy of [Bodin's] Six Livres de la Republique was included in the library of the 
young King of Scots as early as 1577, and the influence which it exercised upon him 
is attested by many similarities both of ideas and phraseology in James's own political 
writings. The parallel is, indeed, so striking as to suggest that James took over bodily 
from Bodin his conception of sovereignty and made it the basis of his whole ideal of 
government. 
'05 
It is easy to incorrectly attribute meaning and influence to James's works and beliefs. 
Historically the "wisest fool in Christendom" has received a bad press and "justice has seldom 
been done to James, whether as statesman or as a thinker. " 106 His ideas on the structure of 
Government and the ideal relationship between the organs involved in government were, 
03 Chown (1926) at pp. 109-110. 
104 Chown (1926) at p. 110. 
105 Chown (1926) at p. 111. For example compare the language used by Bodin above at pp. 48-49 with that 
used by James below at p. 60. 106 Chown (1926) at p. 105. 
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however, to profoundly affect the development of the English constitution both positively and 
negatively throughout the seventeenth century. 
Backdrop to Constitutional Conflict 
James I believed 
The state of monarchy is the supremest thing upon Earth: for kings are not only God's 
lieutenants upon Earth and sit upon God's throne, but even by God himself they are 
called gods a King is truly Parens patriae, the politic father of his people. Kings are 
justly called gods for that they exercise a manner or resemblance of divine power upon 
earth, for if you will consider the attributes to God you shall see how they agree in the 
person of a king. God hath power to create or destroy, make or unmake, at his 
pleasure; to give life or send death, to judge all and to be judged accountable by none; 
to raise low things and to make high things low at his pleasure; and to God are both 
soul and body due. And the like power have kings: they make and unmake their 
subjects; they have power of raising and casting down; of life, and of death, judges 
over all their subjects, and in all causes, and yet accountable to none but God only..... 
And to the king is due both the affection of the soul and the service of the body of his 
subjects. To dispute what God may do is blasphemy so it is seditious in subjects to 
dispute what a king may do in the height of his power I will not be content that my 
power is disputed upon; but I shall ever be willing to make the reason appear of all my 
doings and rule my actions according to my laws. 1°7 
In James' eyes the monarchy was the dominant element in Government. As Knafla puts it: 
King James defined his prerogative to rule as absolute and he believed that all the 
institutions of government and the law existed solely by his grace. Even though he 
accepted the proposition of governing in partnership with the Privy Council, 
Parliament and the courts of law, he spoke continually of his exalted role. 1°8 
107 Prothero (1913) at p. 294. 
°ß Knafla (1977) at p. 65. 
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In this way James's view of monarchy is similar to Austin's notion of sovereign power, and 
the role Dicey attributed to Parliament. 1'9 James' view of monarchy was based on the 
conception of the "Divine Right of Kings". The origins of this ideology are found in 
Scripture, although it underwent radical changes to become the doctrine espoused by James. 
It was dominated by the idea of passive obedience being owed, by the populace, to the king. 
This was no a new argument; it was, however, given new impetus by the "disunity and 
instability inherent in [the] sectarian partisanship" of the sixteenth century. "" Despite the fact 
that "The divine right of kings in this new form was essentially a popular theory, it never 
received, and indeed was incapable of receiving, a philosophical formulation". Its importance, 
if quantified by its number of adherents, "compares favourably withzany political idea that 
ever existed, for it was believed with religious intensity by men of all social ranks and all 
forms of theological belief'. " It is, perhaps, ironic that the notion of the Divine Right of 
Kings originally derived from an assertion of secular authority over the clerical claims of 
absolute power. It is easy to see how James's notion of the Divine Right of Kings evolved 
from his attempt to break free from the claims of the Scottish Kirk. 
In 1598, James published The Law of Free Monarchies [Free Monarchies] which laid out his 
notion of the divine right of kings. Although, 
In common with all James' literary works, [Free Monarchies] contained little that was 
original, [it] was a particularly decisive and pithy restatement of current theory 
regarding the Divine Right of kings and their absolute legal sovereignty, their 
untrammelled freedom of executive action, [and] their sole responsibility to God. 112 
109 See Chapter Three, below at pp. 187-189. 110 Sabine and Thorson (1973) at p. 365. `" Sabine and Thorson (1973) at p. 365. 112 Kenyon (1977) at p. 35. 
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In addition, as Sabine and Thorson note, "this book reflected the unhappy experiences of 
James' family and his own youth with the Scottish Calvinists, as well as his reading of the 
controversial works produced by the religious wars in France. 1#113 In this way Free 
Monarchies displays some of the influences over James' ideological beliefs and the policies he 
based upon them. In this work James set down his ideas on kingship; they encapsulated the 
notion of monarchical absolutism. James "asserted that kings existed before there were 
estates or ranks of men, before parliaments were held or laws made, and that even property in 
land existed only by the grant of the king. "114 He concludes "And so it follows of necessity, 
that kings were the authors and makers of the laws, and not the laws of the kings. ""' 
The constitutional structure that James envisaged was not robust enough to evolve in order to 
encompass the situation that existed on his ascending the throne of England let alone any 
developments that were to occur during his reign. The Parliament at Westminster and the 
English judiciary were possessed of authority and ambition. James' believed that his 
monarchical authority was above theirs and the conflicts that arose out of his attempts to 
impose his will was to dominate his relationship with these other organs of government. 
James, The Crown and the other Organs of Government 
James' attitude towards Parliament is encapsulated in a letter he sent to the Speaker of his 
Third Parliament, where he claimed that Parliament 
Hath emboldened some fiery and popular spirits of some of the House of Commons to 
argue and debate publicly of matters far above their reach and capacity, tending to our 
high dishonour and breach of prerogative royal. These are therefore to command you 
113 Sabine and Thorson (1973) at p. 367 - for example Bodin's Republique. 
110 Sabine and Thorson (1973) at p. 368. 
115 James I at p. 62. 
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to make known in our name unto the House that none therein shall presume 
henceforth to meddle with anything concerning our Govemment or deep matters of 
state. 
116 
In the light of the emerging role of parliament, as an organ of grievance articulation, this 
stance was prone to provoke an aggressive positioning by parliament. Similarly James' 
attitude towards the judiciary, that he was the Supreme Judge and "inferior judges his 
shadows and ministers and the King may, if he please, sit and judge in Westminster Hall in 
any court there, and call their judgements into question. The King beinge the author of the 
lawe is the interpreter of the Lawe, i117 was likely to be controversial. Although ardent 
monarchists viewed James' statements as an "embodiment of the principle of personal 
monarchy, ""' to common law judges it represented an unwelcome intrusion into their domain 
and a challenge to the ancient constitution. 
The king's relationship with the courts formed the focus of early seventeenth century 
constitutional conflicts. The issue concerned the Court of Chancery and became associated in 
many minds with the growing trend towards royal absolutism. The Court of Chancery was 
often depicted as the highest, absolute court of a king who had highflying notions about the 
nature of his supremacy, and propagandists for a pure common law system attacked the 
Chancery as part of their political programme in opposition to the King. "' James accepted 
Bacon's view of the Court of Chancery as "The court of your Majesty's absolute power", and 
stated: 
As kings borrow their power from God, so judges from kings; and as kings are to 
account to God, so judges unto God and kings; and as no king can discharge his 
16 Cited in Tanner (1928) at p. 48. 
Cited in Holdsworth (1932) p. 428. "$ Plucknett (1956) at p. 192. 
19 Knafla (1977) at p. 162. 
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account to God unless he make conscience not to alter, but to declare and establish the 
will of God, so judges cannot discharge their accounts to kings unless they take the 
like care, not to take upon them to make law, but joined together after a deliberate 
consultation, to declare what the law is. For as kings are subject unto God's law, so 
they to man's law. It is the king's office to protect and settle the true interpretation of 
the law of God within his dominions, and it is the judges' office to interpret the law of 
the king, whereto themselves are also subject. 120 
From this we may extrapolate a clear picture of James' notion of sovereignty: it involved a 
specific relationship between the law maker and law interpreter with real power, not merely 
of making laws, but of final adjudication on meaning being vested in the monarch. Although 
he adopts a number of Bodian concepts, such as monarchical dominance of the constitutional 
arrangement, James clearly objected to the notion of a legally, limited sovereign power. James 
denied the legitimacy of any claim, by any other organ of government, to any form of review 
over the actions of the sovereign. The powers James ascribes to the absolute sovereign (for 
him the monarch) are akin, although located within a less sophisticated theory, to those 
subsequent ascribed by Hobbes to his sovereign121 and are similar to those exercised by the 
modern British executive. 
120 Kenyon (1977) at p. 84. 
' `' See below at p. 111. 
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Sir Edward Coke 
Introduction 
The traditional view of Sir Edward Coke is of an outstanding common lawyer who, as a 
judge, stood up to the absolutist policies of James I in the name of freedom and civil liberties 
and who was, following his dismissal from judicial office in 1616, a leader of opposition to 
the monarchy in the House of Commons. " The reality may be less idyllic. Pawlisch notes: 
Among contemporaries, Coke's place as a jurist seems to have been less influential 
than many modern historians assume. Sir Francis Bacon, ... spoke slightingly of 
Coke's Reports and cautioned readers that there were "many peremptory and extra 
judicial resolutions more than are warranted".... Lord Chancellor Ellesmere, in his 
Observations upon the Lord Coke's Reports, provided a more devastating critique of 
the corpus of Coke's work and summarised the Reports as "sunt mala, sunt quaedum 
mediocria, sunt bona plura". He then went on to warn that Coke, "in order to serve 
his own conceits", deliberately misrepresented judgement to establish his own views 
touching the decision of the court. It seems, therefore, that even among 
contemporaries Coke did not possess the inviolable authority depicted by many 
modern historians. " 
Both Bacon and Ellesmere were Coke's political opponents and their formulations would, 
undoubtedly, be coloured by this fact. However, much of what Coke wrote is inconsistent. "-"' 
Upon close examination, Coke's entire career appears to be a contradiction: as Elizabeth's 
Attorney General, his principal role was to defend and uphold the scope and application of 
the monarchical prerogative, and yet as Chief Justice, first of Common Pleas, and then King's 
Bench, he proved to be one of its fiercest critics. A simple explanation for these apparent 
Kenyon (1977) at p. 87. 
'23 Pawlisch (1980) at p. 694. 
124 Bowen (1957) at p. 252. 
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contradictions is that as situations change, so do most individuals, '' and as Bowen states 
"Stuart England was not Tudor England. 11126 
It may seem strange to us, today, that a senior judicial figure could assume such an overtly 
political role. 127 However, such a view would be a blatant importation of modern ideals and 
understanding into an unnatural context. Holdsworth explains: 
in the seventeenth century a great common lawyer was necessarily drawn into politics. 
What was to be the position of the common law in relation to. its rivals? What was to 
be the position of the common law in relation to executive government of the state? 
What were the doctrines of common law as to the powers of Parliament and as to the 
liberties of the subjects? At a time when such questions as these were being raised, a 
man who was both profoundly learned in the common law and passionately convinced 
of its excellence was compelled to take part in politics in order to defend its claims to 
supremacy. "" 
Coke and Common Law Theory 
Coke's name is associated with many of the principles underlying the common law structure; 
his Reports and Institutes are seen as providing an almost definite record of and explanation 
for these principles. However, just as his significance within his own lifetime may be 
overstated so it is possible to exaggerate his importance in the formulation of common law 
theory. In a clear example of this, Stephen's Commentaries state: 
the victory of Parliament in the great constitutional struggle of the seventeenth century 
ultimately gave full effect to certain doctrines of the common law which are associated 
with the name of Chief Justice Coke. Thus: (a) although the King may by his 
t25 Holdsworth (1932) at p. 456; Holdsworth (1935) at p. 336. 
1`6 Bowen (1957) at p. 253. 
127 See Chapter One, above at p. 22, but cf p. 26. 
"'$ Holdsworth (1932) at p. 456. 
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proclamation call attention to the existing law and warn his subjects not to transgress 
it, yet he cannot create any new offence or in any way change the law without the 
consent of Parliament; (b) the King in his own person cannot adjudge any case; and (c) 
the King cannot by his own prerogative establish any new court to administer any but 
the common law. '' 
The tenor of this passage is that Coke was either the formulator of, or most ardent 
campaigner for, these principles. The reality is that they existed, as principles, prior to Coke. 
As Pocock notes: 
The belief in the ancient constitution rested on assumptions which were fundamental 
to the practice of the common law, and it had very great influence in a society whose 
political and social thinking were so largely dominated by this one law. It cannot 
therefore be regarded as the creation of any single mind. "' 
What Coke did do was "summarise it and make it authoritative. ""' 
Coke's approach to almost all political and legal events he was to encounter was governed by 
his reverence for, and underlying belief in the supremacy of, the common law. It is the key to 
unravelling Coke's thinking and inconsistency. Postema explains what is commonly 
understood by common law theory, and how it evolved: 
Common Law theory arose, in part, in response to the threat of centralised power 
exercised by those who proposed to make law guided by nothing but their own 
assessments of the demands of justice, expediency, and the common good. Against 
the spreading ideology of political absolutism and rationalism, Common Law theory 
reasserted the medieval idea that law is not something made either by King, Parliament 
or judges, but rather is the expression of a deeper reality that is merely discovered and 
publicly declared by them. It sought to portray legislators and judges as "not so much 
the creators of the law as the agents through whom it finds expression". But Common 
Law theory gave this medieval doctrine a distinctly historical twist. For the deeper 
129 Stephen (1950) at p. 296. 130 Pocock (1957) at p. 38. 
Page 87 
reality manifested in the public statutes and judicial decisions was not a set of universal 
rational principles, but rather historically evidenced national custom. i12 
Central to this, and crucially important to Coke, was the idea that "the governmental 
institutions were created by the common law and therefore their powers were derived from 
it. to l33 
Central to notions of common law was the idea that it was from time that "all human laws 
receive their highest strength, honour and estimation. """ Sir John Davies explains that 
customary law is the most perfect and most excellent, and without comparison the 
best, to make and preserve a commonwealth. For the unwritten laws which are made 
either by the Edicts of Princes, or by Councils of Estates, are. imposed upon the 
subject before any Triall or probation made, whether the same be fit and agreeable to 
the nature and disposition of the people, or whether they will breed any inconvenience 
or no. But a custome doth never become a law to bind the people, until it hath been 
tried and approved time out of mind, during all which time there did thereby arise no 
inconvenience: for if it had been found inconvenient at any time, it had been used no 
longer, but had been interrupted, and consequently it had lost the virtue and force of a 
law. 135 
Coke, himself, stated 
we are but of yesterday, (and therefore have need of the wisdom of those that were 
before us) and had been ignorant (if we had not received light and knowledge from 
our forefathers) and our days upon the earth are but as a shadow in respect of the 
ancient days and times past, wherein the laws have been by the wisdom of the most 
excellent men, in many successions of ages, by long and continual experience, (the 
trial of light and truth) fined and refined, which no man, (being so short a time) albeit 
he had in his head the wisdom of all the men in the world, in any one age could ever 
-- -------- -- 
131 Pocock (1957) at p. 38. 
132 Posteraa (1986) at p. 3-4. 
1" Winterton (1976) at p. 591. A view more recently expressed by the manner and form theorists, see Chapter 
Four, below at p. 216. 
134 Sir Thomas Hedley quoted in Somerville (1986) at p. 90. 
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have effected or attained unto. And therefore it is optima regula, qua nulla est verlor 
auf fermoir injure, neminem oportet esse sapientiorem legibus: no man ought to take 
it on himself to be wiser than the laws. 16 
This approach is clearly contrary to Bodin's. 137 Bodin was moving away from custom as a 
basis for the law, whilst common lawyers insisted on its importance. The common lawyers' 
insistence on historical founding and precedent presented them with a quandary: 
when new problems arose - and changes in economic life and society in the Sixteenth 
and Seventeenth Centuries made these plentiful - they had to be dealt with by analogy 
with or development from past judgements. To argue from medieval precedent to 
seventeenth century reality was not easy; often there was no real precedent, and 
lawyers had to burrow into the ancient records for something which could serve their 
purpose, which explains their pre-occupation with law and law books of the middle 
ages and the far-fetched arguments which they used. 1311 
This, in part, explains the charges of inconsistency levelled against Coke for he, like other 
common lawyers, "regarded the past as being, in a legal sense, ever present, so that medieval 
judgements and statutes could be applied to their own day without any awareness of the 
differences between earlier societies and the one in which they lived. ""9 Coke used the 
existing authorities, on occasions twisting their meanings, in order to apply them to the issues 
confronting him. This practice occasionally created inconsistencies with what he had 
previously asserted and explains why, today, it can be difficult to clearly determine Coke's 
ideological standpoint, particularly over the nature of the constitution. 
Coke and James I 
The central feature of Coke's constitutional theory is that the organs of government derive 
their authority from the common law. He believed, like Bracton, that 
135 Sir John Davis quoted in Pocock (1957) at p. 33. Contrast with Bodin, above at p. 70. 136 Calvin's Case Co. Re. 7 at p. 3. "' See above at pp. 69-70. 
138 Ives (1968) at p. 117. 
139 Lockyer (1989) at p. 40-4 1. 
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1 
The King must not be under man but under God and the law, because law makes the 
King. Let [the King] temper his power by law, which is the bridle of power likewise 
nothing is so appropriate to empire as to live according to the laws, and to submit the 
princedom to law is greater than empire. "' 
This was anathema to James. 
There were a number of occasions where open conflict between Coke and James occurred. 
Many of these open conflicts centred on the crucial questions of judicial function and the 
existence of unconstrained law making power. When considered in this fashion, it is possible 
to relate what was said, in the course of these 'conflicts', to the debates which have raged 
since, and, indeed, exist today. I 
An illustration of the conflict over the King's constitutional function is represented in the 
Prohibitions del Ra. 141 The case centred on the question of whether the King had the power 
and authority to "take what Causes he shall please to Determine, from the Determination of 
the Judges, and may determine them himself. """ Archbishop Bancroft asserted, "that this was 
clear in Divinity, that such Authority belongs to the King by the Word of God in the 
Scripture. " Coke replied: 
In the Presence, and with the clear Consent of all the Justices of England, and Barons 
of the Exchequer, that the King in his own person cannot adjudge any case, either 
criminal as Treason, Felony etc. or betwixt Party and Party, concerning his 
Inheritance, Chattels, or Goods, etc. but this ought to be determined and adjudged in 
some Court of Justice, according to the Law and Custom of England, and always 
"0 Bracton (1854) at f. 5b. 
141 12 Co. Rep. 64. 





judgements are given, Iden confideratum est per curiam, so that the Court gives the 
judgement. "' 
The conclusion of the matter, according to Coke, was that: 
The King said that he thought the law was founded upon reason, and that he and 
others had reason, as well as the judges: to which it was answered by me, that true it 
was, that God had endowered his Majesty with excellent science, and great 
endowments of nature; but his majesty was not learned in the laws of his realm of 
England, and causes which concern the life, or inheritance or goods, or fortunes of his 
subjects are not to be decided by natural reason but by the artificial reason and 
judgement of law, which law is an act which requires long study and experience, 
before a man can attain to the cognisance of it; and that the law was the golden 
Metwand and Measure to try causes of the Subjects, which protected the King in 
safety and peace: with which the King was greatly offended, -and said that then he 
should be under the law, which was treason to affirm (as he said). To which I said 
that Bracton saith, Quod Rex non debet esse sub homine, set sub Deo et Lege. "" 
Coke's view is supported by Fortescue's statement: "My Prince you will better pronounce 
judgements in the courts by others than in person, it belong not customary for the Kings of 
England to sit in court or pronounce judgement themselves. """ Fortescue explained this 
statement thus: "I know very well the quickness of your apprehension and the forwardness of 
your parts; but for that expertness in the laws which is requisite for the judges the studies of 
twenty years. o1146 
There are a number of observations to be made here; Coke marries a practical reason - lack of 
experience - with a theoretical notion of natural reason and supports it all with observations 
made during the sixteenth century. Coke's account ends with his citation of Bracton, there is 
143 12 Co. Rep. at p. 63-64. 144 
12 Co. Rep. at p. 65. 
14$ Fortescue (1825) at c. 8. 
146 Fortescue (1825) at c. 8. 
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no indication of the eventual outcome, and it is implied that Coke 'bearded the King. "°' This 
latter view is unsustainable in the light of other accounts of the meeting: John Hercy in a 
letter to the Earl of Shrewsbury states that if Cecil (the then Lord Treasurer) "had not 
interposed'to pacify his Majesty' it would have gone hard, with Coke. " Sir Rafe Boswell in a 
letter to Dr. Nilborne mentions the intervention of Cecil on behalf of Coke and describes 
James as being in a terrible rage, not merely offended but "offering to strike" Coke. '48 Usher 
asserts that: 
the account Coke provides is less reliable than the other three accounts of the same 
meeting; he intimates that although the statement in the Twelfth Reports is based on 
truth, it is unlikely that James would have entertained a discussion on this matter for 
the length of time Coke suggests the conversation lasted. 
Usher continues, maintaining 
that the actual dialogue was composed at a later date when Coke was attempting to 
support his assertion through the use of precedents which he had the time to look up, 
and that it had occurred to Coke whilst writing this that the king could not legally 
arrest a man in person and that he then included precedents to this effect to support 
`his somewhat vague precedent in the matter of sitting in the courts of justice. 1149 
Coke portrays himself as master of English law, and defender of citizens' right and a 
governmental structure where the legislative power of the King was constrained to a specific 
constitutional function. The reality may be different; the constitutional structure advocated by 
Coke is undermined by the fact that James emerges as able to enforce his will. The case 
evidences the assertions that Coke was willing to misrepresent cases and manipulate 
precedents and arguments; "' it also partly explains Ellesmere's attitude. 'S' 
1 47 Usher (1903) at p. 674. 
148 Bowen (1957) at p. 263. See Appendix C for the full text of these letters. 
149 Usher (1903) at p. 674. 
Aso See above at p. 85. 
See above at p. 85. 
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Coke and Parliament 
Coke has been portrayed as a'leader of the opposition' within Parliament and an advocate of 
parliamentary authority during its clashes with James. Both of these representations are 
simplistic and potentially misleading. Bowen suggests that Coke naturally allied himself with 
Parliament in an attempt to curtail James' prerogative actions. 'SZ Covell disagrees, stating 
The alliance between Parliament and the Common lawyers was anything but "natural". 
It rested on some very weak assumptions by both parties to it. Even Parliament's belief 
that the Common law supported its claim to a share in sovereignty was very much 
open to question. "' 
The views articulated by Blackstone and Dicey, '54 that common law theory in general, and 
Coke's ideas, in particular, supported parliamentary authority, as an"absolute legislature, are 
misplaced. 
Coke appears to advocate a theory of Parliamentary sovereignty when he states: 
Though divers Parliaments have attempted to barre, restrain, suspend, qualifie, or 
make void subsequent Parliaments, yet could they never effect it, for the latter 
Parliaments have every power to abrogate, suspend, qualifie, explain or make void the 
former in the whole or any part thereof, not withstanding any works of restraint, 
prohibition or penalty in the former; for it a maxime of the law of the Parliament, quod 
leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant... ii 1 ss 
This is not the case. Suggestions that Coke was advocating parliamentary sovereignty import 
a modern conception that would mean nothing to him. 
152 Bowen (1957) at p. 267. 
15' Covell (1962) at p. 324. 
154 See Chapter Three, below at p. 188. 
155 4 Coke's Institutes at p. 43. 
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It is true that within the final sentence there is an element of the modern doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty that "later laws abrogate prior laws that are contrary to them. "116 
This is little more than a rule of interpretation, as Fazal notes "Coke's remarks -that `Acts 
against the power of Parliament bind not' which are supported by Blackstone and Dicey 
merely state the doctrine of implied repeal. "'S7 
What is more indicative of Coke's view of Parliament's place within the constitutional 
framework is that the Fourth part of Coke's Institutes is sub-titled "concerning the jurisdiction 
of courts" and the chapter on Parliament is entitled "The High Court of Parliament. "", ' The 
first line begins "This court consisteth of the King's Majesty sitting there as in his royall 
politick capacity, and of the three Estates of the Realm. ""' This suggests that Coke viewed 
Parliament as a court rather than as a legislature. This stance would not have been unique, 
Peters observes that 
up to the time of the Long Parliament of the seventeenth century legislation was still a 
minor function of Parliament, which was regarded as a kind of court. Specific 
provision of law might be altered from time to time; but the law itself unfolded as 
generation replaced generation. 16° 
It is possible that upon his dismissal and entry to parliament Coke underwent a volte-face and 
recognised Parliament for the constitutional power it really was. 16' More probably, he saw it 
as a forum for continuing his attempts to check James' use of power. White adopts the latter 
156 See Lord Langdale's explanation in Dean of Ely v Bliss (1842) 5 Beav. 574 at p. 582, where he states 
If two inconsistent Acts be passed at different times, the last must be obeyed, and if obedience mot 
be observed without derogating from the first, it is the first which must give way. Every Act is made 
either for the purpose of making a change in the law, or for the purpose of better declaring the law, 
and its operation is not to be impeded by the mere fact that it is inconsistent with some previous 
enactment. 
's' Fazal (1974) at p. 307. 
ºS8 Gough (1955) at p. 42-43. 
119 4 Coke's Institutes at p. 1. 
160 Peters (1956) at p. 229. 
16' A view Holdsworth agrees with, Holdsworth (1932) at p. 186-187. 
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stance and suggests that Coke's dismissal, and the cowering of his former colleagues in the 
face of James' wrath led him to believe that the 'standard' courts were no longer an adequate 
forum for protecting the rights of the subjects nor the supremacy of the commön law. '62 This 
view would have been re-enforced over time, as it became obvious that the judiciary were not 
willing to accept the mantle Coke had crafted for them: that of guardians of the ancient 
constitutional settlement. Supporting White's interpretation is the fact that Coke did not seek 
to present Parliament as a challenger to the King's authority, as he did the common law; 
rather, he used Parliament as a platform for addressing those issues which emerged as 
politically important throughout his membership. Coke believed that Parliament, like the 
King, was subject to fundamental provisions of common law. 
Coke and Fundamental Law 
Gough writes 
Shall we find evidence that such a body of fundamental law came to be recognised 
in the seventeenth century? The answer to this question turns largely on how we 
interpret the work of Sir Edward Coke. 163 
More specifically, it comes down to the question of how we interpret Dr. Bonham's Case. 164 
Even today this case causes consternation and debate. Allott states: 
Sharing in the constitutional ambiguity of its begetter, Coke, its significance 
remains uncertain 370 years later. The uncertainty relates to the validity of the 
decided case precedent used by Coke, to the meaning of the principle actually 
stated by Coke, and to the role of the decision in subsequent constitutional 
development. 165 
'62 White (1979) at p. 23. 
163 Gough (1955) at p. 30. 164 8 Coke's Reports. 
165 Allott (1979) at p. 82. 
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The case addressed whether the College of Physicians had exceeded its authority in 
imprisoning the eponymous hero. Within the course of judgement, Coke stated, as the fourth 
of five reasons explaining why the college had exceeded its authority, that: 
it appears in our books that in many cases the common law will controul acts of 
Parliament and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void: for when an Act of 
Parliament is against common right or reason, or repugnant or impossible to be 
performed, the common law will controul it and adjudge such act to be void. 166 
Bowen claims: 
this was the most controversial judicial dictum of Coke's life [See Thorne below on 
question of dictum or ratio], due to be elaborated out of all proportion to its real 
significance - one of the public statements which as history progresses men seize upon 
and interpret according to their need. 16' 
Plucknett describes it as the "final expression" of Coke's theory. 168 
This latter may be overstating the reality: we should not lose perspective through ignoring the 
context in which the relevant statement was made. Well known constitutional commentators 
have expressed the view that the statement was obiter, had little bearing on the case and is 
more an indication of a personal belief held by Coke. 16' Alternatively Thorne suggests that it 
formed an integral part of the argument constructed by Coke and that it should be viewed in 
the context of the whole judgement.! ' Gough, concurring with Thorne's analysis which he 
described as 'decisive', asserts that all five of the arguments put forward by Coke converge to 
prove that "on a proper construction of the letters patent and of the statute confirming them, 
the College of Physicians did not possess the powers it claimed. ""' 
166 8 Co. Rep at p. 118. 
167 Bowen (1957) at p. 272. 
168 Plucknett (1926-27) at p. 30. 
169 Pollock (1904) at p. 122; C. K. Allen (1958) at pp. 370-371, Holdsworth (1932). at p. 475, are examples of 
this. 
170 Thorne (1938) at pp. 547-548. 
"1 Gough (1953) at p. 33. 
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Twentieth century scholarship has, through careful consideration of the precedents Coke 
relied upon, cast doubt on the authority of the judgement. Coke stands accused of reading in 
words that are not used12 and attributing more weight than is justified to other cases"'. 
Winterton asserts: "The authority of Dr. Bonham's Case is shaky if Coke intended to assert 
that statutes could be declared invalid by the courts, for the precedents he cited were 
"obsolescent" and he himself made contrary statements elsewhere. ""' Even Holdsworth, 
whose own historical method is open to criticism, notes Coke could be "very uncritical of his 
authorities and even misrepresent their views" if he felt it supported his claims. "' Equally, 
such misrepresentations may have resulted from a lack of historical xnethod. 16 These points 
notwithstanding, we should not be overly critical of Coke's technique: there are reports of 
relevant authorities which did not come to light until recently, and the seventeenth century 
judicial mindset did not analyse authorities in the same manner as we do today. 
However, Coke did not escape the censure of his peers, men more familiar with the 
techniques and difficulties of the era. Ellesmere, states 
And for novelty in Dr. Bonham's Case, the Chief Justice having no precedent for him, 
but many judgements against him, yet doth he strike in sunder the bars of government 
of the college of physicians and without any pausing on the matter, frustrate the patent 
of King Henry VIII and tramples upon the Acts of Parliament 14 and 15 H8. Whereby 
that patent was confirmed with the opinion of one judge only for the matter in law 
1'' Tregor's Case Y. B Pasch. 3 Edw. III, 26: Plucknett; (1926-27) at p. 35. Re Cessavit 42, at p. 36. 173 Annuitie -tl, where no judgement is reported, rather than an opinion is delivered "and this does not 
necessarily mean more than the reporter believed that the court inclined to one side rather than the other. " 
Plucknett (1926-27) at p. 39. 
174 Winterton (1976) at p. 594. 
15 Holdsworth (1932) at p. 475. 
176 White (1976) at p. 16. 
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where three other judges were against him, which case possesseth a better room in the 
press than is deserved. "' 
Ellesmere is also cited as saying, "it seemeth by the Lord Coke's Report that statutes are not 
so. sacred that the equity of them may not be examined. And yet our books are that the Acts 
and Statutes of Parliament ought to be reversed by Parliament (only) and not otherwise. 11178 It i 
should be recalled that Coke and Ellesmere were ardent political as well as legal opponents, 
and that Ellesmere had a reputation amongst his contemporaries for being a bitter opponent 
to common law principles - Whitecombe stated Ellesmere was "the greatest enemye to the 
common law that ever did bear office of state. 079 
What Coke actually meant when he issued the judgement is a matter. of conjecture. It is 
certain, however, that it has been ascribed a limited authority. Hobart C. J. possibly had Dr. 
Bonham's Case on his mind, even though he did not cite it as authority, when he said "even an 
Act of Parliament made against natural equity as to make a man judge in his own case, is void 
in itself, for jura naturae sunt immutabilia, and they are leges legem. i1 S° As Coke was out of 
favour, Hobart may have felt it would be prejudicial to his continued favour to rely on Dr. 
Bonham's Case. More explicit is Holt C. J. 's statement in The City of London v. Wood"' that 
What my Lord Coke says in Dr. Bonham's Case is far from extravagancy for it is a 
very reasonable and true saying that if an Act of Parliament should ordain that the 
same person should be party and judge, or which is the same thing judge in his own 
cause it would be a void Act of Parliament: for it is impossible that one should be 
judge and party, for the judge is to determine between party and party or between the 
government and the party; and an Act of Parliament can do no wrong, though it may 
1" Ellesmere (1616) at p. 21. 
178 Gough (1955) at p. 38. 
"' Bowen (1957) at p. 310. 
180 Day v. Savage Hobart C. J. 85. 
1a' 12 Nod. 669. 
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do several things which look pretty odd, but it cannot make one that lives under a 
government judge and party. 182 
Although both these cases talk about an Act of Parliament being void, they do so from a 
particular perspective - that it is the making a man judge 
in his own case that renders the Act 
void. These judgements seem to rely on the principle of "aliquis non debit esse iudex in 
propria causa"' rather than any existence of a body of fundamental, substantive law, breach 
of which renders statutory provisions void. Holt in particular is attempting to reconcile the 
embryonic notion of parliament's legislative supremacy with the existence of iudex in propria 
causa, although he did not employ this terminology. 
Allott summarises the long-term impact of Bonham's Case: 
the echoes of the decision in subsequent decided cases are few and unimpressive. 
It has not been used as authority for holding statutory provisions invalid or for 
reforming or supplementing them. If it had been Coke's intention to re-establish 
the common law's precedence over statute law, then, as a matter of fact, he did 
not achieve his purpose by means of the Bonham decision. On the contrary, what 
has happened is that the courts have declined, time and time again, to apply 
extrinsic controls to the substantive validity of statutory provisions. The Courts 
have listened with courtesy but have resisted the interesting temptation (of 
applying the Bonham principle. ]"" 
The recent judiciary have preferred to develop 'rules of interpretation' for circumventing 
parliamentary provisions which they have felt required curtailment or application in a manner 
clearly at odds with parliamentary intention. "' 
182 12 NOD. 669, at p. 673. 
133 See Yale (1974) for a detailed discussion of this principle. 
184 Alloff (1979) at p. 85. 
cgs See Chapter Five, below at p. 328. 
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Dr. Bonham's Case as a Rule of Construction 
It has been suggested that Coke's assertion that the common law would control an act of 
parliament was little more than the articulation of a rule of construction. 
Gough writes that, 
when Coke said: 
That the common law would "control" an act of Parliament he meant that the courts 
would interpret it in such a way as not to conflict with those same accepted principles 
of reason and justice which were presumed to underlie all law. Similarly, when he 
spoke of adjudging an act to be void, he did not mean that the courts could declare it 
to have been beyond the power of Parliament to enact, but that the court would 
construe it strictly, if this were necessary in order to bring it into conformity with these 
recognised principles, either disregarding such part of it as affecting the case being 
tried, or ruling that the case lay outside the scope of the statute, and that the statute 
was therefore inapplicable. "' 
This view had been previously expressed by Thome, '" and is described by Allott as the 
"minimalist" view: ascribing the minimum of significance to the judgement of Dr Bonham's 
case. I suggest that Coke was not merely interpreting a statute: in that he was also asserting 
the primacy of certain Common law maxims, he went beyond the canons of interpretation 
Coke did not construe the relevant Acts in the light of the Common law; he declared them 
void and disapplied them, which is far more fundamental a step than merely interpreting them. 
Corwin expresses this view when he states: "One thing seems to be assured at the outset - 
Coke was not asserting simply a rule of statutory construction. Coke was enforcing a rule of 
higher law deemed to him to be binding on Parliament and the ordinary courts alike. "'$$ Coke 
would not have understood our doctrines of interpretation, nor would he have recognised the 
need for rules of interpretation such as we employ today. 
186 Gough (1955) at p. 37. 
187 Thorne (1938) at p. 550. 
188 Corwin (1928) at pp. 370-372. 
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There have been a number of other explanations of Dr Bonham's Case189 that emphasise 
alternative approaches to the meaning of the judgement. They are interesting, but I still feel 
that Coke's reverence for the common law and his belief in its supremacy explains the 
judgement in Dr. Bonham's Case. 
Although his report of the case was criticised by Ellesmere, Coke's judgement in Dr Bonham's 
Case did not significantly affect James' decision to dismiss Coke in 1616. Neither is it 
continually referred to or given a place of honour in Coke's own writings. These facts imply 
that Dr. Bonham's Case was not perceived as being revolutionary or as being invested with 
great authority by Coke's contemporaries. The significance of this is that, although many 
subsequent commentators have sought to portray Dr. Bonham's Case as an important 
constitutional authority, neither Coke nor his contemporaries viewed the judgement in this 
way. 190 This suggests that we should approach Dr. Bonham's Case not as a great 
constitutional event, or an opportunity missed, but as a statement that the college of 
Physicians had exceeded their authority and as a precursor to the notions of natural justice. 
We do not wish to force our historical knowledge and current standards upon the decision in 
Dr. Bonham's Case. If we force our current understanding on Dr. Bonham's Case we could 
pervert its actual status, both as a stage in the historical development of our constitutional 
theory and as a constitutional event of the early seventeenth century. 
Conclusions 
Coke's career as a parliamentarian was not exceptional. He helped to frame the Petition of 
Rights and he was a vocal opponent of Monopolies assisting in the drafting of the Statute of 
189 Wagner (1935), Hill (1965), contra these views see Malament (1967). 190 See above at p. 97 for the point of view of Lord Ellesmere and p. 95 et seq. for the arguments surrounding 
Coke's approach to Dr. Bonham's Case 
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Monopolies. Both of these 'achievements' can be explained as issues of the day rather than 
manifestations of Coke's ideological beliefs. Coke would, in all likelihood, have ideologically 
supported these measures, but it was not he who put them on the political agenda. We 
should not overestimate the significance of Coke's parliamentary activity, either to his 
theories, or regarding their place in the course of events that ultimately led to revolution. 
I- 
What is certain is that Coke presented a cogent argument for fundamental laws that were 
I 
beyond the power of the lawmaker to change. This notion has echoes in modern 
assertions, "' and is opposed to the prevailing British approach to sovereignty that relies on 
notions of absolutism traceable to James I, and more obviously to Thomas Hobbes. 




Within the arena of British political science, Thomas Hobbes holds a unique position. He is 
regarded as "the first of the great modern philosophers who attempted to bring political 
theory into intimate relation with a thoroughly modern system of thought"" and his best- 
known work, Leviathan'93 is considered "the greatest, perhaps the sole, masterpiece" of 
English political philosophy. "' Hobbes' attempts to formulate a scientific theory of political 
philosophy have guaranteed his status in the world of political science. "' His position in the 
world of constitutional law is less certain. Muster of the great positivist thinkers who have 
I 
influenced English constitutional law does not automatically include Hobbes. Students are 
taught about Dicey, Austin and maybe Bentham, but rarely do they consider Hobbes as a 
legal theorist. Hobbes deserves consideration on the merit of his own work regardless of the 
influence he clearly exerted over subsequent writers. His works are replete with references 
to, and reliance upon, notions of constitutional law, most significantly sovereignty. 
Throughout his works, Hobbes made continual references to the law, lawyers and the 
relationship between the organs of government. Hobbes reacted strongly to common law 
notions associated with Coke" and was influenced by Bacon's Elements of the Law, 
indicating that he was au fait with the part the judiciary had played in the early decades of the 
`97' Sabine and Thorson (1973) at p. 423. 193 Published in 1651. 
194 Oakshott (1946) at p. 4. 195 Skinner (1965-66) at p. 161-167. 196 See Dialogue Between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Law (Dialogue), (1972(a)) and Chapter 26 of Leviathan (1649-50). 
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seventeenth century, and traditional perceptions of their governmental role and relationships 
with the other organs of government. 
The rationale behind lawyers reading Hobbes' works goes beyond this; Hobbes was one of the 
first English theorists to seek a rational explanation for the institution of government 
including an account of the ideal relationship between the organs of government. In addition, 
a study of Hobbes' work, like one of Bodin's, demonstrates how notions of sovereignty 
provide the background to political theories. This illustrates the folly of studying either 
constitutional law or politics in isolation. 
Interpreting Hobbes' work and extracting his views is a complicated, but not impossible, 
process. He wrote a number of major works over a long period, some of them have a specific 
subject matter - for example Behemoth"' and Dialogue Between a Philosopher and a Student 
of the Common Law198 - others are intended to be more general, laying down a logical and 
scientific theory of statehood and government. ` There are further complications: Gert has 
stated: "Hobbes has been so consistently misinterpreted that it is now difficult to read him 
properly. "200 There have been misinterpretations of Hobbes' work since they were first 
published: Clarendon thought that Leviathan had been written to flatter Cromwell and 
suggested that "what he called the'lewd principles of his institution' were inconsistent with 
the Stuart belief in legitimacy and with prevailing theories of popular representation. "201 Yet, 
throughout his works Hobbes continually asserts the superior nature of monarchical 
197 Being an account of The History of the causes of the Civil Wars of England and the counsels and artifices by which they were carried on from the year 1640 to the year 1660. 
198 Being a polemic against the common law theories of Sir Edward Coke. 
199 For example, De Cive and Leviathan. 
100 Gert (1978) at p. 4. A good example is the literature surrounding the Engagement Oath - see Skinner (1966) and Baumgold (1988). 
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government. 202 It is important to view Hobbes not simply in a bibliological or textual fashion. 
His works are so influenced by his experiences and the political events of his era that his 
theory is grounded in them. To ignore this fact tends to misrepresentation, or at least 
misunderstanding, of Hobbes' intentions. 
Background to Hobbes' Work 
Political Background to Hobbes' work 
The background to Hobbes' theorising is confused. Hobbes' longevity both in terms of his life 
and his literary career, and the era, during which he lived, coincided to produce a varied 
background to his work. Assuming that he was formulating his ideas prior to the actual 
writing process, his period of literary activity witnessed the Civil War, regicide, 
Commonwealth and the Restoration. Undoubtedly, these events profoundly affected his 
formulations. Although there are obvious and real developments through Hobbes' published 
works it is equally obvious that each of his works was "intended to address the contemporary 
political crisis. "'0' Of all the political events that Hobbes experienced, the one that most 
profoundly affected him was the Civil War. " Hobbes wrote, "all such calamities as may be 
avoided by human industry arise from war, but chiefly from Civil War". "' Kateb asserts that 
Hobbes' "work is held together by the effort to understand the causes of civil war and to offer 
proposals for its long term prevention. "206 Not only does reading Hobbes deepen our 
understanding of sovereignty, it allows us an insight into the events and prevailing opinions of 
a time widely regarded as one of the formative eras in our constitutional history. " 
01 Sabine and Thorson (1973) at p. 423. 202 See in particular the Preface to Hobbes (1972b). 
`03 Baumgold (1988) at p. 15. 204 Kateb (1989) at p. 355. 
205 Hobbes (1994) at 1: 58. 
`06 Kateb (1989) at p. 355. 
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Intellectual background to Hobbes' work 
The intellectual background to Hobbes' work is also confused. Common law theory was the 
prevailing legal ideology and Hobbes' work reflects his opposition to many of its notions. 
Hobbes was au fait with the ideas of Francis Bacon, having read his Elements of the Law and 
having "hit it off with Bacon, with whom he had a fairly close association for some little 
while, probably between 1621 and 1626. He was for a time Bacon's amanuensis, and well 
enough attuned to Bacon's way of thinking that Bacon preferred him to any other, and 'loved 
to converse with him. ii207 This background partly explains Hobbes' aversion to Coke's beliefs. 
Positive influences on Hobbes' work also include Bodin; Hobbes owed a substantial 
intellectual debt to the Frenchman. There was substantial monarchist literature criticising the 
legitimacy of the commonwealth and an equal quantity of republican literature seeking to 
justify the commonwealth. It is unclear how much influence these works exerted over 
Hobbes' ideas. What is clear is that Hobbes influenced the literature, of both sides. Some 
monarchists such as Clarendon condemned Hobbes as a friend of the commonwealth, others, 
like Filmer, approved of what Hobbes said. Filmer stated: "with no small content I read Mr. 
Hobbes' book De Cive, and his Leviathan, which no man that I know, hath so amply and 
judiciously handled: I consent with him about the rights of exercising government, "208 this of 
the same work, Leviathan, that Clarendon sought to refute. 
Although Hobbes is often portrayed as an isolated figure who was without intellectual allies 
and whose theories ran contrary to the contemporary wisdom, this approach has been 
207 MacPherson (1968) at p. 16. 
Page 106 
criticised by Skinner, who suggests that many commentators have been looking at the wrong 
aspects of Hobbes' life. Skinner suggests that whilst in exile in France Hobbes came into 
contact not only with the French intelligentsia but also with many of the English thinkers who 
were also in exile. 209Skinner continues to suggest that a number of like-minded thinkers were 
cowed, by Hobbes' sinister reputation, from publishing works agreeing with him. Skinner 
continues: "but in the privacy of memoranda and correspondence it can be seen that Hobbes' 
intellectual relations were often much closer than has been implied". 210 It is evident, from the 
contemporary success of his published works, that Hobbes' ideas had popular appeal. 
Bodin's influence over Hobbes is illustrated through the latter's citation of the former. 
Citation of another's work was rare in seventeenth century literature. Contemporaries 
viewed citation as an admission of lack of originality and, therefore, any reference to another 
theorist's works is indicative of substantial reliance upon, agreement with, or strong 
opposition to, that cited writer. It is obvious, from Hobbes' references to Bodin that he 
thought highly of Bodin's work, particularly on the question of indivisibility. However, 
although there are numerous similarities between the two theorists, there are also substantial 
differences. It is clear that, by the time Hobbes cited Bodin, the Frenchman's views had been 
anglicised and certain aspects of his theory had fallen out of popular English use. 211 Hobbes 
did not attempt to refute Bodin's ideals which he disagreed with; he simply ignored, or was 
ignorant of, them. 
208 Filmer (1949) at p. 239. 209 See Quentin Skinner (1965-66) at p. 153. '10 Skinner (1965-66) at p. 159. Macpherson suggests that this article proves the falsity if the isolationist interpretation. 
. 11 See above at p. 74. 
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Hobbes' Notion of Sovereignty 
In order to understand Hobbes' notion of sovereignty it is necessary to consider his views on 
the nature of man. Hobbes believed that the "natural state" of man was what he termed a 
state of nature: a state where there is no government. Hobbes recognises that 
Nature hath made men so equall, in the faculties of body, and mind; as that though 
there bee found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or of quicker mind 
then another; yet when all is reckoned together, the difference between man, and man, 
is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to himselfe any benefit, to 
which another may not pretend, as well as he. 212 
He also recognises that men strive for the same ends and that they will come into conflict with ' 
each other in order to achieve their aims. Z"- Due to their general equality there is no 
guarantee that any of them will succeed. Men therefore live in fear of conflict, even when 
conflict itself does not occur. He explains: 
It. is manifest, that during the time men live without a common Power to keep them all 
in awe, they are in that condition which is called Wane; and such a warre, as is of 
every man, against every man. ... For as the nature of Foule weather, lyeth not in a 
showre or tow of rain; but in an inclination thereto of many dayes together: So the 
nature of War, consisteth not in actuall fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, 
during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. 21' 
Hobbes states that each and every man possessed "THE RIGHT OF NATURE, which 
Writers commonly call Jus Naturale " and that this 
Is the Liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himselfe, for the 
preservation of his own Nature; that is to say, of his own Life; and consequently, of 
doing any thing, which in his own Judgement, and Reason, he shall conceive to be the 
aptest means thereunto. 21 
22 Hobbes (1968) at p. 183. 
'13 Hobbes (1968) pp. 183-185. 
2)4 Hobbes (1968) at p. 185-. 186. 
`'s Hobbes (1968) at p. 189. 
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Hobbes continues to observe that men will, naturally, agree to limit their own rights, mostly in 
return for a reciprocal limitation on the part of the other party to the agreement. He states 
"The mutuall transferring of Right, is that which men call CONTRACT. "216 Hobbes accepts 
that there are different types of contract, and that 
One of the Contractors, may deliver the Thing contracted for on his part, and leave the 
other to perform his part at some determinate time after, and in the mean time be 
trusted; and then the Contract on his part, is called PACT, or COVENANT: Or both 
parts may contract now, to performe hereafter: in which cases, he that is to performe 
in time to come, being trusted, his performance is called Keeping of Promise, or Faith; 
and the fayling of performance (if it be voluntary) Violation of Faith. "' 
He continues to acknowledge that one-sided agreements to constrain one's rights are gifts. =i8 
Hobbes recognises that there is an inherent danger in performing your side of a covenant first 
for there is no guarantee that the other party will abide by the agreement and perform their 
side. Performing first, with no guarantee of the other's compliance, therefore, contravenes 
the natural law that no one shall willingly surrender his ability to defend himself. 
However, "In a civill estate, where there is a Power set up to constrain those that would 
otherwise violate their faith, that feare is no more reasonable; and for that cause, he which by 
the Covenant is to perform first, is obliged so to do. "219 It is on the basis of this need for an 
authority to enforce covenants that Hobbes founds his ideas: 
The finall Cause, End, or Designe of men, (who naturally love Liberty, and Dominion 
over others, ) in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves, (in which wee see 
them live in Common-wealths, ) is the foresight of their own preservation, and of a 
`16 Hobbes (1968) at p. 192. `17 Hobbes (1968) at p. 193. 218 Hobbes (1968) at p. 193. 219 Hobbes (1968) at p. 196. 
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more contented life thereby; that is to say, of getting themselves out from that 
miserable condition of Warre, which is necessarily consequent (as hath been shewn) to 
the naturall Passions of men, when there is no visible Power to keep them in awe, and 
tye them by feare of punishment to the performance of their Covenants, and 
observation of the Laws of Nature. "' 
Hobbes, in a substantial passage, explains how a civil society of the type necessitated by the 
need for security may be created. He explains that each person joining the society would 
surrender aspects of their own individual sovereign rights and that through conferring this 
power and strength upon one man, or upon one assembley of men, that may reduce all 
their wills, by plurality of voices unto one will: which is as much to say, to appoint one 
man, or assemble of men, to beare their person... . This 
is more than consent or 
Concord; it is a real Unitie of them all, in one and the same Jerson, made by Covenant 
of every man with every man, in such manner, as if every man should say to every 
man, I authorise and give up my Right of Governing my seife, to this Man, or to this 
Assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy Right to him, and Authorise 
all his actions in like manner. This done, the Multitude so united in one person, is 
called a COMMONWEALTH.... This is the generation of that great LEVIATHAN, 
or rather (to speak more reverently) of that Mortali God.... For by this Authoritie, 
given him by every particular man in the commonwealth, he hath the use of so much 
power and Strength conferred on him, that by terror thereof, he is enabled to forme 
the wills of them all, to Peace at home, and mutuall ayd against their enemies abroad. 
And in him consisteth the essence of the Common-Wealth; which (to define it, ) is One 
person, of Whose Acts a great multitude, by mutuall covenants one with another, 
have made themselves every one the author, to the end he may use the strength and 
means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for the Peace and Common Defence. 22, 
This attempt by Hobbes to ground his theory on some practical social need is an inherently 
'modern' approach. This approach has echoes in the utilitarian ideas of Bentham and Austin: 
the citizenry surrender aspects of their individual rights - elements that may not be returned 
220 Hobbes (1968) at p. 223. 
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and which may be enforced against the citizens concerned - so that a greater benefit is 
available to the majority of the populace. 
Hobbes and the Nature of Sovereignty 
Hobbes enumerates a number of defining characteristics common to, and defining, all 
sovereigns. tm These characteristics are very similar to Bodin's, and it is unnecessary to list 
them. Hobbes maintains that these rights are "incommunicable, and inseparable" and 
Because they are essentiall and inseparable Rights, it follows necessarily, that in 
whatsoever words any of them seem to be granted away, yet if the Soveraign Power it 
seife be not in direct termes renounced, and the name of Sovtieraign no more given by 
the Grantees to him that Grants them, the Grant is voyd: for when he has granted all 
he can, if we grant back the Sovereignty, all is restored, as inseparable annexed 
thereunto. "' 
Hobbes also avows that it is not possible for any of the marks to be separated from the others 
and bestowed upon a third party. The rationale for this is that once a sovereign is divided it is 
possible for allegiances to be divided and this could result in a civil war - he cites the events 
in England. " Hobbes suggests that in the light of the civil war 
There be few (in England, ) that do not see, that these Rights are inseparable, and will 
be so generally acknowledged, at the next return of Peace; and so continue, till their 
miseries are forgotten; and no longer, except the vulgar be better taught than they 
have hitherto been. 225 
Like Bodin, Hobbes recognised the existence of sovereign power as distinct from the form of 
sovereignty emplaced in a particular system. Again this is an essentially modern approach to 
the subject but, like Bodin before him, Hobbes feels obliged to argue that one arrangement of 
r-1 Hobbes (1968) at pp. 227-228. 
22 Hobbes (1968) at pp. 229-235. 
223 Hobbes (1968) at p. 237. 
"4 Hobbes (1968) at p. 236-237. 
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sovereign power, out of the three on offer, ' is 'better' than the others. Again, like Bodin, 
Hobbes settles on monarchy as the ideal arrangement for the organs of government. 2-7 
Hobbes and Monarchical Government 
It is Hobbes' devotion to the monarchical ideal of government that has, partly, been 
responsible for him being labelled an absolutist. " It should be recalled that, today, notions of 
democracy carry a very specific meaning, one Hobbes would not have understood. Hobbes' 
objections to democracy take on a very particular aspect: he does not so much critique the 
theoretical foundations of democracy, but rather how it has been applied in practice. For 
example, he states, in De Cive 
in a Democracy, look how many demagogues, that is, how rtany powerful orators 
there are with the people (which ever are many, and daily new ones growing), so many 
children, kinsmen, friends and flatterers are to be rewarded. For every of them desire 
not only to make their families as potent, as illustrious in wealth, as may be, but also to 
oblige others to them by benefits, for the better strengthening of themselves. A 
monarch may in great part satisfy his officers and friends, because they are not many, 
without any cost to his subjects; I mean without robbing them of any of the treasures 
given in for the maintainance of war and peace. In a democracy, where many are to be 
satisfied, and always new ones, this cannot be done without the subject's oppression. 
Though a monarch may promote unworthy persons, yet oft times he will not do it, 
because it is necessary, for else the power of them who did it would so increase, as it 
would no only become dreadful to those others, but even to the whole city also. -=9 
Later on, in the same work, he suggests that the logistics of arranging for everyone to meet 
would be too complicated and that not everyone would be suited to decision-making, as they 
could not all understand the complexities of each and every situation. =70 In De Cive Hobbes, 
'"s Hobbes (1968) at p. 237. 
"6 Hobbes (1972b) at p 41. 
22' Hobbes (1972b) at p. 234. 
228 Shelton (1992) at p. 235. 
229 Hobbes (1972b) at p. 226. 
ao Hobbes (1978) at p. 230.231. 
Page 112 
in a rare insight into potential developments in political life, appears to advocate a system of 
representative democracy. He states 
If the people in a democracy would bestow the power of deliberating matters of war 
and peace either on one or some very few, being content with the nomination of 
magistrates and public ministers, that is to say, with the authority without the 
ministration, then it must be confessed that in this particular democracy and monarchy 
would be equal. " 
Hobbes' Sovereignty and Law 
Hobbes, like Bodin, states that 
Law in generall, is not Counsell, but Command; nor a Command of any man to any 
man; but only of him, whose Command is addressed to one formerly obliged to obey 
him. And as for Civill Law, it addeth only the name of the person Commanding, 
which is Person Civitatis, the Person of the Commonwealth. " 
Having described the powers a sovereign possesses Hobbes specifies that it is the sovereign, 
whichever form it may take, who is the legislator: 
For the Legislator, is he that maketh the Law. And the Common-wealth only, 
prescribes, and commandeth the observation of those rules, which we call Law: 
Therefore the Common-wealth is the Legislator. But the Common-wealth is no 
Person, nor has capacity to doe any thing, but by the Representative, (that is, the 
Soveraign; ) and therefore the Soveraign is the sole Legislator. 2" 
This is a modern approach to the notion of law making; Hobbes is concentrating on the idea 
of a positive action and advocates a simple imperative form of law, a view shared with 
subsequent theorists such as Bentham'` and Austin. 2's. Hobbes dispels the notion that long 
use and custom could form the basis of a legal obligation stating: 
231 Shelton (1992) at p. 233-234. 
232 Hobbes (1968) at p. 3 12. 
233 Hobbes (1968) at p. 313. 
234 See Chapter Three, below at p. 143. 
Page 113 
When long Use obtaineth the authority of a Law, it is not the Length of Time that 
maketh the Authority, but the Will of the Soveraign signified by his silence, (for 
Silence is sometimes an argument of Consent; ) and it is no longer Law, then the 
Soveraign shall be silent therein. And therefore if the Soveraign shall have a question 
of Right grounded, not upon his present Will, but upon the Lawes formerly made; the 
Length of Time shall bring no prejudice to his Right; but the question shal be judged 
by Equity. For many unjust Actions, and unjust Sentences, go uncontrolled a longer 
time, than any man can remember. And our Lawyers account no Customes Law, but 
such as are reasonable, and that evill Customes are to be abolished: But the Judgement 
of what is reasonable, and of what is to be abolished, belongeth to him that maketh the 
Law, which is the Soveraign Assembly, or Monarch. 23" 
This essentially Bodian approach demonstrates a particular attitude towards the judicial 
function within the constitutional structure. Hobbes disagrees with -Coke's common law 
proposition that the longevity of a custom is indicative of its virtue'' instead he adopts the 
obvious point that a bad, or unjust, law could be a law for a long time, and that it would still 
be an unjust law despite its pedigree. Hobbes is, also, disavowing the common law notion 
that when a custom is reinterpreted by a judge, found to be lacking, and 'interpreted' in the 
'correct' fashion the judge has not overruled the previous decision, but rather has recognised 
that the law had been previously misinterpreted and that the new 'interpretation' is the correct 
one. The rationale behind this disavowment is that it places an almost legislative function 
upon the judiciary and Hobbes reserves this function to that body vested with sovereign 
power - one possibility that Hobbes does not seen to investigate is the situation where it is the 
judiciary who are vested with sovereign power. Additionally, Hobbes rejects Coke's ideal 
that it is the judiciary that is vested with the experience and knowledge to determine 'what is 
215 See Chapter Three, below at p. 167. 
16 Hobbes (1968) at p. 313-314. 
23' See above at p. 88. 
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reasonable. 1239 Hobbes'explains that it cannot be a form of'private', or individual, reason that 
is used to determine what should be law, for this would lead to confusion and potential 
contradiction which is totally unacceptable. He also suggests that 
It is possible long study may encrease, and confirm erroneous Sentences: and where 
men build on false grounds, the more they build, the greater is the ruine: and of those 
that study, and observe, with equall time, and diligence, the reasons and resolutions 
are, and must remain discordant: and therefore it is not that Juris prudentia, or 
wisedome of subordinate Judges; but the Reason of this our Artificiall Man the 
Common-wealth, and his Command, that maketh Law: And the Common-wealth being 
in their Representative but one Person, there cannot easily arise any contradiction in 
the Lawes; and when there doth, the same Reason is able, by interpretation, or 
alteration, to take it away. In all Courts of Justice, the Soveraign (which is the Person 
of the common-wealth, ) is he that Judgeth: The subordinate Judge, ought to have 
regard to the reason, which moved his Soveraign to make such Law, that his Sentence 
may be according thereunto; which then is his Soveraigns Sentence: otherwise it is his 
own, and an unjust one. `39 
This ideal is essential to Hobbes' notion of indivisible sovereignty=4° - where Hobbes states 
that the power of judicature is vested in the sovereign - and is similar to James I's position. 241 
Hobbes elaborates upon these points in the Dialogue where he repudiates the entire notion of 
common law theory relying heavily on the theoretical framework he produced in Leviathan. 
Hobbes on Mixed Sovereignty 
Hobbes rejects both limited and divided government as inherently unstable. A division of 
powers leaves no group with sufficient power to guarantee peace and defence and creates 
competing factions that will eventually be at war with one another, as in the civil wars of 
"$ Hobbes (1968) at p. 316-317. 
239 Hobbes (1968) at p. 317. 
240 See below at p. 118 et seq. 
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Hobbes' time. "' Hobbes' entire ambition was to propose a system of government that would 
be capable of averting a civil war of the kind just witnessed in England. Hobbes viewed the 
creation of a polity where different bodies claimed different aspects of the sovereign power as 
likely to produce confusion as to where authority for a particular area resided. 243 He 
illustrates this by stating 
In the Kingdome of God, there may be three persons independent, without breach of 
unity in God that Reigneth; but where men reigne, that be subject to diversity of 
opinions, it cannot be so. And therefore if the King bear the person of the people, and 
the Generall Assembly bear also the person of the people, and another Assembly bear 
the person of a par of the People, they are not one person, nor one soveraign, but 
three persons, and three soveraigns. 244 
Hobbes, like Bodin, 245 relied on the analogy of God to support his ideas. Hobbes' reasoning 
progressed along the following lines: the creation of a multitude of sovereigns would not 
automatically create a system of dispute and anarchy for, as long as they all agreed, there 
could be no disputing the laws they promulgated. However the system would be inherently 
unstable in that once the bodies disagreed - as human nature indicates they eventually 
would2"' - there would be confusion over the exact nature of law. The end result would be a 
reversion to a situation of war of all against all, thus defeating the very idea behind the 
creation of the commonwealth, and breaking the law of nature. 
Consideration of this point clearly establishes the influence that the background political 
events in England exerted over Hobbes' theorising. In Leviathan Hobbes asserts: 
241 See above at p. 83. 
242 Kavka (1986) at p. 229. 
243 Peters (1956) at p. 226. 
. 44 Hobbes (1968) at p. 372. 
245 See above at p. 69. 
246 See above at p. 148. 
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And so if we consider any of the said Rights [6f sovereigns], we shall presently see, 
that the holding of all the rest, will produce no effect, in the conservation of Peace and 
Justice, the end for which all Commonwealths are Instituted. And this division is it, 
whereof it is said, a Kingdome divided in itselfe cannot stand: For unlegse this division 
precede, division into opposite armies can never happen. If there had not first been an 
opinion received of the greatest part of England, that these powers were divided 
between the King, and the Lords and the House of commons, the People had never 
been divided, and fallen into this Civil Warre. 247 
And in Behemoth 
A. The greatest part of the Lords in Parliament, and of the Gentry throughout England 
were more affected to monarchy than to a popular government, but so, as not to 
endure to hear of the King's absolute Power, which made them in Time of Parliament 
easily to condescend to abridge it, and bring the government . to a mixt monarchy, as 
they called it, wherein the absolute sovereign should be divided between the King, the 
House of Lords, and the House of Commons. 
B. But how if they cannot agree? 
A. I think they never thought of that, but I am sure that they never meant the sovereign 
should be wholly, either in one or both Houses. =a$ ' 
It is worth noting that Hobbes did not possess the analytical and organisational tools provided 
by the modern, relatively sophisticated, doctrines of the rule of law or separation of powers. 
We should be wary of importing modern notions into considerations of seventeenth century 
thought. It is interesting, although beyond the scope of this work, to speculate how they may 
have affected Hobbes' approach. 
`47 Hobbes (1968) at p. 236-237. 
248 Hobbes (1840) at p. 205. 
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Hobbes on Illimitable Sovereignty 
In Hobbes' mind, there could be no limitations imposed upon the sovereign. The foundation 
for this assertion was that in the State of Nature, men were free to do as they pleased, there 
were no civil limitations upon them. Part of the process of formulating a civic society, a 
common wealth, was the surrendering of these unconstrained powers to the chosen 
sovereign. The result was the creation of a sovereign with unconstrained power. There are a 
number of consequences of this; one of the most important is that "he that hath the Soveraign 
Power, is [NOT] subject to the Civill Lawes. i249 Hobbes continues to assert that the 
sovereign is still subject to Natural Laws, which are Divine in origin, but not to civil laws. 
This marks a considerable difference between Hobbes and Bodin. Unlike Hobbes, Bodin 
insists that the sovereign obeys certain civil laws, 25° and also that the sovereign is obliged to 
perform any contractual obligation it undertakes. Hobbes' rationale for not allowing the 
enforcement of civil laws against the sovereign confronts one of the limitations in Bodin's 
work: who could enforce the laws? Hobbes explains if you "setteth the Lawes above the 
Soveraign, "u' you "setteth also a Judge above him, and a Power to punish him"252 and this, 
according to Hobbes definition, amounts to making "a new sovereign. ""' 
This clearly illustrates Hobbes' view of the constitutional relationship that should exist 
between the judiciary and the lawmakers: the former is totally subordinated to the latter. This 
view is completely at odds with Coke's notion of common law laying down fundamental rules 
"which granted the subject certain rights that no king could infringe. ""' 
249 Hobbes (1968) at p. 367. 
250 See above at p. 71. 
251 Hobbes (1968) at p. 367. 
252 Hobbes (1968) at p. 367. 
253 Hobbes (1968) at p. 367. However, see Chapter Three below at p. 144. 
254 Sommerville (1997) p. 84-5. See above at p. 90. 
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Hobbes' perception that limitation of the sovereign power, or a sharing of that power, results 
in there being no 'sovereign' and, therefore, no commonwealth has been criticised. Kavka 
states: 
Hobbes is right to this extent: limitations of, or divisions of, government power can 
lead to rebellion and civil war in any of the ways he indicates. But they need not do 
so, for a number of reasons. Officials or bodies that share power in a system of 
divided government will be strongly motivated to compromise differences among 
themselves and to co-ordinate peace and defence, for they have much to lose - their 
present power, status, wealth and life - in a civil war or a collapse of the state through 
paralysis. " 
However, Kavka's analysis is fundamentally flawed. Kavka imports modern ideas into 
seventeenth century thought and reality. Contrary to his assertion that there was everything to 
gain through peace, the various sides perceived the opposite that, after the outbreak of 
hostilities, there was everything to gain through war. Neither of the protagonist sides in the 
Civil War had demonstrated any willingness to compromise; this was due, in part, to 
intractable personalities and, in part, to basic differences in political philosophy. Kavka 
continues: . 
As to limited government, the limitations themselves may serve to keep the 
government in check and to preserve the rights of the people so that there are seldom 
critical disputes between citizens and their government. In addition, if we combine the 
"- limitation and division of power there may now be available effective referees for 
disputes between citizens and government. A person or group in conflict with one 
government body or branch over the existence or nature of a limit on government 
power may seek arbitration or protection from another government body or branch. 216 
This final quotation clearly illustrates Kavka's importation of modern ideas such as the 
separation of powers and the rule of law; such notions did not exist when Hobbes was 
writing. 
255 Kavka (1986) at p. 229-230. 
256 Kavka (1986) at p. 230. 
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Although "it seems that Hobbes' sovereign could have the right to implement any policy just 
because he thought it was a good idea, "u' this does not mean that there are no: limitations on 
a sovereign's actions "for while there are no theoretical limits, there certainly are practical 
limits to the power of the sovereign. ""' Hobbes admitted the existence of practical 
limitations on the actions of the sovereign. He suggested that although these limitations 
could not be legal, there might be prudential reasons for not acting in a certain manner. 
Schochet suggests the example that sovereigns should not "wantonly or indifferently threaten 
the lives of their subjects. "" It was for the preservation of their freedom and lives that 
people 'combined' as a commonwealth and, as Hobbes states, 
The office of the sovereign, be it a monarch or an assembly, consisteth in the end for 
which he was trusted with the sovereign power, namely the procuration of the safety 
of the people, to which he is obliged by the law of nature, and to render an account 
thereof to God, the author of that law, and to none but him. `6o 
If a sovereign cannot master the act of government to this end, then Hobbes recognised that 
the sovereign could fall. 26' As a result of this he appears to acknowledge that it was not 
merely by the power of the sword that sovereigns survived. There were other important 
elements to the art of governing; chief amongst them was 'opinion'. Hobbes states, in what 
Dietz has called "a crucial but neglected observation, ""' in Behemoth that "the powers of the 
mighty hath no foundation but in the opinion and belief of the people. ""' Thus as Shelton 
states "despite his relentless emphasis on the powers required by the sovereign, Hobbes is 
aware that in the end it all rests on an acceptance which can only be achieved by persuasion 
257 Tuck (1989) at p. 72. 
`s$ Shelton (1997) at p. 270-280. 
259 Schochet (1990) at p. 62. 
26° Hobbes (1968) at p. 376. 
261 Shelton (1997) at p. 280. 
262 Dietz (1990) at p. 95. 
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and education. ""' This, in part, explains Hobbes' assertion that the sovereign should exercise 
a high degree of control over the teachings of the Church and Universities, institutions he 
believed to control and shape public opinion and which he considered instrumental in bringing 
about the events of the Civil War. 265 It also demonstrates why Hobbes would wish to see a 
centralisation of power in the hands of the sovereign; this arrangement would deny any other 
'body' the influence to institute a rebellion. It is interesting that this is similar to Austin's use 
of popular sovereignty as a final justification for sovereign power. 266 
Just like Austin, Hobbes' work has provoked strong reactions form subsequent 
commentators. Sir Matthew Hale wrote one of the first critiques of Hobbes' theories. 
`63 Cited in Shelton (1997) at p. 281. `64 Shelton (1997) at p. 241. 
265 Hobbes (1880) Part I. 
2 66 See Chapter Three, below at p. 167. 
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Sir Matthew Hale on Hobbes 
Introduction and Background 
Hale was a brilliant lawyer and judge, he had a reputation for impartiality, and was respected 
by both sides of the constitutional conflicts. His continued sitting as a judge during the 
Interregnum and after the Restoration illustrate this. He was one of only nine judges to serve 
both systems. The system Hale worked within was similar to that of Coke in that "the 
administration of justice had become so involved in political and constitutional controversies 
that lawyers were perforce drawn into politics and politicians were apt to base their 
contentions upon principles of law. X26' 
S 
Although friendly with many of the leading political, legal and constitutional figures, and 
despite his being "one of the outstanding judges of the seventeenth century, "268 Hale is not 
viewed as one of the leading constitutional figures. He remains today "a largely understudied 
figure. 11269 
He was a member of Parliament, actively involved in law reform and sat in all three common 
law courts, presiding over two of them (Chief Baron of the Exchequer, 1660 and Lord Chief 
Justice, King's Bench, 1671). His attitude was, however, restrained. Although he did not 
produce as much written work as Coke or Davies, Hale did make serious contributions to 
legal history and constitutional theory. It is unlikely that Hale even intended any of his works 
to be published and, therefore, improbable that he would have viewed them as suitable in 
267 Birkenhead (1931) at p. 52. 
268 Heward (1972) at p. 9. 
. 69 Gray (1971) at xiii. 
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form, and maybe content, to go to the press. As Yale notes "though Hale has attracted a 
considerable amount of biographical study, his position as a writer on constitutional theory 
and the history of law has only been more recently, and as yet, not fully explored. "" Yale 
suggests that the modern discussions that have occurred owe a great deal to Pocock's Ancient 
Constitutional and Feudal Laws. 
I would ascribe Hale's relatively low-key involvement in constitutional matters during his own 
lifetime partly to his strict sense of judicial duty and his personal beliefs concerning the role of 
both lawyers and judges and partly to the prevailing judicial attitude. In a system where 
judicial tenure was based on 'good pleasure, "' it is fair to say that although the judiciary of 
Charles II were not "shamelessly subservient ... 
in an age of intellectual curiosity and scientific 
inquiry, their notion of law was so narrow and their conception of their own position so 
limited " that they effectively abandoned the role Coke envisaged for them. Further, their 
approach laid the foundation for modern interpretations of the judicial function. Z72 
At the same time, we should not lose sight of the fact that Hale, and his brother judges, 
accepted a revolution and new political and constitutional settlement. Regarding Hale's 
acceptance of the commonwealth, Birkenhead states: 
There was a government in existence that was, in fact, administering the affairs of the 
country, and Hale felt himself free to take an engagement to obey the commonwealth. 
His sympathy was with the existence of a monarchy but he did not shut his eyes to 
accomplished facts. 2' 
270 Yale (1976) at p. 37. 
Z" Re-introduced in 1668 - Havinghurst (1950) at p. 78. `72 See Chapter One, above at p. 22 et seq. 
{ 
273 Birkenhead (1931) at p. 58. 
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This attitude had been displayed many times subsequent to this: in 1688/9 there was no 
judicial outcry to an unauthorised parliament abolishing one dynastic government and 
replacing it with another. A more recent example of the same attitude is to be found in the 
'Rhodesia cases'274 surrounding U. D. I. The judicial willingness to -accept a new regime 
has 
been one of the foundations for the success of these regimes. By analogy, where there is a 
major constitutional evolution, it is the judiciary through their interpretation and application 
of the development who set its parameters and meaning. 275 
Hale and the Common Law Tradition 
Hale may be viewed as an intermediary between the traditional common law views of Coke, 
and the 'modern' views of the positivist. The distinction is principally one of emphasis on the 
nature of law; the traditional view emphasises custom, whereas the modern view concentrates 
on legislation and law making powers. Hale admitted that the following were legitimate 
sources of legal authority: 
First, the Common Usage or Custom, and Practice of this Kingdom in such parts 
thereof as lie in Usage or Custom. Secondly, the Authority of Parliament introducing 
such laws; and thirdly, The Judicial Decisions of Courts of Justice, consonant to one 
another in the Series and Succession of time. "' 
Hale admitted, contra Coke's view, that the common law could, and did, evolve and develop 
whilst remaining identifiably the same; he famously used the imagery of Titus' body and the 
Argo to illustrate this point. 2' Hale seems to have escaped the pitfalls that trapped his great 
predecessor into treating custom as immemorial and immutable; all his emphasis is placed on ., 
274 See Chapter Four below at p. 275. 
27$ This is the role Sir John Laws appears to be claiming for the modern judiciary, see Chapter One, above at 
p. 26. 
276 Hale (1971) at p. 44. 
277 Hale (1971) at p. 40. 
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process and continuity. "" Hale also abandoned the notion that the genesis of each law needed 
to be identifiable. He stated: 
We have not any clear moments of the Original Foundation of the English kingdom or 
state when, and by whom it came to be made. That which we have concerning it, is 
uncertain and traditional, and since we cannot know the Origin of the Planting of this 
kingdom we cannot know the origin of the laws thereof, which may well be presumed 
to be very new or ancient as the kingdom itself. Z79 
This runs counter to Hobbes' notion of the original contract and is closely allied to Hale's 
view of the judicial function. Hale denied Hobbes' idea that the sovereign should perform the 
function of legislative interpreter, instead he embraced the idea that it was through long study 
and application that true understanding and knowledge is gained. Hale passionately explained: 
Now if any the most refined Braine under Heaven would goe about to Enquire by 
Speculation, or by reading of Plato or Aristotle, or by considering the laws of the 
Jews, or other Nations to, find out how Landes descends in England, or how Estates 
are there transferred, or transmitted among us, he would lose his labours and spend his 
notions in Vaine til he acquainted himself with the Laws of England, and the reason is 
because they are institutions introduced by the will and consent of others implicitly by 
Custome, and usage, or explicitly by written Laws of Acts of Parliament. "' 
Pocock summarises Hale's position on this matter thus: 
To know the English law, then, there is no other way but to learn what the English 
have at various times decided shall be law. Since it is essentially an assimilation of 
judgements, decisions, amendments and refinements of age-old customs, to understand 
it is to understand the process by which this accumulation has been built up. Hale 
follows Seldon in implying that the lawyer's knowledge is historical knowledge: in 
knowing the judgements and statutes of the past, he knows what ills they were 
designed to remedy and what the state of the law was which they remedied. In this 
way his understanding of the law's context is deepened, he comes to see a greater part 
278 Pocock (1957) at p. 179. 
279 Hale (1971) at p. 41. 
230 Cited in Holdsworth (1932) at p. 505. 
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- never perhaps the whole -of the accumulated wisdom with which the refining 
generations have loaded it. "' 
Although Hale's historical approach to law was akin to that of Coke it was far more 
sophisticated. It was also the foundation for a fundamentally different approach to the role of 
the judiciary and sovereignty than that of Hobbes. 
Hale on Sovereignty 
Initially Hale's approach to sovereignty appears substantially the same as Hobbes'. Hale 
writes: 
No good subject that understands what he says can make any question where the 
Soveraigne power of this kingdom resides. The Laws of the'Land and the Oath of 
Supremacy teach us, that the King is the only supreme Governor of Realrne and as 
Incident to that supreame power he hath among others these great powers of 
sovereignty. 
1. He hath the only power of making Peace and declaring Warr 
2. He hath alone the power of giving the value and legitimation to Coyne 
3. He alone hath the power of pardoning the punishments of publique offences. 
4. From him Originally is derived all jurisdiction for the Administration of the 
common Justice of the kingdom whether civil or ecclesiasticall, whether ordinary or 
Delegate. 
5. In him alone is the power of the militia of this Kingdome, and the raising of Forces 
both of land and sea. 
6. In him resides the power of making lawes. The Lawes are his lawes enacted by 
him. 
These are the greate Jura Summi Imperii that the laws of this kingdom have fixed in 
the Crown of England. 282 
11 Pocock (1957) at p. 173. 
282 Hale (1921) at p. 296. 
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These rights are similar to those retained to the sovereign by Bodin and Hobbes. Although 
the possession of these rights appears to confer an almost absolute power in the person of the 
monarch, Hale continues to state: 
Butt yett there are certaine Qualifications of these powers especially of the two latter. 
Though the legislative power be in the King, so that none but he can make Laws 
obliging the subjects of this Realme, yet there is a certain solemnitie and Qualification 
of that Power, namely with the advice and consent of the two houses of Parliament, 
without which no law can be made. And therefore proclamations cannot make Law. 283 
Then in a section that, quite clearly, refers to Hobbes, Hale writes 
There are Certaine Speculators that take upon them to correct all the Governments in 
the world and to govern them by Certaine notions and fancies of their owne, and are 
transported with so great confidence and Opinion of them that they thinke all states 
and kingdomes and Governments must properly be conforme to them. 
And these are some of the notions they vent. 
That there can be noe Qualification or Modifications of the power of a Soveraigne 
Prince but that he may make, repeale and alter what law he please, impose what taxes 
he pleases. 
That he alone is the Judge of all publique dangers and may against such remedyes as 
he pleases and impose what charges he thinkes fitt in Order thereunto. 
These wild propositions are 
(1) utterly false (2) against all natural Justice (3) Pernicious to the government ... 
(5) 
Without any shadow of Law or Reason to Support them. " 
For Hale, as for Whitelocke, "the sovereign power was therefore supreme and uncontrollable, 
that is'absolute', but, it was a power within and not above the constitutional frameworki"'. 
This clearly differentiates Hale from Hobbes. Hobbes envisaged no constitutional limitation 
on sovereign power;. Hale not only envisaged the possibility but also believed that there were, 
according to the common law of England, such limitations in place. Hale's approach is more 
`83 Hale (1921) at p. 296-297. 
4 Hale (1921) at p. 297-298. `8 
Page 127 
descriptive whilst Hobbes adopts a more prescriptive stance; in this way Hale's approach 
bears a closer resemblance to that of Bodin than it does to that of Hobbes. 286 It is evident 
that Hale was more faithful to Bodin's notions than was Hobbes. 287 Neither Bodin nor Hale 
were involved in justifying or explaining the creation of the state in which they lived, they 
were content to accept the system under which they lived. They also accepted that 
sovereignty could be curtailed by its own nature and that laws relating to its nature could 
effectively limit the sovereign power. How such laws would be enforced was not adequately 
explained, but a doctrine of the rule of law was still in its infancy. Hale believed that the 
monarch's prerogative powers were a part of, and defined by, the common law. This implied 
that the common law existed prior to the sovereign (the monarch), or created at the same 
time as the monarch, contra Hobbes' assertion that the sovereign was responsible for all the 
laws. 
One final observation concerning the differences between Hobbes and Hale is that, whilst 
Hobbes fervently denied the logical possibility of mixed monarchy, "' Hale accepted that 
The modifications of government all various both in their kinds, Formes and Degrees 
some Monarchical Aristocratical, some Democratical, and some mixt of all, and those 
mixtures are of maybe Infinitely Various. In some constitutions one part of the 
sovereign power is in one part of the government another part in another. 239 
This acceptance allows far more flexibility in constitutional arrangements and is far more 
'modern' than any other aspect of Hale's writing. This approach bypasses the difficulties that 
were to beset the positivist writers of the eighteenth and nineteenth century; it is possible that 
it would also accommodate the' political' issue concerning the electorate under a democracy 
283 Yale (1972) at p. 147. 
=86 Mcllwain (1938) at p. 83. 
2$7 Mcllwain (1938) at pp. 67-68. 
" See above at p. 115 et seq. and p. 118 et seg. 
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that was to confuse some later thinkers. The significance of Hale's work is that he followed 
Bodin's notions of constitutionalism, that the power of the sovereign should be supreme, but 
that they should exist within the framework of legal limitations imposed by the-nature of the 
sovereign and certain other principles. The British theorists who wrote after Hale let this idea 
fall out of their thinking. However the influence of these notions may be seen in the work of 
American constitutionalists such as Otis290 and Samuel Adams291 and in the framework of the 
American Constitution itself. 
I 
289 Hale (1971) at p. 294. 
290 Mcllwain (1938) at p. 67. 
291 Mcllwain (1938) at p. 73. 
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Conclusion 
Coke's significance to this study is that he promulgated a theory discordant with the absolutist 
ideas that have come to dominate our politico-legal world. Not only did he advocate the 
supremacy of law, but also he did so as a sitting senior judge. Coke was, in modern political 
science language, an insider, a member of the political elite who expressed views at odds with 
the other organs of government about the relationship between the said organs. He envisaged 
the judicial function to be more akin to that in place in the modern USA than that in the 
modern UK. It is clear that the USA's system of public law owes much to the ideas of 
Coke. ' 
Coke possessed a certain notion of the relationship between the law maker and the judiciary 
and he sought to persuade his peers to follow his lead and act as constitutional arbiters, this 
view came up against James' notion of kingship and the ensuing conflict resulted in Coke's 
dismissal. This fact is significant in itself for it demonstrates that James retained a position of 
constitutional pre-eminence which some would suggest he had lost through his conflicts with 
parliament and the common lawyers. James' positioning of crown powers emphasises 
absolute control over the constitutional system, a position arguably filled by the modern 
executive. The history of sovereignty theory in the United Kingdom has followed an 
absolutist path, although this may not mean monarchical absolutism, and owes a great deal to 
Hobbes' formulations. 
What emerges from this chapter is that the ur-text of modern sovereignty theory, Bodin's 
Republique, and its most faithful English disciple, Hale, have not been given the position they 
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deserve. Subsequent thinkers have not accepted the formulations of sovereignty Bodin and 
Hale outline. Rather, it is Hobbes who has been the fountain of much of our theory relating 
to sovereignty. 
There may appear to be a gap, at this point, in the history of sovereignty theory. However, 
the events of the eighteenth century were, mostly, re-enforcement of the Restoration 
settlement. Blackstone was the most significant legal figure and his work was mostly 
codification of prior thought. I have explained why Locke and Montesquieu have been 
omitted 293. ' The events surrounding 1688, although interesting, have been covered in great 
detail by other commentators and I do not feel they add a great deal to this thesis, other than 
as interest value. The eighteenth century was a period of consolidation; it was not until 
Bentham, in the late 1700's, was exposed to Blackstone's Commentaries that sovereignty 
theory began to evolve again. 
292 Schwartz and Wade (1972) at p. 206. 293 See Chapter One, above at p. 48 et seq. 
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Chapter Three The Nineteenth Century 
Introduction 
The principal-reason for choosing to concentrate on Jeremy Bentham, John Austin and Albert 
Venn Dicey stems from the impact they have had on subsequent developments in 
constitutional law. This is especially the case with Austin and Dicey. Lamentably, Bentham's 
legacy has been less obvious and less influential than the other two, but he justifies 
consideration because of the ideas he formulated. I will introduce these theorists in reverse 
chronological order and analyse some points of similarity and difference prior to detailed 
consideration of their formulations of sovereignty. 
Dicey 
Dicey, as Vinerian Professor of English law at Oxford University, was a great academic figure 
during his own lifetime. His importance to the study of constitutional law survived his 
departure from Oxford, and his death. His major work, Introduction to the Study of Law of 
the Constitution (Introduction), was, and still is in some cases, a major textbook on 
constitutional law. Hood-Phillips recalls "Indeed for constitutional law in my student days we 
relied almost entirely on Dicey's book, hardly a textbook in the ordinary sense, which we 
treated more or less uncritically. "' It was, arguably, the first comprehensive 'textbook' 
devoted to explaining the British constitutional structure. 
I Hood-Philips (1985) at p. 589. 
Page 132 
Dicey described the lectures upon which the book was based to James Bryce, his friend and 
colleague, thus "They are simply lectures and intended to explain very elementary matters to 
students who seem to me in need of guidance. "I Dicey does not claim that the-work is 
original, nor "could it be seen", he wrote, "as truly novel. "' The concept of sovereignty he 
owed to Austin, the term Rule of Law' to W. E. Hearn, and his understanding of conventions 
to the work of A. Freeman. ' Dicey offered a codified explanation of the British constitution 
of the mid-eighteen hundreds, and grounded it in legal principles. 
Despite his assertion, the principles covered in Introduction are far from elementary. Many 
are complex and confusing and Dicey over-simplified them to render them comprehensible to 
students. The terms Dicey uses have defined the language of constitutional law; his expressed 
views have become orthodoxy - Mount states "Dicey's word has, in some respects, become 
the only written constitution we have. "' In an era where legitimacy and democracy were 
relatively young, and yet formed the crux of much political and legal debate, Dicey's work 
provided a clear explanation of why the British parliamentary system of government satisfied 
the requirements of both. Dicey explained political reality in terms of legal principle and 
appeared to reconcile the notions of absolute sovereignty and the rule of law. 
Dicey's views have influenced academic lawyers, practitioners, politicians and judges. His 
Introduction has been cited as authority in court and parliament. " Although this is significant 
for the development of constitutional theory, it is not surprising; Dicey was, in all likelihood, 
Ms. Bryce, Papers 3,2 Sept. 1884 (Fol. 44) Bodleian Library, Oxford. 
Ms. Bryce, Papers 2,9 Dec. 1884 (Fol. 55) Bodleian Library, Oxford. 
McAuslan and McEldowney (1985) at p. 40. 
Mount (1992) at p. 43. 
6 Gibson v. Lord Advocate f 19751 SIT 138. 
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a teacher to many of the politicians, practitioners and judges of the first half of this century. 
If Dicey did not teach them directly his Introduction was probably one of their textbooks. 
Directly addressing the question of Dicey's influence over the teaching of public law, 
Blackburn observes that the significance of the Introduction can be evidenced through the 
high incidence of questions relating to its content appearing in university question papers. ' 
One reason for Dicey's pre-eminence is that, unlike Bentham's confused writing styles and 
Austin's repetitiveness and turgid writing, ' his 
clarity of style and economy of expression commended his writings to a wide audience 
both nationally and internationally. Students of constitutional law were attracted by 
Dicey's convenient format which encouraged certainty and precision in a subject 
which was vague and imprecise. " 
Because Dicey's work is easy to read and presents his theories in simple format it made 
constitutional law accessible to all levels of student. 
Significantly, Dicey was primarily interested in constitutional law; the other two (Bentharn 
and Austin) considered more theoretical jurisprudence. This explains some of the differences, 
particularly in approach, between Dicey and the others. It may explain why Dicey was so 
determined to divorce the legal and political spheres from each other; he was less concerned 
with the structure of the legal system and the basis of legal obedience. Dicey could, 
therefore, remove matters of morality and politics from his theory, or so he thought. Dicey 
simply accepted the politico-legal structure of Britain; it was outside his remit to analyse or 
7 Blackburn (1985) at p. 679. 
$ See below at p. 137 et seq. 
9 See below at p. 160 et seq. 
11 McEldowney (1985) at p. 41. 
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justify its foundations. Austin and Bentham were not so lucky their ambitions meant they 
could not ignore questions concerning the foundations of the state. This is why, I feel, 
Bentham and Austin present a more sophisticated picture of politico-legal relationships, 
particularly so in Bentham's case. 
Austin 
A survey of Austin's life reveals failure following failure: in the army, as a barrister and as a 
lecturer. His major work is turgid, and his theses difficult to extract. Yet the traditional view 
of Austin is as "the fount of nineteenth century positivism"" and the father of modern English 
jurisprudence. Austin's positivist notions of sovereignty form the foundation of much 
subsequent constitutional thought. The deliberate divorcing of ethics, politics and morality 
represent a particular form of shallow theory and has been the dominant methodology in 
English constitutional law since Austin articulated it. Austin's work was a product of the era 
in which he lived and, during the decades that followed, appeared to represent a logical 
explanation of, and justification for, the governmental structure that emerged. Stone explains 
that the 
stranglehold of the logical science of legal relations is ... 
in part, at least, ... to 
be 
attributed to the social trends of its own age and of the age which proceeded. It 
represented a systematic reaction from centuries of chaotic and fiction ridden growth 
of English law assisted by only spasmodic parliamentary activity. It reflected the 
young faith of the period in the newly democratised legislature. The analysts tacitly 
assumed what the Jacobins a generation before robustly voiced, namely that the 
lawyers may well be kept to their logic chopping, it being for the legislature to define 
the purposes of the law. 12 
" Lloyd (1985) at p. 256. 
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Austin was also influenced by the political and legal thoughts of Bentham. Austin's esteem of 
Bentham is demonstrated in the much used quotation concerning Hobbes and illimitable 
sovereignty: "I know of no other writer excepting our great contemporary, Jeremy Bentham, 
who has uttered so many truths at once new and important concerning the necessary structure 
of supreme political government. "" However, as Hart notes, Austin was not above criticising 
his mentor. Austin, however, never thought "to mention, that Bentham's doctrine of 
sovereignty differed from his own in certain important respects' " or to explain those 
differences in depth. 
As part of Dicey's importance to constitutional law stems from the significance of his major 
literary work so too does Austin's. His Province of Jurisprudence Determined (Province) 
was one of the first 'textbooks' on jurisprudence. The analytical jurisprudence and positivism 
it advocates has formed the core of English jurisprudence since it was first published. It has 
been taught to students and will, therefore, have affected those students when they became 
practitioners and judges. Much of the modern understanding of Austin's thought stems from 
what he said in Province, as a result I shall concentrate on this text. 
Although Austin's positivism has been subject to extensive criticism his view of sovereignty, 
as presented by Dicey, still finds pre-eminence in the British political system today. 
Bentham 
Bentham, unlike the previous two theorists, is not universally regarded as a major influence 
on the development of British constitutional law. For a number of years the view that he 
12 Stone (1947) at p. 4-5. 
13 Hart (1957) at p. 225. 
14 Hart (1957) at p. 225-6. 
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"was not a great original thinker"" dominated the legal world. This view has come to be 
challenged, particularly in the field of analytical jurisprudence. t6 
There are numerous reasons for Bentham's position and significance in jurisprudence and 
constitutional theory being underestimated. One of the most significant of these is Bentham's 
attitude to certain professional legal institutions and attitudes. Schofield suggests that the 
universities, which emerged over the last century as the. major providers of legal education, 
wished for professional legal acceptance of the formal education they provided. They, 
therefore, ignored Bentham when compiling syllabuses on the grounds that he was too ardent 
a critic of that body they were attempting to woo. " Austin's approach in Province on the 
other hand, 
Struck a harmonious note with the academic lawyers who, during the latter half of the 
century, were just becoming established in the English universities. This group 
needed to be able to identify a role for themselves that would both establish their 
credibility as legal scientists and aid their quest for legitimacy in the eyes of both the 
universities and the legal profession. Austin's method, which served both to define an 
autonomous area of study and to restrict the province of the jurist to that of 
exposition, analysis, and ordering, met both requirements. " 
Another reason is that Bentham's style of writing lacks structure and clarity; he produced a 
massive quantity of work, some of it unfinished, over a long career during which his notions 
changed dramatically. Ascertaining Bentham's position on any point, therefore, proves 
problematic. This is particularly so in the fields of constitutional law and politics where some 
marked changes in his beliefs were triggered by his conversion to democracy-19 
is Hearnshaw (1932) at p. 160. 
16 See Hart (1957) and Burns (1973). 
17 Schofield (1993) at p. 58. 
'$ Loughlin (1992) at p. 21. 
19 Dinwiddy (1989) at p. 73. 
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A crucial reason for the underestimation of Bentham's as a constitutional thinker is that Of 
Laws in General (OLG), Bentham's "greatest" contribution to analytical jurisprudence20 lay 
undiscovered for 160 years until 1945 when Professor Everett discovered and published it, 
under the title The Limits of Jurisprudence Defined" It was not until 1970 that a definitive 
edition was published under the correct title. ' This complex work contains sophisticated 
logical analysis of many aspects of the law, particularly the nature of sovereignty and the 
sovereign, and "anticipates certain themes of twentieth century jurisprudence. "" Like much 
of what he wrote OLG is sometimes difficult to read, for example many of Bentham's most 
insightful observations are located in convoluted footnotes. 
Although OLG and Province are, at first sight, similar in the theories they propound, 
"Bentham expounds these ideas with far greater subtlety and flexibility than Austin and 
illuminates aspects of law largely neglected by [Austin]. X24 
Close examination of Austinian and Benthamite views demonstrates that although Austin 
"was greatly influenced by Bentham"" there are great differences between them. One of the 
foremost was in their approach, Loughlin explains: 
Bentham was motivated by the desire to develop a censorial jurisprudence [and] 
Austin's primary objective was simply to produce an expository jurisprudence. 
Bentham's thrust was utilitarian; he used the principle of utility as an instrument of law 
reform. Austin's approach was essentially positivist, he sought a method of defining 
20 Hart (1982) at p. 108. 
21 Hart (1982) at p. 107. 
2= Published by University of London, Athlone press, London, 1970. 
2' Hart (1957) at p. 328. 
24 Hart (1982) at p. 108. 
ZS Loughlin (1992)at p. 20. 
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law, systematically classifying its elements and developing the conceptual apparatus 
through which it could be'scientifically' understood. -6 
Bentham was writing about a theory with both legal and political aspects and was willing to 
accept that one affected the other. Austin was writing from an almost exclusively legal 
perspective and denied intercourse with other subject areas. 
As a consequence of this difference in approach Bentham draws different conclusions than 
does Austin. Foremost amongst these, as far as this thesis is concerned, is the fact that: 
Instead of the uncompromising [Austinian] doctrine that there must in any legal 
system be a single sovereign person or body of persons whose legislative powers are 
legally unlimited, Bentham carefully canvasses the idea that the habit of obedience on 
which for him, as for Austin, legal sovereignty rests, might be susceptible to various 
interacting modifications. It might be, for example, partial or divided' 
Whilst Bentham, like Austin and Dicey, "accepted that the sovereignty of the King in 
Parliament in Great Britain was subject to no legal limitations"' he "felt misgivings about the 
general doctrine. However, his doubts and the qualifications which he sought to introduce 
into the doctrine are never fully developed and are sometimes obscure. i29 In addition, unlike 
either of the other two, "[Bentham] was not in the least tempted to believe that a satisfactory 
theory of law must be modelled on the pattern of British institutions. "'o 
Summary 
Bentham's ideas on sovereignty were closely linked to his radical political beliefs and he was 
willing to ground his views on sovereignty on political reality and could, therefore, assert the 
26 Loughlin (1992)at p. 20. 
27 Hart (1982) at p. 108. 
`3 Hart (1982) at p. 223. 
29 Hart (1982) at p. 223. 
30 Hart (1982) at p. 223. 
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idea of legal limitation. Austin sought to isolate politics, ethics, morality et al, from legal 
study but recognised that there were situations where the governmental structure and system 
could not be explained by law alone. Austin, therefore, included an idea Dicey palled 
"political sovereignty"" the result is an unsatisfactory blend of legalism and limitation. Dicey 
denied that legal sovereignty was anything to do with the political world and was, therefore, 
legally illimitable. Dicey then had to explain de facto limitations in a confusing and 
unsatisfactory fashion. Bentham was interested in legal reform, Austin wanted to create a 
science of jurisprudence and Dicey wanted to demonstrate that the British parliament was 
sovereign. " Although there is an apparent link between the ideas of Hobbes and those of the 
nineteenth century thinkers, particularly Austin, there were substantial differences between 
their various formulations. 33 The nineteenth century theorists used Hobbes' ideas, but they 
excluded elements of his work that they could not reconcile to their formulations. 34 This 
resulted in a distortion of what Hobbes said. 
All three had different agendas, styles and perceptions. It would be incorrect to depict them 
as 'a school of thought' or in terms of a lineal progression. Bentham influenced Austin who 
influenced Dicey, but the differences between them warrant individual consideration. Such 
consideration, I trust, will demonstrate that the traditional view of Dicey's formulation, as 
defining and explaining the British constitution, was misplaced and that Bentham's 
formulation is more valuable and should be given greater consideration when we seek a 
theoretical explanation of sovereignty in the United Kingdom today. Indeed to present all 
three as positivists is misleading for such a phrase has specific modern connotations that do 
31 Dicey (1885) at pp. 64-65. 
32 For evidence see Dicey (1885) at p. 4. 
33 Francis (1980) at p. 527. 
", Francis (1980) at p. 538. 
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not apply to these three figures., However, it is important to note that all three, to some 
extent, did employ similar methodologies, for example they relied on preceding ideas, in 
particularly those relating to the rule of law. 35 
Jeremy Bentham 
Bentham's use of Sovereignty 
For Bentham, as for most positivists and common law theorists, the importance of 
sovereignty theory stems from his definition of law. Bentham asserted: 
a law may be defined as an assemblage of signs declarative of a volition conceived or 
adopted by the sovereign in a state concerning the conduct to be observed in a certain 
case by a certain person or class of persons, who in the casein question are or are 
supposed to be subject to his power. "' 
Thus, as Schofield notes, "the idea of a law (implies] that of a sovereign. "" Without a 
sovereign there can be no laws and this results in sovereignty assuming a central position in 
positivist theory. 
Bentham's notions of sovereignty can be first seen in his Fragment on Government 
(Fragment). Described by Montague as "an essay on sovereignty"" this work is essentially a 
reply to Blackstone's assertions regarding the law and constitution of England, as outlined in 
his Commentaries on the Laws of England. Blackstone's view was a hybrid 
positivist/traditional common law theory not dissimilar to that of Hale39 and represented a 
celebration of the nature and state of English law. Bentham, and later Austin, found the 
fictions employed by generations of English lawyers in order to make the law function 
's Loughlin (1992) at p. 150-151. 
36 Bentham (1970b) at p. 1. 
37 Schofield (1991) at p. 60. 
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adequately, and idolised by Blackstone as the personification of perfection, anathema and 
rebelled against them and the system of law they personified. Criticising traditional common 
law and Blackstone was to be one of the main stimulants for Bentham's work throughout his 
life. 40 Central to Bentham's rejection of traditional English Common Law was the doctrine of 
sovereignty with its associated curtailment of judicial activism and law making. 
Bentham and the Basis of Sovereign Authority 
There is another key difference between Bentham and Blackstone as the latter, like Hobbes, 
relied on notions of original contract in order to legitimise his conceptions of sovereign 
authority. 41 Bentham did not. Blackstone, like Hobbes before him42 employed the idea of 
Original Contract as a means for justifying the existence of a legal system. Although Original 
Contract was different in nature to purely legal fictions "in that it [was] not used in courts of 
law" it belonged to a "class of fictions Bentham was particularly concerned to attack. "43 
Bentham's attitude towards fictions is expressed in Chapter. 1 of Fragment where he states, 
"there was once a time, perhaps, when they had their use" but "the season of fiction is now 
over. i44 Rather, Bentham sympathised with Filmer, the arch-opponent to the contractarianism 
of the seventeenth century, and rejected the notion of government springing from an original 
contract. 45 Bentham points to Hume's Treatise on Human Nature as the source of his 
rejection of contractarianism. Bentham stated: 
3$ Montague (1891) at p. 59. 
39 See Chapter Two, above at p. 124-126. 
40 Rosen (1983) at p. 6. 
01 It was particularly important to Blackstone as it was one means of justifying his Whig interpretation of the 
events surrounding the Bill of Rights 1689. Harrison (1983) at p. 36. It should be noted, as Bentham does, 
that Blackstone was not consistent in his use of sovereignty. Bentham (1977) at p. 439. 
42 See Chapter Two, above at p. 109. 
43 Harrison (1983) at p. 36. 
ea Bentham (1977) at p. 441. 
es Francis (1980) at p. 521. 
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I learnt to see that utility was the test `and measure of all virtue, of legality as much as 
any, and that the obligation to minister to general happiness was an obligation 
paramount to and inclusive in every other. "I bid adieu to the original contract. °6 
Rather than looking to some mythical historical contract, Bentham relies on a social fact as 
justification for his sovereign's power:. 
I say, the ultimate efficient cause of all power of imprecation over persons is a 
disposition in the part of those persons to obey: the efficient cause then of the power 
of the sovereign is neither more nor less than the disposition to obedience on the 
part of the people. ' 
In so doing Bentham asserts that the sovereign's "legislative powers were conferred neither 
by law nor by contract nor by any normative right or duty-generating transaction or social 
relationship. "'$ His reliance on "disposition to obedience", a simple social fact, is the strength 
of Bentham's formulation, it is also the foundation of much of his thought. Bentham uses this 
habit of paying obedience to define a political society, differentiating it from a natural society. 
Further, in Fragment, he indicates that the person, or group of persons, to whom such 
obedience is owed, is the governor, or are the governors; this person or group of people is 
the sovereign. 49 Bentham elaborates in OLG where he states that in most situations: 
The authority of the sovereign is founded or at least in a great degree influenced by 
custom and disposition: On a habit of commanding on one side, accompanied by a 
habit of obeying on the other: and more immediately on the one part in a disposition 
on the one part to expect obedience, on the other part in the disposition to pay it, 
according to the source of that custom from whence the disposition takes its rise. 50 
a6 Bentham (1977) at p. 439-441. 
47 Bentham (1970) at p. 18. Emphasis added. °$ Hart (1982) at p. 221. 
49 Bentham (1977) at p. 428. 
50 Bentham (1970b) at p. 109. 
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Bentham and Divided Sovereignty 
Bentham's notion of habitual obedience is far more sophisticated than the one Austin was to 
adopts` Bentham admits, in a crucial footnote, that "it may happen that one person or set of 
persons shall be sovereign in some cases while another is completely so in other cases. "52 
This marks a significant break from what Hobbes said, goes further than Bodin and is 
completely at odds with, Blackstone's assertion that "there is and must be in every state a 
supreme irresistible absolute and uncontrolled authority in which the summa Jura imperil or 
the rights of sovereignty reside. "" The foundation for Bentham's claim is that "The people 
may be disposed to obey the commands of one man against all the world in relation to one 
sort of act, those of another man in relation to another sort of act. 1154 Where there is such a 
division the disparate bodies, or people, to whom habits of obedience are owed "may be 
considered as composing all together but one sovereign. "" 
.. 
Bentham was able to go beyond the limitations ofBodin and Hobbes and imagine a 
constitution where competence is divided between various governmental bodies. He is more 
sophisticated still in recognising that the populace "may be disposed to obey a man if he 
commands a given sort of act: they may not be disposed to obey him if he forbids it and vice 
versa. 1156 This statement acknowledges that different governmental bodies could have 
different roles to play in legislating. It further acknowledges that just as attempts to legislate 
on subject matter outside a body's remit will not be deemed to be law, so acts that impinge on 
another body's area of competence will be deemed not to be law. 
s' See below at p. 164. 
52 Bentham (1970b) at p. 18 note b. 
ss Blackstone (1769) 149. 
s4 Bentham (1970b) at p. 18, note b. 
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Through the acceptance of divided sovereignty Bentham could more easily incorporate a 
federal constitution within his theory. Thus, Bentham succeeded where Austin was to fail. 57 
Bentham even recognised one of the clearest difficulties facing a mixed constitution: "In some 
of these cases, sharp, one should think, must be the eye that can detect encroachments, and 
resolute the hand that can bear up against them, and that can say to the torrent of sovereign 
power, this far shalt thou go and no further. "" Bentham does not explore this idea much 
further, but this passage lays out the constitutional position of a federal court akin to the 
Supreme Court of the USA. It is not too far away from the position of a court in any system 
that has a mature notion of the rule of law or a strict separation of powers. 
It is significant that all these groups to whom the populace owe habitual obedience together 
constitute a sovereign, the supreme body. Nothing was beyond this body, or some element of 
it. Bentham avows, in Fragment: 
the supreme body cannot, unless where limited by express convention, be said to have 
any assignable, and certain bounds - that is to say there is any act they cannot do - to 
speak of anything of theirs as being illegal - as being void - to speak of their 
exceeding their authority (whatever be the phrase) their power, their right, - is 
however common, an abuse of language. 49 
Bentham continues to elaborate on this point. He suggests that if a law could be counted 
void it would result in a person who follows the mandate of the law being legally answerable 
to a person opposing him. Bentham cites the example of a tax collector collecting taxes 
under a void law: If the tax collector is opposed and is killed in his attempt to collect the 
taxes Bentham suggests the perpetrator would not be liable as a murderer. In the reverse 
ss Bentham (1970b) at p. 18, note b. 56 Bentham (1970b) at p. 18-19, note b. S' See below at p. 181. 
58 Bentham (1970b) at p. 18-19, note b. 
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situation, where the tax collector kills, Bentham, hesitantly suggests, the collector could be 
punishable for murder. He continues: 
To whose office does it appertain to do those acts in virtue of which such punishment 
would be inflicted? To that of the Judges. Applied to practice then, the effect of this 
language is, by an appeal made to the Judges, to confer on those magistrates a 
controlling power over the acts of the legislature. 60 
In the following paragraphs we are exposed to Bentham's objections to bestowing a power of 
constitutional review on the judiciary. His democratic tendencies and his inherent distrust of 
the British legal community influence this view; Bentham asserts: 
Give to the Judges a power annulling its acts; and you transfer a portion of the 
supreme power from an assembly which the people have had some share, at least, in 
the chusing, to a set of men in the choice of whom they havi not the least imaginable 
share: to a set of men appointed solely by the Crown: appointed solely, and avowedly 
and constantly, by that very magistrate whose partial and occasional influence is the 
very grievance you seek to remedy. 6' 
This assertion is based upon a parliamentary structure along the Westminster model, and 
would certainly not be true, for example, in a system where the judiciary enjoys a more 
popular mandate. Bentham denies that granting the judiciary the power to annul legislation 
would constitute granting the judiciary a legislative power: "The power of repealing a law 
even for reasons given is a great power: too great indeed for Judges: but still very 
distinguishable from, and much inferior to that of making one. "62 This demonstrates an 
important distinction that runs throughout positivist thought: there is an inherent difference 
between positive and negative acts, the former includes the making of laws, the latter 
repealing them. This distinction might be used to explain express repeal. 
P 1- 
59 Bentham (1977) at p. 485-486. 
60 Bentham (1977) at p. 487. 
61 Bentham (1977) at p. 488. 
62 Bentham (1977) at p. 488. 
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Bentham and Limited Sovereignty 
Express conventions 
Bentham accepted the idea that a sovereign power could be curtailed, albeit in limited 
circumstances. The key term demonstrating this is "unless where limited by express 
convention. i63 As shown, Bentham accepted that the populace might-be disposed to habitually 
obey one body on one matter and one body on another, what this requires is a "common 
signal" that obedience will be paid to one body in one area, and another body in another area. 
A convention provides such a common signal. The effect of such a signal is, according to 
Bentham, 
Either none at all, or this: that the disposition to obedience confines itself within these 
bounds. Beyond them the disposition is stopped from extending: beyond them the 
subject is no more prepared to obey the governing body of his own state, than that of 
any other. What difficulty, I say, there should be in conceiving a state of things to 
subsist in which the supreme authority is thus limited, - what greater difficulty in 
conceiving it with this limitation, than without any, I cannot see. ' 
Thus Bentham could envisage such a system and found support for his claim in the examples 
of the German Empire, Dutch provinces, Swiss cantons and Achean league. This 
demonstrates a reasonable degree of practical grounding for his theories. " In his later work, 
Bentham added the example of the Roman commonwealth, an example employed by Hume in 
Of Some Remarkable Customes where he observes that in the Roman commonwealth the 
comitia centuria and comitia tributa both "possessed full and absolute authority. "" In 
employing this latter example Bentham has gone beyond the federal and confederal examples 
63 Bentham (1977) at p. 458, see p. 145 above. 64 Bentham (1977) at p. 458. 
65 Bentham (1970b) at pp. 23,26, and 34-36. 
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he employs in Fragment and has entered the arena of alternative "constitutional arrangements 
which embody some kind of limitations upon power which is in other respects supreme. "67 
Bentham gives examples of limitations imposed by an express convention stating: 
Where the state has, upon terms, submitted itself to the government of another, or 
where the governing bodies of a number of states agree to take directions in certain 
specific cases from some body or other that is distinct from all of them: consisting of 
members, for instance appointed out of each. " 
These examples could be applied to constitutional situations today, situations an Austinian 
interpretation could not explain. 69 They are also different in nature to the limitations imposed 
on absolute sovereignty Bentham advocated in OLG. 7° Evidence for the difference comes in 
the fact that Bentham discusses express conventions in note a. on page 18 of OLG, and 
discusses mixed constitutions in note b. This is not a hugely significant point in itself, but it 
does demonstrate Bentham's increasingly sophisticated understanding of how sovereignty can 
and might operate and exist in a constitutional structure. 
Hart criticises the idea that limited sovereignty may be explained through a limited disposition 
to obey. " He does not direct his criticism against the idea of a limitation through express 
convention but, rather, against the idea of limitation through expression of a common signal 
that the populace was unwilling to obey the legislative command. In reply it must be said that 
Bentham himself only admitted such limitations as theoretical possibilities; he suggested the 
66 Cited in Hart (1982) at p. 227. 
67 Burns (1973) at p. 404. 
63 Bentham (1977) at p. 484. 
69 See below at p. 168 et seq. 
70 See above at p. 147 et seq. 
Hart (1982) at pp. 228-239. 
Page 148 
actual existence of such a signal to be "impossible. " It is not clear, from the terms of Hart's 
essays, whether he was referring to Bentham's conception in general or to a particular 
manifestation, such as that of OLG, or Fragment. 73 The logic of the arguments Hart 
employs, that the word 'habit' cannot adequately impute a limitation until it has occurred over 
a period of time, during which the theory does not explain the actual obedience, is clear 
enough. However, Bentham's use of the'disposition to obey' may, logically, follow from 
recognition of a 'superior body' (a constitution) imposing limitations, rather than limitations 
following from a disposition to obey. This may provide an answer to Hart's objection. Hart 
suggests that a repudiation of this idea follows along similar lines to that of habitual 
obedience: 
if the Courts operating under a written constitution recognise that the legislator's 
powers are legally limited they will be `disposed' to refuse to punish in certain cases 
where the legislator requires them to punish and it will make perfectly good sense to 
say that they are already so disposed on the occasion of the first attempt by the 
legislator to legislate outside the limits and indeed even before any attempt is made. 
But this disposition is a derivative consequence of a fact which escapes Bentham's 
form of analysis, namely the fact that the Courts recognise the provisions of a 
constitution as a standard of correct adjudication and so as providing a reason for 
withholding obedience to certain classes of legislative commands or prohibitions and a 
reason for yielding it to others. 74 
Hart continues to explain 
Bentham's theory of limited sovereignty as the correlate of limited obedience inverts 
the order of primary and derivative. The Courts are disposed to disobey because they 
recognise that the legislator's powers are limited, but according to Bentham the 
powers are limited because the courts are disposed to disobey-'s 
72 Bentham (1977) at p. 484. 
" Hart (1987). 
74 Hart (1982) at p. 238. 
75 Hart (1982) at p. 238. 
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But as Hart recognises, the real significance of Bentham's conception is that he does not 
blithely accept the "oversimplif cation of the doctrine of legally illimitable and indivisible 
sovereignty. "" Rather his analysis points out that there is a complex question, which requires 
careful consideration, including a consideration of the role the courts play in the question of 
limited or unlimited governmental authority. This fact that seems to have eluded Austin, and 
has not subsequently figured highly in the debates surrounding UK constitutional law. 
Unfortunately, as Hart notes, "Bentham says little about the juridical status of the express 
convention which may limit the supreme legislature. He does not tell us whether it or the 
limitations it imposes are to be thought of as legal [or non-legal]. "" Regardless of this, any 
breach of the convention would require adjudication and this would require another body 
vested with power to adjudge and punish, if necessary, the sovereign and the existing 
judiciary to be empowered to so act. 
Limitation through constitutional law 
Bentham's wrestling with the notion of limited sovereignty did not end with questions of 
dispositions to, or habits of, obedience. In OLG, Bentham admits 
There yet remain a class of laws which stand upon, a very different footing than have 
hitherto been brought to view. The laws of which we have hitherto been speaking 
have for their passable subjects not the sovereign himself, but those who are 
considered as being subject to his power. But there are laws to which no other 
persons in quality of passable subjects can be envisaged than the sovereign himself 
The business of the ordinary sorts of laws is to prescribe to the people what he shall 
do: this business of this transcendent class-of laws is to prescribe to the sovereign 
what he shall do: what mandates he may or may not address to them. Laws of this 
76 Hart (1957) at p. 335. 
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latter description may be termed in consideration of the party who is their passable 
subject, laws in principem: in contradistinction to the ordinary class of laws which in 
this view may be termed laws in subito or in populem. '$ 
Bentham continues to distinguish between two forms of laws in principem. He continues to 
distinguish between those which are essentially covenants between the sovereign and the 
populace, designed to bind the sovereign himself, which Bentham terms pacta regalia; 79 and 
the second type which occur when the sovereign covenants that his successors shall be bound 
by its terms. " These latter instances are interesting, for Bentham states that the covenanting 
on the behalf of latter sovereigns has no effect until the subsequent sovereign accepts the 
covenant as his own. " This confuses the question of who's covenanting renders the covenant 
binding. Of this situation Bentham states: 
The causes which originally produced the original covenant and the considerations of 
expediency which justified the engaging in it on the part of the predecessor will in 
general subsist to produce and justify the adoption of it on the part of the successor. 
In most instances therefore it will have happened that upon any change taking place in 
the, sovereignty such adoption shall have taken place: it will have become customary 
for it to do so: the people influenced partly by the force of habit and partly by the 
consideration of the expediency of such adoption, will be expecting it as a thing of 
course: and this expectation will add again to the motives which tend to produce such 
effect in any given instance. So great in short is the influence of all these causes taken 
together, that in any tolerably well settled government the successor is as much 
expected to abide by the covenants of his predecessor as by any covenants of his own: 
except where any change of circumstances has made a manifest and indisputable 
change in the utility of such adherence. This expectation may even become so strong, 
as to equal the expectation which is entertained of the prevalence of that disposition to 
obedience on the part of the people by which the sovereign de facto is constituted: 
" Hart (1982) at p. 231. 
'$ Bentham (1970b) at p. 64. 
79 Bentham (1970b) at p. 64. "`. 
8° Bentham (1970b) at p. 64-65. 
8' Bentham (1970b) at p. 65. 
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inasmuch that the observance, of the covenant on the one part shall be looked upon as 
a condition sine qua non to the obedience that is to be paid on the other. ' 
Although couched in conditional language, the impression given is that it is possible to 
impose limitations on subsequent sovereigns. 
Bentham, in his Fallacies, appears to contradict this point. This fact partially demonstrates 
Bentham's inconsistencies. He wrote: 
A law, no matter to what effect, is proposed to a legislative assembly, and no matter 
in what way, it is by the whole or a majority of the assembly regarded as being of a 
beneficial tendency. This fallacy consists in calling upon the assembly to reject it 
notwithstanding, upon the single ground that a regulation was made by the 
predecessors of the present legislators precluding forever, orto the end of a period 
not yet expired all succeeding legislators from enacting a law to any such effect as that 
now proposed. " 
The basis for this is that the advantage of the preclusion that existed at its conception may no 
longer exist, and thus allowing such preclusion would be contrary to the principle of utility. 
It is important to note that in the Fallacies Bentham was discussing a law, whereas the 
preceding discussion on limiting subsequent sovereigns concerned a convention. The 
differences between a law and a convention might justify the different stances Bentham 
adopted. 
One of the principal problems facing Bentham's conception of laws in principem, which are 
similar to Bodin's principles of constitutional laws touching the nature of the sovereign 
itself, 84 was enforcement -a problem that confronted Bodin. BS Bentham recognised this fact. 86 
82 Bentham (1970b) at p. 65-66. 
83 Bentham (1952) at p. 54. 
84 See Chapter Two, above, at p. 72. 
$S See Chapter Two, above at p. 73. 
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He considered two possible means of enforcement, the second and, for this study, the more 
interesting, is found in an extensive footnote. The first means of enforcement is along 
conventional means, discounting physical force, leaving political, religious and moral87 force. 
Bentham continues to assert that religious and moral sanctions could be levied against a 
sovereign in order to compel him, (it), to abide by laws in principem. 88 
The second, and more intriguing, idea is reliant on a particular distribution of governmental 
powers. It supposes that "there is no one person or body of persons in whose hands the 
sovereignty is reposed", rather it: 
Suppose[s] two bodies of men, or for shortness' sake two men, the one possessing 
every power of the state, except that the other in case of a public accusation, preferred 
in such or such forms, has the power of judging him; including such power as may be 
necessary to carry the judgment into execution. 89 
Bentham explains that "it is plain the sovereignty would not be exclusively in either: it would 
be conjunctively in both. "" Bentham explains how such a relationship would appear, in 
reality, stating: "in common speech it is probable that the first man would be styled the 
sovereign, or at least a sovereign: because his power would be constantly in exercise: the 
other's only occasionally, or perhaps never. "" Bentham's formulation partly explains 
questions arising in rigid constitutions, particularly evident in discussions on the USA 
Constitution, for example whether sovereignty is vested in the legislature, congress, or in the 
body authorised to adjudicate on matters of legality, the supreme court, or a combination of 
the two. This is a key question that echoes the seventeenth century question: who is vested 
86 Bentham (1970b) at p. 68. 
$' Bentham (1970b) at p. 68. 
as Bentham (1970b) at p. 70. 
89 Bentham (1970b) at p. 68. 
90 Bentham (1970b) at p. 69 in note n. 91 Bentham (1970b) at p. 69. 
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with the power of interpretation. 2 This question is also central to modern debates on 
European law and Human Rights. 93 
Bentham acknowledges that a logician may attempt to disprove this structure through giving 
a narrow definition to the word sovereign, and through a particular interpretation of inferior 
and superior. However, he dismisses this approach by stating that words are ambiguous and 
that until men are "sufficiently aware" of this, "political discussions may be carried on 
continually, without profit and without end. "' This view has some relevance to modem 
questions on the meaning of'political' itself. " 
Bentham was aware that the nature of government may change and his conception of the 
habit of, and disposition to, obedience allows for changes in the governmental structure. In 
fact the distinction between them implies that change occurs. If change was not a likely event 
then the disposition element could be dispensed with for the habit would suffice: past 
obedience would be sufficient to render the populace subordinate to the sovereign power. 
Bentham's prospective, and retrospective, approach marks him out from other sovereignty 
theorists, most of who do not consider the future when they formulate their theories. Many, 
therefore, often fail to produce a robust theory; rather they become descriptive in their 
outlook, a fact implicit in Austin and Dicey's work with their acceptance of the British 
constitutional structure as an ideal or model of sovereignty. 
See Chapter Two, below at p. 89. 
93 See Chapters Five, Six and Seven, below. 
94 Bentham (1970b) at p. 69. 
91 See Chapter One, above at p. 25-26, and Chapter Seven. 
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However, as Raz notes, Bentham 
did not have an explanation of divided sovereignty. He suggested no way of deciding 
whether a certain legal power is part of a sovereign power, and, if so, of which. Nor 
did he explain what are the relations, if any, between the. various powers constituting 
one sovereign power. Similarly, he did not explain satisfactorily how sovereignty 
could be legally limited. He was aware of certain legal phenomena which he could not 
reconcile with the doctrine that in every legal system there is one undivided and 
unlimited sovereign, and consequently he declined to subscribe to that theory-96 
It is this incomplete structure that opens Bentham to much criticism. He perceived certain 
possibilities, but failed to elaborate on them, and a number of them prove to be incompatible 
with the basic ideas underpinning his work, particularly the nature of a law. 97 Although 
incomplete, Bentham's work provides firm foundations on which we. could construct a robust 
and dynamic doctrine of sovereignty. 
Bentham's Later Works 
Bentham's later life, and in particular his major work on constitutional issues, the 
Constitutional Code (Code), demonstrates clear developments in his thought. There are, 
also, some crucial divergences between his earlier and later works. 
One of the most significant divergences concerns Bentham's objectives. In his earlier works 
Bentham is involved in a more theoretical consideration of law and sovereignty. In the Code 
he employs the practical workings of the British, American and French constitutional systems 
as a basis for the formulation of a codified system which was ultimately intended to be applied 
in a real system. This wish, held by Bentham to the last, 98 was doomed to fail. This marks a 
96 Raz (1980) at p. 10. 
97 See Chapter Four. below at p. 231. 98 Dinwiddy (1989) at p. 86. 
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significant divergence, because considerations of a solid reality, such as the British system of 
government, are more prone to the influence of personal belief. One of the strengths of 
Bentham's earlier works is that he is not limited by his own experiences. " In the Code, 
Bentham's negative experiences of British government are demonstrated. He was convinced 
that the governing elite was not representing the wishes of the people; he wanted to ensure 
that the ultimate wish of the people was effected, and that the government could not block 
this wish to protect their own self-interest. '00 In addition, Bentham was impressed by 
elements of the American Constitution and built in aspects of the divisions between Federal 
and State competencies in his Code. "' 
The Code has, as its base, the notion of popular sovereignty, not a wholly new concept for 
Bentham as it found an airing in Parliamentary Reform. `02 In the shortest chapter of the 
Code, `03 Bentham states, "The sovereignty is in the people. It is reserved to them, it is 
exercised by the Constitutive authority. i104 
What is really interesting is that Bentham does not continue to elaborate on what he had said 
elsewhere as to the nature of sovereignty, he simply prescribes where it ought to be located"' 
and employs the notion of "constitutive authority" to justify that location. Rosenblum, 
perceptively, notes that Bentham may be using sovereignty in a different fashion from that 
employed in a Fragment and OLG. 1 °6 She justifies this observation by stating that in the 
99 See above at p. 154-155. 
100 Dinwiddy (1989) at p. 83. 
101 Everett (1966) at p. 83. 
102 Bentham (1818) at Chapter IV. 
103 Rosen (1983) at p. 4 1. 
104 Bentham (1818) at Chapter II, Art. 1, at p. 25. 
105 Rosen (1983) at p. 41. 
106 Rosenblum (1978) at p. 74. 
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earlier works, concerned with explanations of legal authority and command theories of law, 
Bentham was using sovereignty in a juristic form and in the Code he was using it as a 
normative idea that explained the origin of power and justified its nature. 10' This is true, there 
is, however, a link between the two notions. It is only in the Code that Bentham really starts 
to consider the question of de facto politico-legal limitations on the sovereign and the role of 
checks and balances. He viewed popular sovereignty as a means of restraining the operation 
of absolute sovereignty108 and through doing so reduced the "power of... elites to rule in 
their own interest. "109 Bentham, thereby, recognised that the validity of laws ultimately rests 
on political consensus and the acceptance, by the populace, of laws promulgated by the 
sovereign authority. "' 
The Code should be viewed as a practical manifestation of Bentham's earlier theoretical 
formulations allied to a democratic ideal and reflects Bentham's disillusionment with the 
existing system. "' 
Bentham clearly realises that identification of this form of sovereignty with the electors will 
lead to possible inconsistencies with his previous formulation of sovereignty, and will 
certainly result in linguistic confusion. To resolve these problems he coins the expression 
"omnicompetent" in order to explain the position of the legislature: 
The supreme legislature is omnicompetent. Coextensive with the territory of the state 
is its local field of service; coextensive with the field of human action is this logical 
field of service. To its power there are no limits. In place of limits it has checks. 
107 Rosenblum (1978) at 74. 
108 Rosenblum (1978) at p. 79. 
109 Rosen (1983) at p. 12. 
110 Rosenblum (1978) at p. 92. 
"' Burns (1973) at p. 414. Bentham (1818) at p. 11. 
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These checks are applied, by the securities, provided for good conduct on the part of 
the several members, individually operated upon. " 112 
There are a number of important observations to be made: sovereignty is no longer, in a 
sense, to be equated with the power of the legislature, rather it is housed in the people 
invested with the "constitutive authority" to appoint the "omnicompetent" legislature. There 
are, also, checks as to what that power may do, but no limits: "' thus, through stating that 
operationally the legislature was unlimited, Bentham continued the notion of irrevocable 
laws. "" At the same time there is a clear limitation imposed on the omnicompetent legislative 
body, it may not enact legislation that will adversely affect the unlimited nature of future 
legislatures. This is a paradoxical position which, to date, no theorist has adequately 
explained, and which forms the mainstay of Dicey's formulation. "' 
Rosen has suggested that 
It was perhaps inevitable that once Bentham favoured representative democracy, he 
would have difficulty in combining the association of sovereignty both with the power 
to legislate and with a supreme directing power in the state. But because he did not 
formulate the notion of a supreme power in as rigid a manner as Blackstone did, he 
found little difficulty in depicting the people as sovereign and the legislature as 
omnicompetent. 116 
This was a difficulty that Austin was not to face for the simple reason that he did not attempt 
to reconcile the ideas of a sovereign populace and an omnicompetent legislature. Austin 
simply assumed that sovereignty was resident in the electorate, House of Lords and Queen. 
Austin lacked Bentham's political fervour and was far more conservative and wary of 
112 Bentham (1983) at p. 41-42. 
13 It is necessary to look at chapter VI, article XXXI for an exploration of these checks. 
114 See above at p. 151. 
115 See below at p. 194. 
116 Rosen (1983) at p. 47. 
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representative democracy. As such his theory was less complicated and beset by the 
inconsistencies inherent within Bentham's, more obviously political, and sophisticated, 
aspirations. 
Bentham differs substantially from both Austin and Dicey in that he did not believe that the 
British model of government was an ideal. His willingness to accept different arrangements 
of constitutional organs'17 gave his theory far more flexibility than that of his pupil, John 
Austin. 
f 
L17 Bentham (1970b) at p. 69. 
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Austin 
Austin's Objectives and his use of Sovereignty 
The essence of Austin's doctrine in The Province may be shortly stated: ' His object in 
his avowedly preliminary work [Province] is to identify the distinguishing 
characteristics of positive law and so to free it from the perennial confusion with the 
precepts of religion and morality which had been encouraged by natural law theorists 
and exploited by the opponents of legal reform. "' 
In doing this Austin was seeking to create a scientific explanation for law that would be 
applicable to all developed countries. This scientific meaning was intended to be logically 
consistent, not reliant upon assumptions of divine lawmaking, independent of morality and 
ethics and free from fiction. Underpinning this objective is the principle, common to much 
conceptual jurisprudence, "that there is something universal or general" to be determined. 119 
In the words of J. S. Mill, one of Austin's students, "Austin was attempting to free from 
confusion and set in a clear light those necessary resemblances and differences which if not 
brought into distinct apprehension by all systems of law, are latent in all, and do not depend 
on the accidental history of any. ""' 
There is clear evidence for this assertion, most clearly in The Uses of the Study of 
Jurisprudence (Uses), where Austin wrote: 
Though every system of law has its specific and characteristic differences, there are 
principles, notions, and distinctions common to various systems, and forming 
analogies or likenesses by which such systems are allied. Many of these common 
principles are common to all systems - to the scanty and crude systems of rude 
societies, and the ampler and more mature systems of refined communities. But the 
ampler and maturer systems of refined communities are allied too by the numerous 
analogies that obtain between all systems and also by numerous analogies that obtain 
"$ Hart (1954) at p. x. 
"' Jennings (1938) at p. 26. 
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exclusively between themselves. Accordingly, the various principles common to 
maturer systems (or the various analogies obtaining between them) are the subject of 
an extensive science: which science (as contra-distinguished to natural or particular 
jurisprudence on one side, and on another, to the science of legislation)"has been 
named General (or comparative) Jurisprudence, or the philosophy (of general 
principles) of Positive law. "' 
Austin continued to accept the fact that: 
In each particular system, the principles and distinctions which it has in common with 
others, are complicated with its individual peculiarities, and are expressed in a 
technical language peculiar to itself. It is not meant to be affirmed that these 
principles and distinctions are conceived with equal exactness and adequacy in every 
particular system. In this respect different systems differ. But, in all they are to be 
found more or less nearly conceived, from the rude conceptions of barbarians, to the 
exact conceptions of the Roman lawyers of enlightened modern jurists. "-'- 
These statements evidence Austin's stalwart belief in the existence of this common or general 
Jurisprudence that Austin equates with the Jus Gentium of the Roman lawyers. 11' This 
approach is open to criticism. Principles that may appear'general' at first sight, when their 
development is ignored may not be applicable in another jurisdiction when their purpose and 
history are examined. 124 Linguistic distinctness is another significant point. It is easy to 
translate a phrase, particularly a technical phrase, into another language according it the same 
meaning as a near, but not complete, match and so slightly, or significantly, pervert its 
meaning. Perhaps the most damning criticism that may be levied at Austin's approach to a 
general Jurisprudence is summarised by Hart: 
Austin is unaware that in committing himself as he does in this essay [Uses] to the 
view that Jurisprudence is concerned with what is'necessary' ... 
in the common nature 
10 Mill (1863) at p. 444. See Chapter One above, at p. 6. 
Austin (1954) at p. 365. 
1"2 Austin (1954) at p. 366. 
123 Austin (1954) at p. 366, note 35. 
124 See Chapter One above, at pp. 9-10. 
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of man', he has identified himself with what is most intelligible in the natural la,. v 
theories he despised. " 
The nature of Austin's objectives is problematic and there is a large body of literature 
regarding it. Stone, in a rationalist approach based mainly on the Uses, asserts, "Austin's 
objective was to develop a theoretical framework for understanding the Logical coherence of 
any mature legal system. ""' Austin sought "to suggest a framework for viewing the 
proposition of a legal order as a logically self-consistent system. "1z' Stone continues to state: 
Austin's theory is not a description of an actual state or of actual law. [Rather it is] a 
formal theory from which has been abstracted all reference to actual political and 
social conditions or to desirable political and social conditions. These definitions and 
the deductions from them belong to one dream of arranging .a body of law in a logical 
interdependent system. 128 
Thus: 
As soon as Austin went beyond the postulogical nature of his own conceptions, and 
sought instead of one, "authority", some "person" or "persons" who wielded "power", 
he had moved outside his own proper sphere of discourse. His main purpose and 
contribution despite occasional lapses was to suggest a framework for viewing law as 
a logically consistent system, it was not to provide a theory of how power was or 
ought to be distributed in society. "' 
This interpretation would have profound effects on criticisms of Austin, many of which are 
based on demonstrations that Austin's doctrines do not accord with the factual evidence. As 
Rumble notes "such criticisms assume that the purpose of [Austin's] theories was to describe 
125 Hart (1954) at p. xv. 
1`6 Stone (1947) at p. 72-73. 
"27 Stone (1947) at p. 90. 
12S Stone (1947) at p. 60-61. 
``9 Stone (1947) at p. 62. 
Page 162 
the facts. If Stone's interpretation is correct this assumption is unfounded. ""' Rumble 
continues, observing that: 
Stone cites a number of Austin's ideas in order to suggest this interpretation. The 
result is an exploration of his concepts of law and sovereignty that is not wholly 
indefensible. In particular it correctly indicates the high value that Austin attached to 
logical coherence and a certain geometrical precision. Even so Stone's account 
confronts a number of very grave difficulties. They boil down most fundamentally to 
the conflict between his interpretation and many of Austin's most distinctive 
doctrines. "' 
It should be remembered, "Stone does not contend that his interpretation of Austinian 
Jurisprudence is consistent with all Austin wrote. "12 However, as Morrison states, Stone 
explains away incompatible statements as lapses to which Austin was subject when he 
momentarily forgot that he was outlining not actuality but a logical dream world. He 
accordingly dismissed Austin's attempt to exemplify "sovereigns" by reference to 
contemporary European and American communities as an incidental weakness arising 
from Austin's departure from his proper sphere of discourse, contrary to his "main 
purpose and contribution". The major flaw in Stone's analysis stems not from what 
Austin wrote, but, rather, from the foundational ideas of utilitarianism. Principal 
amongst these is the fact that utilitarian thought was directed by factual evidence. 
Leslie Stephen, a man "personally associated" with members of the Benthamite school 
and the author of a three volume treatise about them thus evaluates their contribution 
to knowledge: "the strong points of Benthamism may, I think, be summed up in two 
words. It meant reverence for facts. Knowledge was to be sought not by logical 
juggling, but by scrupulous observation and systematic appeals to experience. " 33 
This debate is categorically settled by a quotation from Lecture V of Province where Austin 
states 
130 Rumble (1979) at p. 169. 
131 Rumble (1979) at p. 170. 
132 Morrison (1958-59) at p. 218. 
133 Stephen (1895) at p. 123. 
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'Tis true in theory, but then'tis false in practice. Such is common talk. This says 
Noodle, propounding it with a look of the most' ludicrous profundity. 
But with due and discreet deference to this worshipful and weighty personage, that 
which is true in theory is also true in practice. "` 
As Morrison asserts "all the first hand evidence shows that Bentham and Austin each believed 
that the sovereigns he described actually existed, and that the attempts which each made to 
find them were not mere fits of absent-mindedness. ""' 
Although Austin was determined to produce a general science of jurisprudence, it is clear that 
much of the evidence he produces in support of his notions stems from a limited number of 
advanced states (although Roman Law is classical in origin it possesses a more 'modern' 
sophistication and structure than many subsequent legal systems and value sets), especially 
the British governmental system. His formulation reflects this. 
Positive Law and Sovereignty 
Central to Austin's science of jurisprudence is the notion of positive law. Introducing his 
Province, Austin stated "The matter of jurisprudence is positive law: law simply and strictly 
so-called: or law set by political superiors to political inferiors. ""' In a similar vein, when 
introducing Uses, he asserts "the appropriate study of Jurisprudence, in any of its different 
departments, is positive law: meaning by positive law (or law emphatically so called), law 
established or'positum', in an independent political community, by the express or tacit 
authority of its sovereign or supreme government. "" 
134 Austin (1879) at p. 115-116. 
135 Morrison (1958-59) at p. 221. 
136 Austin (1954) at p. 9. 
137 Austin (1954) at p. 365. 
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These'positive laws' should be "considered without regard to their goodness or badness. ""' 
The rationale is that " the goodness or badness of a human law is a phrase of relative and 
varying import. A law which is good to one man is bad to another, in case they tacitly refer it 
to different and adverse texts. ""' Austin spends a great deal of time in Lectures 2,3,4, and 
to a lessor degree 5, in distinguishing God's law from positive law. I do not have space or 
time to consider such matters in detail on their own, but shall touch on them when necessary. 
It is necessary to say a little more on the nature of positive laws, or'laws properly so called' 
' as Austin terms them, before considering what he says regarding sovereignty. Austin explains 
that "Laws properly so called are a species of commands. But, being a command, every law 
properly so called, flows from a determinate source, or emanates from a determinate 
author. ""' The determinate superior is the sovereign. Attached to these commands was a 
sanction;. without this sanction the command could not constitute a law. This is a classic 
exposition of the imperative model of laws. This model has been subject to modern criticism 
that I shall not consider in detail. 141 
Throughout Lecture 5 of Province Austin continues to differentiate between what he called 
positive laws, laws of God and positive morality. Austin dismisses the latter in a number of 
ways and it is not necessary to examine them here. Although Austin admits that the two 
former classifications are both 'Laws Proper" he differentiates between them stating the 
nature of the sanction distinguishes them. He illustrates the distinction thus: 
138 Austin (1957) at p. 126. 
139 Austin (1957) at p. 128-9. 
Sao Austin (1954) at p. 133. 
141 See Raz (1980) and Hart (1994) for examples of modern positivist critiques of the early analytical jurists. 142 Austin (1957) at p. 134. -, . 
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If a man were smitten with blindness by the immediate appointment of the Deity, and 
in consequence of a sin he had committed against the Divine law, he would suffer a 
religious sanction through his physical or bodily organs. The thief, who is hanged or 
imprisoned by virtue of a judicial command, suffers a legal sanction through physical 
or material means. "' 
In the same way 
Rights conferred by the law of God, or rights existing through duties imposed by the 
law of God, may be styled Divine. Rights conferred by positive law, or rights existing 
through duties imposed by positive law, may be styled, emphatically, legal. Or it may 
be said of rights conferred by positive law, that they are sanctioned or protected 
legany. 144 
Although it is possible that "The body or aggregate of laws which may be styled the law of 
God, the body or aggregate of laws which may be styled positive law, and the body or 
aggregate of laws which may be styled positive morality. """ Positive law and morality may 
"sometimes coincide", such as in the case of murder, "" but they should never, according to 
Austin, be equated. The reason for this is that they have different sources and different 
standing. 
Having distinguished the nature of the various 'types' of law, or sources of authority, that may 
claim to be the law, Austin explains the significance of sovereignty to his conception of law. 
He states that 
Every positive law, or every law simply and strictly so called, is set by a sovereign 
person, or a sovereign body of persons, to a member or members of the independent 
political society wherein that person or body is sovereign or supreme. Even though it 
sprung directly from another fountain or source, it is a positive law, or a law strictly 
143 Austin (1957) at p. 181. 
144 Austin (1954) at p. 159. 
145 Austin (1954) at p. 159. 
146 Austin (1954) at p. 160. 
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so called, by the institution of that present sovereign in the character of political 
superior. Or (borrowing the language of Hobbes) 'the legislator is he, not by whose 
authority the law was first made, but by whose authority it continues to be a law'. 147 
From this it is clear that for Austin's model of positive law to function it is necessary for a 
sovereign, of the kind described by him, to be also present. 
Austin's Notion of Sovereignty 
Austin defines his notion of sovereignty thus: 
The superiority that is styled sovereignty, and the independent political society which 
sovereignty implies is distinguished from other superiority, and from other society by 
the following marks or characters 
1. The bulk of a'given society, one in a'habit of obedience ör submission to a 
determinate and common superior: let that common superior be a certain 
individual person, or a certain body or aggregate of individual persons. [The 
positive Mark] 
2. That certain individual, or that certain body of individuals is not in a habit of 
obedience to a determinate human superior. [The negative Mark] 
Laws (improperly so called) which opinion lets or imposes, may permanently affect 
the conduct of that certain individual or body. To express a tacit command of other 
determinate parties, that certain individual or body may yield occasional submission. 
But, there is no determinate person, or determinate aggregate of persons, to whose 
commands, express or tacit, that certain individual or body renders habitual 
obedience. "' 
By defining a sovereign body, when he asserted he was going to define sovereignty, Austin 
demonstrates that the latter, although distinct from the former, requires the existence of the 
former for its existence in a political society. 
147 Austin (1954) at p. 193. 
48 Austin (1954) at p. 227. 
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From the above quotation we can identify a number of characteristics which must be present 
before an individual or body may be considered to be an Austinian sovereign. The generality 
of bulk or a society must be habitually obedient to a determinate, common superior, either an 
individual or a collegiate body who in turn must not be habitually obedient to any other 
individual or body. This does not represent an entirely novel approach, as Jenks notes, for it 
was 
derived ultimately from Hobbes ("Law is to every man that which the commonwealth 
has commanded him") through Blackstone ("A rule of civil conduct, prescribed by the 
supreme power in a state, commanding what is right and prohibiting what is wrong"), 
and Bentham ("the will to which it (a law) gives expression either emanates from the 
supreme authority in the state or has that same authority for its support"). ' 49 
It might be reasonable to assume that Austin had managed to amalgamate the best features of 
the preceding theorists; unfortunately this is not the case. 
Upon careful consideration of what he wrote it appears that Austin actually disregarded some 
of the best, most sophisticated and insightful, elements of his predecessors. Thus although 
"Bentham's sovereignty is certainly non-subordinate and unique he never said that sovereignty 
is illimitable or united. ""' Austin never explores Bentham's ideas of limitation, or the 
possibilities they allow. In this way Austin disregards what was an enormous strength in 
Bentham's work. Austin does adopt the notion of habitual obedience. Unfortunately, this 
idea is subject to criticism as an inadequate tool for defining sovereignty. 
t49 Jenks (1933) at p. 74. 
150 Raz (1980) at p. 8. 
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Austin and 'Habitual Obedience' 
Austin's notion of habitual obedience is one of the central elements of his formulation of 
sovereignty. Discussing the creation of an independent political society, Austin declares that: 
Habitual obedience must be rendered, by the generality of bulk of its members, to a 
determinate and common superior. In other works, habitual obedience must be 
rendered by the generality or bulk of its members to one and the same determinate 
person or determinate body of persons. Unless habitual obedience be rendered by the 
bulk of its members, and be rendered by the bulk of its members to one and the same 
superior, the given society is either in a state of nature, or is split into two or more 
independent political societies. "' 
Where obedience is "rare or transient and not habitual or permanent" the "relationship of 
sovereignty and subjection is not created thereby between that certain superior and the 
members of that given society. ""' This illustrates the significance of habitual obedience and 
the interdependence between Austin's notions of sovereignty and political society. Political 
society requires a sovereign, and sovereignty is founded on the notion of habitual obedience. 
In this way Austin's formulation looks similar to Bentham's. They both accept the place of 
'habitual obedience' with its emphasis on the retrospective. However, Bentham also adopts a 
prospective approach in his notion of disposition to obedience. Such a prospective approach 
is lacking from Austin's conception. This is significant for the split emphasis on the past and 
future tacitly accepts that there could be a divergence between them. This, in turn, implies 
that the positioning or nature of the sovereign power could change. This proposition might 
explain the problems inherent within the succession of one sovereign to another. This 
proposition, and therefore potential solution, is absent from Austin's theory. 
151 Austin (1954) at p. 229. 
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Although habitual obedience seems like a simple enough test, it raises as many issues as it 
settles. For example: What frequency constitutes habitual? Does the entire community have 
° to defer all the time? How many people need to belong to the society in order-to render such 
ideas relevant? 
These questions are not easily answered, in absolute terms. Austin recognised this fact, he 
states 
Since these questions cannot be answered precisely, the positive mark of sovereignty 
and independent political society is a fallible test of specific or particular cases. It 
would not enable us to determine of every independent society whether it were 
political or natural. "' 
He continues to state that this positive mark should be used in extreme cases; it will be able to 
identify the societies who clearly satisfy this element of the test for identifying a sovereign 
body and those who do not. 1S4 However, 
in the cases of independent political society which lie between the extremes, we 
should hardly find it possible to fix with absolute certainty the class of the given 
community. We should find it possible to fix with absolute certainty, whether the 
generality of its members did or did not obey one and the same superior. Or we 
should hardly find it possible to determine with absolute certainty, whether the general 
obedience to one and the same superior was or was not habitual. "' 
It, therefore, becomes necessary to impose another requirement into the test for identifying 
sovereign bodies. Austin calls this additional requirement the negative mark of sovereignty. 
Austin explains the negative mark, commenting that 
152 Austin (1954) at p. 227. 
t$3 Austin (1954) at p. 233. 
Asa Austin (1954) at p. 233-234. 
iss Awn (1954) at p. 234. Interestingly he uses the example of the English Civil War, asking at what point 
did English society re-unite to follow a single body, and thus constitute a single independent political society. 
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in order that [a] given society may form a society political and independent, [its] 
certain superior must not be habitually obedient to a determinate human superior. The 
given society may form a society political and independent, although that certain 
superior be habitually affected by laws which opinion sets or imposes. 
The given 
society may form a society political and independent, although that superior renders 
occasional submission to commands of determinate parties. But the society is not 
independent, although it may be political, in case that certain superiors habitually obey 
the commands of a certain person or body. "" 
Austin recognises that, in reality 
If perfect or complete independence be of the essence of sovereign power, there is not 
in fact the human power to which the epithet sovereign will apply with propriety. 
Every government let it never be so powerful, renders occasional obedience to 
commands of other governments. Every government defers frequently to those 
options and sentiments of its own subjects. If it were not in a habit of obedience to 
the commands of a determinate party, a government has all the independence which a 
government possibly enjoy. 157 
In this way Austin is distinguishable from preceding theorists, such as Grotius - whom Austin 
expressly criticises158 - and demonstrates Austin's desire to ground his theory on fact. `S9 By 
allowing for transient obedience on the part of a sovereign, Austin demonstrates why 
international law, as it existed when he was writing, was adhered to by the various nations. 
However, Austin's model does not easily fit with the modern system of international law. 
Today, international and supranational law governs increasingly large spheres of law and, as a 
corollary, the domestic remit is diminishing. Increased globalisation has necessitated a more 
pervasive international law with the supporting structure of effective and enforceable 
sanctions. This is clearly evidenced in the evolution of European Law culminating, recently, 
156 Austin (1954) at p. 230. 
157 Austin (1954) at p. 242. 
153 Austin (1954) at pp. 213-215. 
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with decisions such as R. v. Secretary of State for Transport. ex pane Factortame160 and 
Francovich v. Italian State. 161 both of which have imposed anti-Austinian constraints on 
sovereign powers. The reliance on an essentially Austinian theory in order to explain the 
sovereignty of the British Parliament has resulted in substantial difficulties in reconciling 
European developments with the tenets of British constitutional law. '62 
Habitual obedience, therefore, forms the basis of both of Austin's marks of sovereignty and its 
significance should not be underestimated. Despite Austin's reliance on it as the foundation 
of his doctrine of sovereignty, and his attempts to explain and justify it, the notion remains 
inherently unsatisfying. 
Use of the concept of "habitual obedience", as noted by Lloyd, "touches obliquely on the 
point that every legal system is ultimately founded on some social fact for which no legal 
justification can be adduced. """ Austin, like so many previous'6° and subsequent thinkers, 
had to look beyond legal explanations for a basis for his conception. As Manning notes 
"Austin's point is that authority is merely the reflex of habitual obedience. ""' 
The point is that, whereas Austin suggests that habitual obedience is one of the hallmarks of 
sovereignty, the reality is that Austinian sovereignty is merely a term to describe the practical 
relationship between the polity and ruler. 
1 59 See above at p. 160 et seq. 
1601199111 A. C. 603, See Chapter Six, above for a discussion on this case. 
161 Francovich v. Italian State 119911 E. C. R 15357. 
162 See Chapters Five and Six. 
163 Lloyd (1985) at p. 348. 
164 Hobbes' idea of the original contract is akin, and has a similar use to Austin's habitual obedience. 
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The most significant question that this idea poses is whether Austin identified the correct 
section of society to concentrate on? Dias suggests, as an example of the majority being the 
wrong group to focus on, that the events of the Restoration could enlighten our: view of 
Austinian analysis. He states " It was the obedience on the part of the judges after 1689 that 
established the sovereignty of the Crown in Parliament. ""' Such acceptance had little to do 
with the generality or bulk of the people, many of who were unaware of the events unfolding 
many miles from their lives. Hart, discussing Bentham's limitations on sovereignty suggests 
that "until the attitude of the courts is known the significance of popular obedience or 
withholding of obedience cannot be known. " 167 Dias's example may be distinguished from the 
modern situation by the simple fact that today we live in a representative democracy with 
wider knowledge and understanding of events. This is not to disregard the argument in toto. 
An illustration of Dias' point could by found in the judicial events following the Rhodesian 
U. D. I.. 168 During U. D. I., as in the Restoration of the English Monarchy, the Rhodesian 
courts accepted the power (if not authority - if there is a meaningful distinction between the 
two) of the usurper government. The Rhodesian courts treated the decrees of the post U. D. I. 
government as laws, and lent authority and legitimacy to what was an effective, albeit 
'bloodless' and perhaps merely legal, revolution. 169 
Austin certainly did not explicitly examine, in sufficient detail, the role the courts did, or 
perhaps might, play in the process of obedience. This is a serious deficiency in his theory for 
he is failing to consider one of the key organs of government and administration. 
165 Manning (1933) at p. 208. 
166 Dias (1985) at p. 348. 
167 Hart (1982) at pp. 234-235. 
168 See Chapter-Four, below at p. 275. 169 For a general discussion of the legal events surrounding U. D. I., and an explanation of the idea of necessity, 
Eeklaar (1969) and Honore (1967). 
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There are other obvious deficiencies in Austin's notion of habitual obedience. One of the 
more important, which again touches on the role of the judiciary and is discussed by Hart, is 
succession. Hart gives a clear example of the limitations of'habitual obedience' in relation to 
succession. He states that if Rex I, a leader who has, for many years, been habitually obeyed, 
dies leaving Rex II as his successor, then "the mere fact that there was a general habit of 
obedience to Rex I in his lifetime does not by itself even render probable that Rex II will be 
habitually obeyed. ""' Hart continues to explain that 
If we have nothing more to go on than the fact of obedience to Rex I and the 
likelihood that he would continue to be obeyed, we shall not be able to say of Rex Ills 
first order, as we could have said of Rex I's last order, that it; was given by one who 
was sovereign and was therefore law. There is as yet no established habit of 
obedience to Rex II. We shall have to wait and see whether such obedience will be 
accorded to Rex II, as it was to his father, before we can say, in accordance with the 
theory, that he is now sovereign and his orders are law. "' 
Therefore, within the tenets of Austin's notion of habitual obedience, "there is nothing to 
make [Rex II] sovereign from the start. ""' This makes succession a very difficult matter for 
Austinian theorists to explain. 
However, a consideration of Bentham's theory, with its dual test of habit of, and disposition 
to obey, presents a more realistic explanation. Although there is no evidence to demonstrate 
a habit, there could still exist a disposition to obey. The disposition arises from the 
relationship between Rex II and Rex I, and the inherent desire, amongst a majority of the 
population, for stability in government. The passing of time will shift the nature of the 
"o Hart (1994) at p. 53. 
"t Hart (1994) at p. 53. 
172 Hart (1994) at p. 53. 
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obedience to Rex II from a disposition to a habit. Alternatively, before a habit can be said to 
have formed, the polity will abandon its disposition to obey and will effectively rebel. Such a 
revolution could take a number of forms and it is beyond the scope of this thesis to explore 
this matter further. It is possible that whilst one sovereign, say Rex I, is 'alive' or actively 
sovereign, there could be a disposition forming within the polity to obey the 'commands' of 
Rex I's successor. This view could be applied to the courts. The courts expressly obey the 
'commands' issued by the current parliament, but they also display a disposition to obey the 
commands of future parliaments. This may be illustrated through a consideration of the 
litigation surrounding membership of the European Communities, and by the existence of the 
rule that no Parliament may limit its successors. 
Similarly to his treatment of the courts, Austin fails to adequately examine the role of the 
executive. Although there was a less obvious and active executive during Austin's era, he did 
recognise that the king was an element of the sovereign, and the executive, in the United 
Kingdom, is, at least theoretically, constituted of the monarch representatives, and is vested 
with the monarch's power. This remains a weakness. Austin failed to foresee the emergence 
of a system where the executive dominates the governmental system, and the role of the 
legislative is effectively subordinated to the executive. Further, his theory cannot 
accommodate such a constitutional arrangement. 
Austin and Limited Sovereignty 
The most significant aspect of Austin's views of limited sovereignty is articulated in the 
following quotation: 
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it follows from the essential difference of a positive law, and from the nature of 
sovereignty and independent political society, that the power of a monarch properly so 
called or the power of a sovereign number in its collegiate and sovereign capacity, is 
incapable of legal limitation. A monarch or sovereign number bound by a legal duty, 
were subject to a higher or superior sovereign: that is to say a monarch or sovereign 
number bound by a legal duty, were sovereign and not sovereign. Supreme power 
limited by a positive law, is a flat contradiction in terms. Nor would a political society 
escape from legal despotism although the power of the sovereign were bounded by 
legal restraints, or the power of some other sovereign superior to that superior, would 
still be absolutely free from the fetters of positive law. For unless the imagined 
restraints were ultimately imposed by a sovereign not in a state of subjection to a 
higher or superior sovereign, a series of sovereign ascending to infinity would govern 
the imagined community. Which is impossible and absurd. 
Monarchs and sovereign bodies have attempted to oblige themselves, or to oblige 
their successors to their sovereign powers. But in spite of the laws which sovereigns 
have imposed upon themselves, or which they have imposed upon the successors to 
their sovereign powers, the position that "sovereign power is incapable of legal 
limitation" will hold universally or without exception. "' 
Certain elements within this notion have come to be accepted as tenets of the traditional 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, for example: 
1. Parliament has the competence to pass binding laws on any matter; 
2. no parliament is able to bind its successors in any way; and 
3. almost all legislation is subject to implied repeal. 
Austin lists two illustrations to prove this quotation: the union between England and 
Scotland and the Roman law of privilegia ne irroganto. '74 
"' Austin (1954) at p. 254. 
174 Austin (1954) at pp. 256-257. 
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Austin's arguments, that a sovereign body cannot be habitually obedient to another body and 
retain its sovereign nature and that sovereignty cannot be legally limited in any way, are based 
on logic alone. '75 If a legally omnipotent sovereign is a prerequisite for the existence of a 
political society, then the argument that the sovereign power must be legally illimitable "is 
irrefutable. ""' Any assertion to the contrary is, however, a flat contradiction 
only because of the way in which supreme power has been defined. The genuine 
question is, therefore, why this concept should be defined as legally unlimited power. 
Unfortunately Austin gives no satisfactory response to this question. Although he 
does attempt to demonstrate that the facts are compatible with his definition, he 
adduces no other justification of it. "' 
Austin fails to consider the possibility that the electorate, might decide to delimit the 
sovereign's area of competence through delegating but a part of their authority and power to 
the sovereign body, an idea akin to Bentham's partial disposition to obedience. "' This is, 
arguably, the case that has arisen in the United Kingdom over Europe and, more recently, 
Scotland. 179 The manner in which it has occurred has not only been through a parliamentary 
act, but one backed by a referendum on the specific issue, An explicit mandate for limitation 
exists, and, at the very least, a similar process would need to be followed in order to reverse 
the situation. 
Austin recognised that there are de facto limitations on the sovereign's power/authority. He 
accepted that 
"s See Chapter Four, below at p. 226 for a detailed consideration of the logic supporting Austin's claim. 16 Rumble (1979) at p. 168. 
17' Rumble (1979) at p. 168. 
178 See above at p. 144 et seq and p. 147 et seq. "' See Chapter Six. 
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In every, or almost every, independent political society, there are principles or maxims 
which the sovereign habitually observes, and which the bulk of the society, or the bulk 
of its influential members, regard with feelings of approbation. Not infrequently, such 
maxims are expressly adopted by the sovereign or state, but are simplyjmposed upon 
it by opinions prevalent in the community. 18° 
However, he continued to state 
Whether they are expressly adopted by the sovereign or state, or are simply imposed 
upon it by opinions prevalent in the community, it is bound or constrained to observe 
them by merely moral sanctions. Or in case it ventured to deviate from a maxim of 
the kind in question, it would not and could not incur a legal pain or penalty, but it 
probably would incur censure and might chance to meet with resistance, from the 
generality or bulk of the governed. '$' 
Austin says that when the sovereign acts contrary to these maxims it might be acting 
unconstitutionally, but cannot be acting illegally. It follows that whereas a sovereign may 
never act illegally it may act unconstitutionally. 182 In this way Austin admits that sovereign 
bodies have parameters to their power. He also accepts that it is possible to censure them. 
However the parameters and powers of censure are not legal in their nature. This represents 
an attempt on Austin's part to square his theory of legal illimitability with the social reality he 
observed existing in actual constitutional structures. 
180 Austin (1954) at p. 273. 
181 Austin (1954) at p. 273. 
182 A view accepted by some twentieth century judicial figures: see Lord Reid in Madzimbamuto V. Lazdner 
Burke f 196911 A. C. 645. See Chapter Four, below at p. 275. 
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The Structure of Austinian Sovereignty 
Austinian sovereignty has been described as a vertical structure. At the pinnacle is a 
sovereign who is completely free from legal fetters, but who pays transient obedience to such 
influences as international law and public opinion. Below this sovereign lies the body politic, 
the masses who constitute the inferior portion of a political society, who habitually obey the 
commands of the sovereign or who suffer the sanction, imposed by the sovereign, if they do 
not. 
Public opinion International Law 








obeyed by the sovereign 
------> Habitual obedience 
"---"-> Transient obedience 
This simple structure does not consider the role of any governmental organ individually, and 
it does not consider the placing of the judicial function: how the courts enforce the 
commands, why they enforce the commands, and why the populace accept the judicial 
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function and the judgments that are reached. It is the courts that impose the sanctions, and 
the courts, indeed, who interpret the very meaning of the 'law'. Placing the courts in a 
diagram such as that above is difficult. They owe'habitual obedience'to the sovereign for 
they apply the law, but they have other functions. Ignoring the question of customary or 
common law, they interpret whether a particular case falls within the terms of a statute and 
they then impose a sanction, which the parties to the case accept (on the whole). In criminal 
cases this action is easily reconciled with Austinian notions of law, for the coercive power of 
the state is behind the judicial decision, this may even be the case in civil suits. It does not, 
however, explain the relatively modern aspects of constitutional and administrative law 
(public law). The problem lies with Austin's identification of law with a sovereign's command 
(the imperative model); although this model explains positive laws, it fails to explain laws of 
empowerment or enablement. Additionally, there is no scope for Bodin's leges imperil, 183 or 
the constitutional laws anticipated by Bentham. 184 This is simply because it would be 
impossible for an Austinian sovereign to be bound in any position on any matter. If anything, 
the sovereign, and its constituent elements, has accepted a habitual obedience to judicial 
decisions and interpretations. What is clear is that Austin's model of sovereignty was distilled 
from his interpretations of the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century British 
governmental system, and that, assuming his notions were valid when he wrote (which is 
questionable), they certainly are not so today. Additionally, Austin was far less sophisticated 
or forward thinking than was his mentor, Bentham. Austin also misinterpreted Bentham's 
objectives and unfairly criticised him; he may, therefore, have prejudiced the minds of 
subsequent thinkers to the meaning and value of Bentham's work. 
'$' See Chapter Two, above at p. 73. 
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Austin did provide the tool of analytical jurisprudence that Dicey relied on, and formulated 
the foundations Dicey used to build his edifice of constitutional law. 
Just as Dicey was to struggle with explaining federal structures through his formulation, so 
Austin struggled as well. His notion of habitual obedience failed to explain the role of the 
body, - defined in article v. of the United States of America constitution - empowered to 
change the provisions of the constitution. This is one of the most telling modern criticisms of 
early positivism. 1" Dicey, through his failure to accommodate federal structures, is, perhaps, 
more culpable than Austin for the simple reason that he had more experience of such 
constitutional arrangements than did Austin. Austin's willingness tq locate ultimate 
`sovereignty' in the electorate is yet another weakness that complicates his work, and, 
although it is realistic, it produced difficulties when Dicey came to interpret it. 
184 See above at p. 147. 




Dicey is principally regarded as a constitutional lawyer, a man credited with articulating the 
nature of Britain's constitution. It is easy to forget, in the face of this fame, that Dicey was 
actively involved in political debate during the same time that he was involved in academic 
writing and lecturing. Dicey's political beliefs profoundly affected what he wrote. This is 
most clearly demonstrated in his books against Home Rule: England's case against Home 
Rule (1886), A Leap in the Dark (1893) and A Fool's Paradise (1913). Despite avowing that 
politics and legal matters should be divorced, it is widely accepted that Dicey's legal theory 
owes a lot to his political beliefs. If it were possible to say that a single political issue 
dominated Dicey's views it would be Home Rule. Mount states that. Dicey "fought against 
Home Rule for Ireland with a vigour and tenacity rivalled by no fit man in the British Isles. 
And even when that case was lost, he turned, right at the end of his life, to save the Union of 
England and Scotland from the agitation for'Home Rule all round"`. 186 Home Rule even 
affected Dicey's notion of sovereignty, Mount explains: 
According to Dicey it was the untrammelled power of Parliament which was the 
secret of England's power and glory; under all the formality, the antiquarianism, the 
shams of the British constitution, there lies an element of power which has been the 
true source of its life and growth. This secret source of strength is the absolute 
omnipotence, the sovereignty of parliament. "' 
The idea of creating a legislature of some form for Ireland and changing the nature of the 
British constitution, into some form of federal system, would, according to Dicey, destroy 
parliamentary government and erode that which he believed had made Britain great. '88 For 
186 Mount (1992) at p. 50. 
187 Mount (1997) at p. 51. See also Dicey (1886) at p. 168, Harvie (1976) and Ford (1970). 1 88 Dicey (1886) at p. 176. 
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this reason, amongst others, Dicey's formulation of sovereignty came to be the central 
element of his theorising, and formed the background to his other major formulations. 
Dicey was convinced of the importance of strong government, and at the time of his writing 
Britain was pre-eminent-in Europe and the world. The federal system of the USA was 
recovering from a debilitating civil war, and the other European powers - Germany, France 
and Russia - were experiencing political and economic problems, and so the British model of 
government appeared to provide the best model of stable, effective government. However, 
Bogdanor notes that in England's Case against Home. Rule, 
As in his other polemical works on Home Rule, Dicey was inclined to confuse the 
purely legal doctrine of the sovereignty of parliament with a statement about the 
authority which parliament exercised or ought to exercise. That political stability 
depends upon an omnicompetent parliament is a highly disputable thesis, one that has 
little to do with constitutional law, but rests instead on some fairly dubious historical 
claims. "" 
Interestingly Mount observes, that, today, Britain is not the pre-eminent world power, "* 
federal states and those with rigid and semi-rigid constitutions enjoy, at the very least, parity 
in terms of world standing and political stability, with the United Kingdom. It is an 
interesting source of speculation to ask whether Dicey would come to the same conclusions 
today as he did in 1885. 
What emerges is that Dicey's outlook was particularly anglocentric. Dicey, through his 
assumption that "the United Kingdom was held together through the authority of an 
omnicompetent parliament gave insufficient weight to the very real acts of political 
189 Bogdanor (1985) at p. 665. 
190 Mount (1992) at p. 59. 
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management needed to secure the allegiance of the non-English parts of the United 
Kingdom. ""` In short Dicey oversimplified, and overstated the reality; he did not give 
adequate consideration to the historical evidence nor did he properly explore the nature of the 
relationship between Scotland, Wales, Ireland and England. 
Self-correcting majoritarian democracy 
Dicey's belief that the British model of government was stable and effective was founded on a 
particular interpretation of the nature of the British constitution! Craig maintains, "the 
absence of constitutional review and the Dicean conception of sovereignty are firmly 
embedded within a conception of self-correcting majoritarian democracy. " 93 This 
interpretation emerges from Dicey's claim that: 
The permanent wishes of the representative portion of Parliament can hardly in the 
long run differ from the wishes of the English people, or at any rate of the electors: 
that which the majority of the House of Commons command, the majority of the 
English people usually desire. To prevent the divergence between the wishes of the 
sovereign and the wishes of the subjects is in short the effect, and the only certain 
effect of bona fide representative govemment. 194 
Craig continues to explain that, according to Dicey's understanding of the British political 
system, 
Representative government would necessarily produce a coincidence between the 
external and internal limits of sovereign power in much the same way that the invisible 
hand of the market ensured a correspondence of supply and demand. A Parliament 
duly elected on the extended franchise represented the most authoritative expression 
of the will of the nation, and the exercise of public power was channelled through 
such a Parliament. This Parliament duly controlled the executive and therefore the 
19` McEldowney (1985) at p. 666. 
19'2 Craig (1990b) at p. 107. 
193 Craig (1990b) at p. 108. 
194 Craig (1990b) at p. 108. 
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affairs of the nation should be entrusted to those approved by a majority of the 
House. 195 
From these statements, it is possible to deduce a number of features of the political system 
which were central to Dicey's notion of unitary, self-correcting representative democracy. 
Foremost of which is that parliament controlled and appointed the executive. 19' This was a 
common view, as may be expected in an era where constitutionalism was seen as a virtue of 
political government. As late as 1893, Lord Harrington stated: 
Parliament makes or unmakes our ministries; it revises their actions. Ministries may 
make peace and war but they do so at pain of instant dismissal by Parliament from 
office, and in affairs of internal administration the power of Parliament is equally 
direct. It can dismiss a Ministry if it is too extravagant or too economical; it can 
dismiss a Ministry because its government is too stringent or too lax. It does actually 
and practically in every way directly govern England, Scotland and Ireland. "' 
This proposition is questionable today, and even in 1893 or 1885 it might have been untrue. 
However, to Dicey it was a certain fact that "a modern cabinet could not hold power for a 
week if censured by a newly elected House of Commons. ""' Similarly, he believed that "all 
the power of the English State is concentrated in the Imperial Parliament and all departments 
of government are legally subject to parliamentary despotism. i199 It is on these bases that 
Dicey built his entire constitutional theory. 
195 Craig (1990b) at p. 108. 
196 See Dicey (1959) at p. 433. 
1" Craig (1990b) at p. 109. 
198 Dicey (1959) at p. 156. 
199 Dicey (1959) at p. 156. 
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Dicey on Sovereignty 
Dicey opens the chapter on the sovereignty of parliament by stating that "(from a legal point 
of view)" the sovereignty of parliament is "the dominant characteristic of our political 
institutions. "200 He continues to assert 
My aim in this chapter is, in the first place, to explain the nature of Parliamentary 
sovereignty and to show that its existence is a legal fact, fully recognised by the law of 
England; in the next place, to prove that none of the alleged legal limitations of the 
sovereignty of Parliament have any existence; and, lastly, to state and meet certain 
speculative difficulties which hinder the ready admission of the doctrine that 
Parliament is, under the British constitution, an absolutely sovereign legislature. °' 
From this it is clear that Dicey is incontrovertibly concerned with the situation of Britain. It is 
also clear that he is less concerned with wider jurisprudential questions that so plagued 
Hobbes, Bentham and Austin, for, as Bryce notes, 
The question, who is legal sovereign? stands quite apart from the questions, why is he 
sovereign? and who made him sovereign? The historical facts which have vested 
power in any given sovereign, as well as the moral grounds on which he is entitled to 
obedience, lie outside the questions with which the law is concerned, and belong to 
historical or to political philosophy or to ethics; and nothing but confusion is caused 
by introducing them into purely legal questions of the determination of the sovereign 
and the definition of his powers. `02 
Dicey was concerned with the question of who is the legal sovereign. He thought he had an 
answer and the Introduction represents an attempt to demonstrate that Parliament was the 
sovereign body in the British constitution. In this way, although his methodology clearly 
belongs to the 'school' of analytical jurisprudence, 203 Dicey's project was more humble than 
that of Bentham or Austin. 
200 Dicey (1959) at p. 39. 
201 Dicey (1959) at p. 39. 
20` E. C. S. Wade (1959) at p. xxxix. 
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Dicey clearly articulates his understanding of sovereignty when he state that: 
The principle of Parliamentary sovereignty means neither more nor less than this, 
namely, that Parliament has under the English constitution, the right to make or 
unmake any law whatever; and, further, that no person or body is recognised by the 
law of England as having a right to override or set aside the legislation of 
Parliament. 2 " 
We can see evidence of Austin's positive and negative marks here. Dicey takes these ideas 
further, through expressly applying them to the British system. He explains "the principle 
then of Parliamentary sovereignty may, looked at from its positive side, be thus described: 
Any Act of Parliament, or any part of an Act of Parliament, which makes a new law, or 
repeals or modifies an existing law, will be obeyed by the courts. "205 This explicitly ties the 
positive mark to the constitutional function of the English courts and outlines that the modern 
notion of parliamentary sovereignty defines the relationship between the courts and the 
legislature (Parliament). 
Dicey continues to explain the negative mark. He states: 
The same principle, looked at from its negative side, may be thus stated: There is no 
person or body of persons who can, under the English constitution, make rules which 
override or derogate from an Act of Parliament, or which (to express the same thing 
in other words) will be enforced by the courts in contravention of an Act of 
Parliament. "' 
Again the negative mark is tied to the attitude of the courts. The sum of these two marks is 
unlimited legislative authority being vested in Parliament, but only in so far as, and because, 
the courts accept no other source of authority. Dicey states, "The classical passage on this 
203 Hood-Phillips (1985) at p. 587. 
Z04 Dicey (1959) at p. 39-40. 
205 Dicey (1959) at p. 40. 
206 Dicey (1959) at p. 40. 
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subject is the following extract from Blackstone's commentaries. ""' He then proceeds to 
quote a long passage where Blackstone himself quotes from Coke, Hale and Montesquieu. 218 
The irony here is immense. Dicey employed Austin's methodology, and borrowed significant 
ideas from Austin and Bentham who in turn had borrowed from Hobbes. Austin and 
Bentham were responsible for vitriolic attacks on Blackstone's writings and ideas and would 
have been ardently opposed to those ideals underpinning Coke and Hale's common law 
beliefs. Hobbes was vehemently opposed to the common law views of Coke and Hale and, 
by extension, would in all likelihood have been equally ill disposed towards Blackstone. This 
citation illustrates Dicey's lack of historical method, and suggests that he did not fully 
appreciate Coke and Hale's approaches to the function and foundation of law. It also shows 
how a particular historical interpretation - in this instance a Whig interpretation209 - can shape 
a theorist's outlook. Dicey was clearly applying his own interpretation of history and 
documentary evidence and was distorting the works of previous thinkers; this is obvious 
when it is recalled that Coke and Hale were writing about parliament not as a legislature, but 
as a court . 
210 There may be a defence by stating that it is only through modern scholarship 
that such a view has come to be mooted. It is telling, however, that Hale explicitly uses the 
term "highest and greatest court" and that Coke's Fourth Institute is a treatise on the 
courts. 2' Dicey knew that Coke had asserted the contrary position (that parliament could be 
constrained by the tenets of common law, and that the judges could enforce this natural law 
against the provisions of parliament), "' for he (Dicey) cited Dr. Bonham's Case =" Dicey's 
use of Blackstone's quotation is typical; he cites eminent writers as evidence of a particular 
`p7 Dicey (1959) at p. 4 1. 
208 1 Bl. Com. p. 160-161. 
'09 Hanbury (1958) at p. 132. 
210 See Chapter Two, above at p. 94. 
21 See above at p. 94 for more detail. 
212 See Chapter Two, above at p. 96. 
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standpoint and does not engage in deeper analysis of what they said. Rather than accord the 
previous theorist's work the status of analysis, he uses it as factual evidence in its own right. 
He obviously falls into the trap Bagley highlighted. 214 Dicey does not attempt to 
contextualise what is said, nor does he see how it accords with other pronouncements the 
writer in question made. This demonstrates inadequate techniques of documentary 
interpretation. 215 Not only is Dicey's historical technique lacking, 216 his analytical process 
does not stand up to modem methods. Dicey did not attempt to analyse sovereignty in an 
historical fashion, just as he failed to consider how it might develop, 217 and this deprived him 
of evidence that the nature of sovereignty changes, over time, in line with changes in the 
structure of the governmental system. Dicey simply asserted that parliament had been 
sovereign since time immemorial, and presented the argument as self-evident. 
Structure and Content of Dicey's Argument 
The structure of Dicey's argument that the British parliament is sovereign is, essentially, 
negative. Having detailed high level criteria of sovereignty, Dicey's method of argument was 
to show that no other constitutional body exhibited the necessary marks of sovereignty. 
Dicey lists the possible alternative sovereigns, the Queen, "' resolutions of either House of 
Parliament, " the voice of Parliamentary Electors=° and the Law Courts; -"' he continues , to 
dismiss each in turn. Of principal interest for this thesis, is what Dicey said regarding the law 
courts (it would be too time and space consuming to consider all of Dicey's arguments 
213 In a note at p. 61-62, see below at p. 191. 214 See Chapter One, above at p. 13. "5 See Chapter One, above at p. 13 et seq. 
'16 McEldowney (1985) at p. 58. 
217 Thus failing to conform with Pollock's interpretation of the objective behind creating a science of case law. 
Despite his reliance on his science of case law. See below at pp. 190-195. 218 Dicey (1959) at p. 50. 
219 Dicey (1959) at p. 54. 
220 Dicey (1959) at p. 59. 
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relating to the other listed bodies). Dicey himself asserts that the topic of the law courts was 
too large for him to deal with in detail and, after directing his audience to read Pollock's 
Science of Case Law, states: 
All that we need note is that the adhesion by our judges to precedent, that is, their 
habit of deciding one case in accordance with the principle, or supposed principle, 
which governed a former case, leads inevitably to the gradual formation by the courts 
of fixed rules for decision, which are in effect laws. This judicial legislation might 
appear, at first sight, inconsistent with the supremacy of Parliament. But this is not 
so. English judges do not claim or exercise any power to repeal a Statute, whilst Acts 
of Parliament may override and constantly do override the law of the judges. Judicial 
legislation is, in short, subordinate legislation, carried on with the assent and subject to 
the supervision of Parliament. 
Pollock observes in The Science of Case Law, that "the ultimate object of natural science is to 
predict events - to say with approximate accuracy what will happen under given 
conditions. "113 Dicey maintained that it was possible to predict that the courts will always 
apply Acts of Parliament. This is not always the case. The courts have, periodically, refused 
to apply the Parliamentary Acts224 and, arguably, through the mechanism of interpretation 
they have subverted Parliament's intention by according a statute a different meaning to that 
envisaged by Parliament. Following Dicey's formulation we should have been safe in 
predicting that the courts would always have literally applied parliamentary Acts. However, 
as they have not, either Dicey's conception of the science of constitutional law is wrong, or 
there is no legal science along the line Pollock suggested. Alternatively, the nature of 
constitutional law might be changeable. 
Dicey (1959) at p. 60. 
= Dicey (1959) at p. 60-61. 
223 Pollock (1961) at p. 169-170. 
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Having dismissed the possible alternative sovereign bodies, Dicey discussed, and then 
dismissed, the claims that legal limitations, on the actions of a sovereign, stem from: the 
principles of morality, the prerogative of the Crown and entrenchment of legislation. To 
these Dicey adds a fourth 
Another limitation has been suggested more or less distinctly by judges such as Coke 
(Bonham's case (1610) 8 Co Rep 118, and Case of Proclamations (1616 12 Co Rep 
74. at 76. K&L 78, and see Hearn, The Government of England 2nd Edition 1887, 
pages 48,49); an Act of Parliament cannot (it has been intimated) overrule the 
principles of the common law. This doctrine once had a real meaning (see Maine, 
Early History of Institutions (7th Edition, 1905, pages 381,382)), but it has never 
received systematic judicial sanction and is now obsolete. ' 
Dicey treats the notion of legal limitation thus: 
The logical reason why Parliament has failed in its endeavours to enact unchangeable 
enactments is that a sovereign power cannot, while retaining its sovereign character, 
restrict its own powers by any particular enactment. `Limited sovereignty', in short, is 
in the case of a Parliamentary as of every other sovereign, a contradiction in terms. ==6 
Dicey's treatment of these matters is satisfying only in so far as we can accept that the 
theoretical arguments that Dicey relies on are correct. Dicey has firmly linked his 
conceptions to the Austinian notion of sovereignty, and has declined from entering into a 
theoretical consideration of the issues himself. 
This is a weakness. Austin's formulations were not robust and could not, easily, be applied to 
any individual situation other than in a very general fashion. In addition Dicey did not subject 
any of the writers he relied on to any form of systematic analysis; instead he accepted their 
propositions verbatim. Compounding this is a failure to consider the judicial evidence and 
M-4 See the examples of MacKenzie v. Stewart (1752) 9 Mor. Dic 7443 and R. v. Secretary of State for 
Transport, ex harte Factortame 119911 1AC 603. 
`25 Dicey (1959) at p. 61-62. 
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expose the case law to a rigorous examination. 
Dicey is too happy to discard ideas as 
'obsolete' without justifying his point of view through reasoned argument. 
He is equally too 
happy to simply rely on evidence that appears to support 
his arguments. 
Dicey and Austin 
Having considered the possible alternatives to parliament and'dispelled' any question of legal 
limitation on parliamentary activities, Dicey simply states 
Parliamentary sovereignty is therefore an undoubted legal fact. It is complete both on 
its positive and on its negative side. Parliament can legally legislate on any topic 
whatever which, in the judgment of Parliament, is a fit subject for legislation. There is 
no power which, under the English constitution, can come into rivalry with the 
legislative sovereignty of Parliament. No one of the limitations alleged to be imposed 
by law on the absolute authority of Parliament has any real existence, or receives any 
countenance, either from the statute book or from the practice of the courts. ' 
Dicey continues to assert that although the 'dogma' of Parliamentary sovereignty - as he has 
portrayed it - "sounds like a mere application to the British constitution of Austin's theory of 
sovereignty. "' He continues to state that: 
Intelligent students of Austin must have noticed that Austin's own conclusion as to the 
persons invested with sovereign power under the British constitution does not agree 
with the view put forward, on the authority of English lawyers, in these lectures. For 
while lawyers maintain that sovereignty resides in `Parliament', i. e. in the body 
constituted by the Queen, the House of Lords, and the House of Commons, Austin 
holds that the sovereign power is vested in the Queen, the House of Lords, and the 
Commons or the electors. " 
Dicey explains that: 
21.6 Dicey (1959) at p. 68. 
227 Dicey (1959) at p. 68-70. 
2-28 Dicey (1959) at p. 71. ,. _.. . 
229 Dicey (1959) at p. 71. 
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The term `sovereignty', as long as it is accurately employed in the sense in which 
Austin sometimes uses it, is a merely legal conception, and means simply the power of 
law-making unrestricted by any legal limit. If the term `sovereignty' were thus used, 
the sovereign power under the English constitution is clearly `Parliament'. But the 
word `sovereignty' is sometimes employed in a political rather than a strictly legal 
sense. That body is "politically" sovereign or supreme in a state the will of which is 
ultimately obeyed by the citizens of the state. In this sense of the word the electors of 
Great Britain may be said to be, together with the Crown and the Lords, or perhaps, 
in strict accuracy, independently of the King and the Peers, the body in which 
sovereign power is vested. 23° 
In a way Dicey is correct; it is easy to confuse the sense in which the word sovereignty is 
used. According to Dicey, Austin's partial location of sovereignty in the electorate appears 
misguided and likely to confuse. However, Austin was concerned with a far wider project 
than Dicey. Austin was considering political society as well as legal sovereignty whereas 
Dicey was concerned with a narrow attempt to locate legal sovereignty, a concept he had not 
adequately examined himself, and one which is not, necessarily, divisible from the notion of 
political sovereignty. Dicey's predecessors had, mostly, recognised that positivist notions of . 
sovereignty depend on notions outside the strictly legal sphere; social facts, rules determining 
the nature of sovereignty had to pre-exist the sovereign body, for it was they that defined the 
nature of the sovereign. Positivists subsequent to Dicey have recognised these facts - Hart 
and Kelsen accepted the need for rules above the'purely legal. '23 l 
Dicey accepts that "the electors can in the long run always enforce their will". However, he 
continues to state that: 
The courts will take no notice of the will. of the electors. The judges know nothing 
about any will of the people except in so far as that will is expressed by an Act of 
230 Dicey (1959) at p. 72-73. 
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Parliament, and would never suffer the validity of a statute to be questioned on the 
ground of its having been passed or being kept alive in opposition to the wishes of the 
electors. " 
This stance is questionable today. There is every reason to believe that the judiciary would be 
unwilling to enforce a law patently at odds with the wishes of the populace. For example 
where a referendum had formed the democratic legitimacy for a particular notion which the 
government now sought to undo - where there has been a clear expression, by the populace, 
of what Bentham would call an express convention, a situation which may have been created 
by enactment of the European Communities Act 1972, and may be created by the Scotland 
Act - the judiciary may require a similar political process for amendment as that which 
introduced the original measure. 
Dicey and de Facto Limitation 
Having laid out his arguments that parliament is sovereign and therefore legally unlimited, 
Dicey admits that: 
whatever lawyers may say, the sovereign power of Parliament is not unlimited, and 
that King, Lords, and Commons united do not possess anything like that "restricted 
omnipotence" - if the term may be excused - which is the utmost authority ascribable 
to any human institution. There are many enactments, and these laws not in 
themselves obviously unwise or tyrannical, which Parliament never would and (to 
speak plainly) never could pass. "" 
Dicey broadly categorises the limitations as internal and external. This was not a'new' 
distinction; Stephen drew a similar conclusion in his Science of Ethics in 1882 where he 
stated: 
Lawyers are apt to speak as though the Legislature was omnipotent, as they do not 
require going beyond its decisions. It is, of course, omnipotent in the sense that it c,. E 
23 See Chapter Four, below at p. 234. 
232 Dicey (1959) at p. 73-74. 
=3' Dicey (1959) at p. 71. 
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make whatever laws it pleases in as much as a law means any rule which has been 
made by the legislature. But from the scientific point of view, the power of the 
legislature is of course strictly limited. It is limited, so to speak, both from within and 
from without: from within, because the legislature is a product of a certain social 
condition, and determined by whatever determines society; and from without, because 
the power of imposing laws is dependent upon the instinct of subordination, which is 
itself limited. If a legislature decided that all blue-eyed babies would be illegal, but 
legislators must go mad before they could pass such a law, and subjects idiotic before 
they could submit to it. 234 
The Austinian/Benthamite influence is obvious. "Instinct of subordination" can be equated 
with "habitual obedience" and the nature of a law is shown to be dependent upon the notion 
of a command from a sovereign - although Stephen recognises that legislative 
omnicompetence is dependent upon the interpretation of law as a command, the imperative 
model. 235 
Dicey explains external limitations thus: "The external limit to the real power of a sovereign 
consists in the possibility or certainty that his subjects, or a large number of them, will disobey 
or resist his laws. " 6 Dicey's notion of internal limitations "arises from the nature of the 
sovereign power itself'. He explains "even a despot exercises his powers in accordance with 
his character, which is itself moulded by the circumstances under which he lives, including 
under that head the moral feelings of the time and society to which he belongs. "" Dicey 
brings the two ideas together by asserting, "The aim and effect of [representative] 
government is to produce a coincidence, or at any rate diminish the divergence between the 
234 Stephen (1882) at p. 143. 
'35 See Chapter Four, below at p. 23 1. 
236 Dicey (1959) at pp. 76-77. As illustrated by events surrounding the introduction of the poll tax. 
Dicey (1959) at p. 80. 
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external and internal limitations of the exercise of sovereign power. "" He continues to assert 
that: 
Where a parliament truly represents the people the divergence between-the external 
and the internal limit to the exercise of sovereign power can hardly arise, or if it arises, 
must soon disappear. Speaking roughly, the permanent wishes of the representative 
portion of parliament can hardly in the long run differ from the wishes of the English 
people, or at any rate of the electors, that which the majority of the House of 
Commons command, the majority of the English people usually desire. 239 
This analysis is all well and good, but today it is not certain that the majority of the electors 
agree with the "commands" of the House of Commons. Such implied agreement assumes that f 
a majority of the electors vote for the majority party in the House of Commons; use of the 
"first past the post" system cannot guarantee this result. 
Dicey advocates the division of constitutional functions between the organs of government. 
However, he fails to recognise that the object behind Locke and Montesquieu's notions of the f 
separation of powers was to institute a system of checks and balances to prevent arbitrary 
government, 240 not to provide a model of sovereignty where the only check on arbitrary 
government is the exercise of morality. 
Dicey's writing reflects a belief in the importance of morality: parliamentarians would not 
breach accepted norms of morality because they believed in the values they reflected. He also 
believed that these values were reflected in the larger political community, the electorate. 
When Dicey was writing there was a higher coincidence between the morality and views of 
the electorate, and those that were represented in parliament. This is easily explained. The ; 
=3$ Dicey (1959) at p. 83. 
239 Dicey (1959) at p. 83. 
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electorate of Dicey's day, and, more importantly, that which existed immediately prior to 
publication of The Introduction, was more homogeneous than that of today; the industrial 
working classes were disenfranchised until 1884, and women were not admitted to the 
franchise until the 1920's. Today, however, with a much-increased electorate and an 
expanded social and cultural diversity amongst its members, and with a continuing 
homogeneity amongst Members of Parliament241 there is relatively little coincidence between 
the internal and external limitations on parliament. 
Dicey's `Abdication of Sovereignty' 
In an interesting, but under-cited, and, I would add, under-appreciated footnote, Dicey made 
one observation which could have been used in order to explain many of the issues which 
have arisen around the notion of parliamentary sovereignty this century. Dicey states: 
Let the reader note that the impossibility of placing a limit in the exercise of 
sovereignty does not in any way prohibit either logically, or in matter of fact, the 
abdication of sovereignty. This is worth observation, because a strange dogma is 
sometimes put forward that a sovereign power, such as the parliament of the United 
Kingdom can never, by its own act, divest itself of sovereignty. This position is, 
however, clearly untenable. Z°2 
He continues to explain that: 
An autocrat such as the Russian Czar can undoubtedly abdicate, but sovereignty or 
the possession of supreme power in a state, whether it be in the hands of a Czar or of 
a parliament, is always one and the same quality. If the Czar can abdicate, so can a 
parliament. To argue or imply that because sovereignty is not limitable (which is 
true), it cannot be surrendered (which is palpably untrue) involves the confusion of 
240 See Chapter One, above at p. 22. 241 They still tend to be white middle class men. 
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two distinct ideas. A sovereign power can divest itself of authority in two ways, and 
(it is submitted) in two ways only. It may simply put an end to its own existence. 
Parliament could extinguish itself by legally dissolving itself and leaving no means 
whereby a subsequent parliament could be legally summoned. A sovereign again may 
transfer sovereign authority to another person or body. of persons. =43 
This line of reasoning opens avenues of thought that Dicey did not adequately consider: it 
allows for the notion of empowerment. If sovereignty is surrendered then the body 
surrendering it no longer has the authority to legislate in the area surrendered. Dicey is 
recognising political reality, and attempting to incorporate it into his theory without adversely 
affecting his central tenets. The reality is, however, that after a surrendering of sovereignty, a 
court could hold that a subsequent attempt to legislate for that territory must be void. 244 
Employing these lines of reasoning, the events surrounding the enactment of the statute of 
Westminster 1932, and even that of the ECA 1972 may be explained. There has not, 
however, been adequate consideration of what Dicey would have classified as 'abdication': 
whether it referred to territorial as well as legislative abdication, and whether partial 
abdication was, also, possible. It is certain that consideration of this aspect of Dicean theory 
could have been relevant, particularly during the parliamentary debate on membership of the 
European Communities, but seems to have been ignored. 245 
242 Dicey (1959) at p. 68. 
243 Dicey (1959) at p. 68. 
244 See Chapter Four, below at p. 249 et seq, and the statements of Lord Sankey at p. 261. 
245 See Chapter Five, below. 
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Brief Overview of Nineteenth Century Case Law 
Although my principal interest in the nineteenth century centres around the theoretical works 
of the characters considered above, there were some judicial pronouncements which, if for no 
other reason than they figure in subsequent cases and discussion on sovereignty in the UK, 
merit consideration. 
I am not able, due to space and time constraints, to include a fuller review of the case law 
than appears below. I have included those cases that have proved fundamental to the 
arguments of the twentieth century that are in turn considered in Chapters Four and Five. 
Prior to the nineteenth century there were a few judicial pronouncements suggesting that the 
higher courts, primarily the House of Lords, would be willing to set aside legislation, 
principally private Acts, on the grounds that they were obtained by fraud. One of the best 
known was Mackenzie v. Stewart, 246 a case which has been cited this century as evidence that 
the courts are vested with a power to declare Acts of Parliament - normally private Acts - 
which have been obtained through fraud, invalid. However, in 1974247 the House of Lords 
rejected this idea, suggesting, in the course of judgement, that Mackenzie v. Stewart had been 
correctly adjudged on a matter of legislative construction. 248 The House of Lords preferred 
the view expressed in two other nineteenth century cases stating that these two other cases 
correctly identified the nature of the relationship between the courts and Parliament. These 
two cases have been persistently referred to in the debate surrounding the nature and meaning 
`46 [ 17521 9 Mor. dic. 1443 
247 In Pickin v. British Railways Board f 19741 AC 765. 2 48 [19741 A. C. 765, at p. 786, per Lord Reid. 
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of parliamentary sovereignty; they are Lee and Another v. The Bude and Torrington Junction 
Railway Co_249, and Edinburgh and Dalkeith Railway Co. v. Wauchope. uo 
Both of these cases concerned private Acts of Parliament and both contain unequivocal 
statements as to the constitutionally appropriate nature of the relationship between the courts 
of law and Parliament. In Edinburgh and Dalkeith Railway Co. v. Wauchope Lord Campbell 
famously asserted: 
My Lords, I think it right to say a word or two ... upon the point that has been raised 
with regard to an Act of Parliament being held inoperative by a court of justice 
because the forms, in respect of an Act of Parliament, have not been complied with. 
There seems great reason to believe that (sic) notion has prevailed to a considerable 
extent in Scotland, for we have it brought forward as a substantive ground which the 
act of the 4th and 5th William the Fourth could not apply... 
All that a court of justice can do is to look to the Parliamentary roll: if from that it 
should appear that a Bill has passed both Houses and received the Royal Assent, no 
court of Justice can enquire into the mode in which it was introduced into Parliament, 
nor into what was done previous to its introduction, or what passed in parliament 
during its progress in its various stages through both Houses. 251 
In Lee and Another v. Bude and Torrington Junction Railway Co., Wiles J., with whom the 
remainder of the Court agreed, considered the constitutional role of the court vis-a-vis 
Parliament, and stated 
It is further urged that the company was a mere non-entity and that there never were 
any shares or shareholders. That resolves itself into this, that Parliament was induced 
by fraudulent recitals ... to pass the Act which 
formed the company. I would observe, 
as to these Acts of Parliament, that they are the law of the land; and we do not sit here 
`49 (1871) L. R. 6 C. P. 576. 
uo (1842) 1 Bell 252. 
251 (1842) 1 Bell 252 at p. 278-279. 
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as a court of appeal from parliament. It was once said -I think in Hobart, 
252 
- that if 
an Act of parliament were to create a man judge in his own case, the Court might 
disregard it. That dictum, however, stands as a warning, rather than an authority to be 
4". 
followed. We sit here as servants of the Queen and the legislature. Are we to act as 
regents over what is done by parliament with the consent of the Queen, lords and 
commons? I deny that any such authority exists. If an Act of Parliament has been 
obtained improperly, it is for the legislature to correct it by repealing it: but so long as 
it exists as law, the courts are bound to obey it. The proceedings here are judicial, not 
autocratic, which they would be if we could make laws instead of administering 
them. 253 
Both of these statements, illustrate that the courts were willing to subordinate themselves to 
the power/authority of Parliament. Although the statements were made in relation to private 
Acts of Parliament, and they are therefore technically obiter, so far as Public Acts of 
Parliament are concerned, - although Lord Campbell did include public Acts within his 
analysis254. - they have been treated as representing the position for both private and public 
Acts of Parliament. 235 It is worth noting that both cases were decided prior to publication of 
Dicey's Introduction and, thus, his views can be seen to reflect the views of the judiciary. In 
both cases the courts denied that they possessed even the slightest degree of oversight over 
the actions of Parliament. The judiciary throughout the twentieth century echoed this stance. 
152 In Day v Savadge Hob. 87, see Chapter Two, above at p. 78. 253 (1871) L. R. 576 at p. 582. 
254 (1842) 1 Bell 252 at p. 279. 
'55 See Chapter Four, below at p. 278. , 
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Conclusion 
The three writers figuring in this chapter have, more than any others, defined British 
constitutional law. They have not only provided explanations of, and justifications for, the 
structure of our government (some more successfully than others) but they have also 
provided us with a vocabulary, for discussing any constitutional issues that may arise, which 
we have, sub-consciously, if not consciously, assimilated. 256 Bogdonar has stated that Dicey 
"remains a living presence in contemporary discussions of constitutional reform. ""' Although 
the other two theorists have not been so overtly influential, their notions have been 
instrumental in the development of the 'modern' notion of sovereignty. Unfortunately the 
imperative theories upon which they relied have done "very little to advance our 
understanding of either sovereignty or the law. "258 It has been subjected to a great deal of 
criticism, and is inadequate when employed as a potential map for explaining our system of 
constitutional law. Rosenblum suggests that obedience is not the essence of sovereignty. 
Rather, as she notes, it provides a starting point for many debates. 259 This is not surprising; 
Bentham, Austin and Dicey were seeking to explain a politico-legal system that was still in its 
infancy when they formulated their ideas. Their ideas reflect the immature nature of early to 
mid-nineteenth century representative democracy. 
We must, however, be careful to distinguish between these theorists and emphasise the 
differences as well as the similarities. Bentham was the most original - although he did owe a 
lot to Hume - and Dicey was the least original. Dicey's description of the constitution is less , 
satisfying than Bentham's (although it may be more polished and easier to read) and this is 
256 Drewry (1985) at p. 676. 
u' Bogdanor (1985) at p. 672. 
258 Rosenblum (1978) at p. 74-75. 
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due, at least in part, 'to Dicey's acceptance that the British system of Government was an 
ideal, whereas Bentham was much more critical in his approach. This fact is evidenced by 
Dicey's=willingness to refer to Blackstone as an authority when Bentham and Austin were 
engaged in debunking Blackstone's work. It emerges from a consideration of their work that 
Austin, whilst sharing some of Bentham's views, was more akin to Dicey in his acceptance 
that the British constitutional structure represented a good model for how a system should 
function. Extrapolation of a theory of sovereignty predominantly from observations of the 
Westminster Parliament led to the difficulties Dicey and Austin experience in reconciling their 
formulations with federal structures. Bentham, with his greater acceptance of change, more 
censorial attitude and perhaps more'liberal' outlook promulgated a far more flexible notion of 
government. The fact that Bentham was engaged in a far more'political' project should not 
be disregarded as coincidence. Nor yet should the unsatisfactory nature of the attempts by 
Austin and Dicey to divorce the legal from the political be ignored when considering the 
unconvincing nature of their formulations. 
Hobbes's notions of sovereignty were significant in the evolution of sovereignty during the 
nineteenth century. His ideas were, however, 
tamed and turned into a support for Victorian conservatism. His nineteenth century 
interpreters ignored some of his seventeenth century presuppositions, such as his 
appeals to reason and his use of contract. They also failed to dwell upon his 
unashamed defence of tyranny. It would seem that these parts of Hobbes were still 
radical enough to threaten hereditary authority and the status quo. Instead of exploring 
these dangerous underpinnings and descriptions of sovereignty, they concentrated on 
Hobbes' notions of fear and self-interest. Confusions which sometimes resulted from 
this partial interpretation were not noticed or were explained away as the imperfect 
259 Rosenblum (1978) at p. 75. 
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reasonings of a man who was regrettably, in places, still caught in the web of the 
seventeenth century primitivism. 2w 
The influence of Hobbes on Austin and Dicey, albeit implicit, is more obvious than his 
influence over Bentham. Bentham's formulations do not easily follow those of Hobbes who 
despaired at, and disagreed with, any form of limitation on, or division of, sovereignty. In 
this way, Bentham's ideas on this matter are more akin to Bodin's discussions, which, 
incidentally, have the added attraction, from a Benthamite perspective, of not relying on 
original contract. This is particularly so regarding limitations affecting the nature of 
sovereign, and the potential distinction between the nature of ordinary and public laws. 
All three writers formulated new elements of sovereignty theory, which in some cases became 
background theory to other aspects of their work. Their formulations on sovereignty have all 
contributed to the background of modern British parliamentary sovereignty. Although it has 
been developed and interpreted (sometimes misinterpreted) by subsequent writers, the 
modern theory of sovereignty bears a greater resemblance to Austin and Dicey's formulations 
than to Bentham's. Many subsequent writers have followed Austin's and Dicey's lectures 
concerning the division of law from politics; many of these writers have also ignored 
Bentham's and, to a lesser degree, Austin's acceptance of the link between law and politics. 
The high level of retrospection present in Dicey's and Austin's work, compounded by their 
use of the British system as a model (implying a high level of satisfaction with, if not quite 
Blackstonian adoration of, the then state of the British parliamentary system), did not 
engender a desire for adequacy checking their formulation of sovereignty. Both Dicey and 
Austin could have simply checked their theory by considering how it would fit with potential 
260 Francis (1980) at p. 538. Page 204 
developments and how it might explain a system that had evolved beyond the one they knew. 
Dicey acknowledged change, "' but he did not explicitly examine whether his formulation 
could explain the way in which the system of government was evolving. Dicey eschewed the 
idea that the changes in the structure of government could have any impact on the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty and insisted on it being still valid and still central to the British 
constitutional structure. 
None of the three theorists featured, adequately examined the constitutional function of the 
judiciary. For Austin and Bentham this may have partly resulted from their views of 
Blackstone and the function of the common law. But another factor affecting all three would 
be the attitude of their contemporary judges. There is little evidence of judicial activism, nor 
of any willingness to grasp the nettle in difficult and sensitive cases rather than pass the matter 
back to the legislature for resolution. It has to be doubtful that Dicey and Austin would have 
formulated the same theories today that they did during the nineteenth century. The system 
has changed so radically that it is no longer the same as the system that Dicey and Austin 
commentated upon. The feeling persists that Bentham's formulation would more adequately 
explain the modern reality that either Austin's Dicey's or even the current theory that has 
evolved out of their works. 
In the words of Francis, by the end of the nineteenth century 
Sovereignty had become the graveyard of political philosophy instead of its summit. 
Authority, obligation, consent, right and many others disappeared in it, and never 
seemed to have much meaning afterwards. Austin had used sovereignty to give some 
philosophical meaning to the Benthamite `habit of obedience' which upheld 
261 See the introduction to the Introduction (1915). 
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govemments. It was through habit that a law was obeyed, not because it was justified. 
Conversely, or even circularly, a law was such because it came from the person of the 
sovereign, and that person possessed his sovereignty because the bulk of the people 
was in the habit of obeying him. The notion of legal right meant having the same habit 
of obedience that others have. From this cemetery of philosophy it was Hobbes that 
emerged triumphant again in the guise of an apostle of order, and Bentham's equation 
of right with useful became just another item of funereal decoration. 262 
2 62 Francis (1980) at p. 531. 
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Chapter Four - Sovereignty in Modern Britain 
Introduction 
Background, 
One, post-war, analysis of Dicey's formulation of sovereignty suggests that 
[it] is not sovereignty at all. It is not supreme power. It is a legal concept, a form of 
expression which lawyers use to express the relations between Parliament and the 
courts. It means that the courts will recognise as law the rules that Parliament makes 
by legislation. ' 
It is certainly true that Dicey's formulation of legal sovereignty does not match Hobbes 
notion of sovereignty, nor yet does Dicey's match Austin's notion2., This interpretation has 
had a profound effect on the debate surrounding the nature of sovereignty in the United 
Kingdom ("UK") this century. We have been happy to accept Dicey's delineation of the 
debate to the realm of legal sovereignty. This is possibly due to the comparatively secure 
nature of our constitutional settlement: we no longer need to produce justifications for the 
existence of government, neither do we need to philosophise about the foundations of our 
society or its nature as political or natural. We are in a similar position to Bodin; we possess a 
relatively settled and stable governmental structure. Our position is fundamentally different 
than Hobbes who was faced with revolution and difficult questions of legitimacy. Even 
Bentham and Austin wrote in circumstances different to our own: they were seeking to justify 
a break with the traditional tenets and foundational arguments of the common law and impose 
a new constitutional understanding and practice upon the governmental organs. Our questions 
have become narrower in scope. We have been happy to accept the boundaries laid down by 
Dicey and have discussed the `legal' conception of sovereignty. 
1 Jennings (1959) at p. 149. 
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Dicey's Notions of Legal Sovereignty in the Twentieth Century 
Between 1885, when the First Edition of the Introduction was published, and 1915, the year 
in which the Eighth Edition, the last to be edited by Dicey, was published, massive changes in 
the structure of the British politico-legal system had occurred. Dicey was not oblivious to this 
fact, however he maintained that 
The sovereignty of Parliament is still the fundamental doctrine of English 
constitutionalists. But the authority of the House of Lords has been gravely 
diminished, whilst the authority of the House of Commons, or rather of the majority 
thereof during any one Parliament, has been immensely incrgased. Now this increased 
portion of sovereignty can be effectively exercised only by the Cabinet which holds in 
its hands the guidance of the party machine. And of the party which the parliamentary 
majority supports, the Premier has become at once the legal head and, if he is a man of 
ability, the real leader. This gradual development of the power of the Cabinet and of 
the Premier is a change in the working of the English constitution.; 
Dicey did not attempt to reconcile the expansion of Prime Ministerial and Cabinet power with 
his model arrangement of the constitution. He accepted that these developments could prove 
critical to the future evolution of the constitutional settlement and suggested that no one, 
Dicey included, truly anticipated how significant they could be. `` These structural changes in 
the nature of Government were compounded by subsequent individual changes: the 
emergence of the Welfare State, ' the enactment of the Statute of Westminster 19316, the 
Various Independence Acts, the passing of the Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949 and the 
See Chapter Three, above at p. 192. 
3 Dicey (1915) at p. c. 
Dicey (1915) at pp. c-ci. % 
S "The reach of government - central, local and quangos - continued to grow between the two World Wars, 
during the Second World War, and afterwards with the creation of the welfare state. " McAuslan and 
McEldowney (1985) at p. 4. 
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various changes in the position and power of the Local Authorities have contributed to the 
problems facing proponents of Dicean sovereignty. These changes have not always, 
directly, 
addressed the issue of sovereignty, and have occurred within the framework of the existing 
constitution. They have, however, affected the constitutional and governmental position of 
Parliament, and its constituent parts, vis-a-vis the other organs of government, most 
particularly the executive. 
The constitutional position of Parliament is crucial to the structure of government within the 
UK and to the conception of legal sovereignty. During the late nineteenth century and early 
twentieth centuries the courts were willing to obey the dictates of Parliament without 
question. This was, in part, due to the growth, real and perceived, of democracy'. Close 
consideration of this notion reveals the following reasoning: the populace vest Parliament 
with the power to make laws for them, giving parliament a form of political legitimacy for 
their actions; the courts lack such legitimacy, but recognise that of Parliament. This 
connection between the vesting of absolute political power - more akin to Hobbes notion of 
sovereignty than Dicey's - and Dicey's notion that the courts will obey the commands of 
Parliament absolutely, renders the following conclusion inevitable: "The place of Parliament 
in legal thinking cannot be divorced from the place of Parliament in current political 
thinking. "' This connection explains the problem the changes enumerated above have caused 
for Dicean theory. 
6 Hanks suggests that the Statue of Westminster was little more than "a formal declaration of political 
realities: it recognised rather than affected, the autonomy of the dominions. " Hanks (1968) at p. 286. ' Mitchell (1968) at p. 89. 
$ Mitchell (1968) at p. 89. 
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Dicey's conception of Parliament as controlling the actions of the executive cannot 
be 
sustained in the light of the executive's accretion of powers to the 
detriment of Parliament. 
The instruments of constitutional protest and balance, the House of Lords and the Crown, 
were to see their relative strengths eroded through a number of the above reforms. 
The result 
was a constitutional settlement where the checking and 
balancing bodies were ineffective, and 
the executive controlled a legally supreme legislature: a situation Locke and Montesquieu had 
been striving to prevent through their formulations. 
The increase in the use of secondary legislation has dispensed greater power to the executive, 
both in terms of legislative capacity and through the increased difficulties faced in 
parliamentary oversight of executive action. The rise of the party, as a part of the electoral 
settlement, ' and the significance of the Parliamentary Party to the workings of the Houses of 
Parliament10 have been compounded by the strengthening of the position of the House of 
Commons vis-ä-vis the House of Lords - through the provisions and political effects of the 
Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949. Greater powers than Dicey anticipated, at least in his written 
work, are now vested in the executive. There has been a great body of literature devoted to 
this phenomenon, and space precludes me from a more detailed consideration of the political 
science angle of the development. It is sufficient, as far as this thesis is concerned, to illustrate 
It is commonly accepted that the electorate does not vote for individual members of Parliament but rather for 
the Party they feel represents their interests and the Leader of the party who is portrayed as more effective and 
capable. In this way the part controls the membership of parliament through controlling who stands as 
representative for their party, and thus ultimately who the voter may choose between. 
10 Rose asserts that: 
In terms of efficient power, Parliament is not ... 
impressive, because its role in policy is strictly 
limited. The Cabinet controls most of its proceedings .... The Prime Minister can be sure that any 
proposal the government puts forward will be promptly voted on in Parliament in the form desired by 
the executive, for the government drafts legislation and controls parliament. 
Rose (1980) at pp. 85-86. 
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that the political structure and constitutional relationship between Parliament and the 
Executive has undergone dramatic change this century. 
There have been other changes in the constitutional framework that Dicey would find less 
taxing to explain. The development of administrative law and judicial oversight over 
executive action through judicial review has required the judiciary to amend their 
constitutional position. Judicial review of secondary legislation and other executive actions 
conforms to both the idea of the rule of law'and parliamentary sovereignty. Parliament vests, 
in various bodies, the power to perform certain acts. As soon as that power is exceeded then 
the excesses are illegal and the courts may censure the executive fortheir excess. The 
appearance is that the executive is constrained by law and by the sovereignty of Parliament. 
The reality is that the executive, if on the losing end of a judicial decision, can then compel 
Parliament, through its control over the House of Commons, to grant increased powers to the 
executive body concerned, or simply overrule the court's decision". This demonstrates that, 
in practice at least, the Executive is the dominant part of the UK constitutional and 
governmental structure. Legal scholars have not ignored this fact. 
Rose suggests that the current constitutional position is that "once Cabinet has approved a 
policy, endorsement of action by the House of Commons can normally be taken for 
granted"12. Lord Hailsham has famously concluded that 
The sovereignty of Parliament has increasingly become, in practice, the Sovereignty of 
the Commons, and the Sovereignty of the Commons has increasingly become the 
" See the decision in Burmah Oil v Lord Advocate f 19651 AC 75 12 Rose (1980) at p. 63. 
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Sovereignty of the government which ... controls the party whips, the party machine 
and the Civil Servants. " 
Therefore, in a simplistic diagrammatic form, the following is true: Dicey formulated the 
relationship between the major organs of government to be arranged thus: 
Electorate 
Parliament 
Executive 4 Judiciary 
Parliament is at the pinnacle; it determines the authority vested in the other major organs of 
government and specifies their constitutional roles (the arrows indicate the direction of 
control over action - so Parliament controls the actions of both the courts and the executive). 
The courts control the actions of the executive in that the executive must adhere to the 
principles of the rule of law, and must not act ultra vires. 





The positions of the executive and Parliament are reversed, and the flow of control is similarly 
altered. This reflects the fundamental divergences between the modern political world and 
13 Lord Hailsham (1976) at p. 497. See also Lord Hailsham (1978) at p. 126. 
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Dicey's understanding of the arrangements during the mid 1800's. In this situation the 
executive's control over the judiciary operates through its control over Parliament. 
Dicey's notions concerning the self-correcting and representative nature of the governmental 
system, and his reliance on the convergence of the internal and external limitations, should be 
carefully reviewed to determine their applicability in the real world. The very appropriateness 
of his formulation, with its reliance on self-imposed and political checks and balances on 
executive action, to the government of a modern nation in an increasingly supra-nationalistic 
world should be questioned. However, this century there has been very little, officially 
accepted, development in the theory of parliamentary sovereignty, despite the compelling 
criticism levelled at Dicey's formulations. 
A "new" theory suggesting an alternative to Dicey's static notion of parliamentary absolutism 
was formulated during the middle decades of this century. The "new" theory has not been 
officially accepted, and important political decisions are still dominated by essentially Dicean 
ideas and are described using a Dicean vocabulary 14. The "new" theory is important in a 
number, of ways; it admits the possibility of limitation and redefinition, both of which are 
important in discussions of what has happened in the past three decades, and also because of 
the likely future developments in the structure of the United Kingdom government. 
Scottish constitutionalists have emerged as a further source of opposition to the traditional 
Dicean conception. This challenge centres on Dicey's notions about the foundations of the 
UK Parliament and his treatment of the status of the Acts of Union of 1701. These too will be 
considered in the following sections. 
14 See comments in Chapter Five, below at p. 305. 
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Changes in the Debate over the Nature of Sovereignty 
From the Sixteenth Century to the end of the Nineteenth Century the debate over the nature 
of sovereignty, in the UK, assumed a distinctive, essentially academic, characteristic. There 
were few judicial cases directly addressing the nature or placement of sovereignty in the UK. 
Sovereignty theory did not form the subject matter of political crises; rather it was the 
preserve of political and legal theorists. This was to change during the Twentieth Century. 
The changing nature of the governmental system, the break-up of Empire, and, more recently, 
membership of the European Communities, have led to fundamental questions over the nature 
of sovereignty and its applicability to the current political settlement being posed not only in 
the political arena, but also in the courts. This has led to more detailed analysis of the 
competing notions, and should have provoked a probing debate into the viability not only of 
the existing theories of sovereignty, but also of the very notion of sovereignty in the modern 
supra-national worldly. This has not happened, there have been numerous articles written and 
cases decided, but the language used, and the notions debated are still essentially Dicean. The 
case law which has emerged has been ridden with judicial procrastination and reliance on the 
finer points of law, there has been little judicial consideration of principle or theory'6, and the 
result has been confusion, not only amongst lawyers but also amongst the political community 
and, more recently - in large part due to the manner in which it has been reported - amongst 
l7. the populace 
's See MacCormick (1993). 
16 See below at p. 263. 
" See Chapter Six, below at p. 374 et seq. 
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As a result of the changing nature of the debate, I am adopting a different structure in the 
following chapters. Although I intend to address the evolution of the theory through the 
works of the contemporary theorists, more attention will be paid to the decisions of the 
courts and the manner in which Parliament has come to use the notion of sovereignty. 
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A "New" Interpretation of Parliamentary Sovereignty: The Manner 
and Form Argument 
The Basis of the Argument 
The manner and form "argument" (self-embracing sovereignty) has very close links with 
modern case law on the nature of a legislative assembly. The term itself is derived from the 
provisions of the Colonial Laws Validity Act 186518. Much of the case law relates to this Act 
and the Statute of Westminster, the creation of colonial constitutions and the political 
settlements that accompanied these developments. Although a majority of the case law has a 
Commonwealth background there are domestic cases that have significance for the manner 
and form argument, and they shall be considered below. The theory originates, in its 
recognisable form, in the mid-decades of this century and constitutes the most significant 
challenge to Dicean conceptions of sovereignty. 
In order to explain the "new" notion of self-embracing sovereignty and how it differs from the 
traditional, continuing notion, it is necessary to briefly introduce the foundations of the 
traditional idea. 
The "traditional", continuing, notion of sovereignty associated with Dicey is grounded in the 
idea that sovereignty, as a concept, does not have any legal origins. Rather, it is based on 
history, or social fact. Salmond explains that: 
All rules have historical sources. As a matter of fact and history they have their origins 
somewhere, though we may not know where it is. But not all of them have legal 
sources. ... The rule that a man may not ride a bicycle on the footpath may have its 
source in the by-laws of a municipal council; the rule that these by-laws have the force 
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of law has its origins in an Act of Parliament, but whence comes the rule that Acts of 
Parliament have the force of law? This is legally ultimate; its source is historical only, 
not legal.... It is the law because it is the law, and for no other reason that it is 
possible for the law itself to take notice of. No statute can confer this power upon 
Parliament, for this would be to assume and act on the very power that is to be 
conferred. '9 
Jennings, one of the principal manner and form theorists, however, asserts that 
the power of a legislature derives from the law by which it is established. In nearly 
every country, including the countries of the Commonwealth, this law is to be found in 
the written constitution. In the United Kingdom, which has no written constitution, it 
derives from the accepted law, which is the common law. 20 
Sir Owen Dixon commented on this matter in a 1957 article. He explained that 
the common law is the source of the authority of the Parliament at Westminster. It is a 
proposition of the common law that a court may not question the validity of a statute 
but, once having construed it, must give effect to it according to its tenor. And that is 
only another way of expressing the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty over the 
law. 21 
This is not a `new' idea. There have been many assertions that the power and authority of the 
organs of government are derived from the common law. These date as far back as Coke and 
Bracton22. In 1867, Professor Hearn asserted that 
The English constitution forms a part of the Common Law. Our government by King 
Lords and Commons, the mutual relations of these several powers, our courts of law 
and equity, our great offices of State, are all, and from their earliest rudiments have 
been, known to the law; and recognised by it.... 
This conception of the Constitution as forming a part of the Common Law not only 
accounts for its peculiar form, but is essential in determining its relation to the other 
parts of our legal system. 23 
i$ See Appendix D, for the exact terms. 
19 Salmond (1966) at p. 155. 
`0 Jennings (1959) at p. 156. 
21 Dixon (1957) at p. 242. See also Dixon (1935) at pp. 591-592. 
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Jennings attempts to explain why questions on the source of Parliament's authority and 
power have arisen in the United Kingdom but do not plague the constitutionalists of other 
nations to the same extent. He states: 
The difficulty of proving a fundamental problem of this nature is that our laws and our 
institutions have grown together; and what had to be produced was not a theoretical 
solution but a modus vivendi a practical man's answer to current problems. In drafting 
a Constitution nobody bothers about sovereignty; the problem is the distribution of the 
various powers; and if the result is that nobody can claim sovereignty, so much the 
better. The task in England has been even more modest, to sort out the relations 
among the principal institutions, mainly the monarchy, the aristocracy, the Commons 
24 and the courts of law. 
Jennings maintains that, when addressing these questions, theorists have not adequately 
explained "the relation between Acts of Parliament and the common law. " He explains the 
reason for this omission thus: 
It was not settled because the judges, as sensible men, acquiesced in the assumption of 
power by the Long Parliament, the restoration of Charles II, the accession of William 
and Mary under the Bill of Rights, and the accession of the Hanoverians under the Act 
of Settlement. ... If the 
judges had wished, they could have questioned all the Acts and 
Ordinances of the Long Parliament which did not receive the Royal Assent, all the 
Acts of the Parliaments of Charles II and James II because the Long Parliament had 
never lawfully been dissolved, and all the Acts since 1688 because no Parliament since 




See Chapter Two above at pp. 89-90. 
a Hearn (1867) at pp. 1-2. 
`0 Jennings (1959) at p. 157. 
25 Jennings (1959) at p. 159. 
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The implication is that the Judiciary's acceptance of the legislative supremacy of Parliament 
has been the defining element in our constitutional history26. 
Essential to Jennings's formulation of the common law as the basis of legal sovereignty are 
two fundamental questions which Dicey did not address and which Pollock identified as early 
as 1890: "What is Parliament? [And] Who is the wielder of sovereign power? "27 Although 
Dicey may answer the latter question "Parliament", this immediately refers the questioner 
back to the first question. In reality, where a collegiate body is deemed to be sovereign, there 
is a need for rules to determine how a decision of that collegiate body may be recognised. 
These rules may take the form of a set percentage of the total available votes, or a simple 
majority, of the votes cast, being in favour of the motion. The exact nature of these rules is 
not important; rather it is their existence. 
Latham, in a classic exposition of this point, states 
It is not impossible to ascertain the will of an individual without the aid of rules: he 
may be presumed to mean what he says, and he cannot say more than one thing at a 
time. But the extraction of a precise expression of will from a multiplicity of human 
beings is, 
... an artificial process and one which cannot be accomplished without 
arbitrary rules. It is, therefore, an incomplete statement to say that in a state such and 
such an assembly of human beings is sovereign. It can only be sovereign when acting 
in a certain way prescribed by law. At least some rudimentary manner and form is 
demanded of it: the simultaneous incoherent cry of a rabble, small or large, cannot be 
law, for it is unintelligible. 
Proponents of the self-embracing school of thought assert that these rules are derived from 
the Common Law. The continuing school of though, however, locates them in history and 
26 See Chapter Two, above at p. 122. 27 Pollock (1900) at p. 106. 
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social fact. The fundamental difficulty is that there is no case law on this matter and none of 
the organs of government seem to have been willing to explore the issue and expound a 
definitive answer agreed to by all. The courts have been happy to enforce Acts of Parliament, 
passed by both Houses of Parliament and given the Royal Assent, but there is no document 
demanding this process, it has evolved out of case law decided by the courts28. 
Limitation through Manner and Form 
Heuston outlines the manner and form argument thus: 
(1) Sovereignty is a legal concept: the rules which identify the sovereign and prescribe 
its composition and functions are logically prior to it. 
(2) There is a distinction between rules which govern, on the one hand, (a) the 
composition, and (b) the procedure, and, on the other hand, (c) the area of power, of a 
sovereign legislature. 
(3) The courts have jurisdiction to question the validity of an alleged Act of Parliament 
on grounds 2(a) and 2(b), but not on ground 2 (c). 
(4) This jurisdiction is exercisable either before or after the Royal Assent has been 
signified - in the former case by way, of injunction, in the latter by way of declaratory 
judgement. 29 
The differences between this formulation and that of Dicey are not difficult to see. Dicey 
admits of no limitations on Parliamentary action, the self-embracing conception allows for 
limitations in the manner by which an Act of Parliament is to be enacted and the form such an 
Act must take in order for the courts to adjudge it a binding law. 
23 See Stockdale v Hansard (1839) 9 Ad. & El. and Edinnburgh and Dalkeith Railway v Wauchone (18 a_) 
Bell 252. 
29 Heuston (1961) at pp. 6-7. 
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The basic argument is that the Common Law provides the rules prescribing the manner and 
form Acts of Parliament are to take in order to be considered as law by the courts. It, 
therefore, follows that, as statute is a higher source of law than the Common Law, an Act of 
Parliament may alter the nature of the manner and form subsequent Acts of Parliament are to 
take in order for the courts to apply them as binding laws. However, this is only true if the 
amending Act of Parliament adheres to the rules governing the manner and form of Acts of 
Parliament in place at the time of its own enactment. Jennings summarises the position thus: 
`Legal Sovereignty' is merely a name indicating that the legislature has for the time 
being power to make laws of any kind in the manner required by the law. That is, a 
rule expressed to be made by the Queen, `with the advice and consent of the Lords 
spiritual and temporal, and Commons in this present Parliament assembled, and by the 
authority of the same, ' will be recognised by the courts, including a rule which alters 
this law itself. If this is so the `legal sovereign' may impose legal limitations upon 
itself, because its power to change the law includes the power to change the law 
affecting itself. 3o 
In many ways the manner and form argument reflects the reality of the political world: there is 
no question that Parliament is unlimited as to the subject matter of legislation (other than by 
enforceability and good sense)31. There are, however, often situations where there is an 
effective procedural limitation, perhaps effective only because of a political arrangement or 
international agreement, for example the Statute of Westminster 1931 and the Parliament 
Acts of 1911 and 1949. There have, more recently, been other political events that may have 
forced a new manner and form of enactment upon subsequent Parliaments. The first, and 
clearest, being the European Communities Act of 1972, and the subsequent referendum on 
continued membership. The position of the proposed Scottish Parliament, and Human Rights 
Acts are ambiguous. There are government statements that suggest that a degree of 
entrenchment is foreseen32, there are also statements that Parliamentary Sovereignty will not 
30 Jennings (1961) at p. 152.153. 
31 Prior to membership of the European Communities. 
32 See Chapter Six, below at pp. 396-399. 
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be abrogated or even affected33. The position of these Acts will not be clear until there has 
been a high degree of judicial consideration of their meaning. 
33 See Chapter Six, below at p. 387 etseq. 
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Modern Interpretations of the "Traditional" Dicean Conception 
H. W. R. Wade and the Modern Defence of Dicean Sovereignty 
11 
Professor H. W. R Wade represents the modern face of Dicean conceptions of constitutional 
law. In a seminal article entitled The Basis of Legal Sovereignty he lays out a critique of the 
manner and form argument and a defence of a modernised Dicean conception of 
sovereignty34. Within this article Wade states that the manner and form arguments "must be 
tested in two ways: first, are they supported by judicial authority; secondly, can they lay claim 
to superior logic? s33 I shall consider the arguments relating to the case law in the following 
sections, and would like to immediately concentrate on the matter of logic. 
Wade asserts that 
At the heart of the matter lies the question whether the rule of common law which 
says that the courts will enforce statutes can itself be altered by a statute. Adherents of 
the traditional theory, who hold that future Parliaments cannot be bound are here 
compelled to answer `no. ' For if they answer `yes, ' they must yield to Jennings's 
reasoning. But to deny that Parliament can alter this particular rule of law is not so 
daring as it may seem at first sight; for the sacrosanctity of the rule is an inexorable 
corollary of Parliament's continuing sovereignty. If the one proposition is asserted, the 
other must be conceded. Nevertheless some further justification is called for, since 
there must be something peculiar about a rule of common law which can stand against 
a statute. 36 
This something peculiar is provided in the form of a reference to Salmond's statement quoted 
above37. Wade continues by asserting that 
sa [195S] Cambridge Law Journal 17?. 
ss Wade (1955) at p. 182. 
36 Wade (1955) at p. 187. 37 See above at pp. 216-217. 
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if no statute can establish the rule that the courts obey Acts of Parliament, similarly no 
statute can alter or abolish that rule. The rule is above and beyond the reach of statute 
... 
because it is itself the source of statute. This puts it into a class by itself among rules 
of common law, and the apparent paradox that it is unalterable by Parliament turns out 
to be a truism. The rule of judicial obedience is in one sense a rule of common law, but 
in another sense - which applies to no other rule of common law - it is the ultimate 
political fact upon which the whole system of legislation hangs. Legislation owes its 
authority to the rule: the rule does not owe its authority to legislation. To say that 
Parliament can change the rule, merely because it can change any other rule, is to put 
the cart before the horse. 39 
The underlying rationale for this assertion is that the relationship between the courts and 
Parliament is a political reality and not a legal arrangement. Thus, the courts could seamlessly 
transfer their loyalty from the monarchical system of government to -the Commonwealth 
Parliaments during the seventeenth century. The courts did not legally shift their allegiances, 
although they did so politically, and these shifts therefore constituted legal revolutions. The 
old rules concerning what constituted a validly made law ceased to be applicable, and the 
courts instituted new rules. From the events of the seventeenth century, and the logical 
considerations laid out, Wade concludes that "What Salmond calls the `ultimate legal 
principle' is therefore a rule which is unique in being unchangeable by Parliament it is changed 
by revolution, not by legislation: it lies in the keeping of the courts, and no Act of Parliament 
can take it from them. t139 
The practical implication of this rule is that "it is always for the courts, in the last resort, to 
say what is a valid Act of Parliament; and that the decision of this question is not determined 
by any rule of law which can be laid down or altered by any authority outside the courts. It is 
'$ Wade (1955) at pp. 187-188. 
39 Wade (1955) at p. 189. 
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simply a political fact. "40 The implication for Jennings's theory is that this conception exposes 
a fallacy in his reasoning that "requires the courts to obey any rule enacted by the legislature, 
including a rule which alters this law itself. [But] this rule is itself ultimate and unalterable by 
any legal authoritys41. This is essentially the same argument that Dicey, and subsequent 
thinkers, have used to explain the distinction between a sovereign and subordinate legislature: 
the existence of rules that are outside the remit of legal change and exist solely in the political 
world. 
Where changes in the political rules occur a legal revolution has been affected. Such 
revolutions do occur and, as Wade suggests, the events surrounding the South African case 
of Hams v. Minister of the Interior" represents a revolution in progress. Undoubtedly, 
another example is to be found in the actions of the Rhodesian judiciary following U. D. I. 43. 
Unlike most other forms of revolution a legal revolution may be discreet and go unnoticed. 
In Wade's words "when sovereignty is relinquished in an atmosphere of harmony, the naked 
fact of revolution is not so easy to discern under its elaborate legal dress. "44 Although there 
may be a radical change it is often clothed in such a way that its true significance is unclear. 
The true significance only becomes obvious where hindsight reveals the practical implications 
of the change. 
40 Wade (1955) at p. 189. 
41 Wade (1955) at p. 189. 
42 (1952) (2) S. A. 428. 
" See below at p. 275. 
44 Wade (1955) at p. 191. 
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Utilising this theory of legal revolution we may, once again, explain the events surrounding 
membership of the European Communities and Union. We might, using this analysis, identify 
the European Communities Act 1972 as a legal revolution. 43 
The Logical Argument against Manner and Form Expanded 
Although Wade considers the logical arguments against the manner and form argument he 
does not consider them in as much depth as other theorists, for example Alf Ross. One of the 
reasons for this is that Wade is essentially aconstitutional lawyer whereas Ross approaches 
the question from the jurisprudential and logician's viewpoint. The most significant difference 
is that Wade is more interested in the practical implications for the various theories in a 
particular constitutional setting. Ross, however, emphasises the theoretical aspects, in 
particular the logical inconsistencies and problems posed by a legal system founded on 
imperative and sanction based notions of law and what Kelsen termed the "Never ending 
Series of Sanctions"46. The basis of these problems is that, if the nature of a law demands the 
existence of a sanction, it is impossible to impose legal restrictions on a supreme law meng 
body. This was the problem that faced Austin and Bentham°7. Employing the Austinian model 
it is logically impossible for a legal limitation to be imposed upon the sovereign. The 
significance of Ross and Hart's analysis is that it highlights that the notion of legal 
illimitability is based upon the notion of law that is employed. 
°S See Chapter Six for a detailed consideration of this question. 
46 Kelsen (1949) at pp. 28-29. 
4' See Chapter Three above. 
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Ross explicitly addresses the questions concerning problems of legislatures imposing 
limitations upon themselves, the reflexivity argument, in a 1969 article, where he addresses 
the traditional and manner and form arguments. Ross outlines the `problem' thus: "Since [a] 
series of authorities cannot be infinite, the inevitable conclusion follows that there must be a 
highest authority whose competence is not derived from any other authority. "4 Ross 
illustrates this idea in the following fashion: 
At is constituted by C1; C1 is enacted by A2 
A2 is constituted by C2; C2 is enacted by A3 
A3 is constituted by C3; C3 is not enacted by any other authority. 
And continues to explain the figure thus: 
A3 then is the highest authority of the system and C3 its basic norm. But what does it 
mean to say that its constituting set of norms of competence C3 is not enacted by any 
other authority? How in that case, could the legal existence of C3 be established? Two, 
and only two, possible answers seem possible.... 
The two possible answers are: 
(1) C3 is enacted law; as it is not enacted by any other authority this means that it is 
enacted by A3 itself, 
(2) C3 is not enacted law; this means that its legal validity cannot be derived from the 
validity of any. other norm, but it is an original fact, a presupposition for the validity of 
any other norm of the system. 49 
The first of these propositions represents the manner and form argument, the second the 
traditional view of Wade and Salmond. 
's Ross (1969) at p. 2. See also Ross (1974) at p. 80-81. 49 Ross (1969) at p. 3. 
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Ross's argument against the manner and form approach is based upon a "logical theorem 
according to which self-referring sentences are devoid of meaning" and that there are certain 
contradictions involved within the fabric of the ideaSO. He explains the latter point thus: 
if we suppose art. 88 (a rule regarding the future amendment of the constitution is] to 
be amended according to its own rules with the result that it is replaced by art. 88 (with 
a content contrary to that of art. 88) the validity of art. 88' is based upon an inference 
of the following pattern: 
art. 88: The constitution may be amended by a process in accordance with 
conditions C1, C2, and C3i and only by this process; 
art. 881(stating that the constitution may be amended by a process in accordance 
with conditions C, ', C2`, and C3`) has been created in accordance with conditions 
C,, C2, and C3 
. ". art. 88 
is valid, that is, the constitution may be amended by a process in accordance 
with conditions C11 Cif, and C3' and only by this process. 
As the meaning of art. 88 is to indicate the only way in which the constitution may be 
amended, this is an inference in which the conclusion contradicts one of the premises, 
which is a logical absurdity. " 
Ross's other line or argument concerning the self-referring sentence argument owes a great 
deal to the works of preceding philosophers such as Bertrand Russell, Jorgen Jorgensen, and 
Karl Popper. Ross considers a number of theoretical objections to the validity of self-referri ng 
statements. He also considers such ideas as partial self-reference and how such partiality may 
render the statement true. Exploration of these ideas is outside the scope of this thesis, and 
space and time preclude a detailed consideration of Ross's analysis. It is sufficient to list his 
summation, that 
none of the objections to the logical condemnation of reflexive sentences has proved 
itself tenable. It must still be considered a plausible thesis that genuine self-reference, 
so Ross (1969) at p. 4. 
51 Ross (1969) at p. 5. 
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whether direct or indirect, whether total or partial, deprives the sentence of meaning as 
far as self-reference is concerned. " 
H. L. A. Hart, in his essay entitled Self Referring Lawsf 3, questions whether the principles 
relating to self-referring sentences are applicable to norms relating to legal rulesS4. Ross 
maintains that there is no reason why the rules should not be so transferred and continues to 
propose a solution to the problem posed by reflexivity" 
Legal Revolution and Changes in the Constitutional System 
Ross summarises the idea of legal revolution in the following terms: 
all legal enactment must be intra-systematic, that is, go on inside a given legal order in 
accordance with a rule of competence belonging to the order. The transition from one 
basic norm to another, that is from one system to another system, therefore cannot be 
the outcome of an enactment, but must be an extra-systematic fact amounting to the 
founding of a new system that replaces the old one. 56 
However, Ross also dismisses this idea asserting that it is contrary to the factual evidence. He 
suggests that people really do believe that the basic norm has been changed in accordance 
with its own terms. He continues to suggest that people are not willing to look outside the 
boundaries of their legal system for a justification of why the new basic norm replaces the 
olds'. Ross, using the United States of America Constitution as an example, states: 
In the United States, the highest authority is the constituent power constituted by the 
rules in art. v of the Constitution. These rules embody the highest ideological 
presupposition of the American law system but they cannot be regarded as enacted by 
any authority and they cannot be amended by any authority. Any amendment of art. v 
of the Constitution which in fact is carried out is an alegal fact, and not the creation of 
law by way of a procedure that has been instituted. 
52 Ross (1969) at p. 17. 
53 Hart (1964). 
sa See below at p. 239. - 5s Ross (1969) at p. 19, note 1, also see below at p. 241. 56 Ross (1969) at p. 4. 
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I am, of course, aware that it will be objected that all politicians in positions of 
authority do in fact act on the assumption that art. v of the Constitution legally can be 
amended, and only be amended, by a certain procedure, namely that indicated in art. v 
itself. While I certainly accept this view as a social-psychological fact which will exert 
a great influence on the actual course of political life, this circumstance is no reason 
for modifying the logical analysis above. SB 
Ross argues that this is, unfortunately, logically impossible, and can only be explained through 
the use of artifice. However, the arguments employed by Wade, and also Hart, relating to the 
idea of legal revolution and changes in the rule of recognition - often using the British 
Commonwealth cases as examples -, are convincing" 
Ross (1969) at p. 6. 
58 Ross (1974) at p. 81. 
59 See below at p. 237 for Hart's understanding of legal revolution and changes in the rule of recognition. 
Page 230 
H. L. A. Hart, Modern British Positivism and Sovereignty 
Introduction 
The leading `modern' British positivist was H. L. A. Hart. His work spans a number of decades 
and has formed the foundation of much modern British jurisprudence. I wish to consider 
Hart's work because he not only formulated a critique of the early British positivists who 
have figured previously in this thesis, but also because he suggested an alternative approach 
to identifying the nature of legal sovereignty. Hart's alternative approach also determines the 
boundaries, or lack of them, which delimit the power of the sovereign body. I will then 
consider what this approach could mean in the UK context. 
Hart's Critique of Early English Positivism 
Hart criticised early positivism on the grounds that habitual obedience was an inadequate 
basis for constructing a legal system. As a correlate of this fact, Hart suggested that there 
was no need for an unlimited sovereign in order to demonstrate the existence of a legal 
system. Hart maintains that if we employ the Benthamite/Austinian ideal of law being a 
command from a sovereign body, habitually obeyed by the majority of the populace and not 
habitually obedient to any other body, then we may explain a system of criminal law. 
However, 
there are important classes of law where this analogy with orders backed by threats 
altogether fails, since they perform a quite different social function. Legal rules 
defining the ways in which valid contracts or wills or marriages are made do not 
require persons to act in certain ways whether they wish to or not. Such laws do not 
impose duties or obligations. Instead they provide individuals with facilities for 
realizing their wishes, by conferring legal powers upon them to create, by certain 
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specified procedures ad subject to certain conditions, structures of rights and duties 
within the coercive framework of the law. 
60 
There are a number of points that this observation raises, one of the most significant relates to 
the notion of obedience: 
What ... 
is the relevance of the fact ... that the person ordered would certainly 
have 
done the very same thing without any order? These difficultie's are particularly acute in 
the case of laws, some of which prohibit people from doing things which many of 
them would never think of doing. Till these difficulties are settled the whole idea of a 
`general habit of obedience' to the laws of a country must remain somewhat 
obscure. " 
Hart continues to criticise the negative mark, again questioning the need for an absence of 
habitual obedience to another body. He explains 
the conception of the legally unlimited sovereign misrepresents the character of law in 
many modern states where no one would question that there is law. Here there are 
legislatures but sometimes the supreme legislative power within the system is far from 
unlimited. A written constitution may restrict the competence of the legislature not 
merely by specifying the form and manner of legislation ... 
but by excluding altogether 
certain matters from the scope of its legislative competence, thus imposing limitations 
of substance. 12 
Hart is explicitly referring to the example of rigid constitutions, the examples that have been 
perennially cited as counter-evidence to the Austinian/Benthamite imperative law proposition. 
Hart suggests that these formal Constitutions approach the subject of law making from a 
different perspective. He states 
A Constitution which effectively restricts the legislative powers of the supreme 
legislature in the system does not do so by imposing (or at any rate need not impose) 
duties on the legislature not to attempt to legislate in certain ways; instead it provides 
60 Hart (1994) 27-28. 
61 Hart (1994) at p. 51. 
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that any such purported legislation shall be void. It imposes not legal duties but legal 
disabilities. `Limits' here implies not the presence of duty but the absence of legal 
power. 63 
There are other examples that could be cited against the imperative law standpoint, most 
obviously international law. Hart recognises this fact, but does not consider it in detail on the 
grounds that rigid constitutions provide as much evidence as is required64. 
The notion of empowerment is critical. It accords with the theoretical basis for modern 
administrative law, the notion of ultra vires. This notion also reflects the ancient 
constitutional idea that each organ of government has a specific constitutional role and power 
designated to it; these roles and powers are not derived from any other organ and are is 
strictly policed by the common law. 
Hart's Rule of Recognition 
Rather than rely on the notions of habitual obedience, and unlimited sovereignty when 
attempting to discover whether a particular pronouncement is a law, Hart suggests that "we 
have to show that it was made by a legislator who was qualified to legislate under an existing 
rule and that either no restrictions are contained in the rule or there are none affecting this 
particular enactment. "65 In order to satisfy these criteria it is necessary to recognise the 
existence of a different type of legal rule, other than simply the rules that prescribe and 
proscribe certain types of action - termed "primary rules". These different, "secondary", rules 
have the task of defining the criteria for legitimate creation, application and administration of 
62 Hart (1994) at p. 68. 
63 Hart (1994) at p. 69. 
64 Hart (1994) at p. 68. 
65 Hart (1994) at p. 70. 
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the primary rules66. In short, primary rule imposes duties, whereas secondary rules confer and 
67 define power. 
In some respects these secondary rules are akin to the constitutional laws identified by Bodin: 
they touch on the nature of the sovereign and affect such matters as succession (explicitly 
employed by Bodin as an example)". The existence of these secondary rules does not impose 
duties upon the sovereign; rather they delimit its authority and may, thus, render an act, 
contrary to their provisions, void. This circumvents the early positivists' problems of duty and 
enforcement: there is no need to impose a sanction in order to enforce a breach of a 
fundamental rule by the sovereign, the sovereign simply lacks the competence to do what it 
attempted, and the courts may punish the abuse of power. 
At the pinnacle of Hart's conception of primary and secondary rules there exists a special type 
of secondary rule: the rule of recognition69. This rule of recognition "determine[s] the criteria 
which settle the validity of the rules of a particular legal system"70and as such, Hart suggests, 
forms the foundation of all legal systems. There is no set formula for the rule of recognition, it 
may "take any one or more of a variety of forms: these include reference to an authoritative 
text; to legislative enactment; to customary practice; to general declarations of specified 
persons, or to past judicial decisions in particular cases. 117l What is truly significant, in the 
face of all that has been written before, is that under Hart's model, the higher rules conferring 
66 Hart (1994) Chapters IV - VI. 67 Hart (1994) at p. 81. 
68 See Chapter Two, above at footnote 79. 
69 Hart (1994) Chapter VI. 
70 MacCormick (1981) at p. 21. 
71 Hart (1994) at p. 100. 
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and defining the power to make primary rules (legislate), may confer either unlimited or 
indeed limited powers of legislating on the person (or persons) designated as sovereignn 
The examples Hart uses are, necessarily, relatively simple. In reality, as Hart notes, the 
situation is more complex: 
In a modern legal system where there are a variety of `sources' of law, the rule of 
recognition is correspondingly more complex: the criteria for identifying the law are 
multiple and commonly include a written constitution, enactment by a legislature, and 
judicial precedents. In most cases, provision is made for possible conflict by ranking 
these criteria in an order of relative subordination and primacy. 73 
In the United Kingdom system this is understood by the relationship between common law 
and statutory law: that the former is subordinate to the latter and subject to any changes the 
latter decrees necessary. Hart continues to state that 
In the day-to-day life of a legal system its rule of recognition is very seldomly 
expressly formulated as a rule.... For the most part the rule of recognition is not 
stated, but its existence is shown in the way in which particular rules are identified, 
either by courts or by private persons or their advisers. There is, of course, a 
difference in the use made by courts of the criteria provided by the rule and the use of 
them by others: for when the courts reach a particular conclusion on the footing that a 
particular rule has been correctly identified as law, what they say has a special 
's authoritative status conferred on it by other rules. 
A further complication arises in Hart's formulation: the public and official attitudes towards 
the rule of recognition may be different. The public is principally concerned with the primary 
rules, and these rules should be generally obeyed (although it does not necessarily matter 
what motivates such obedience), "on the other hand, (the] rules of recognition specifying the 
'' 
'4 
Hart (1994) at p. 77. 
Hart (1994) at p. 101. 
74 Hart (1994) at pp. 101-102. 
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criteria of legal validity and its rules of change and adjudication must be effectively accepted 
as common public standards of official behaviour by its officials. "7s The emphasis of the rule 
of recognition is weighted towards the actions of public officials, and most significantly the 
rule makers (legislature) and the rule enforcers (courts). 
Hart's thesis is simply summarised thus: 
To say that a given rule is valid is to recognise it as passing all the tests provided by 
the rule of recognition and so as a rule of the system. We can indeed simply say that 
the statement that a particular rule is valid means that it satisfies all the criteria 
provided by the rule of recognition. " 
Hart's Theory in the Political Context of the United Kingdom 
Hart's notion of a supreme rule of recognition supplying the criteria for legal validity may, he 
suggests, also explain the confusion that has appeared, in the United Kingdom context, over 
the question of illimitability. Hart explains that 
It is plain that the notions of a superior and a supreme criterion merely refer to a 
relative place on a scale and do not import any notion of legally unlimited legislative 
power. Yet `supreme' and `unlimited' are easy to confuse - at least in legal theory. 
One reason for this is that in the simpler forms of legal system the ideas of ultimate 
rule of recognition, supreme criterion, and legally unlimited legislature seem to 
converge. For where there is a legislature subject to no constitutional limitations and 
competent by its enactment to deprive all other rules of law emanating from other 
sources of their status as law, it is part of the rule of recognition in such a system that 
enactment by the legislature is the supreme criterion of validity. This is, according to 
constitutional theory, the position in the United Kingdom. " 
75 Hart (1994) at p. 117. 
76 Hart (1994) at p. 103. 
77 Hart (1994) at p. 106. 
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The rule of recognition in the United Kingdom could be simply stated as being: the Queen in 
Parliament is the supreme law maker and Acts of this body constitute the highest form of 
domestic law, and that common law, where it does not conflict with the provisions of 
statutory law is to be accepted as law, unless and until either the courts or the Queen in 
Parliament declare otherwise and that any subsequent Act of Parliament has the effect of 
repealing the provisions of any former Act inconsistent with the provisions of the 
subsequent78. At the crux of this is the point that it is the courts who declare what the law is, 
not only in relation to the common law, but through their interpretation of the meaning of 
Acts of Parliament, they determine the content of the rule of recognition, the basic norm, or 
as Kelsen called it the Grundnorm. 
Hart and Legal Revolution 
Hart acknowledges that there are situations where the basic norm will change; he cites the 
possibility of Revolution and enemy occupation79. He also explores the possibility of a "new" 
system emerging from the "womb" of the old. In such circumstances there would be a 
gradual change that does not, necessarily, involve the dramatic breaks envisaged in the 
previous two examples. Hart uses the Commonwealth experience as an example of this 
process80. At the beginning of the process the Parliament at Westminster was the sovereign 
lawmaker; under this system the basic norm was that which applies to the domestic British 
system. Later on the British Parliament creates, through legislation, local organs of 
government within the imperial territory which possess legal competence within the 
framework laid down in the British statute. At this point in time the British Parliament 
'$ This latter element is often explained through the theory of leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant. 
79 Hart (1994) at p. 118. 
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reserves the competence to amend the constitutive rules of the territorial organs of 
government. However, after a number of years of self-government, the British Parliament no 
longer possesses the competence to amend the territorial organ's constitutive rules. The 
effect of the process is that 
At the end of the period of development we find that the ultimate rule of recognition 
has shifted, for the legal competence of the Westminster Parliament to legislate for the 
former colony is no longer recognised in its courts. ... much of the constitutional 
structure of the former colony is still to be found in the original statute of the 
Westminster Parliament: but this is now only an historical fact, for it no longer owes 
its contemporary legal status in the territory to the authority of the Westminster 
Parliament. The legal system in the former colony has now a `local root' in that the 
rule of recognition specifying the ultimate criteria of legal validity no longer refers to 
enactments of a legislature of another territory. The new rule rests simply on the fact 
that it is accepted and used as a rule in the judicial and other official operations of a 
local system whose rules are generally obeyed. " 
Hart accepts, as does Wade, that the process of legal revolution may be peaceful, gradual, 
and internal. A Hartian interpretation of political development can be explained thus: 
we can say that over a long tract of time there emerged a power-conferring `rule of 
change' which stemmed originally from a power to settle conclusive evidence of law, 
grew into a power of limited legal change and was finally re-interpreted as an 
unfettered power of change. Parallel with this development were refinements in and 
modifications of the `rule of recognition' upheld by the judges as settling the criteria of 
recognition determinative of their duty to decide according to `laws' which are for 
them valid as justifying grounds for their decisions. The judges are thus amongst those 
who participate in the redefinition of the power of change vested in the legislator. 82 tY 
The examples, adduced as evidence of this process, still tend to be the movement from 
Empire to Commonwealth, or the development of the Great British constitution during the 
80 Hart (1994) at pp. 120-121. 
$1 Hart (1994) at p. 120. 
82 MacCormick (1981) at p. 120. 
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seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. There are more recent examples of this process, for 
example the events surrounding membership of the European Communities and Union, 
particularly since the Factortame litigation83. 
Hart, Self-reference and Duties 
Hart, using the language of primary and secondary rules, suggests that self-reference may be 
explained through the use of empowerment and duties, rather than commands and sanctions. 
He produces an example with the following rules: 
Rule I- No individual shall steal. 
Rule II - An organ of the Community (a Judge) shall punish any one who breaks any law 
including this one. 
This allows for a potentially infinite regress: a judge must punish a judge who failed to punish 
a judge who failed to punish a judge who failed to punish a thie? 4. In this way Hart has 
changed the language of the debate: he discusses the whole legal system in terms of duty, and 
in addition, although rule II refers to itself, it does so in the context of a class of laws. As 
Hart explains, the difference between Rule 'II and a rule that states, "A judge shall punish any 
individual who breaks this rule" is that 
the idea of punishing for a breach of [Rule II] is essentially incomplete. It is 
incomplete without the idea of a rule which requires behaviour other than punishment. 
This means that, though it is perfectly good sense to provide a series of punishments 
for failures to punish, there must be some ultimate reference to punishment for 
something else. " 
$' For a consideration of these matters see Chapter Six.. below particularly at p. 351 et seq. 84 Hart (1964) at p. 309. 
85 Hart (1964) at p. 311. 
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Hart then refers to the examples of certain Commonwealth cases86, where there are clear 
examples of partly self-referring rules. He also accepts that there is a significant difference in 
approach between the continuing and self-embracing schools of thought and that this may 
profoundly affect the answer to the question of self-limitation, and reflexivity. This solution to 
these problems relies on a particular notion of self-limitation; it does not answer the question 
of full self-limitation, but side steps it. This does not mean that there is no answer to the 
problem of full self-limitation. 
86 See below at p. 253. 
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A solution to the question of reflexivity and self-limitation? 
Any attempt at a solution must stand by the principle that from the validity of a norm 
it is impossible to derive the validity of any norm in conflict with N. Therefore, the 
basic norm of a legal system must be unchangeable in any legal procedure. If the basic 
norm of a system is in fact changed, this change cannot be derived from any rule of 
competence (amendment) within the system87 
Ross' solution to the problem relies on a simple idea, touched on by Hart in his criticism of 
the early positivist ideas of Austin and Bentham88, that, rather than there being an ultimate 
norm allowing for a process of amendment, there is an ultimate norm which vests conditional 
validity in the `supreme rule' used in assessing the validity of any other norm89. Ross 
articulates his idea (using the terms referred to above) thus: 
t 
No: Obey the authority instituted by art. 88, until this authority itself points 
out a successor; then obey this authority, until it itself points out a 
successor; and so on indefinitely. 90 
The emphasis is not on duty, obligation or command, but rather on the notion of 
empowerment and authorisation. Once the authority instituted by art. 88 has pointed out a 
successor the original authority is not empowered to issue any legally binding acts unless its 
successor expressly allows for such a power to be vested. Any amendment of art. 88 is 
empowered not through the terms of art. 88 but through the terms of No. There is no 
reflexivity to be countered and no express contradiction between art. 88 and art. 88' which 
could be used to argue that the latter is logically impossible and therefore invalid. This 
$7 Ross (1969) at p. 21. 
88 See above at p. 233. 
89 Ross (1959) at p. 22. 
90 Ross (1969) at p. 24. 
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argument would appear to support the self-embracing ideas of the manner and form 
theorists". 
The basic norm in the United Kingdom would, therefore, not relate to Parliamentary statutes 
as the pinnacle of the normative system, for there would be no means of change in such a 
system. Rather the basic norm would refer to the authority of Parliament to make any law in 
any form until it vested the power to issue laws to any other body. Where such a "vesting" to 
take place it could impose any manner and form upon that body. In this way it would be 
possible, through Ross's model, to explain the Parliament Acts of 1911 and 1949. It could, 
similarly, be used to explain the result of the European Communities Act 1972. Such an 
explanation would, probably, more satisfactorily than reliance on any idea of legal 
revolution92. 
91 Marshall (1971) at p. 48. 
97* For a detailed consideration of this point see Chapters Five and Six below. 
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Case Law this Century 
Introduction 
As Wade acknowledges superior logic is one means of demonstrating that a particular 
explanation is the most appropriate, the other method he suggests is a review of the case law 
äddre'ssing the matter93. That is the object of the following section. 
The case law considered falls into three distinct categories; the pre-European Communities 
Membership (excluding those cases which were precursory to actual accession) domestic 
cases; the Commonwealth cases; and those cases pertaining to membership of the European 
Communities (including those cases dealing with the question of membership which occurred 
prior to actual accession). At this point in time I wish to consider the former two categories, 
the last category of cases is -considered in Chapter Five. 
Traditional considerations of the case law centre on the question of whether the self- 
embracing argument of the manner and form theorists or the continuing argument of the 
traditionalists is supported by the judicial statements. This question is complicated by the fact 
that prior to 1971, 
It ha[d] in fact, never been necessary for a court in this country to decide the points in 
issue between the older and newer doctrines of Parliamentary supremacy, since 
Parliament ha[d] never attempted to use its authority to regulate the future by an 
explicit reformulation of legislative procedure accompanied by entrenchment. 94 
Furthermore, " the judges know nothing (so it is said) of abstract theories of sovereignty. Still 
less do they reflect about presupposed ideology or the relationships between norms. s93 The 
courts have, instead, continually decided the case before them and have pronounced on 
" See above at p. 223. 
94 Marshall (1971) at p. 53. 
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matters concerning the nature of sovereignty only in so far as they have, directly, affected the 
cases before them. 
Domestic Case Law 
Within the domestic jurisdiction two cases decided in the 193 Os provided the basis for the 
early discussions over the correct interpretation of the nature of Parliamentary supremacy: 
Vauxhall Estates Ltd. v. Liverpool Corporation96 and Ellen St Estates. Ltd v. Minister of 
Health97. Both cases concerned the effect the provisions of the Housing Act 1925 had on the 
provisions of the Acquisition of Land (Assessment of Compensation) Act 1919. The central 
phrase was: "the provisions of any Act authorising acquisition of land, if inconsistent with the 
Act of 1919, `shall cease to have or shall not have effect. si98 It was argued, in the course of 
these two cases, that the terms of the Act of 1919 protected its provisions against implied 
repeal. The argument was that "by enacting that inconsistent provisions `shall not have 
effect, ' Parliament had altered the rule of law which says that where two Acts of Parliament 
conflict, the later repeals the earlier by implication. "99 
Had the provisions of the earlier Act altered the notion of leges posteriores priores 
contrarias abrogant it could have entrenched its provisions and precluded any subsequent 
amendment by Act of Parliament, albeit only to the extent that they could not be amended or 
repealed by implication. Repeal by express provision may still have been possible. A higher 
degree of entrenchment than ever before would have existed. This would, effectively, have 
95 Marshall (1971) at p. 50. 
96 [19321 1 K. B. 733. 
97 [19341 1K. B. 590. 
98 Wade (1955) at p. 175. 
99 Wade (1955) at p. 176. 
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altered the terms of the basic norm and would support the self-embracing interpretation of 
Parliamentary sovereignty. 
However, during the course of the judgements, emphatic statements were made to the effect 
that Parliament could not in any way bind its successors. In Vauxhall Estates Ltd. v. 
Liverpool Corporation Avory J. asserted that 
we are asked to say that by a provision of [the] Act of 1919 the hands of Parliament 
were tied in such a way that it could not by any subsequent Act-enact anything which 
was inconsistent with the provisions of the Act of 1919. It must be admitted that such 
a suggestion is inconsistent with the principle of the constitution of this country. 
Speaking for myself, I should certainly hold, until the contrary were decided, that no 
Act of Parliament can effectively provide that no future Act shall interfere with its 
provisions. "o 
In the more authoritative case of Ellen Street Estates. Ltd v. Minister of Health. Maugham 
L. J. famously asserted that 
The legislature cannot, according to our constitution, bind itself as to the form of 
subsequent legislation, and it is impossible for Parliament to enact that in a subsequent 
statute dealing with the same subject-matter there can be no implied repeal. If in a 
subsequent Act Parliament chooses to make it plain that the earlier statute is being to 
some extent repealed, effect must be given to that intention just because it is the will 
of the legislature"' 
Wade interprets these cases as evidence that Parliament cannot restrict itself as to the form 
future statutes must assume. He continues to assert that this demonstrates that Parliament 
cannot change the fundamental rule regarding its own omnicompetence. Interestingly, and 
'ö [19321 1 K. B. 733, at p. 743. 
[1934) 1 K. B. 590, at p. 597. 
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potentially significantly, Wade suggests that the courts are vested with the responsibility for 
protecting this rule 102, an idea not at odds with Hart's view of legal development103 
Intriguingly, Vauxhall Estates Ltd. V Liverpool Corporation is also adduced as evidence in 
support of the manner and form argument. Professor Friedmann asserts, "That a Parliament 
cannot fetter its successors is true only in the sense that it cannot tell them what policy to 
pursue in regard to specific subject matter. On this English and Australian cases are in 
agreement. " 104 Following this statement, Friedmann refers the reader to the Vauxhall Estate 
Ltd v. Liverpool Corporation decision, but does not, unfortunately, elaborate on how this 
decision, apparently so at odds with the manner and form argument, actually demonstrates his e 
point. Due to this failure the best course of action is to ignore Friedmann's assertion due to 
lack of reasoninglos 
Of all the manner and form theorists Jennings presents the most compelling explanation of the 
two cases. Jennings asserts that the cases where correctly decided "on any interpretation of 
the power of Parliament". He forwards this argument on the basis that the implication in the 
1925 legislation " that the Act of 1919 was pro tanto to be repealed was so evident that it 
was almost an explicit repeal" 116 He continues to classify Maugham L. J. 's statement as obiter 
"because Parliament had not purported in the Act of 1919 to deprive itself of the power of 
repealing the Act of 1919. The case is not an authority for saying that Parliament cannot 
102 Wade (1955) at p. 176. 
103 See above at pp. 238-239. 
104 Friedmann (1950) at p. 104. . '05 Wade briefly considers the significance of Friedmann's assertion and he too disregards it as being prima 
facie inconsistent with the judicial statements and lacking in sufficient argument to overcome the more 
obvious interpretation. Wade (1955) at p. 180. 
106 Jennings (1959) at p. 162. 
Page 246 
deprive itself of that power. " 107 This is clearly at odds with Wade's analysis, which suggests 
that the statement was an integral part of the judgement108. Although compelling, Jennings's 
argument is more incongruous with the expressions employed by Maugham Ll than is 
Wade's. The tenor of Maugham's words demonstrates that he possessed a traditional 
continuing interpretation of parliamentary sovereignty. 
Avory J. 's assertion is easier to square with the principles of self-embracing sovereignty. His 
was a statement from a lower and, therefore, less authoritative court. He clearly prefixes his 
statement, addressing the possibility of Parliament imposing restrictions upon its successors, 
with the expression "speaking for myself'. He continues to say that he would hold this view 
until it was decided otherwise; this implies that he believed such a decision was possible. 
Taken together, these cases do not further the self-embracing argument. They support 
Wade's thesis concerning the continuing nature of sovereignty. A reasonable suggestion is 
that these two cases were easily decided employing narrow interpretative techniques'" 
Further, today, we should not afford them any great degree of authority; we should remember 
that 
The background (to the cases] must be borne in mind when considering the doctrine of 
the sovereignty of Parliament, for some of the precedents, some of the authoritative 
writings, must be considered (to an extent at least) in the light of the Parliament which 
existed contemporaneously with them, and which may be materially different from that 
which exists now, either in itself or in general acceptance. ' 10 
107 Jennings (1959) at p. 163. 108 Wade (1955) at p. 184. 109 Mitchell (1968) at p. 63, note 3. 110 Mitchell (1968) at p. 63. 
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There are a number of other cases which support the continuing interpretation of 
Parliamentary sovereignty; some of these cases are far more recent than the authorities cited 
above and some of them address the questions of parliamentary supremacy far-more overtly. 
One of the more obvious, Cheney v. Connll1. addressed the relationship between international 
law ratified by the Crown under its prerogative powers and domestic legislation in the form of 
the Finance Act 1964. The judgement is worth mentioning because of the following 
statement, by Ungoed-Thomas J, that 
What [a] statute itself enacts cannot be unlawful, because what the statute says and 
provides is itself the law, and the highest form of law which is known to this country. 
It is the law which prevails over every other form of law, and it is not for the court to 
say that a parliamentary enactment, the highest form of law i this country, is illegal12 
There are many other cases worthy of consideration; unfortunately I do not have the space to 
mention them all. I do, however, consider the case of Pickin v. British Railways Board' 13 
later on in this section as it demonstrates a very clear judicial attitude towards the issue of 
sovereignty. 
The domestic judicial attitude of the early and mid decades of this century was characterised 
by the judiciary refusing to assert its own authority against that of Parliament. There have 
been cases where the opposite is true, for example Burmah Oil v. Lord Advocate and there 
have been judicial figures willing to take a far more creative and censorial role than their 
peers, the clearest example is Lord Denning"4. These exceptions have, however, been tiie 
examples that defined the `rule'. The statements made in Liversidge v. Anderson that 
"Parliament is supreme. It can enact extraordinary powers of interfering with personal liberty. 
111 [19681 1 W. L. R242. 
112 [1968] 1 W. L. R. 242, at p. 247gh. 
113 [1974] A. C. 765 
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[That]If an Act of Parliament ... 
is alleged to limit or curtail the liberty of the subject ... the 
only question is what is the precise extent of the power given" 1 5, taken in conjunction with 
those cited above, demonstrates a judicial approach clearly opposed to the activism of Coke 
and the attempts by some theorists to reserve a power of, albeit limited, constitutional review 
far the modern British judiciary. 
Commonwealth Authorities 
Whilst the judiciary have been `conservative' and have upheld traditional tenets of the 
domestic political settlement, they have also been involved in the debate over the nature of 
sovereignty in their capacity as Imperial judges.. Many of the `key' cases in the debate have 
been decided in Commonwealth courts. The British judiciary have frequently been involved, 
in their capacity as Privy Councillors. 
Attorney-General for New South Wales v. Trethowan (1931) 44 GL. R 394 
The traditional starting point in this aspect of the debate over the nature of parliamentary 
sovereignty is Attorney-General for New South Wales v. Trethowan (Trethowan's Case). 
The facts are sufficiently well known and do not require in depth consideration; a brief outline 
of the pertinent points is all that is required. The constitution of New South Wales was 
governed by the Constitution Act 1902. The legislature constituted under this Act had the 
power to determine its own powers and procedure. However, as the New South Wales 
legislature was considered to be a non-sovereign legislature, it had to do so in accordance 
114 For example see his judgement in Maltor and St Mellons v. Newport Corporation 1195012 All ER 1236. 
and compare it with the judgement of Lord Simmonds f 195112 All E. R. 839. 115 [ 19421 A, C. 206, at pp. 260-161. 
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with the provisions of the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865, which 
"ranked as `a superior' 
116 
law, for all non-sovereign legislatures in the Empire" 
The legislature of New South Wales, in 1929, passed a law requiring that the legislature's 
upper house should not be abolished without first approval 
from the electorate through a 
referendum. It further asserted that the Act containing these provisions should not be 
repealed but through the same process. In the following year a new government attempted to 
do what the 1929 Act prohibited: it issued Bills aimed at repealing the 1929 Act and 
abolishing the upper house. The government failed to comply with the process demanded by 
the preceding legislation and was in the process of submitting the Bills to the Governor for 
His Majesty's assent when Members of the legislature objected to the failure to comply with 
due process as determined by the 1929 Act. These opponents sought redress through the 
courts. The matter went through the Imperial judicial system and the New South Wales 
Supreme Court's decision to grant an injunction, against the government presenting the Bills 
to the Governor before a referendum had been held, was upheld by all the courts up to, and 
including, the Privy Council. 
There are so many questions surrounding this case and there has been so much discussion of 
its meaning that its significance can sometimes be overstated. The New South Wales 
legislature was a non-sovereign legislature. Although Friedmann states that this is not 
significant and that the decision is applicable to all "`sovereign legislatures' operating under 
flexible constitutions ... with a machinery of constitutional change 
by simple statute... "117, this 
is not the interpretation subsequent courts have adopted. The judicial decision was a relatively 
116 Friedmann (1950) at p. 103. For the terms of the relevent sections of the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865, 
see Appendix D. 
Friedmann (1950) at p. 104. 
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easy one. The actions of the New South Wales legislature were constrained, by the Colonial 
Laws Validity Act and the Constitution Act. The New South Wales legislature was not 
`sovereign' in the sense that the British Parliament may be deemed to be sovereign. For this 
reason the correctly decided decision has little bearing on possible "constraints over the actions 
of the British Parliament. Wade expresses this opinion. He continues to assert, "In the 
opinion of the judges who decided it, Trethowan's case is simply an application of the 
principle of ultra vires, which cannot be applied to any At of the United Kingdom 
Parliament. ""' Wade, in support of his claim, adduces the statement of the Privy Council, 
that 
The answer depends in their Lordship's view entirely upon a=consideration of the 
meaning and effect of section 5 of the Act of 1865, read in conjunction with section 4 
of the Constitution Statute, assuming that latter section still to possess some operative 
effect. Whatever operative effect it may still possess must, however, be governed by 
and be subject to such conditions as are to be found in section 5 of the Act of 1865 in 
regard to the particular kind of laws within the purview of that section. "' 
Within the judgements of the lower courts, however, there are some interesting and 
provoking ideas expressed in what must be admitted to be obiter dicta. Foremost amongst 
these is a famous and well-quoted dictum from Dixon J., who stated 
An Act of the British Parliament which contained a provision that no Bill repealing any 
part of the Act including the part so restraining its own repeal should be presented for 
the royal assent unless the Bill were first approved by the electors, would have the 
force of law until the Sovereign actually did assent to a Bill for its repeal. In strictness 
it would be an unlawful proceeding to present such a Bill for the royal assent before it 
had been approved by the electors. 12" 
Wade (1955) at p. 183. 1 19 [19321 A. C. at p. 539. For the terms of section 5 of the Colonial Laws Validity Act see Appendix D. 1 .o At p. 426. 
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As a dictum from a Commonwealth court, it would be easy to ignore this pronouncement, 
however coming from such an eminent lawyer it does beg an answer. The simple answer 
would be that the British courts would never adopt such an approach. Rather, -they would be 
happy to wait until the Bill was enrolled and would then simply obey the provisions of the Act 
of Parliament that had received the approval of both Houses of Parliament and had received 
the Royal Assent. Prior to membership of the European Communities there was little judicial 
enthusiasm for reviewing the internal workings of Parliament; indeed Clause 9 of the Bill of 
Rights precluded them from such action. 121 Friedmann accepts that the "courts regard 
themselves as unable to control the legislative process, except indirectly through the 
interpretation of statutes" 122 . 
Dixon's statement addressed what was essentially an academic question as far as Britain was 
concerned. There was no history of referenda, nor did it appear likely that such a tool would 
ever be used. Today, however, there is a more pressing case supporting Dixon's argument. 
The decision to remain within the European Communities and the granting of a legislature to 
Scotland, and the assembly to Wales and Northern Ireland, all confirmed through an express 
wish of the people (referendum) may have elevated the enabling legislation to a position 
beyond the scope of simple legislation. There are some significant differences between 
Dixon's dictum and the modern position; the enabling legislation in each of the examples cited 
does not explicitly specify that a referendum must be effected prior to any amendment. The 
position is, however, arguably such that repeal of any of the enabling legislation may require 
121 See the judgements delivered in Pickin v. British Railways Board f 19741 A. C. 765, for details see below at p. 278. 
17= Friedmann (1950) at p. 106. 
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the same process of repeal as of enactment: a valid Act of Parliament confirmed by an express 
decision of the people. '23 Friedmann, in 1950, noted that 
It is true that the normal legislative machinery in Britain, as expressed by. the enacting 
words of any Act passed by Parliament, consists of the Commons, the Lords, and the 
King.. But to imply that the additional provision of a referendum by Parliamentary 
legislation could. be -safely ignored by the Government of the day because no Court 
could ever question the validity of an Act passed by both Houses and duly signed and 
promulgated, would be to elevate this purely customary though venerable procedure 
into a provision equivalent to that of a fundamental law. 124 
There has been an increased willingness on the part of the judiciary to consider the workings 
of Parliament and the processes by which legislation is made. 125 This suggests that the 
current judiciary is more willing to take an active part in the process. of legislation. There have 
been gradual indications that fewer processes are now deemed to be outside the oversight 
remit of the judiciary. 126 The period of constitutional development since 1973 could be 
portrayed as marking a change in the constitutional settlement similar in nature to that which 
constitutes the background to the second Commonwealth case Harris v. Minister of the 
Interior. 127 
Harris v. Minister of the Interior (1952) (2) S. A. 428. 
In the course of argument in Harris v. Minister of the Interior 128 counsel for the Minister 
drew a number of analogies between the Union of South Africa legislature and that of Britain. 
He relied on these analogies to support a number of propositions regarding the nature of the 
Union Parliament's sovereignty. Cowen lists these analogies thus: 
123 For a more detailed analysis of this proposition see Chapter Six below. ''' Friedmann (1950) at p. 107. 125 See for example the decision in Pepper v Hart 119931 A. C. 593, and the impact this development has had 
on the work process of the judiciary when interpreting difficult statutes. '26 See Chapter One, above at p. 25 et seq, also see the development of Judicial Review. 12' (1952)(2) S. A. 429-, [195211 T. L. R. 1245. 
L28 (1952)(2) S. A. 428. 
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(i) that a court of law cannot take any note of the procedure in Parliament whereby a 
Bill came to be enacted; (ii) that a measure which appears on the Roll of Parliament is 
good law, whatever the method adopted for its passage; (iii) that a Sovereign 
Parliament cannot bind itself as to the form of subsequent legislation, and, therefore, 
the provisions of a later Act, so far as they are inconsistent with an earlier Act, must 
prevail; and (iv) that a legislature can only rank as sovereign if there is one manner of 
law-making which the constituent elements of that legislature can always adopt in 
legislating. 129 
Their Lordships in Harris v. Minister of the Interior accepted that the position in South Africa 
was substantially different to that which then existed in Britain, and as such "they did not 
consider it relevant to consider the position in Britain". 130 The analogies drawn are, therefore, 
of limited direct significance to discussions concerning the nature of British sovereignty. 
There is, however, significance in the academic argument the case has provoked and the 
treatment, by the courts, of the issue of sovereignty and the nature of legal sovereignty, as a 
general principle. 
The major distinction between the British and Union of South Africa (Union) systems was 
that the Union constitution was governed by the provisions of the South Africa Act 1909. 
There is, however, no equivalent statute in Britain. Section 35 of the South Africa Act 
(hereafter section 35), as amended, stated that there could be no disqualification of any Cape 
coloured voter, nor could there be any alteration in the number of members of the House of 
Assembly who could be elected by those same voters, 
unless the Bill embodying such disqualification or alteration be passed by both Houses 
of Parliament sitting together, and at the third reading be agreed to by not less than 
'29 Cowen (1952) at p. 282. 
130 Cowen (1953) at p. 273. 
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two-thirds of the total number of members of both Houses. A Bill so passed at such 
joint sitting shall be taken to have been duly passed by both Houses of Parliament. 
The Act at the centre of the dispute was the Separate Representation of Voters Act 46 of 
1951 (hereafter the Act), which purported to change the electoral rights of the "non- 
European voters" in the Province of the Cape of Good Hope. Each House of the South 
African Parliament, but not sitting together, passed the Act. The contention was that the 
provisions of the South Africa Act rendered the Act void for lack of conformity with a 
prescribed procedure, viz. section 35. The Defendants countered by asserting that the Statute 
of Westminster had, by making the South African Parliament a sovereign legislature, rendered 
section 35 obsolete and that the Act, was valid, and binding upon the courts. 
There was no dispute that prior to the Statute of Westminster 'section 35 was binding, as 
Centlivres C. J. recognised: 
If Act 46 of 1951 had been passed before the Statute of Westminster, it is clear from 
the reasons given in decision of this court in Rex v. Ndobe that that Act would not 
have been a valid Act, as it was not passed in accordance with the procedure 
prescribed by secs. 35(1) and 152 of the South Africa Act. 131 
The Statute of Westminster effectively made the South African Parliament a sovereign body 
in that it removed from the Westminster Parliament the political right to legislate for any of 
the Dominions without the express wish of the Dominion in question. 132 Centlivres C. J. 
concludes that 
The effect of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 2 [of the Statute of Westminster] is that the Colonial 
Laws Validity Act no longer applies to any law made after December 11,1931, by the 
"1 (1952) (2) S. A. 428 at p. 456ef. 132 See Appendix D for the terms of the relevant provisions of the Statute of Westminster. 
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Union Parliament. Consequently the Union Parliament can now make a law repugnant 
to a British Act of Parliament in so far as that Act extends to the Union. 
133 
Clearly the Union Parliament no longer owed any degree of obedience to the Westminster 
Parliament, and should be deemed to be a sovereign legislature, as counsel for the Minister 
insisted. Counsel for the Minister continued to argue that as the Statute of Westminster made 
the Union Parliament a sovereign body so it should assume the mantle of the Westminster 
Parliament possessed of the same powers, and be governed by the same doctrine of 
Parliamentary Sovereignty. However, 
The court rejected this argument. It was not prepared to accept as self-evident the 
major premise upon which it was based, namely, that the Union Parliament has always 
been a replica of the United Kingdom Parliament in regard to its mode of legislating. 
On the contrary, it found the premise to be false. The Union parliament, their 
Lordships held, is, and always has been, different in kind from the United Kingdom 
Parliament. 134 
This allowed for the view that the Union Parliament was not unconstrained. As Centlivres 
notes: 
As far as I have now considered the Statute of Westminster it is clear that when it 
refers to a law made by a Dominion, such law means in relation to South Africa a law 
made by the Union Parliament functioning either bicamerally or unicamerally in 
accordance with the requirements of the South Africa Act. The reference was clearly 
not only to Parliament sitting bicamerally, for it would be absurd to suggest that a law 
made by Parliament in terms of sec. 63 of the South Africa Act would still be subject to 
the provisions of the Colonial Laws Validity Act. 135 
Again it is easy to distinguish this case from any potentially similar British case on the 
grounds that there was a higher form of law than a simple statute, the South Africa Act 1909, 
133 (1952) (2) S. A. 428 at p. 462. 134 Cowen (1952) at p. 286. 
135 (1952) (2) S. A. 428, at p. 462. 
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and that the limitations imposed by this Act did not create problems of reflexivity and self- 
reference as they were instituted by the Imperial Parliament and not the Union Parliament. 
Thus, the Union of South Africa's Parliament was not born free, but was subject to restraints 
- imposed prior to, or perhaps more accurately, concurrent with its creation. There was a 
limitation on its authority, albeit a procedural limitation, and it could not, therefore, be 
deemed to be absolute as to procedure and subject matter. 
In many ways this refers back to the simple questions posed by Pollock, 136 and ignored by 
Dicey: What is Parliament? In answering this question Centlivres asserted that 
The words `Parliament of a Dominion' in the Statute of Westminster must, in my 
opinion, be read, in relation to the Union in the light of the Söuth Africa Act ... one 
is 
doing no violence to language when one regards the word `Parliament' as meaning 
parliament sitting either bicamerally or unicamerally in accordance with the 
requirements of the South Africa Act. 137 
Having concluded this point, the only real issue lay with whether the courts had the power to 
adjudicate on the validity of a law, or whether it was a matter solely for the Union Parliament 
under the rules of their privilege. This matter had been previously decided in the Union in the 
case' of Rex v. Ndobe where Villiers C. J. declared that 
Under section 48 of the South Africa Act, each House of Parliament is free to 
prescribe its own rules with respect to the order and conduct of its business and 
proceedings. Into the due observance of such rules this court is not competent to 
inquire. But whether an Act has been validly passed by Parliament is another 
matter... 138 
and one that the courts were empowered to decide. On the basis of this power the courts 
declared that "the measure known as Act 46 of 1951 is invalid, null and void, and of no legal 
1J6 See above at p. 219. 137 (1952) (2) S. A. 428, at p. 463. 
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force and effect in terms and by virtue of sections 35 and 152 of the South Africa Act 1909, 
as amended. " 
There is, despite what was said earlier, 139an important analogy between the Union and British 
systems: in both cases the courts have been empowered to declare what is and what is not 
valid law. This may seem contrary to what was said in Wauchope v. Edinburgh and Dalkeith 
Railway, 140 as endorsed in Pickin v. British Railways Board, 141 regarding a court's power to 
declare an Act void or not. However, it was the judicial committee of the House of Lords 
who made this declaration and there has been no attempt by any other organ of government 
to subvert the idea, or to question Lord Campbell's competence to make such a claim. 
Following the Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent) 142 of 1966 the `rule' laid down in 1842 
could be overruled by a simple House of Lords judgement and this would be completely 
consistent with the constitutional procedures adhered to by the governmental bodies. This is 
the case because, although Lord Cambell's statement has been taken to be a true analysis of 
the relationship between Parliament and the courts in 1847, the Practice Statement (Judicial 
Precedent) of 1966 allows the House of Lords to overrule one of its previous judgements 
through the simple mechanism of issuing a subsequent judgement that is inconsistent with the 
former judgement. The grounds where it is appropriate to depart from the former judgement 
include where the House of Lords "consider that the earlier decision was influenced by the 
existence of conditions which no longer prevail, and that in modern conditions the law ought 
to be different". 
13$ (1952) (2) S. A. 428, at p. 457. 
139 See P. 254 above. 
140 (1842) 1 Bell 252, for details see Chapter Three above at p. 199-201. 
"' [1974] A. C. 765, for details see below at p. 278. 
142 [1966] 1 W. L. R. 1234 
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It is arguable that the constitutional/governmental situation existing in the latter part of the 
twentieth century is so radically different from that which existed in 1842 that the enrolled 
Bill rule has little or no relevance to the modern democratic model of government. 
The Bribery Commissioner v. Pedrick Ranasinphe /19651 A. C 172. 
Within the context of The Bribery Commissioner v. Pedrick Ranasinghe (RanasinQghe)'43 there 
was deemed to be a governing document, as in Harris v. Minister of the Interior and 
Trethowan's Case. Again, the judiciary asserted that this fact distinguished the English 
position from that before them. Lord Pearce stated: 
The English authorities have taken a narrow view of the court's power to look behind 
an authentic copy of the Act. But in the constitution of the United Kingdom there is 
no governing instrument which prescribes the law-making powers and the forms which 
are essential to"those powers: There was, therefore, never such a necessity as arises in 
the present case for the court to take any close cognisance of the process of law- 
making. '" 
This distinguishing mark demands careful consideration of Gray's assertion that 
The case of The Bribery Commissioner v. Ranasinghe represents an important stage in 
the process of delimitation of the legal doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty, as 
representing a recognition by a British court of a principle that the powers of a 
sovereign legislature may be legally limited by `manner and form" requirements. "' 
It further requires reflection on his conclusion that 
While it is true that Bribery Commissioner v. Ranasinghe is not of itself an authority 
on similar obstacles imposed by itself upon a sovereign legislature, it is submitted that 
the principles are the same as those applied in the present case. The question is capable 
143 [19651 A. C. 172. 
144 [1965) A. C. 172, at p. 195. 14S Gray (1964) at p. 705. 
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of arising whenever there is more than one method open to a sovereign legislature of 
enacting legislation and it can happen here. 146 
Gray's assertion is that although the Constitution of Ceylon determines the entrenching 
provision, it could, in fact, have been found in a simple Act of Parliament that introduced an 
amendment to the constitution. 147 If this were the case then the amending Act would become 
a part of the constitution, and it would, therefore, be the higher law - the Constitution - that 
dictated the procedure, and not the Act per se. Additionally, as Gray does note, Ranasinghe, 
like the other cases cited above, does not encounter the question of reflexivity: it was the 
Imperial Powers who issued the Constitution of Ceylon, and not the Parliament of Ceylon. 
There was no question over the sovereign nature of Ceylon's Parliament. However, the 
applicability of the decision to the British situation is questionable in that it has little 
supportive evidence. The courts have been careful to ensure that they do not fuel speculation 
over the future use of manner and form arguments in the United Kingdom by continually 
distinguishing their decisions as Imperial judges from the domestic United Kingdom system. 
Although Ceylon's legislature was deemed sovereign, Lord Pearce upheld the view of the 
privy Council in McCawley v. King148 "that a legislature has no power to ignore the 
conditions of law-making that are imposed by the instrument which itself regulates its power 
to make law. " He further stated "this restriction exists independently of the question whether 
the legislature is sovereign, as is the legislature of Ceylon. " 14' As a result of this reasoning, 
Lord Pearce declared that: 
The legislative power of the Ceylon Parliament is derived from section 18 and section i 
29 of its Constitution. Section 18 expressly says `save as otherwise ordered in 
subsection (4) of section 29. ' Section 29 (1) is expressed to be `subject to the 
provisions of this Order. ' And any power under section 29 (4) is expressly subject to 
its provision. Therefore in the case of amendment and repeal of the Constitution the 
Speaker's certificate is a necessary part of the legislative process and any Bill which 
146 Gray (1964) at p, 709. 
"' Gray (1964) at p. 709. 
148 [19201 A. C. 691. 
149 [19651 A. C. 172, at p. 197. 
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does not comply with the condition precedent of the proviso, is and remains, even 
though it receives the Royal Assent, invalid and ultra vires. '5° 
Again this is clear support for the manner and form argument and, once again, this support is 
derived from the existence of a higher form of law: the written source of legislative power. In 
this way the British situation is distinguished from the Commonwealth case law and the 
assertions of the British manner and form theorists is thwarted. Ranasinghe does provide 
some solace for the manner and form theorists. Lord Pearce does make some general 
comments on the nature of parliaments, which may be extended to parliaments other than that 
of Ceylon: 
A Parliament does not cease to be sovereign whenever its component members fail to 
produce amongst themselves a requisite majority, e. g., when. in the case of ordinary 
legislation the voting is evenly divided or when in the case of legislation to amend the 
constitution there is only a bare majority if the Constitution requires something 
more. "' 
This does of course imply that for such to be the case a written or known constitution is 
required, but it could be equally applicable to the British constitution for all that it really 
requires is a degree of certainty to surround the process of legislation on all matters. The 
decision clearly demonstrates that the courts are willing to envisage the existence of two 
distinct legislative processes. This fact is important to the United Kingdom domestic system 
as such an arrangement currently exists with the clear division between European and purely 
domestic legislation and the processes and sources of law that are implied by this division. l52 
150 [19651 A. C. 172, at pp. 199-200. 151 [19651 A. C. 172, at p. 200. 152 See Chapters Six and Seven below for further discussions on this split. 
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I should like to conclude this section with some comments on a famous Commonwealth case 
British Coal Corporation v. The King. 153 The reason for considering this case out of context I 
is that comments made during judgement encapsulate the rationalisation of the 
Commonwealth cases. Lord Sankey asserted that 
It is doubtless true that the power of the Imperial Parliament to pass on its own 
initiative any legislation that it thought fit extending to Canada remains in theory 
unimpaired: indeed, the Imperial Parliament could, as a matter of abstract law, repeal 
or disregard s. 4 of the Statute [of Westminster]. But that is theory and has no relation ti 
to realities. '54 
When Lord Sankey talks about theory he is talking about jurisprudence and the fact that it no 
longer bears any relevance to the constitutional law governing this matter. He is suggesting 
that the map provided by Dicean parliamentary sovereignty no longer serves the purpose of 
explaining the reality and should be discarded. '" 
153 [19351 A. C. 500. 
Isa [19351 A. C. 500, at p. 520. 
155 See Chapter One, above at p. 11. 
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The "Scottish Theory" 
Background 
A debate over the nature of the Union between England and Scotland has been raging for a 
number of decades and has some bearing on the subject matter of this thesis. It has long been 
argued that a constitution that is bounded by a higher form of law, such as a constituent 
document, may be subject to any manner and form limitations laid out in that document. 156 
What I intend to call the Scottish theory centres around the claim - from mostly Scottish 
commentators - that the Acts of Union between England and Scotland of 1707 amounts to a 
constituent 'document', 157 and that it lays down fundamental law beyond the power of the 
Parliament at Westminster to change. The basis of this argument is that these Acts of Union 
touch the very nature of the British Parliament and define its being in a similar way to Bodin's 
constitutional laws. "' 
This viewpoint is incompatible with the `traditional' views of constitutional lawyers who have 
followed Dicey's lead. These traditional views - promoted chiefly by English constitutional 
lawyers - propose that the Act of Union should be treated in exactly the same fashion as any 
other `normal' Act of Parliament! " Smith, a fervent supporter of the Scottish theory, 
suggests that these traditionalist views have emerged through a misunderstanding of the 
history of the Union; and that it is often too easy to refer to the Act of Union, "" forgetting 
that this pre-union piece of legislation has no validity in Scotland, or indeed anywhere outside 
England. Rather the Union between England and Scotland was the result of a political 
156 See above at p. 249 et seq. 1s' Smith (1959) at p. 121. 158 See Chapter Two, above at pp. 73-74. 159 Dicey (1915) chapter 1. 
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process ratified by both the English and Scottish Parliaments, both of whom enacted 
legislation in order to create the British Parliament-161 A further misrepresentation is the view 
that the British Parliament is the English Parliament with the Scottish Parliamentarians 
admitted to its number. Again this is not the case. The British Parliament is born out of both 
the English and Scottish parliaments, both of which ceased to exist when the British 
Parliament came into being. 162 It would be against the intentions of the protagonists involved 
in the unification process if we simply assume that the British Parliament is vested with all the 
characteristics of the English Parliament and none of the characteristics of the Scottish 
Parliament. It would be equally presumptuous to assume that the British Parliament enjoys 
the powers of the English Parliament without carefully considering the process of unification, 
the terms of the Union and the subsequent case law that surrounds disputes over the meaning 
of the provisions of the Unification documents. 
There has, since 1707, been a substantial amount of literature addressing these points. Due to 
space and time constraints I am not able to consider it all in detail. What I propose to do is to 
briefly review the ideas involved in the Scottish theory and how they might affect the notion 
of Parliamentary sovereignty, and what has been the most interesting case on this matter 
decided this century. MacCormick v. Lord Advocate. 163 
1 60 Meaning 6 Anne c. 11. 
161 Smith (1957) at pp. 109-110. The early part of this article provides a more detailed description of the 
process of Union. 
'62 MacCormick (1978) at p. 2. 
163 (1953) S. C. 396. 
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Foundation of the Scottish Theory 
There is no question that the Union between England and Scotland involved a larger and a 
smaller nation merging to become one nation. The larger of these nations was richer and more 
powerful, as a result of this certain clauses were incorporated into the documents, effecting 
union with the intention of protecting the interests of the citizenry of the smaller nation, viz. 
Scotland. The English were far stronger de facto and required no safeguards164 - although it is 
certainly true that certain aspects of the English constitution are preserved in the Acts of 
Union. The terms of the Union allow the British Parliament to fully amend certain provisions 
of the Acts of Union, amend other provisions in certain circumstances, 165 but preclude 
amendment of yet other provisions in any way. 
166 
The contention is that the areas where amendment is outside the jurisdiction of the 
Westminster Parliament represent real legal limitations on the power of the British legislature, 
that any legislation contrary to the provisions of the Union would be void, and that the courts 
are vested with the power to make declarations to this effect, and ignore the offending 
legislation. Further, it is contended that the notion of absolute parliamentary sovereignty is an 
essentially English idea, and constitutionalists should not assume that simply because such an 
idea may have been applicable to the English Parliament it is now applicable to the British 
Parliament167 
`6'' Smith (1957) at pp. 107-108. 165 See Article XVIII 6 Anne c. 11 concerning the regulation of trade customs and excises - asserting that "no 
alteration be made in laws which concern private right except for evident utility of the subjects within 
Scotland". 
16See Article XIX enshrining the existence of the Scottish Legal system. 167 MacCormick (1978) at p. 2. 
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The first contention is open to criticism on the grounds that some of the provisions of the 
Union that are phrased as fundamental and unalterable have, in fact, been altered by a simple 
Act of Parliament. One of the clearest examples is the passing of the Universities (Scotland) 
Act 1853 which abolished the requirement that "professors and principals of Scottish 
Universities should declare their adherence to the Presbyterian form of Church government in 
Scotland. s168 A simple Act of the British Parliament was considered sufficient for abolishing 
what had been included within the Acts of Union as a provision of fundamental law. From this I 
example, amongst others, commentators seek to extract evidence supporting the view that 
what has been done to the declaration of adherence to the Presbyterian Church could be done 
to any of the so-called fundamental provisions of the Acts of Union. Smith disagrees and 
explains the 1853 Act as a "revolution by consent". He further suggests, "it does not follow 
that all other purported repeals of terms of the Union would be so generally accepted. " 169 
Mitchell notes that the Act of 1853, and the subsequent Acts affecting the status of the 
Presbyterian Church in Scotland, were instigated at the behest, and with the full support, of 
"the body most able to express national opinion upon the topic". '" This does not mean that 
there would be no opposition to a measure designed, for example, to abolish the Scottish 
system of law. 171 It is unlikely that the Scottish courts would be disposed to apply such an 
Act of Parliament if there were no other mechanism involved in the decision and legislative 
168 Smith (1957) at p. 112. 
169 Smith (1957) at p. 112. 
170 Mitchell (1968) at p. 73. 
"' Regarding this question Lord Keith's declined to give a direct answer in Gibson v Lord Advocate (19751 
S. L. T. 134 but stated : 
I prefer to reserve my opinion on what the question would be if the United Kingdom Parliament 
passed an Act purporting to abolish the Court of Session or the Church of Scotland or to substitute 
English law for the whole body of Scottish private law... 
obviously declined to endorse the traditionalist view that such an Act would be just as applicable as 
any other simple Act of Parliament, and his failure to do so may indicate that this question is more 
complicated than Dicey et al believed. It could be contended that he equally failed to endorse the 
`Scottish view'. What it does demonstrate is that this question is far from simple and could result in 
complicated proceedings if any party successfully raised these issues before British courts. 
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process designed to affect such an abolition - by this I mean a referendum or convention 
expressly addressing the possible abolition of Scottish lawn. 
Considering the impact of the Scottish Theory on the notion of Parliamentary sovereignty one 
is drawn to a number of areas of contention. Dicey bases his formulation of Parliamentary 
sovereignty upon historical and logical arguments, but MacCormick demonstrates that the 
two methods of reasoning are not always consistent and may create inconsistencies in Dicey's 
interpretation of sovereignty. MacCormick asserts that 
Dicey can claim that the statute book countenances no other possibility (than his 
formulation of Parliamentary sovereignty] only because he has already used the logical 
argument to establish that despite appearances the Union legislation of 1707 
necessarily failed to impose the limits which its authors thought they could thereby 
create. '73 
Dicey's use of historical reasoning, explaining that the British Parliament could not impose 
limitations upon itself, when he refers to the fact that an absolute sovereign had ruled England 
since the Norman Conquest, is illogical when he accepts that the Parliament of Britain only 
came into existence in 1707.174 
The British situation provides difficulties for other, more logically coherent theorists, not the 
least for Hans Kelsen and adherents to his notion of positivism with its reliance on the notion 
of the first constitution. 175 MacCormick suggests that the position is that the Treaty of 1707 
172 When considering the example of the Universities (Scotland) Act 1853, the events surrounding the 
enactment of the Judicature Act 1873 should also be considered, for they appear to provide an example of the 
provisions of the Union being treated as fundamental and beyond reform by siple Act of Parliament. For a 
brief outline of these events see MacCormick (1978) at pp. 12-13. "3 MacCormick (1978) at p. 10. to MacCormick (1978) makes detailed reference to this point at pp. 14-15. "s Kelsen (1961) at p. 115. 
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provides the first constitution. He denies the idea that the custom of the common law should 
be considered to be the first constitution. 176 The only certainty is that the constitutional 
implications of the events surrounding the Treaties of 1707 are still unclear. It is certain that 
the framers of the agreement intended to crystallise a particular political settlement that 
involved the entrenchment of fundamental principles. It is also clear that subsequent 
Parliaments have not been dissuaded from repealing these supposedly entrenched principles 
through the enactment of simple legislation. Applying Wade's and Smith's analysis it is 
possible to portray these subsequent parliamentary enactments as legal revolutions with 
consent, as legal developments which reflected changes in the political settlement. Although, 
according to Wade, it is beyond the power of Parliament to institute changes in the basic 
norm, it is the courts that possess the authority to institute such changes. "7 
MacCormick v. Lord Advocate (1953) S. C. 396 
The central issue of this case is relatively unimportant, as is the final decision. From the 
Scottish Theory perspective the truly significant statements are identified as obiter dicta, 
particularly those of the Lord President, Lord Cooper. The facts of the case are, briefly, that 
two members of the Scottish public objected to Elizabeth II adopting the numeral II, arguing 
that a monarch named Elizabeth I had not, ever, ruled Scotland. They petitioned that the 
adoption of the numeral II was contrary to the fundamental provisions of Article I of the 
Treaty of Union, and related legislation. The Lord Ordinary rejected these claims, amongst 
others, and dismissed the case. On a reclaiming motion, it was decided 
(1) that the petition was incompetent, not [contrary to Lord Guthrie's original 
decision] because of the provisions of the Royal Titles Act, 1953, which was not 
16 MacCormick (1978) at p. 15. For a contrary view see Harris (1971) at p. 103. 
'" Wade (1955) 
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concerned with the name and numeral adopted by the sovereign, but because the 
Court had no jurisdiction to determine whether a government act of the type in 
question (did or did not] conform to the provisions of the Treaty of Union; (2) that 
art. I of the Treaty of Union did not prohibit the use of the numeral in question, and 
the petitioner's averments were accordingly irrelevant; and (3) that the petitioners had 
no title to raise the point in issue, which was outwith the scope of an actio popularis; 
and accordingly (4) that the Lord Ordinary had rightly dismissed the petition. 178 
In a much noted and referred to dictum Lord Cooper, having explained the reasons for the 
dismissal, added 
The principle of the unlimited sovereignty of Parliament is a distinctively English 
principle which has no counterpart in Scottish constitutional law. It derives its origin 
from Coke and Blackstone, and was widely popularised during the nineteenth century 
by Bagehot and Dicey, the latter having stated the doctrine in its classic form in his 
Law of the Constitution. Considering that the Union legislation extinguished the 
Parliaments of Scotland and England and replaced them by a new Parliament, I have 
difficulty in seeing why it should have been supposed that the new Parliament of Great 
Britain must inherit all the peculiar characteristics of the English Parliament but none 
of the Scottish Parliament, as if all that happened in 1707 was that Scottish 
representatives were admitted to the Parliament of England. That is not what was 
done. Further, the Treaty and the associated legislation, by which the Parliament of 
Great Britain was brought into being as the successor of the separate Parliaments... 
contain some clauses which expressly reserve to the Parliament of Great Britain 
powers of subsequent modification, and other clauses which either contain no such 
power or emphatically exclude subsequent alteration by declarations that the 
provisions shall be fundamental and unalterable in all time coming, or a declaration of 
a like effect. I have never been able to understand how it is possible to reconcile with 
elementary canons of construction the adoption by the English constitutional theorists 
of the same attitude to these markedly different types of provision. 179 
18 (1953) S. C. 396, Headnote at p. 397. 179 (1953) S. C. 396, at p. 411. 
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Lord Cooper correctly then considers the question of whether there is any body vested with 
the authority to declare that a governmental act is in breach of the Treaty of Union, and how 
such a breach could be policed. 18° He concludes that there is no evidence that the Court of 
Session is vested with such a power, and reserves his opinion on the matter, declining to 
speculate further. 
It is easy in the light of Lord Cooper's statements to forget the statements made by the other 
judges involved in the case. Lord Guthrie, the Lord Ordinary, asserts 
In my opinion, the petitioners' propositions in law are unsound and indeed 
extravagant. No Scottish court has ever held an Act of Parliament to be ultra vires, 
and it has never been suggested that it could do so. I do not require to examine the 
contention that the Scottish Parliament was not sovereign, but there could not be a 
more remarkable exercise of sovereign power than the abolition of the separate 
Kingdom of Scotland by the Act of Union. The propositions of the petitioners are 
based upon a challenge of the sovereignty of the Parliament of the United Kingdom.... 
The petitioners urged that Professor Dicey's work was an English book based on 
English law, and should not be accepted in Scotland. It is sufficient to say that his Law 
of the Constitution has been for generations accepted in the schools of law in our 
Scottish Universities as an authoritative exposition of the constitution of the United 
Kingdom. The doctrine of the sovereignty of Parliament is recognised in Scotland as a 
basic principle of constitutional law. '8' 
Finally Lord Russell, having dismissed the reclaimers' propositions, stated 
it is unnecessary to determine whether the Lord Ordinary's opinion affirming in 
absolute terms the unchallengeable sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament, 
and the absence of any right or power of the judicature to nullify or treat as null any 
Act of Parliament, is or is not well founded. But I concur generally with the comments 
of your Lordship in the chair [Lord Cooper] regarding the authority to be attributed by 
180 (1953) S. C. 396, at pp. 412-413. 
181 (1953) S. C. 396, at p. 403. 
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a Scottish Court to the opinions expressed by such writers as Professor Dicey on this 
topic. ' 
The statements made by the three judges are all enlightening in their own way. .. 
Lord Guthrie 
accepts the traditional Dicean approach, which has been widely accepted and employed by the 
United Kingdom judiciary before and after this case; Lord Cooper is advancing a more pro- 
Scottish Theory approach, and presents the clearest juristic challenges to the'traditionalists; 
whilst Lord Russell side-steps the issue by delivering vaguely worded support for Lord 
Cooper's views. I should, before considering the importance of this case to theory and 
practice, like to point out that Lord Cooper's view that the notion of Parliamentary 
Sovereignty emanates from Coke and Blackstone not only ignores the fact that Coke's 
position is less than certain, 183 but completely ignores the contributions made by the analytical 
jurists of the nineteenth century and suggests that Dicey's only role was one of populiser, 
rather than creator and simplifier. Bearing this in mind, Lord Cooper does not adequately 
consider evidence which might support his assertions that parliamentary sovereignty was not 
an idea known to the Scottish Parliament and that it might not even have been known to the 
English Parliament in the form Dicey et al present it. 
Conclusions? 
MacCormick v. Lord Advocate stands as a case alone. It has not been the start of a process 
whereby the fundamental nature of the Treaty of Union has been accepted. The judiciary have 
not developed the idea of a constrained British Parliament. Indeed subsequent British cases 
have emphasised the traditional ideas that Parliament's sovereignty is unconstrained, and that 
`s: (1953) S. C. 396, at pp. 416417. '83See Chapter Two above at p. 73 et seq. 
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the courts are not vested with constitutional powers akin to those of the USA's Supreme 
Court. The various cases touching on the issue of Parliamentary sovereignty have not referred 
to the Treaty of Union as a constituent document, nether have they utilised the. notion of 
revolution with consent when they have tackled such difficult questions as membership of the 
E. E. C. 184 The Scottish Question has, for the past two decades, been dominated not by 
questions regarding the nature of the treaty of Union, but rather the question of devolution of 
power, and even within the context of this debate there has been relatively little made of the 
notion of parliamentary sovereignty. The position today is considered in Chapter Six, but in 
short the Labour Government is adhering to the traditional notion of Parliamentary 
sovereignty, whilst talking about political entrenchment. 
What MacCormick v. Lord Advocate clearly demonstrates is that a successful challenge to an 
Act of the British Parliament, based upon the provisions of the Treaty of Union, is hard to 
imagine. There are a large number of procedural requirements, failure to satisfy any one of 
which will result in a dismissal of any case, regardless of its theoretical standing, and the 
judiciary's personal views of the theoretical arguments. This approach is not unique to the 
Scottish Theory; it arises in a number of cases considered in the subsequent Chapter of this 
thesis. 185 
Mitchell provides an interesting idea, although it is not fully explored: he states that 
the question of title to sue is of great importance. Here the pursuer was seeking 
general political redress. It is clear that in modern times the courts are not appropriate 
7 
184 See Chapters Five and Six below. 
135 See Chapters Five, Six and Seven below. 
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forum for the ventilation of general political grievances, and that fact alone may 
impose a substantial limitation upon general judicial review. '86 
'The central question in MacCormick v. Lord Advocate was not concerned with individual 
rights or with alterations to a constitution that would have an effect on an individual; it was a 
purely political issue with very little practical significance. The applicants were attempting to 
make a political point, which might or might not have been valid. The fact that there was no 
potential infringement of personal liberties and that the issue remained in the public arena 
meant that the courts could easily deny the applicants sufficient standing. In many ways 
where such standing is denied the courts are effectively stating that the issue would be more 
appropriately dealt with in the political arena rather than seeking judicial redress. The courts 
are accepting that they are not, in a democratic era, the sole source "of protection for 
individual or public rights. This argument was echoed in Lord Keith's judgement delivered in 
Gibson v. Lord Advocate1" where he stated 
Like Lord President Cooper [in MacCormick v. Lord Advocate], I prefer to reserve 
my opinion on what the question would be if the United Kingdom Parliament passed 
an Act purporting to abolish the Court of Session or the Church of Scotland or to 
substitute English law for the whole body of Scots private law. I am however of the 
opinion that the question whether a particular Act of the United Kingdom Parliament 
altering a particular aspect of Scots private law is or is not `for the evident utility' of 
the subjects within Scotland is not a justiciable issue in this court. The making of 
decisions upon what must essentially be a political matter is no part of the function of 
the court, and it is highly undesirable that it should be. The function of the court is to 
adjudicate upon the particular rights and obligations of individual person, natural or 
corporate, in relation to other persons, or in certain instances, to the state. A general 
inquiry into the utility of certain legislative measures as regards the population 
generally is quite outside its competence. '88 
186 Mitchell (1968) at p. 87. `$' [1970] S. L. T. 134. 
1$$ [19701 S. L. T. 134, at p. 137. 
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Mitchell also notes that within the judgements delivered during MacCormick v. Lord 
Advocate "there is an emphasis on the fact that the traditional answer denying judicial review 
was largely dependent on the traditional view of the sovereignty of Parliament. -If that view of 
sovereignty is rejected, views on constitutional review may be accepted. "189 MacCormick v 
Lord Advocate certainly provides some support for the proposition that the Acts of Union are 
constituent documents: for example the dicta from Lord Cooper and Lord Russell, and the 
little cited acceptance by the Lord Advocate, that there are fundamental provisions within the 
articles of the Acts Of Union. Unfortunately, for the Scottish Theory, there is little evidence 
that the other organs of Government consider the Acts to be such a document, although it is 
worth considering the issues raised in relation to passage of the EC41972.190 Without the 
support of the other organs of government it would be difficult for the courts to uphold the 
notion of a constituent document vesting immutable rights in the citizens of Scotland, in 
addition, ' existing judicial pronouncements are couched in conditional language, and it is not 
certain how they would decide future cases. The issue of standing would need to be 
circumvented prior to any definitive judicial pronouncement; that hurdle has proved to be 
fatal to the claims in both MacCormick v. Lord Advocate and Gibson v. Lord Advocate. 
189 Mitchell (1968) at p. 87. 
190 See Chapter Five below at pp. 312-313. 
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Nineteenth Century Judicial Orthodoxy 
Despite the development of the above theories, and the case law, which appears to support 
their assertions, the orthodox, institutional, attitude towards the nature of parliamentary 
sovereignty may be demonstrated through the consideration of two cases arising within five 
years of each other. One was decided in the House of Lords, and one in the Privy Council. 
However, they shared the majority of judicial personnel and both occurred towards the 
beginning of the 1970's. The two cases are Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke. 191 and British 
Railways Board v. Pickin. 192 Considering that the judicial personnel were essentially the same 
in both cases, and that Lord Reid, one of the great constitutional lawyers, was a member of 
the panel in both cases, it is not surprising that they followed the same ideological reasoning. 
Afadzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke 1196911 A. C. 645. 
The facts of Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke193 are relatively well known and require only a 
very brief introduction. The territory of Southern Rhodesia was a British Dominion, which 
was not subject to the provisions of the Statute of Westminster 1931, and was granted a 
Constitution in 1961. On the 11`h October 1965 the then Prime Minister, Ian Smith, and his 
government made a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (U. D. I. ). The British Parliament 
responded by promulgating the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965. This Act declared that the 
British Government and Parliament had responsibility "and jurisdiction" in Southern 
Rhodesia. 194 The subject matter of the case itself is of minimal importance to the issue of 
parliamentary sovereignty, but related to a detention order issued by the Smith Regime 
191 [19691 1 A. C. 645. 
192 [1974J A. C. 765. 
193 [1969) 1 A. C. 645. 
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relating to the appellant's husband. She maintained, in the Privy Council, that the order was 
illegally made, and therefore void. The fact that the Privy Council heard this case is intriguing 
in itself. There was little chance that the Southern Rhodesian authorities would pay heed to 
the pronouncements of British judges, even sitting in an Imperial capacity. The domestic 
judiciary, although they denied the Smith regime's legitimacy, persisted, for different reasons, 
in applying the laws it promulgated. Most of them agreed that if they were to ignore the laws 
Smith's government promulgated there would be a governmental vacuum, and the result of 
this would be lawlessness. Therefore, on the grounds of necessity, and because the Smith 
government was the de facto government, 195 they felt obliged to enforce and give effect to the 
regime's laws. 
During the course of argument it was suggested that the 1961 Constitution had vested at least 
partial sovereignty in the governmental institutions of Southern Rhodesia. Such a grant may 
have complicated the case, for at that point the question of who possessed the sovereignty to 
do what would have been raised, and would have required an answer. The Privy Council, 
however, rejected the assertion, "' and the argument was not judicially considered in detail. 
Had it been so it would have been instructive to consider whether it conformed to the 
Benthamite model of mixed sovereignty, with its emphasis on limited habitual obedience, or 
perhaps to use modern language a limited empowerment. 197 
After considering the history behind the dispute Lord Reid, who delivered the majority 
judgement, asserted that: 
194 Section 1. 
195 Per Beadle C. J. [19681 (2) S. A. 284, at pp. 359-360. 
1" Per Lord Reid at p. 723de. 
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It is often said that it would be unconstitutional for the United Kingdom Pärliament to 
do certain things, meaning that the moral, political and other reasons against doing 
them are so strong that most people would regard it as highly improper if Parliament 
did these things. But that does not mean that it is beyond the power of Parliament to 
do such things. If Parliament chose to do any of them the courts could not hold the 
Act of Parliament invalid. 198 
This represents as clear an affirmation of the Dicean notion of parliamentary sovereignty as 
judicially possible. Lord Reid considered that the efficacy of the 1965 Act was irrelevant, the 
fact that it was unenforceable in the. territory in question was immaterial. All Lord Reid was 
willing to, do was reassert the traditional notion that the British Parliament was capable of 
making laws for Southern Rhodesia and that, therefore, the 1965 Act was valid and the courts 
could do no more than apply its provisions. Lord Reid does not delve deeper into the matter 
and consider the question of legal revolution, as formulated by Wade'99 or Hart200, despite 
acknowledging the statement of Munir C. J. that 
It sometimes happens ... that a constitution and the national legal order under it is 
disrupted by an abrupt political change not within the contemplation of the 
Constitution. Any such change is called a revolution, 'and its legal effect is not only the 
destruction of the existing Constitution but also the validity of the national legal 
order. 20 
What makes this decision particularly difficult to comprehend is the fact that the Southern 
Rhodesian judiciary had refused to accept the legitimacy of the British Southern Rhodesia Act 
1965, on the grounds that authority upon which it acted was ineffective. 202 This is an 
9' See Chapter Three, above at pp. 152-155. 98 [19691 1 A. C. 645, at p. 723abc. 199 See above-at p. 223. 20° See above at pp. 237-239. 201 The State v Dosso [ 19581 2PSCR 180. '02 Eekelaar (1969) at p. 21. 
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acknowledgement of revolution in Munir C. J. 's terms, and Beadle C. J. 's statement, made 
during the course of Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke (No. 2), 203 that 
if in the instant case the stage is reached where it can be said with reasonable certainty 
that the revolution has succeeded, then in the eyes of international law, Rhodesia 
would have become a de jure independent sovereign state, its "Grundnorm" will have 
changed and its new constitution will have become the lawful constitution, 204 
again indicates the willingness to consider jurisprudential notions of legal revolution and their 
constitutional impact. It should be noted that Beadle C. J. did not believe that the revolution 
could be considered a success at that stage. This view is clearly at odds with the "strict 
constitutionalism" of the Privy Council who refused to venture beyond settled British 
constitutional law and investigate what was a critical idea in constitutional law, not merely 
theory, for suddenly it has very real practical implications. As a final point on this case, at the 
first opportunity the Rhodesian courts rejected the Privy Council's argument and "recognised 
the [Rhodesian] government de jure and rejected the authority of the Privy Council. ""' 
Through doing this they demonstrated that the Privy Council misunderstood the whole 
situation and, through reliance on an outdated and inaccurate map, failed to navigate the 
practical terrain and recognise what was happening in political reality. 2o6 
Pickin v. British Railways Board /1974] A. C. 765. 
Similar to Lee and Another v. Bude and Torrington Junction Railway Co. and Edinburgh and 
Dalkeith Railway v. Wauchope, this case arose out of a claim that a private Act of Parliament 
relating to a railway was inoperative in so far as it referred to the plaintiff. The ground for 
203 (1968) 2 S. A. 284. 
204 (1968) 2 S. A. 284, at p. 315. 
205 Eekelaar (1969) at p. 3 1. 
206 See Chapter One, above at p. 11 et seq. 
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this claim was that Parliament was misled. The judicial panel were referred to the case of 
Mackenzie v. Stewart, 207 which they duly considered, but disregarded. 208 Their lordship 
relied, rather, on the statements of Lord Campbell209 and Wiles J. 21° Lord Rei&stated 
The function of the court is to construe and apply the enactments of Parliament. The 
court has no concern with the manner in which Parliament or its officers carrying out 
its Standing Orders perform their functions. Any attempt to prove that they were 
misled by fraud or otherwise would necessarily involve an inquiry into the manner in 
which they had performed their functions in dealing with the Bill ... 
211 
Lord Reid explained the basis for this decision thus, "For a century or more both Parliament 
and the courts have been careful not to act so as to cause conflict between them. "212 Lord 
Simon elaborated on this notion maintaining that 
It is well known that in the past there have been dangerous strains between the courts 
and Parliament - dangerous because each institution has its own particular part to play 
in our constitution, and because collision between the two institutions is likely to 
impair their power to vouchsafe those constitutional rights for which their citizens 
depend on them. 213 
This quotation raises a critical question: what would the courts be willing to do if the rights of 
the citizens were threatened by Parliament itself? I believe that it is necessary to consider this 
matter when construing the decision of the House of Lords in R. v. Secretary of State for 
Transport, ex parte Factortame (no. 2). 214 
The above quotations reveal that the House of Lords adopted an approach governed by 
orthodox notions of parliamentary sovereignty. It also shows that they denied the courts the 
''07 See Chapter Three, above ät p. 199. '08 See Chapter Three, above at p. 199. '09 See Chapter Three, above at p. 200. '10 See Chapter Three, above at pp. 200-201. 211 [19741 A. C. 765, at p. 787g. '12 [19741 A. C. 765, at p. 788a. 213 [19741 A. C. 765, at p. 799d. 
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power to consider the process by which an Act of Parliament is promulgated. However, 
consideration of the case in this fashion hides the fact that the Court of Appeal felt that Pickin 
had a sufficient claim to allow an appeal to the highest court. The House of Lords decision 
represents a clear affirmation of the traditional tenets of parliamentary sovereignty. It also 
expresses support for Lord Campbell's statement regarding what the courts may and may not 
do. 
Although unspectacular in this respect, Pickin v. British Railways Board is a useful case for 
comparison with the later authorities of Pepper v. Hart2t5 and R. v. The Secretary of State for 
Transport. ex pane Factortame, 216 for the simple reason that it represents a contrary view. 
There are other interesting points. The House of Lords considered Pickin v. British Railways 
Board after membership of the Communities had been effected. Although I would not expect 
to see any reference to the effect of membership on the constitution, because it had no 
bearing on the case, the decision of such an eminent constitutional lawyer as Lord Reid would 
surely have been influential in cementing in the minds of other lawyers the idea that 
Parliament was supreme. Further it stated that no court should be willing to challenge that 
sovereignty because to do so would be to challenge the constitutional settlement and this 
could lead to friction between the organs of government. There is no consideration of the fact 
that such friction might be required if individual's rights were to be protected. Again there is 
no consideration of the theory underpinning these ideas. The fact that the theory relating to 
sovereignty had, until then, emphasised the rights of the sovereign and not the rights of the 
individual would have presented a challenge to Lord Simon if he were to reconcile his 
statements with the reality of the traditional, orthodox, doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty, 
214 See Chapter Six, below at p. 376. 
215 119931 A. C. 593 
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t 
216 [1991] 1 A. C. 603, see below at p. 376 for detail consideration of this case. 
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Conclusions 
The above sections illustrate that new foreground and background theories have been 
promulgated. New interpretations of the nature of Parliamentary sovereignty and new 
interpretations of the environment within which Parliament sovereignty exists have been 
persuasively presented. However, the higher English courts have not been enthused by such 
ideas, and have persisted in following the traditional notion of Parliament sovereignty. 217 
There have been a number of intriguing judicial statements, many of which provide support 
for the "newer" interpretations of Parliament sovereignty. However, many of these statement; 
are obiter dicta or are not authoritative in the British legal system. 
What is also equally clear is that Parliament persists in enacting legislation which purports to 
impose lasting limitations on the actions of its successors: the examples of the Statute of 
Westminster and the Parliament Acts are foremost in this category. 218 The outcome of such 
action is confusing; the courts are presented with a problem that does not necessarily have a 
literally "legal" solution. Thus Lord Sankey was forced to admit that, following the Statute 
of Westminster, 
It is doubtless true that the power of the Imperial Parliament to pass on its own 
initiative any legislation that it thought fit extending to Canada remains in theory 
unimpaired: indeed the Imperial Parliament could, as a matter of abstract law, repeal 
or disregard section 4 of the Statute [of Westminster]. But that is theory and has no 
relation to realities. 219 
21 See the comments made in Pickin v British Railways Board f 19741 A. C. 765, for a detailed consideration 
of this case, see above at p. 278 and Manuel v Attorney General f 19831 1 Ch. 77 in Chapter Five below, at 
p. 337. 
'`'8 See Mitchell (1968) at p. 240 for further examples. 
219 British Coal Corporation v The King f 19351 A. C. 500, at p. 520. Italics added. 
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Thus, were Parliament to decide to repeal the Statute of Westminster (highly unlikely though 
that may be), the British courts would be faced with the absurd position of theoretically being 
forced to accept that the repeal was valid and that the Westminster Parliament could legislate 
for Canada, South Africa and the other former Dominions. At the same time, the national 
courts of those states would, in all likelihood, ignore the repeal and would accord the Acts of 
the Westminster Parliament no more and no less authority after the repeal than they did 
before. The British courts according to the continuing school of thought would be bound to 
give full effect to the repealing statute. " This would give rise to a situation very similar to 
that of Rhodesia during the 1960's, and would create a patently unenforceable constitutional 
structure. 
The root of the difficulty surrounding legislation such as the Statute of Westminster and the 
Independence Acts, the Parliament Acts, and the European Communities Act221 is that they 
all represent legislation designed to ratify a political fact, frequently ex post facto, and 
necessitated by the duality of the British legal system. Employing the traditional divide 
between legal and political spheres makes an explanation of the legal effect of this legislation 
difficult, if not impossible, for the legal effect is often of secondary importance to the political 
fact. It is only through accepting at the very least a partial synthesis between the two spheres 
that we are able to explain what has happened, and justify a rational judicial approach. 
A political decision to surrender authority and power challenges the theoretically illimitable 
nature of legal sovereignty by presenting a situation where the theory patently fails to explain 
the reality of the transfer of competence. It is in this area, therefore, that a theory can be 
220 See the comments of E. C. S. Wade (1959) at p.. xlviii. 
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tested against reality in order to determine its validity and applicability to any individual legal 
system. The issue of surrender of competence to legislate is an issue that has very real 
implications; it is not simply a theoretical exercise to determine the validity of an idea, and 
i. 
this should always be borne in mind. 
The ideas represented in the works of Jennings and Wade, although ascribing a different 
theoretical basis for the nature of sovereignty, are both forced to accept that there are 
situations where the courts are not working in a purely legal arena. The manner and form 
argument provides a degree of internal cohesion, which is initially lacking from the continuing 
school of thought. The latter is forced to go outside the simple idea of a pre-existing 
historical explanation for the continuing sovereignty of Parliament, and who rely on notions 
of revolution, tacit, legal or actual in order to explain and justify breaches in the obvious 
sovereign relationships. Although the manner and form school of thought might argue that 
the courts refer solely to legal facts when determining the manner and form legislation should 
take, this is not strictly true. This fact is shown in Harris v. Minister of the Interior' which 
had overtly political aspects which the courts had to resolve, and is reflected in de Smith's 
comments on U. D. I. 223 
Wade's assertion, that there are areas where the political and legal overlap, is clearly 
demonstrated in the cases touching sovereignty. 224 Thus, although Dicey envisaged the legal 
and political spheres thus: 
2 21 See Chapters Five and Six below. 
222 (1952J (2) S. A. 428. 
`u See Chapter One, above at p. 25. 
`'4 Not only in the cases cited above, but in R. v. Secretary of State for Transport ex oarte Factortame 
litigation, see Chapter Six below, where the House of Lords effectively had to determine the nature and impact 
of a political decision taken in the early 1970s. 
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Political )( Legal 
I The reality looks more like this 
Political (1 Legal 1 FI 
with the issue of sovereignty sitting in the area of coincidence. 225 
There are clear instances of the courts possessing a political role. One of the central political 
functions of the courts is declaring what constitutes a valid law, and what effect should be 
given to such a law. 226 This may, however, involve considering legal limitations as to manner 
and form. These limitations could be enacted by Parliament, with the object of cementing a 
political decision, thus allowing for self-limitation through the courts altering their outlook as 
to what constitutes a valid law. This situation could be explained through the notion of 
empowerment. Dicey accepted that a Czar could abdicate his sovereignty power; he equally 
accepted that a Parliament could abdicate its sovereign power. The difficulty arises in partial 
abdication, or abdication over a part of the sovereign's territorial holdings. This is the precise 
2 25 Cowen (1952) at p. 282 and Wade (1955) at p. 173. r6 Wade (1955) at p. 189. 
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area where the confusion and theoretical difficulties have arisen during this century. It is this 
area that has caused so many problems for the judiciary who have been asked to resolve 
conflicts between domestic and European law during the past thirty years. 
The judiciary have not made He easy for themselves. They have refused, wherever possible, 
to issue a clear statement as to their political role in the debate on sovereignty. This is partly 
because abstract theories really are irrelevant to their decision-making processes. They are 
concerned with the reality, and the reality is that in a "mature" democracy there is a perceived 
divide between those decisions which should be made by a body at least notionally 
representing the populace and those decisions which should be made by an unelected body. It 
is an issue of correct arena for dispute resolution. 
The British judiciary do not have a traditional role in a democratic structure; their function 
evolved in a constitutional system dominated by an absolute ruler. There has not been a 
deliberate consideration of the roles each of the organs of government should fulfil in a 
democratic structure, unlike the position in many of the countries that have been subject to 
revolutions. Where such a revolution has occurred the protagonists have been forced to 
consider the merits of different constitutional arrangements, and have been afforded the 
luxury of choosing that which they feel best served their culture and history. 
The only opportunity for the British constitutional organs to engage in considering their own 
constitutional function has been when there has been either an addition or a removal of sonne 
aspect of constitutional decision-making. The addition of the European Community's, and 
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Union's, constitutional organs, and the removal of the Imperial function and, to a degree, the 
removal of some functionality from the House of Lords. 
If the proposition that the courts have a political as well as legal function is accepted, it is 
arguable that their role will change as the political system within which they function changes. 
In addition to this, if the proposition that the legal and political spheres coincide, as suggested 
above, as the political situation changes so the degree of overlap, and/or the areas located 
within the coincidence may also change. In the United Kingdom system the issue of 
Sovereignty is one that concerns all the organs of government, and even the "legal" notion of 
sovereignty falls within this category. It is widely accepted that the Statute of Westminster 
and the European Communities Act have profoundly affected the doctrine of Parliament 
sovereignty. These legislative events are clearly the work of the Legislature (Parliament), 
they ratify political decisions made by the Executive (Cabinet), and have their meaning and 
impact designated by the Judiciary (Courts). If we were to plot the constitutional remit of the 
organs of government in a similar way to the diagram displaying the coincidence of the legal 
and political spheres, it would resemble this: 
Executive 
Parliament I Judiciary 
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Sovereignty would sit within the centre point where all three circles coincide. This diagram 
goes some way in demonstrating the apparent simplicity that hides the actual complexity of 
the question of sovereignty. There are so many competing influences and uses of sovereignty, 
both in theory and in practice, that a particular view of any one of the three organs of 
government and its relationship with the other two can significantly affect how one 
approaches sovereignty as a concept and as a practical politico-legal problem. 
The evidence we have, both judicial and theoretical, is inconclusive. In practice the attitude of 
the protagonists has been changeable. It has depended on the circumstances of the case and 
the political and legal equity of the potential outcome. The clearest example of this entire 
process in action is provided by the most recent situation arising out of membership of the 
European Communities and Union. 
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Chapter Five - Nature of European Communities' Law prior to 
United Kingdom Membership 
Introduction 
Although we talk about the European Community, we are in fact a member of three distinct 
communities: The European Coal and Steel Community ("ECSC"), The European Atomic 
Energy Community (Euratom), and the European Economic Community ("EEC"). For ease, 
4. 
when using the word Community I shall refer to all three communities unless otherwise 
specified. The Communities share common institutions; for example the European Court of 
Justice ("ECJ") exists under the provisions of all three founding treaties and has the same 
remit, to "ensure that in the interpretation and application of (the] Treaty the law is 
observed". ' 
The Communities in general, and the EEC in particular, have been subject to a great deal of 
change since their creation. The most significant changes include the Single European Act 
1986 and the Treaty of the European Union (TEU). 2 The European Union established under 
i 
the TEU enjoys a wider scope than the Communities. Thus, although "The Union shall be 
founded on the European Communities" it will be "supplemented by the policies and forms of 
co-operation established by this Treaty". 3 Under the terms of TEU new areas of competence 
were placed under European governance, for example, aspects of common, foreign and 
security policy, 4 justice and Home Affairs. 5 With regards to the structure of the Union, Lasok 
states: 
Article 164 EEC; Article 31 ECSC, Article 136 Euratom. 
Z Signed in February 1992 and fully ratified in 1993. 3 Article A(3) TEU. 
4 Article JI TEU. 
5 Article K1 TEU. 
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Founded on the European Communities, the Union intends to build upon the acquis 
communautaire, whilst being governed by the Pommunity., institutions with the 
exception of the European Council, which is an institution of the Union and not of the 
Community. Certain competences of the Union are outside the Community legal 
system and thus expressly excluded from the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice. 
Justice and home affairs are reserved for co-operation among the Member States and 
common foreign and security policy are matters left to the Member States and to the 
Member States and the Union. They remain subject to inter-gover=entat relations of 
the Member States. The Treaty creates new institutions and extends the competences 
of the Community. It is another milestone on the path towards European Unity. " 
As the Communities form the first pillar of the Union the case law relating to the role and 
function of the communities has been adopted by the Union. Therefore, it is unnecessary, for 
the purposes of this thesis, to consider the Union and Communities as separate entities. 
Within the Communities there are a number of different sources of law: the provisions of the 
founding Treaties, legislation passed by the appropriate institution under the terms of the 
Treaty provisions, the case law of the ECJ, and the principles of law common to the Member 
States. For many years the case law of the ECJ proved to be the dynamo for the development) 
of Community law. The Court has, on the whole, adopted a consistent approach to prior case 
law. It essentially employs a doctrine of precedent, often manifested through repetition of 
prior judgements. A review of the ECJ's case law reveals that it has, adopted a pro-active 
attitude to the development of the Communities. Examples of court-developed principles 
include the doctrine of direct effect and the primacy of Community law. Both of these are 
considered to be foundational to the Community legal structure. 
6 Lasok (1994) at p. 22. Page 290 
As a result of its proactive attitude, allied to certain Treaty provisions, the status of the Court 
within the Community structure has increased dramatically. It has angered many national 
governments - and legislatures - with its judgements, 
' but, with few exceptions, its authority 
has gone unquestioned. 
Supremacy of Community Law 
The case law of the ECJ is responsible for many of the most significant developments in the 
doctrine of the supremacy of Community law. There is a long line of unambiguous authority 
avowing the superior nature of Community law. Amongst the most significant are Algemene 
Transport-en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos-N. V. v. Nederlandse administratie 
der belastingen. 8 Costa v. E. N. E. L.. 9 Simmenthal SpA v. Amministrazione delle Finanze 
dello Stato (No. 2)'° and Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und 
Vorratsstelle fur Getreide und Futtermittel (Handelsgesellschaft). " It is to these cases that 
we must look if we are to discover, and understand, the meaning of the primacy of 
Community law, its theoretical and practical bases, and how it affects the doctrine of 
Parliamentary sovereignty. 
As a corollary of the primacy of Community law, the member states were deemed to have 
limited their own sovereign rights. This view was promulgated by the ECJ as early as 1963 
when it stated: 
The objective of the EEC Treaty, which is to establish a Common Market, the 
functioning of which is of direct concern to interested parties in the Community, 
See Chapter Six, below at p. 374. $ [1963] E. C. R. 1. 
9 [19641 E. C. R585. 
10[ 197813 C. M. L. R 263. 
it [19701 C. M. L. R 1125. 
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implies that this Treaty is more than an agreement which merely creates mutual 
obligations between the contracting states. This view is confirmed by the preamble to 
the Treaty which refers not only to governments but to people. It is also confirmed 
more specifically by the establishment of institutions endowed with sovereign rights, 
the exercise of which affects Member States and also their citizens. Furthermore it 
must be noted that the nationals of the states brought together in the Community are 
called upon to cooperate in the functioning of this Community through the 
intermediary of the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee. 
In addition the task assigned to the Court of Justice under Article 177, the object of 
which is to secure uniform interpretation of the Treaty by national courts and 
tribunals, confirms that the states have acknowledged that Community law has an 
authority which can be invoked by their nationals before those courts and tribunals. 
The conclusion to be drawn from this is that the Community constitutes a new legal 
order of international law for the benefit of which the states have limited their 
sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and the subjects of which comprise not 
only Member States but also their nationals. 12 
In the subsequent case of Costa v. ENEL the Court was afforded the opportunity of 
reviewing what it had said in Algemene Transport-en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & 
Loos N. V. v. Nederlandse administratie der belastingen, and took the opportunity to reinforce? 
the previous decision. The ECJ stated: 
By creating a Community of unlimited duration having its own institutions, its own 
personality and its own capacity in law, apart from having international standing and 
more particularly real powers resulting from a limitation of competence on a transfer 
of powers from states to the Community, the member states, albeit within limited 
spheres, have restricted their sovereign rights and created a body of law applicable 
both to their nationals and to themselves. 
12 [19631 E. C. R. 1. at p. 12. 
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The reception within the laws of each member state, of provisions having a 
community source and now particularly of the terms and spirit of the Treaty, has as a 
corollary the impossibility for the member states, to give preference to a unilateral and 
subsequent measure against a legal order accepted by them on a basis of. reciprocity. 
13 
This approach is subsequently justified thus 
The precedence of Community law is confirmed by Article 189, whereby a regulation 
'shall be binding' and 'directly applicable in all Member States'. This provision, which 
is subject to no reservation, would be quite meaningless if a State could unilaterally 
nullify its effects by means of a legislative measure which could prevail over 
Community law. 
It follows from all these observations that the law stemming from the Treaty, an 
independent source of law, could not, because of its special and original nature, be 
overridden by domestic legal provisions, however framed, without being deprived of 
its character as Community law and without the legal basis of the Community itself 
being called into question. , 
1'` 
In 1970, the ECJ was, again, asked to comment on the nature of the primacy of Community 
law, this time in the context of a clash between Community law and German Basic law'5. The 
Court reiterated what it had said before, stating: 
recourse to the legal rules or concepts of national law in order to judge the validity of 
measures adopted by the institutions of the Community would have an adverse effect 
on the uniformity and efficacy of Community law. The validity of such measures can 
only be judged in the light of Community law. In fact, the law stemming from the 
Treaty, an independent source of law, cannot because of its very nature be overridden 
by rules of national law, however framed, without being deprived of its character as 
Community law and without the legal basis of the Community itself being called into 
question. Therefore the validity of a community measure or its effect within a member 
state cannot be affected by allegations that it runs counter to either fundamental rights 
" (1964) C. M. L. R. 425, at p. 455. 14 119641 E. C. R. 585, at p. 594. 
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as formulated by the constitution of that state or the principles of a national 
constitutional structure. 16 
Subsequent to the UK's membership of the Communities, the ECJ issued perhaps the most 
forthright judgement on this matter. The judgement in Amministrazione delle Finanze dello 
Stato v. Simmenthal SpA (No. 2) has been relied on in such significant cases as R. v. The 
Secretary of State for Transportex pane Factortame'7, and is worth noting at this juncture. 
In the course of its judgement the ECJ asserted 
in accordance with the principle of the precedence of Community law, the relationship 
between provisions of the Treaty and directly applicable measures of the institutions- 
on the one hand and the national law of the member-States on the other is such that 
those provisions and measures not only by their entry into force render automatically 
inapplicable any conflicting provision of current national law. , 
but - in so far as they are 
an integral part of, and take precedence in, the legal order applicable in the territory of 
each of the member-States - also preclude the valid adoption of new national 
legislative measures to the extent to which they would be incompatible with 
Community provisions. [18] Indeed any recognition that national legislative measures 
which encroach upon the field within which the Community exercises its legislative 
power or which are otherwise incompatible with the provisions of Community law had 
any legal effect would amount to a corresponding denial of the effectiveness of 
obligations undertaken unconditionally and irrevocably by member-States pursuant to 
the Treaty and would thus imperil the very foundations of the Community. " 
The Court continued to say that 
every national court must, in a case within its jurisdiction, apply Community law in its 
entirety and protect rights which the latter confers on individuals and must accordingly 
set aside any provision of national law which may conflict with it, whether prior or. 
subsequent to the Community rule. [22] Accordingly any provision of a national legal 
system and any legislative, administrative or judicial practice which might impair the 
15 Intemazionale HandesgeselIschaft MbH v. Einfurmund Vorratsstelle Fur Getrieife und FuMMjýý 
C. M. L. R. 1125 
16 [19701 C. M. L. R. 1125, at p. 1134. 
17 See Chapter Six, below at p. 3 51 et seq. 
18 [ 197813 C. M. L. P- 263, at p. 283. 
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effectiveness of Community law by withholding from the national court having 
jurisdiction to apply such law the power to do everything necessary at the moment of 
its application to set aside national legislative provisions which might prevent 
Community rules from having full force and effect are incompatible with these 
requirements which are the very essence of Community law. 19 
The principle that finally emerged was not unique to the ECJ. In 1964 the then President of 
the Commission, Professor Hallstein, asserted "Community law not only take[s] precedence 
over pre-existing law, but also over subsequent municipal law". He continued thus: "the legal 
acts of the Community organs can be defined, examined as to their validity and interpreted 
only in terms of Community law. The provisions of Community law must take precedence 
irrespective of the level of conflict between the two legal orders". 20 
These quotations demonstrate a clear and consistent point of view: Community law was to be 
deemed superior to national law whenever conflict occurred. This entailed application of 
" Community law and disapplication of national law, even if the latter was a fundamental rule of 
the constitution or was enacted subsequent to membership of the Communities. 21 A 
" significant point, noted by de Smith, was that although "Community law is hierarchically 
superior to national legal systems ... the 
implications are imprecise. The obligation of member 
states to assure the supremacy of Community law is unaccompanied by effective sanctions. "22 
This was an issue that was not to be resolved until the 1990s. During the 1990s the ECJ 
formulated a series of remedies based on its decision in Francovich v. Italian State [19911 
E. C. R. I- 5357. 
19 [1978] 3 C. M. L. R 263, atp. 283. 20 Quoted in Ipsen (1964-65) at p. 392. 21 Ipsen (1964-65) at p. 393. 22 De Smith (1971) at p. 606. 
Page 295 
The judgements addressing the primacy of Community law make it clear that the Court 
interpreted the process of membership as involving a pooling of at least a portion of member 
states' sovereignty in so far as they were no longer deemed competent to legislate in certain 
proscribed fields. That the "member states were anxious to circumscribe the surrender of 
national sovereignty within clearly defined limits"23 is evidenced by the quantity of case law. 
on the matter. The existence, and need, for this case law also*indicates that there was no 
universal and consistent acceptance and understanding of the impact on national law, of the 
doctrine of primacy of Community law. McCaffrey writes "the national courts have not 
always been able to reconcile the requirements of community law with their own constitutions 
and judicial conventions. France, Germany and Italy have had lengthy tussles with supremacy 
issues and some of them are by no means over yet. tv24 The degree to which the national courts 
have afforded primacy to Community law has, unsurprisingly, "depended on the constitutional 
law of each member state", 25 and has varied considerably despite the 'common' civil law 
background of the founding members. Despite the conflicts that did occur, by the time the 
UK joined the Communities, there was a settled body of law upholding the primacy of 
Community law. This body of law was increasingly accepted and applied by national courts. ' 
Problems Posed by UK Membership 
No political occurrence this century has provoked more discourse on the subject of the 
constitution of the UK, and in particular the nature of parliamentary sovereignty, than our 
membership of the European Communities. Innumerable academic articles have been written, 
23 Mancini and Keeling (1964) at p. 176. 
2' McCaffrey (199 1) at p. 110. See Hartley (1988) Chapter 2 for a detailed analysis of the various cases, which' have given rise to conflicts between national and Community law. 
25 Warner (1977) at p. 359. 
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before, during and after accession, considering the effect of membership on the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty. The Houses of Parliament and the naiional press has been involved 
in passionate debates at the centre of which there are a number of important court cases, 
many of which do not substantively address the question of sovereignty. 
Those who oppose our membership of the Communities, or who fear that the European 
institutions are accreting too much power, often rely on the notion of sovereignty in order to 
support their arguments. Preliminary observations on these arguments should include the facts 
that there are few protagonists who take the time to define what they mean by sovereignty. 
Consequently, these protagonists confuse the "legal" notion of parliamentary sovereignty, 
which should, in its Dicean form, support their argument, with a wider notion of national 
sovereignty. This latter is, essentially, a "political" notion, which includes wider notions of 
statehood. 
Before further consideration of the impact of UK membership it is necessary to ask why "it 
must be recognised that the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty presents a particularly 
delicate dilemmai26 when UK membership of the Communities is discussed? The principal 
difficulty is seen to relate to the relationship between Acts 'of the Westminster Parliament 
passed subsequent to the ECA 1972 and. Community laws, where there is some degree of 
inconsistency. The UK doctrine of Parliament Sovereignty, dictates that the element of 
European law that is inconsistent with the UK statute would be impliedly repealed. The 
doctrine of supremacy of Community law, states otherwise. This is not a uniquely UK 
`problem'. Consideration of the constitutions of the other member states reveals: "doctrines 
26 McCaffrey (1991) at p. 110. 
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akin to that of most formulations of the sovereignty of Parliament, in so far as it relates to 
future legislation, are common place". 27 
This is an important constitutional question, and in the final sub-paragraph of the Commission 
Opinion of 29th September 1967, it was concluded that any problems arising out of potential 
UK membership would be "no more serious" than those that had arisen in relation to the, :. 
founding members. This view was reiterated in the UK White Paper of 1967, addressing 
possible UK membership of the Communities. However, as Simmonds notes, although ,,,: 
the White Paper draws the conclusions that Community law of direct internal effect ... 
would not necessarily be difficult to apply in the UK. This is perhaps over-optimistic if 
one looks at the difficulties in judicial interpretation of Community law that have 
already emerged from the national courts of member states. 28 
Problems over how to conceptualise the relationship between national and Community law, *2' 
were emerging and UK membership, it was felt, was likely to compound these problems. 
This was due to the conceptual differences between common law and civil law systems. 
The ECJ happily upheld the supremacy of Community law. It was willing and capable of 
explaining it through reference to its unique nature and the need for such a theory if the., 
efficacy of the Communities was to be maintained. There was, however, a lack of acceptable 
theory explaining the relationship between national and Community law. 30 The need for a 
consistent theoretical solution explaining the nature of the relationship between the domestic 
and Community law was paramount. This need was recognised by senior Community 
officials, Professor Hallstein - the then President of the European Commission - Stated that a' 
`7 Mitchell (1980) at p. 77. 
28 Simmonds (1967) at p. 644. 
29 Ipsen (1964-65) at p. 379 et seq. 
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unified solution vilia for"'th: e"whole Community must be ýrovided for this question of 
the priority to be established between the [various] legal systems. Any attempt to find 
different solutions, to this question in accordance with the idiosyncrasies of the various 
member states, the provisions of their constitutions and their political structure would 
run counter to the unifying tendenc'y'of European integration. 31 
The problems the founding members encountered were new problems and the solutions 
evolved as the case law exposed the areas of contention. As Community law developed, so 
member-states' constitutional systems evolved to accommodate the necessary practical and 
theoretical implications of Community membership. Sovereignty was transferred slowly, and 
in a controlled fashion. 32 The ECJ had a mandate to ensure the universal interpretation and 
replication of Community law. 33 In order to execute its, duties it had to ensure that the 
principle of the supremacy of community law was enforced in all member states. Although 
the ECJ provided the theoretical explanations for the supremacy of community law, it was left 
to the national courts to provide a theoretical reconciliation of their own constitutional system 
with the supremacy of community law. The ECJ only became involved in this process of 
reconciliation when the member state failed to adequately incorporate the principle of 
community law supremacy within the national legal system. 34 The ECJ has continually 
declined to impose a theoretical explanation reconciling community law supremacy with 
principles of national law. 's In many ways it would be impossible for the ECJ to formulate a 
theory that would satisfactorily reconcile all domestic systems to the principle of community 
law supremacy. For this reason the manner of reconciliation has been left to the national 
30 See Professor Ipsen's example of Germany, Ipsen (1964-65) at p. 379. " Introduction to the European Parliament of the Seventh General Report on the Community's activities. 18th 
June 1964. 
32 Mancini and Keeling (1994) at p. 176. 33 Arising out of, amongst others, Article 177 EEC. 34 The situation that arose in R v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex-parte Factortame [199013 C. M. L. R- 
867. 
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judiciary and has, as a result, evolved according to the principles of national law. 
Importantly, for founding states, this process was gradual and could evolve in line with the 
developments in the principle of community law supremacy. Countries who have 
subsequently joined the Communities, including the UK, have not had the opportunity to , 
develop their governmental systems, and the theories underpinning them, alongside the I- 
emergence of a European constitution. They have been forced to accept a large number of, 
I 
often major, practical and theoretical constitutional developments in order to accommodate 
the principles of Community law. The luxury of time was not available to them. 
Although the White Paper and senior Community officials maintainýd that there would be no 
additional difficulties involved in UK membership, this view was not universally accepted. 
Andre Bettencourt, the then Secretaire D'Etat aux affaires Estrangers, stated, as early as 0 
1967, that " in the light of the nature of British law, the insertion of Community rules into the 
legislative apparatus of the UK would raise very difficult questions". 36 He comments that 
there are "profound divergencies in the structure, basic concepts and effects of the legal 
systems" between the British, common law, and continental, civil law, systems. There are 
very obvious differences between the two systems, but this should not lead to an automatic - 
assumption that any particular problems should arise as a result of UK membership. 37 
35 Fore example see Chapter Six, below at p. 369. 
36 Rouen colloquiurn on "the Effects of British Entry into the Common Markef', I Ith November 1967. 
37 Daglatoglou (1978) at p. 78. 
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The UK Problem in Detail 
The dualify'of the UK constitution results in a two-stage process in incorporating the 
piovisions of a Treaty into the domestic legal system. The two I clear stages involve ratifying 
the Treaty, an executive action based on prerogative powers, and enactment of legislation to 
give domestic effect'to the'freaty provision's within the UK's legal system. " 
TI-ds constitutional structure results in Parliament having to enact legislation to incorporate 
Community law within the UK's domestic legal system. Doing this through a simple Act of 
Parliament would theoretically only incorporate Community law until such a time as 
subsequent legislation was demonstrated to be inconsistent with the provisions of Community 
law and would, according to the traditional tenets of TJK constitutional law, impliedly repeal 
the ECA 1972. At the very least, such subsequent legislation would supersede the 0 
Community law that, theoretically, only derived its authority from Parliament's will as 
expressed through the ECA 1972. Within the UK's constitutional structure there was no 
other mechanism for incorporation. Entren*Chment is impossible as no Parliament may bind its 
successors, either in terms of the manner or form of legislation, or the subject matter . 
3' This 
interpretation was clearly at odds with that expressed by the ECJ in the chain of cases cited 
previously. 
It fell to the Government benches to resolve these seemingly irreconcilable theoretical 
standpoints. The need for such reconciliation arose because opponents to membership were 
38 See Lord Atkin's judgement in Attomey-General for Canada v Attomey-General for Ontario f 19371 A. C. 
12_6 for a classic exposition of this point. 
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suggesting that national/parliamentary sovereignty would be abrogated through membership 
of the communities. The Government did not accept that theory would be amended, or that it 
had already been amended. Rather than state that its opponents' arguments were obsolete, 
the Government asserted that membership would not affect the sovereignty of Parliament, as 
it was traditionally understood. From this point on confusion and a legal conflict were 
inevitable. The search for a theoretical basis for the supremacy of Conununity law was 
central to the evolution of the Communities. A generally acceptable foundation was not -- 
possible whilst the TJK authorities continued to adhere to the doctrine of Parliamentary 
sovereignty. 
Academic Comment on the Issue of Parliament Sovereignty andiNlembership of the 
Communities 
Academic commentators had been analysing the potential consequences of our joining the 
communities from the moment the idea was first mooted. I do not have the time or space to 
comment on each every one of the comments made. I shall, therefore concentrate on those 
points that I feel are most relevant. Firstly, Simmonds in 1967, wrote 
The White Paper [CMND 3301] is helpful and timely. It does not however, in the 
writer's view, sufficiently stress the autonomous character of the System of 
Community law, nor its inherent supremacy over national law. Membership places a 
check on the exercise of traditional 'sovereign rights' but involves a sharing in similar 
sovereign rights of other members. 40 
This is a significant point. The White Paper Simmonds mentions was to form the basis of 
much of the Government's argument in 1971 and yet as early as 1967 certain shortcomi, ngs 
were obvious. One of the more obvious of these was the White Paper's reply to the eOnIrnan 
39 The alternative theoretical explanations had been rejected by the organs of government. See preceding 
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observation that "there is in theory no constitutional means available to us to make it certain 
that no future parlia'ment would enact legislation in conflict with COMMUnity laW'. 4' The 
answer, according to the official Paper, was "Parliament will have to refrain from putting 
fresh legislation inconsistent"42 with Community law. Some commentators viewed this as 
"pragmatic" citing, as evidence, the example that Parliament "scrupulously refrained from 
passing legislation inconsistent with the UN Charter or GATT or the E. C. H. R. ". 43 This view 
was unsustainable for a number of reasons. Firstly, because there was no equivalent 
abridgement'of sovereign power in the cited examples as was proposed through membersl-dp 
of the Communities. "Secondly, it ignored the role of lawyers and their practical ingenuity in 
formulating arguments that would have required continued scrutiny, of proposed legislation to 
a degree that was simply impractical. 45 Finally, it ignored'the evidence of the case law of the 
Communities. 46 Conflicts were inevitable whether Parliament attempted to avoid them or not. 
This simple solution was criticised by many commentators who began to explore various 
alternatives, such as the passing of an annual Act granting priority to Community law and the 
inclusion, in all legislation, of a set paragraph declaring that the Act and Community law were 
compatible. Retrospectively these ideas may appear fantastic, but a similar idea is about to be 
given a statutory footing, and has been heralded as "ingenious". 47 
Chapters for a discussion of this matter. 40 Sirnmonds (1967) at p. 645. 41 Mitchell (1967-68) at p. 113. 42 CNIND 3301, at para. 23. 43 Martin (1967-68) at p. 23. 44 de Smith (197 1) at p. 609. Punnctt (1987) at p. 46 1. 43 Trindale (1972) at p. 399. 4's Wade (1972) at p. 3. Martin (1968-69) at p. 22. 47 See Chapter Six, below at p. 384. 
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One of the difficulties the theorists faced is that none of these ideas accorded with the 
pronouncements of the ECJ. It was difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile the notion of an 
unabridged doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty and the primacy of Community law. Some 
theorists were willing to admit that the only process by which a reconciliation could be 
effected was through an admission that (1) the constitutional structure of the LJK was going 
to be fundamentally altered through membership; (2) that Parliamentary sovereignty was one 
element of theory which could not survive the enforced changes further; and (3) that the only 
means of explaining the attendant changes in the basic norm would be to accept that a legal 
revolution had occurred (or was going to be instituted through membership). " 
It was pointed out that there had been other 'surrenderings' of sovereignty; the most 
frequently cited example was that of the territorial limitations imposed by the Statute of 
Westminster. From this proposition Mitchell induced the idea that limitation was possible; he 
continued to postulate that if one type of limitation is possible then another form of limitation, 
such as on legislative content, should be possible. 9 There are difficulties within this notion., 
The Statute of Westminster granted the power of self-determination; almost total legislative 
competence was vested on the Dominion Parliaments. Even Dicey admitted that this was 
theoretically possible. " Lord Sankey saw fit to make reference to the practical effect of the 
divergence between theory and practice, " and Lord Denning has famously suggested that 
having granted such power it would be impossible to claim it back. Some theorists 
persistently suggest, however, that the judiciary would have to uphold legislation that a 
48 Nfitchells, Kuipers, and Gall (1972) at pp. 145 -246. 
49 Nfitchell (1967-1968) at p. 119-12 1. 
50 See Chapter Three, above at p. 197. 
5' See Chapter Four, above at p. 263. 
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purported to repeal such a grant of freedom. 32 Thus, although there were practical examples 
of Parliament's sovereignty being diminished, theorists still struggled to reconcile supremacy 
of Community law with Parliamentary sovereignty. 
The true significance of the academic discussion on this question was important, but not 
,, necessarily for what was said. Membership of the Communities, as a possibility, focused the 
minds of public lawyers on the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty, highlighted those areas 
where it was inflexible and could not be adapted to explain political developments. It also 
threw into relief the static nature of Dicean and Austinian theory, and the unsophisticated 
vocabulary available to British public lawyers. Prior to the debates surrounding membership 
the focus of British academic public lawyers had been predominantly the evolution of 
administrative law. Although there had been a number of 'new' ideas emerging in the field of 
constitutional law, 53 the traditional neo-Dicean explanation associatedwith Wade was still 
accepted as orthodoxy. Academics began to question the viability of the traditional 
formulations of constitutional law, and addressed the fundamental notions underpinning our 
constitution. Theory came to be used by judges in order to explain judicial decisions, and 
increasingly it came to be accepted that the theory that was employed in order to explain UK 
constitutional system could not be used in those areas where the Communities were 
competent to legislate. 
Parliamentary Debate Addressing the Issue of Membership and Sovereignty 
When reading the parliamentary debates, addressing how membership of the communities 
. 
would affect parliamentary sovereignty, one is struck by a number of facts. Firstly, the 
52 For a discussion on the practical problems involved in such a view see the events surrounding Rhodesian 
U. D. I. 
S 
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government adhered to the argument that membership would not alter the nature of 
parliamentary sovereignty, and relied on traditional theory to justify this approach. Secondly, 
there are a number of apparent contradictions within the arguments employed by all parties; 
the preceding developments in the academic argument were, largely, ignored. However, one. 
of the most startling is the lack of guidance offered to the courts instructing them on what, 
their role should be, how they should interpret Community law, and on the relationship 
between Community and national law. 
It is equally clear that opponents of membership were concerned with the issue of 
sovereignty, or at least saw it as a powerful weapon supporting their opposition. "' There, is, 
however, no definition of sovereignty anywhere in the Second Reading of the Bill. 
Second Reading 
The Financial Times on 15th February declared, regarding the Second Reading of the 
European Communities Bill, 
This is ... in the constitutional sense, the truly decisive vote. The debate in October an 
the 'principle' of entry was in fact merely a decision to approve the Government's 
White Paper, and although both Government and pro-Marketers on the Labour side 
are saying that that vote was the critical one, they are wrong. It is the Bill that 
enshrines the principle of entry to the Market and it is the Bill that makes the crucial 
cession of sovereignty in certain areas to the Community. " 
This view was echoed in the House of Commons, Russell Johnston NP notes "There has 
been a natural and understandable tendency to concentrate on the issue of sovereignty, 
5' See Chapter Four, above for a discussion of some of these. 
54 See comments made on 5th July 1972. 
55 Quoted by Marten, Vol. 831,16th February 1972. Col. 524. 
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because ... that is basically what the Bill is about". 
56 The views on the nature of sovereignty, 
the desirability of surrendering or transferring sovereignty, whether that was the effect of the 
Bill, and whether it was a new and iniquitous idea all received attention duringfthe Second 
Reading. There are so many speeches touching on the issue of sovereignty, commentary on 
all of them is beyond the space and time constraints of this thesis. Those that are most 
important to this thesis, those that address the development of the theory, and the practice, of 
sovereignty in the UK context, are considered below. 
Geoffrey Rippon NT - Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, and Nfinister responsible for 
entry into the Communities - presented the Government line and claimed that because 
accession to the treaties would involve the passing of UK legislation, it would represent "an 
exercise, of course, of Parliamentary sovereignty, and it is important to realise that 
Community law, existing and future, would derive its force of law in this country from that 
legislation passed by Parliament. "" 
He continued to state 
I do not pretend that this process of Community law- making involves no 
constitutional innovation whatever. It does, but only to the extent clearly set out in the 
1967 White paper Legal and Constitutional Implications of United Kingdom 
Memhership of the European Communities. 
Of course nothing in this Bill abridges the ultimate sovereignty of Parliament. As Lord 
Gardiner said ... when he was Lord Chancellor, 
The UK legislation would be an exercise of parliamentary sovereignty and 
Community law existing and future would derive its force as law in this country 
from it. The Community law so applied would override our national law so far as 
it was inconsistent with it. Under the British constitutional doctrine of 
56 H. C. Deb. Vol. 831,16th February 1972, Col. 472. See also Walker-Smith on 15th February. 57 H. C. Deb, Vol. 83 1.15th February, 1972, Col. 270. 
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parliamentary sovereignty no Parliament can preclude its successors fforn 
changing the law'. 58 
When confronted with the difficult question of subsequent Acts of Parliament being 
inconsistent with Community law and therefore, according to Community law, being void, 59 
Rippon maintained that 
I, 
By accepting the directly applicable law in clause 2(l) and accepting the jurisprudence 
of the European Court in clause 3(l) the Bill provides the necessary precedence (for, 
giving full effect to Community law]. In relation to statute law, this meahs that the -- 
directly applicable provisions ought to prevail over future Acts of Parliament in so far 
as they might be inconsistent with them. In practice, this means that - again quoting 
the Leader of the Opposition -'It would be implicit in our acceptance of the Treaties 
that the UK would, in future, refrain from enacting legislatioý inconsistent with ' 
Community law'. 6o 
This stance echoes the White Paper of 1967; 61 it is equally unrealistic and naive. Regardless 
of the degree of pre-enactment review, it was inevitable that inconsistencies between 
subsequent national legislation and Community law would occur. 6' Rippon's approach is 
potentially very dangerous. In any situation where inconsistencies arose there would be no 
framework for resolution. The national courts would be presented with no guidance as to the 
correct course of action. Rippon's approach demonstrates a politician evading difficult issues. 
By doing this he presented the courts with a problem that they had to resolve for 
themselves. 63 
58 H. C. Deb. Vol. 931,15th February 1972, Cols. 278-279. 
59 See Amministrazione dello Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal-SIA (No. 21 above at p. 273. 
60 H. C. Deb. Vol. 831.15th February 1972. 
61 See above at p. 298. 
62 See above at p. 303 for Nfitchell's response to the White Paper's adherence to this Policy Of restraint. 
63 See below at p. 324 et seq, in particular at p. 326 for elaboration on the judicial solution to this issue. 
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Rippon's assertion that there would be no abridgement of Parliament's sovereignty was not 
widely accepted in the House of Commons. Harold Wilson, as Leader of the Opposition, 
stated: 
What is not at issue, and cannot be, is the transfer of a marked degree of sovereignty, 
including the requirement to legislate to give effect to regulations, decisions and 
directives of the European Economic'Community. That was always understood. On 
the sovereignty issue, I quoted as Prime Nfinister, and again recently, what I said in 
our debates in 1961.... ;.., 
'The whole history of political progress is the history of gradual abandonment of 
national sovereignty .... The question 
is not whether sovereignty remains absolute 
or not, but in what way one is prepared to sacrifice sovereignty, to whom and for 
what purpose ... Whether any proposed surrender of sotereignty will advance our 
progress to the kind of world we would all want to see. ' 
I think that aH of us would have decided in the light of the terms and what was to 
happen whether and how far sovereignty should be abandoned. " 
Austen Albu NT accepted the proposition "that there is bound to be some derogation of 
Sovereignty", and also identified the real issue as being how much derogation Parliament 
would accept. 65 
There are other, slightly more sophisticated, views that emphasised the pooling and sharing of 
16 sovereignty; these views accorded with the pronouncements of the ECJ. Russell Johnston 
asked whether "an intent to share sovereignty represents a loss in sovereignty in modem 
terms? s67 and Knox asserted that 
By joining the Common Market, Britain will have access to a new sovereignty which 
-, neither she nor any of the individual countries of the Common market can ever enjoy if 
64 H. C. Deb, Vol. 831 17th February 1972, Cols. 639-640. See also Johnston. H. C. Deb., Vol. 831,16th February 
1972, Col. 473. 
65 H. C. Deb., Vol 831,15th February 1972, Col. 330. 
" See above at p. 289 et seq. 
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they stay separate. Therefore, it seems to me that the argument about sovereignty in 
respect of this Bill is a very narrow legal argument which ignores conunon sense. " 
Although Knox is willing to countenance abridgement of sovereignty, and is laudably viewing 
accession as an opportunity and not a threat, the issue of parliamentary sovereignty is to a 
large extent a legal formulation. 69 Much of the debate tends to ignore this element of the 
equation; parliamentarians concentrated on the democratic deficit and the relative weakness 
of the European Assembly (later called the European Parliament) within the constitutional' 
framework of the Communities . 
7' Although this is an important political issue, it is not linked 
to the legal notion of parliamentary sovereignty as defined by Dicey. 
With regard to the notion of pooling sovereignty, Douglas Dodds-Pirker NT stated 
I do not believe that any great new principle is involved but that an old principle haS' 
been extended... Iet us recall the transfer of decision-making under the RAT. 0. 
Treaty by the Labour Government after the war and by our adherence to Westem 
European Union and the International Monetary Fund. In all these we pooled a 
fraction of sovereignty to facilitate decision-making by ourselves in conjunction with 
our friends and allies with whom we wished to have closer association. I believe that 
such pooling is necessary in the post-1945 circumstances, through the United Nations 
and other co-operation. " 
This was the subject of a number of interesting speeches. Ronald King Murray INT replied to 
Dodds-Parker thus: 
(Mr Dodds-Parker] sought to draw a parallel between our accession to N. A. T. O., the 
United Nations and so on, sugc 9a resting that some soverei nty was given up then. Th t 
is true but it was sovereignty in a peripheral sense, the international periphery Of Our 
67 H. C. Deb., Vol. 831.16th February 1972, Col. 473. 
69 Vol. 831.16th February 1972, Col. 480. 
69 See Chapter Four, above at p. 207. 
7' Peter Shore, H. C. Deb, Vol. 831,15th February 1972, Col. 298. Peter Jay. H. C. Deb, Vol. 831,16th Febn,, Lr 1972, Col. 498. Kenneth Baker H. C. Deb., Vol. 831,17th February 1972, Col. 688. 
71 H. C. Deb., Vol. 831,15th February, Col. 304. 
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being which did not involve the heart of our domestic constitutional being as the Bill 
unquestionably does. We are surrendering a portion of the inner core of our 
sovereignty because we are dealing with two aspects of the constitution, first with an 
economic aspect and secondly with one which is more properly constitutional. "2 
Russell Johnston rejected Murray's distinction, but Murray was correct. What he termed core 
sovereignty relates to the notion of parliamentary sovereignty; his peripheral sovereignty is 
the political/national sovereignty that relates to the freedom of the executive to formulate 
policy. This is a distinction that I believe Knox, amongst a large number of his 
contemporaries, failed to understandAt is linked to the notion that nation-statehood was a 
transient phase in the development of international politics. There is a level of connection 
between this idea and the'doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty: as ýt nation's sovereignty is 
pooled with that of other members of supra-national organisations so the position of their 
legislatures is altered. Under this model, there are more constraints imposed upon 
legislatures; some are purely political, and others are more clearly legal. n 
Some parliamentarians accepted that, as with many supra-national organisations, joining the 
Communities would involve acceptance of new laws. One of these new laws would have to 
be the supremacy of Community law. 
Richard Luce NT noted this point. He stated "If we accept the principle of entering the 
Common Market on the terms which have been negotiated, then undoubtedly we must accept 
that there is existing law to which we must adapt. O'Indeed it was widely accepted that 
without the provisions, allowing for incorporation, found in clauses 2 and 3, the existing 
'2 H. C. Deb., Vol. 831,15th February 1972, Col. 363. 
73 See MacConnick (1993) for a consideration of this idea. 74 H. C. Deb., Vol. 831,16th February 1972, Col. 491. 
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members of the Communities would not be willing to admit the UK. 
75 What is surprising, 
considering this recognition, is the fact that there is no reference made to the 
ECJ's decisions, 
outlined above. 76 These judgments provided a good idea of those changes likely to 
be 
imposed on Parliament's sovereignty. At the time of the debate the ECJ had clearly made'Its 
case for the supremacy of Community law, had explained the rationale behind it, and had 
explicitly said that no internal rule could prevent the application of Community law. 
Parliament, however, declined to commerit on the ECJ case law in anything other than a 
superficial fashion. It ignored the evidence that there would be real changes in the 
constitutional arrangement between Parliament and the courts. This lack of consideration 
provides further evidence that the emphasis of the debate was the pplitical effects of 
membership, and not the legal. implications. 
Murray makes an interesting observation, one which was not considered in its entirety, when 
he questions the compatibility of the Bill with the provisions of the "1707 ... Treaty of 
Unioe'. In particular he considered Article XVHI, in which "There was a constitutional " 
guarantee, however flimsy, that the people of Scotland were entitled to expect that nothing 
would be done, as for instance in this Bill, affecting the private rights of the people of 
Scotland, except for their evident utifity. "77He continues "It is... doubtful whether one cOU'ld 
reconcile this Bill with that important constitutional declaration. "78 The limited discussion an 
this matter reveals the level of significance accorded to the provisions of the Acts Of Uniorl'79 
This would have been an interesting debate because it would have involved the question 
75 For example see John P. Mackintosh, H. C. Deb., Vol. 831,16th February 1972, Col. 530. 
,6 See above at p. 289. 
H. C. Deb., Vol. 831,15th February 1972, Col. 361- 
H. C. Deb., VoI83 1.15th February 1972, Col. 361. See also Jones H. C, Deb., Vol831,16th February 1972, 
Col. 464. 
See Chapter Four. above at p. 271 et seq. 
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whether the Westminster Parliament was empowered to incorporate Community law through 
the process of a simple Act of Parliament. 
There were other, astute, observations concerning the nature of Parliament's sovereignty. 
One of the sharpest of these was "The supremacy of Parliament has been waning for years. 
The power of the bureaucratic machine has caused that to happen. "80 John P. Mackintosh MP 
echoed this sentiment maintaining, "that in many areas where we think that this House has 
total sovereignty, there has been a seepage and an erosion of the sovereignty, in practice, to 
the executive. "81 This point relates directly to the notion that Dicey's doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty is reliant upon a particular conception of ýarliament's 
constitutional position within a particular political system. 
What emerges from the debate is not so much a picture of the legal relationship between the 
courts and Parliament, but rather a view about the constitutional role of Parliament and how 
that will be affected by Membership of the Communities. The relationship between the Courts 
and Parliament will be affected by any changes in the constitutional role of Parliament. The 
exact nature of such changes, and their impact, are more difficult to determýine where the only 
view on likely change and impact is provided by the institution being'affected. The 
constitutional position of any organ of government is dependent not only on its self- 
perception, but also on the perceptions of the other organs of government. The views 
provided through the course of the debate on the Bill in question are decidedly one sided, that 
of parliament. 
8') Per David Clark NIP, H. C. Deb.. Vol. 831.15th Febmary 1972, Col. 354. 
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The reliance, by the Government Benches, on the White paper of 1967 is interesting for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, the views it laid out had been overtaken by events. Rippon partly ý 
accepted this point, but never really addressed the deficiencies, which even then, were 
apparent within the White Paper's arguments, nor the fact that it failed to consider the 
potential development of the Communities! 2 Secondly, it demonstrates the Conservative 
Government's eagerness to use arguments formulated by senior Labour figures, during the 
course of preceding Parliaments, in order to support membership on the grounds proposed 
the then Conservative Government. 83 This reliance suggests a purely mercenary approach to I 
the issue of membership; there is no better way of de-fusing an opponent's argument than by 
citing his own leadership back at him. A side effect of this approacjý however, is that it stiflesi 
legitimate debate, particularly when the arguments being cited are either weak or have been 
superseded by events. When such a course of argument is used, and when the Bill in questioO. 
is relatively short, the result can be a lack. of direction. At the time of entry into the 
communities the UK courts were precluded from considering travaux preparatoires and 
Parliamentary debates when determining the meaning to be attributed to statutes. As a result' 
any guidance provided during the course of parliamentary debate would not have assisted the 
judges in their interpretation of the changes instituted through membership. This position waý 
different to that practised in much of continental Europe, a point raised by Charles Fletcher, 
A' 
Cooke W who asked if the British Courts would have to change their approach in order to 
fall in line with the Community position. 84 This is relevant because the British courts did, in 
81 H. C. Deb., Vol. 831,16th February 1972, Col. 532. 
82 Clarke and Suffin (1983) at p. 42. 
93 See above at pp. 308-309. 
84 H. C. Deb., Vol. 831,15th February 1972. Cols. 339-340. 
Page 314 
the course of time, have to grapple with this issue. " It simply highlights the lack of guidance 
the Bill provided for the judiciary in what was obviously going to be a difficult task. 
The lack of guidance arises because of a number of facts. Firstly, it would be impossible to 
ascertain, or provide guidance as to, how the Communities would evolve and how the 
judiciary would fit within the evolving constitutional structure. Secondly, the Government 
wanted to avoid issuing too many specifics for fear of giving the Bill's opponents ammunition 
to use against them in what was going to be a tightly fought political battle to achieve 
effective incorporation. 86 This is akin to using opposition speeches and papers. " It was an 
easier, and more practical, solution to introduce enabling legislatiom. that accorded the 
judiciary maximum freedom for development whilst satisfying the Communities' requirements 
for entry. This amounts to little more than recognition that the courts were going to play a 
leading part in the process of incorporation. It also enabled the Governrnent, to avoid 
embarrassing conflicts. 
Committee Stage - Clause 11 
During the House of Commons Commýittee stage Sir Elwyn Jones NT moved a new clause, 
Clause 11. It was framed in the following terms: 
It is hereby declared that nothing in the Treaties or in this Act shall detract from the 
ultimate sovereignty or supremacy of Parliament or shall prejudice the power and right 
of any Parliament to repeal this Act or to alter any of its provisions or effects; and any 
as See below at pp. 328-330 for a discussion of the case law. Also see the comments of Lord Irvine, in Chapter 
Six below at pp. 410-41 1. 
86 See Appendix E. 
" See above at pp. 309-3 10. 
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determination of the European Court or any of the Communities or their institutions 
which is inconsistent herewith shall be null and void. " 
It was, avowedly, designed to guarantee that the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty 
prevailed over the incompatible 41ternative of the supremacy of Community law. 
89 It would 
provide'the judiciary with an incontrovertible asýertion of this fact. Jones stated 
The right hon. and teamed gentleman the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster has 
told us that there is no need to worry about the future; we can easily undo what *we 
have so painffilly done. He has not put it quite like that, but that is the effect. With- 
great respect to the right Hon and learned gentleman, I prefer the authority of the 
Master of the Rolls, Lord Denning, ... 
He considered the matter in June of last year_ in 
the case of Blackburn v. Attomey-General9o. The MR said 
'It does appear that if this country should go into the C6rnmon Market and sign 
the Treaty of Rome, it means that we will have taken a step which is irreversible. 
The sovereignty of these islands will thence forward be limited. It will not be ours - 
alone but will be shared with others'91 
Jones continues to state 
the MR concluded: 
(we must wait and see what happens before we pronounce on sovereignty in the 
Common Market'. 
That is the state of total uncertainty about the matter. This is the alarming conclusi or, 
to which one comes from the statement of the Nllý. In his view Parliament is enterill 91, 
upon irreversible action, not something that can be changed overnight, and that is the' 
grim significance of the debate today and of our discussions throughout the passage of 
the European Communities Bill. 92 
88 H. C. Deb., Vol. 840,5th July 1972, Col. 556. 
89 H. C. Deb., Vol. 840,5th July 1972, Col. 557. 
90 [197112 All ER 13 80. 
91 H. C. Deb., Vol. 840,5th July 1972, Col. 558. 
92 H. C. Deb., Vol. 840,5th July 1972, Col. 559. 
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Although he briefly mentions them, Jones does not consider in any great detail the ECJ's 
judgements outlined above. This implies that he either did not view them as central to this 
issue, or he simply wanted to avoid considering the, principle they lay down. 
Nlichael English NT did recognise the significance of the ECJ's judgements. He stated 
It is clear from the decisions of the European Community that Community law is to be 
regarded as superior to the law of the subordinate states of the Communities. It is also 
clear that no one of those states can unilaterally revoke its adherence to the 
communities once it is given. 93 
English recognised that whilst the ECJ asserting the primacy of Community law, and the 
traditional position in British law was that Parliament was supreme, 'ýthere was likely to be a 
conflict over the correct relationship between national and Community law. The result would 
be confusion. He draws an interesting analogy, which I do not intend to explore in detail, 
between the'quandary facing the judiciary when Henry VHI forced through the Act of 
Supremacy, 94 and the ECA 1971. Further examples would be the Restoration, the Bill of 
Rights, the Act of Settlement and the Statute of Westminster as other, similarly, complicated 
positions facing the judiciary. 
English, like Jones, claims that the inclusion of Clause 11 would resolve the problem by 
issuing the British judiciary with a very clear statement of the effect of membership on the 
sovereignty of Parliament. The solution, as Denzil Davies NIP explains, provided by Clause 
11 is that it 
tells the judges (ifl 'you are not sure whether a later Act takes priority over this Act. 
(This Clause resolves any] doubt .. for you, ' because it tells the judge in a matter of 
93 H. C. Deb., Vol. 840,5th July 1972. Col. 562. 
94 H. C. Deb., Vol. 840,5th July 1972, See Cols. 562-563. 
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doubt the sovereignty of Parliament always overrides in the ultimate. The purpose of 
the clause is to resolve the kind of doubt which arises from the legislation. " 
However, in an astute observation, Douglas Dodds-Parker NIP notes that the "The new 
clause challenges the whole concept of the UK joining the Community. "96 Selwyn Gurnmer 
echoed this view stating "I believe in a very profound sense that [this Clause] would write 
down the whole nature of the Bill, diminish its whole concept, and din-dnish the concept of 
our entry into the Community. )997 The basis for this claim comes back to the point noted in the 
second reading, there is existing Community law which has to be recognised and given 
unconditional effect if the Communities are to agree to UK membership. The raison d'etre of 
the proposed Clause II was to deny one of the precepts of Community law, which had to be 
accepted. 98 Geoffrey Howe NT noted, "the second part of the Claýse ... 
is 
... quite 
irreconcilable with the Treaty obligations. "99 Through this denial the Clause would defeat Uy, 
membership of the Communities. At the very least, it would make entry more difficult by 
antagonising the Community institutions and the existing members. 
The whole tenor of this debate is different from that of the Second Reading. This debate was 
far more "legal" in its terms used and arguments raised. There is more detailed reference to 
the theory behind the issue of sovereignty, at least the traditional theory as interpreted by 
Wade. 100 There was more willingness to consider what is meant by parliamentary 
sovereignty. 10' Despite such willingness the debates continually return to the Political posit ion 
95 H. C. Deb., Vol. 840,5th July 1972, Col. 64 1. 
96 H. C. Deb., Vol. 840,5th July 1972, Col. 639. 
97 KC. Deb., Vol. 840.5th July 1972, Col. 584. 
98 See pp. 308-')09 above on the existence of Community law which must be given effect, and pp. 291 et seq. on 
the need for the primacy of Community law to be given effect throughout the Communities 
99 H. C. Deb., Vol. 840,5th July, Col. 627. 
100 See Chapter Four, above at p. 223 et seq. 
'0' Selwyn Gummer, H. C. Deb., Vol. 940.5th July 1972. Col. 580-58 1. Alexander Lyton NT, H. C Db e 
Vol. 840,5th July 1972. Col. 614-615. 
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of Parliament and fail to address the issue of the relationship between Parliament and the 
judiciary. In fact there is a continual assertion that "Sovereignty is not simply legalism. 
Sovereignty is where the political power is. 102 Although this point is accepted' --and many 
people discuss the limitations imposed upon Parliament through the curtailment of its political 
power to implement its Will, 103 there is a persistent claim that this curtailment is immaterial 
because in theory Parliament can still do what it wants. Thus Lyton maintained that 
In the judgement to which my right hon. and learned Friend (Sir Elwyn Jones] 
referred, (Blackburn v. Attorney-General 104] 'he Master of the Rolls said that in 193 1, t 
in the Statute of Westminster, Parliament gave the dominions their complete 
independence from this country and that no-one could take back that power. I suggest 
that Parliament can but that it would not. It would not becalfýe the plain realities of 
political power are that we could not enforce it. 
I do not like to touch on the controversial issue between the parties concerning 
Rhodesia, ... but we know the limits of our legislative power compared with the role 
of political power in such a situation. Clearly we would not say to Canada 'we gave 
you independence in 193 1, but we are going to take it away now' because we have not 
the power to enforce it. However this does not curtail'the sovereigntyof this 
Parliament to deal with the matter if it wished. That therefore is the situation. 
Sovereignty rests with us up to the moment when physical power has taken away that 
sovereignty 
This view accepted real limitations on the power of Parliament, but attributed them to the 
inability to ensure obedience. Such a view is reliant on the Austinian and Dicean notions of 
sovereignty and law. An alternative interpretation would be to emphasise the notion of 
empowerment. Under this model the reason for Canada's refusal to accept any reversal of 
the granting'of independence is that the Westminster Parliament is no longer empowered to 
"'2 Per Alexander Lyton NIP, H. C. Deb., Vol. 840,5th July 1972, Col. 614. 
103 Selwyn Gununer, H. C. Deb.. Vol. 840, Sth July 1972, Col. 580-58 1. 
104 (197112 All E. R. 13 80. 
105 H. C. Deb., Vol. 840,5th July 1972, Col. 614-615. 
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make that decision itself Any proposed reversal would require the assent of the Canadian 
authorities, for the provisions of the Statute of Westminster vests the power to make such 
decisions in a body composed of the Westminster Parliament and the Canadiarýbrgans of 
government. For the Westn-dnster Parliament to make such a decision on its own would be 
ultra vires. The Statute of Westminster has created a new authority, superior to Westminster I 
Parliament in this matter, and this has involved an alteration to the basic norm - as it related 
to the dominions. Using this interpretation, the questions Lord Denning's asks in Rlackbum 
v. Attorney-Generall" relating to the Statute of Westminster, and the answer he provides: 
Can anyone imagine that Parliament could or would reverse that Statute? Take the 
Acts which have granted independence to the dominions and territories overseas. Can 
anyone imagine that Parliament could or would reverse thos; laws and take away their 
independence? Most clearly not. Freedom once given cannot be taken away. Legal 
theory must give way to practical politics... ""' 
may be reconciled with legal theory without the idea that political theory is not capable of 
explaining such matters, and must give way to practical politics. It is worth noting that Jones 
does not cite this quotation from Lord Denning despite its position in the middle of those 
passages that he does cite. 10' 
Lyons use of the Rhodesian example is interesting because he does not consider the question 
of legal revolution. This observation is applicable to the entire passage of the Bill. There is a 
high level of reliance on, and consideration of, Wade's ideas and notions of the nature of 
sovereignty, but there is no consideration of what is a central contention within Wade's 
formulation. A number of the protagonists accept that nothing the Bill says can affect the 
106 (197112 All ER. 13 80. 
107 At p. 13 82hi. 
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nature of Parliament's sovereignty because it is beyond Parliament's power to alter. Few, 
however, really explore the fact that the courts may determine that Parliament's sovereignty 
was altered by the new politic-constitutional arrangement. This is surprising considering that 
Sir deoff-rey Howe, represe , nting the Government, quoted Wa de's 1955 essay, 109 that 
If no statute can establish the rule that the courts obey Acts Of Parliament, similarly no 
statute can alter or abolish that rule. The rule is above and (sic. ] beyond the reach of 
statute ... because it is itself the source of the authority of statute. This puts it into a 
class by itself among rules of common law, and the apparent paradox that it is 
unalterable by Parliament turns out to be a truism. ... Legislation owes its authority to 
the rule: the rule does not owe its authority to legislation. "0 
He continues to observe "that is the underlying reality and why the first part, of Clause (11] 
I 
cannot affect the position (of Parliamentary sovereignty]. That is thd reality of which Lord 
Denning, and Lord Sankey too, spoke. ""' These observations are correct, according to 
Wade's theoretical formulation. However, the Government's insistence that the sovereignty 
of Parliament would not be altered through membership simply does not accord with the fact 
that political events have been altering the nature of sovereignty for centuries, albeit, 
sometimes, in minor ways. 
Towards the end of the debate Denzil Davies NIP asserted "Although this Parliament may do 
what'it likes, it is the courts of this country and ultimately the European courts, which will 
decide whether later legislation is to take precedence over former., '112 This appears to finally 
recognise the relationship between the courts and Parliament, at least in Wadian terms. 
Unfortunately, Davies continued 
log See H. C. Deb., Vol. 840,5th July 1972, Cols. 556-560, and compare with [197112 All E. P. at pp-1382- 1383. 
109 The Basis ofLegal Sovereignty, Wade (1955). 
110 H. C. Deb., Vol. 840,5th July, cited at Col. 628. 
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For this purpose, in order, so to speak, to make the matter clear to the judges - not 
only our own judges who are familiar with the doctrine that Parliament cannot fetter 
its future actions but the European judges, too - this Parliament should make clear that 
future legislation shall not be encumbered or restricted by the present Bill. 
This passage clearly demonstrates that he does not understand the arguments Wade 
employed, or the legal aspect of the relationship between Parliament and the courts, either 
according to Wade's analysis, the manner and form argument, or the case 14)NýOf the 
European Court. This state of affairs was not unique to Davies, but was unfortunately 
prevalent throughout the House of Commons. 
Davies continued to assert that 
The Clause is intended to enable us to withdraw from the Treaty of Rome, because 
any European judge, looking at a future Act, would have to interpret that Act on the 
basis of the sovereignty of Parliament. But if the Clause is not accepted, the European 
Court - and the final arbiter would be the European Court - would seek to say, 'The 
earlier Act takes precedence over the later Act', and then we shall be in the Position of 
breaking our treaty obligations. 113 
This evidences that he clearly did not comprehend the position of the ECJ. The ECJ had 
emphasised the internal nature of Community law, it had disregarded the idea that national 
rules could impair the application of Community law. Further, the ECJ looked to the treaty 
provisions in order to determine the manner of interpretation of subsequent national 
legislation. It did not follow national rules of interpretation. " 
111 H. C. Deb., Vol. 840,5th July 1972, Cols. 628-629. 
112 H. C. Deb., Vol. 840,5th July 1972, Col. 640. 
113 H. C. Deb., Vol. 840,5th July 1972, Cols. 641-642. 
See above at pp. 281-287. 
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The debate denionstrates some of the'same traiis as the Second Reading. Howe relies on 
statements made by senior member -sI of the LaboUr Party - the Leader of the Opposition'" and 
the former Lord. Chancellor' 16 - he also relies on statements made by other senior judicial 
figures 117 who maintained that Parliament could not fetter its successors. The judicial 
statements were all correct. At the time of their making the accepted orthodoxy was that 
Parliament could not fetter its successors. Reliance on these statements, however, ignores the 
possibility of change'. It portrays sovereignty as an absolute, denies that it has a dynamic 
character, and emphasises the static interpretation that had dominated constitutional law since 
Dicey. 'The result was to create confusion over the constitutional effect of entry into the 
Communities. 
Before moving on to consider the judiciary's reaction to membership, I should like to draw an 
analogy between the situation which emerged over membership of the Communities and 
other, previous, political decisions which have involved reliance on notions of sovereignty. 
The constitutional conflicts of the early seventeenth century, the proposals for Irish Home 
Rule and the break-up of Empire were all highly contentious political issues. In addition, they 
all presented significant legal difficulties. They all illustrate the area of coincidence between 
the legal and political worlds. The fact that sovereignty was an issue in all of these situations 
demonstrates that it sits within this area of coincidence. What is also demonstrated in all these 
examples, through subsequent events, is that, despite the assertions of politicians, sovereignty 
115 H. C. Deb., Vol. 840,5th July 1972, Cols. 625,626,629,630 and 63 1, 116 H. C. Deb., Vol. 840,5th July 1972, Cols. 626 and 627-8,4 117 H. C. Deb., Vol. 840,5th July 1972, Lord Dilhome at Col. 627, Lord Gardiner at Col. 627-628, Lord Hailsharn at Col. 628, and Lord Diplock at Col. 629. 
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was, in reality, abridged by each of the political decisions. They also show that the courts 
played a critical role in this process, and that Parliament accepted the abridgement. 
Sovereignty, the Courts and Membership 
Introduction 
From the foregoing it is clear that some of the protagonists believed that the role of the courts 
would alter. These protagonists believed that the judiciary could be confronted with a 
situation where they would be forced to make an overtly "political" decision; in the sense of 
declaring what form the constitutional settlement took. It was inevitable that the courts would 
be confronted with cases involving conflicts between domestic and Community law; the 
question was how they would perceive their role in such circumstarLces. The question of 
constitutional positioning depends not only on the role ascribed to an organ of government by 
the other organs, but also on the internal perspective of the organ in question. If their self- 
perception is one of intervention and pro-activisrn, then that will detern-dne their approach to 
issues that confront them. 
However, simply considering the judicial response to membership, immediately after j ohUng. 
would not present an accurate picture of their self-perception. There can be little doubt that 
the judiciary would require time to adjust to the new source of law, the new constitutional 
norms stemming from the introduction of a new hierarchy of law, and the different 
adjudicatory processes and approaches employed in Community law. In addition they would 
require cases to come before them addressing this question, before any discernible "policy, 
towards sovereignty could emerge. The result of this process was that the judiciary develop d e 
an initial view, but as more exposure to Community law occurred and more cases came ". 
before them the attitude of the judiciary changed. This process was be assisted by the 
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inevitable changes in judicial personnel. Those senior judges, who had been brought up solely 
on a diet of domestic law, with its emphasis on parliamentary sovereignty, may have found it 
more difficult to embrace the primacy of Community law with all its requirem6its. However, 
over the fullness of time younger judges who were happier with the idea of Community law 
supremacy and were more willing to abandon notions of absolute sovereignty replaced the 
senior judiciary. 
Precursory Case Law 
We must, therefore, be willing to adopt an historical approach, considering the cases as they 
arise, and viewing them as a chain of events. I will start by briefly considering cases which 
arose prior to membership, but which directly touched the matter ofýsovereignty. Blackburn 
v. Attomg3L-Generall is perhaps the most famous of these cases. The debate over Clause II 
outlined Lord Denning's judgement, and rather than go over this area again, I wish to make 
some comments on the tenor of the judgement. Lord Denning's judgement exists on a number 
of levels. Firstly, the refusal to recognise Blackburn's standing released the Court from 
having to make a difficult decision that may have profoundly affected the process of accession 
and have fuelled the debate which surrounded the passage of the European Communities Bill 0 
through Parliament. It is similar to the arguments employed in MacCormick v. Lord 
Advocate., "' Secondly, Lord Denning's statements reveal an attitude of wait and see, which 
was, practically, all that they could do. 
A similar attitude was displayed the year after Blackbum_v. Attomey-General when the Court 
of Appeal was again asked to consider, in McWhirter v. Attorney-General. 120 whether the 
118 [ 197112 All ER 13 80. 
119 [19531 S. C. 396. 
120 [19721 C. M. L. P, 882. 
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Government had acted unlawfully in singing the Treaty of Brussels, and thus acceding to the 
Treaty of Rome. Again Lord Denning delivered the leading judgement. The plaintiff sought a 
declaration that the signing of the treaty was invalid in order to prevent it being. implemented 
through an Act of Parliament and thereby become the law in the UK. McWhirter relied on the 
provisions of the Bill of Rights of 1688; he maintained that the Government was not seized 
with the power to agree to such treaties. Lord Denning rejected this claim. The MR 
maintained that even after 1688 the "Crown retainid, as fully as ever, the prerogative of the 
treaty-making power. ... (And] 
it is exercised on behalf of the Crown by the governrnent of 
the day: and it cannot be impugned in any way in these Courts, either before or after a Treaty , 
is signed. " 121 Referring to the Position after the Treaty was implemented, Lord Denning 
simply stated "Once it is implemented by an Act of Parliament, these courts must go by the 
Act of Parliament. " 122 
.L. 
I Lord Denning and Macarthys Ltd v. Smith 
23 
it is fair to acknowledge that Lord Denning was not always consistent in his approach to 
Community law. Despite the judgement in Blackburn v. Attorna-General. 124 Warner 
suggests that Lord Denning found it difficult to acknowledge the prospect, that a UK statute 
was no longer the highest form of law that could be applied within the domestic 
jurisdiction. 125 Warner adduces evidence in the form of some early post-membership 
judgements that are confusing and inconsistent. The first of these cases is H. P. Bulmer v 
121 (19721 C. M. L. P, 882 at p. 886. 
12, [ 19721 C. M. L. PL 882 at p. 886. 
123 [197913 All E. R. 325. 
1 2.4 [ 197112 All E. P, 13 80. 
125 Wamer (1977) at p. 364. 
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Bollinger S. A. . 
126 During the course of his judgement Lord Denning stated that the EEC 
f. 1 * tv 127 Treaty is equal in force to any [UK] statute . Warner observes 
worse still, if I may say so without disrespect, is a dictum in Felixstoweýbock and 
Railway Co. v. British Transport and Docks Board 128 (where Lord Denning stated] 'I 
would add -only this. It seems to me that once the B ill is passed by Parliament it 
becomes a statute, that will dispose of this discussion abou t the Treaty. These courts 
will then have to abide by the statute without regard to the Treaty at all. "29 
In Shields v. E. Coomes (Holdings) Ltd. 130 Lord Denning stated 
Suppose that the Parliament of the UK was to pass a statute inconsistent with article 
119: as for instance, if the Equal Pay Act 1970 gave the right to equal pay only to 
unmarried women. I should have thought that a married woman could bring an action 
in the High Court to enforce the right to equal pay given to 4er by article 119.1 may 
add that I should have thought that she could bring a claim before the industrial 
tribunal also ... If such a tribunal should find any ambiguity in the statutes or any 
inconsistency with Community law, then it should resolve it by giving the primacy to 
Community law. "' 
Then in Macarthys Ltd. v. Sn-tith. 112Lord Denning stated that the Treaties "take priority even 
over our own statute. " 133 He continued to state 
Under section 2(1) and (4) of the ECA 1972 the principles laid down in the Treaty are 
'without enactment' to be given, legal effect in the UK, and have priority over' any 
enactment passed or to be passed' by our Parliament. We should, I think, look to see 
what these provisions require about equal pay for MI en and women. Then we should 
look at our own legislation on the point giving it, of course, 'full, faith and credit, 
assuming that it does not fully comply with the. obligations under the Treaty. In 
construing our statutes we are entitled to look at the Treaty as an aid to its 
(197411 Ch. 401. 
[ 197411 C. 401 at p. 4 I 8f. 
1: 8 [ 197612 C. M. L. R. 65 5. 
129 Wamer (1977) at p. 364. 
130 [197911 All E. R. 456. 
1 31 [ 197911 All ER 456 at p. 46 1. 
132 [ 197913 All E. 1325. 
133 [ 197913 All E. R. 3 25 at p. 3 28b. 
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construction; but not only as an aid but as an overriding force. If on close exarnination 
it should appear that our legislation is deficient or it is inconsistent with Conununity 
law, by some oversight of our draftsmen then it is our bounden duty to give priority to 
Community law.... If the time should come when our Parliament deliberiaely passes an 
Act with the intention of repudiating the Treaty or any provision in it, or intentionaUy 
acting inconsistently with it and says so in express terms then I should have thought 
that it would be the duty of our courts to follow the statute of our own Parliament. 134 
The 'rule' that has been distilled from this judgement is that unless Parliament expressly 
legislates in contravention of Community law, the domestic courts are under a duty to apply 
Community law wherever there is an inconsistency. In the event of express terms 
commanding a deviation from Community law the 1972 Act should be considered to be 
repealed and superseded. 
The decision in Macarthys Ltd v. Smith does represent a more sophisticated fomulation of 
the interaction between national and Conununity law. However, its theoretical underpinnings 
are not clear. It appears to be introducing a manner and form requirement: only where there 
are express terms permitting a deviation should the courts giVý effect to the Act of Parliament 
over the provisions of Community law. This amounts to a practical entrenchment of section 
2(l), of the ECA 1972, through the provisions of section 2(4). It further, introduces the 
requirement of "express words" whenever any deviation is intended. Employment of the 
continuing theory of sovereignty to explain the resultant situation is not convincing. Under 
the continuing theory of sovereignty, any deviation from Community law in a subsequent Act ý 
would be sufficient to impliedly repeal the ECA 1972 despite the provisions of section 2. 
Additionally, the introduction of the "express terms" requirement appears to institute a 
procedural requirement on any Parliament wishing to repeal the ECA 1972, or deviate fT011, 
134 [ 197913 All ER 325 at p. 329abcde. 
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any provision of Community law. In the words of Allan, employing the Macarthys Ltd. v. 
Smith approach, "Parliament in 1972 accomplished the impossible and (to a degree) bound its 
successors. " 
135 
It is possible to explain the inconsistencies between the early, confusing, statements and the 
more mature formulation in Macarthys Ltd. v. Smith through the process of acceptance and 
recognition outlined above. 136 These decisions highlight that the question of supremacy was a 
difficult one, even for a judge as willing to develop the law in unusual ways and possessed of 
a more overtly "politicar' role as Lord Denning. 137 Even though the decision in Macarthys 
Ltd. v. 'Smith may be interpreted as a clever interpretation of the provisions of the ECA 1972, 
the simple fact is that Lord Denning is not looking to the provisions of Community law, 
particularly the case law of the ECJ when he formulates this idea. The source of his 
interpretation is national law and the provisions of the traditional doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty. This perpetuates confusion: the ECJ is saying one thing, and basing its 
judgements on Community law, and the higher UK national courts are saying something else, 
slightly different, and are basing their assertions on a different foundation. 
The existence of such confusing authorities as these could not have made the job of the lower 
courts any easier. They would have been looking for the higher courts and senior judicial 
figures 138 to provide guidance on these matters. Any inconsistent statements, even dicta, 
would have made their job more difficult. 
' 35 Allan (1983-3) at p. 25. 136 See above at pp. 324-325. 
131 For an explanation of this compare the decisions of Lords Denning and Simmonds; in Magor and St 
Mellons v. NewDort Corporation [195012 All E. R. 1236. - 138 See Griffiths (199 1) at pp. 29-30. on the role, and significance, of the Master of the Rolls in matters of 
constitutional law. 
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It would be unfair to merely use Lord Denning as an example ofjudicial confusion over the 
issue of sovereignty and the position of Parliament in the new Community sysf6m. Lawton 
L. J. in Macarthys Ltd v. Smith stated "Parliament's recognition of European Community law 
and the jurisdiction of the ECJ by one enactment can be withdrawn by another. " 139 This is a 
clear reaffirmation of the continuing theory Of Parliamentary sovereignty. Reliance on this 
statement is not without criticism. Clarke and Suffin maintain that it is wrong to ascribe too 
much precedence to a dictum uttered at the end of the judgement. 140 It is the existence of 
such dicta, because they are illustrative of individual beliefs held by senior judges and thus 
demonstrate their understanding of the theory surrounding the issue, that make this a 
fascinating topic. Allan maintains that "reassuring thougW' Lawton L. J. 's 
assertion of sovereignty may be to those who value traditional doctrines, it should not 
be allowed to disguise the remarkable innovation which has occurred. In the absence 
of clear evidence of a deliberate intention to legislate in conflict with prevailing 
Community law, future UK statutes will not be applied when they are inconsistent 
with pre-existing Community legislation. The attempt to. entrench section 2(1) of the 
European Communities Act by means of section 2(4) has to some extent succeeded: 
the effect of the decision seems to impose a requirement of form (express wording) on 
future legislation designed to override Community law. "'I 
Suhsequent use of the Macarthvs Ltd v. Smith Form . ulation 
The Macarthys Ltd. v. Smith approach, which avoids the subject of sovereignty as much as 
possible, was to be popular for a number of years. Some of the most eminent judges Opted to 
139 [197913 All E. R. 325 at p. 334f. 
140 Clarke and Sufrin (1983) at p. 55. 
141 Allan (1983) at p. 24-25. 
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treat the whole sovereignty question as one that they would answer when required to, but not 
before that time arose. Lord Diplock's statements in Garland v. British Rail 
Ensuneering'42support this claim. He stated: 
The instant appeal does not present an appropriate occasion to consider whether, 
having regard to the express directions as to the construction of enactments "to be 
passed" which is contained within section 2(4) (of the ECA 1972], anything short of 
an express positive statement in an Act of Parliament passed after January I st 1973, 
that a particular provision is intended to be made in breach of an obligation assumed 
by the UK under a Treaty would justify an English court in construing that provision 
in a manner inconsistent with a Community Treaty obligation of the United Kingdom 
however wide a departure from the prima facie meaning of the provision might be 
needed in order to achieve consistency. '43 
Lord Diplock also maintained that 
even if the obligation to observe the provisions of article 119 were an obligation 
assumed by the UK under an ordinary international treaty of convention and there was 
no question of the treaty obligation being directly applicable as part of the law to be 
applied by the courts in this country without the need for any further enactment, it is a 
principle of construction of UK statutes, now too well established to call for a citation 
of authority, that the word of a statute passed after the Treaty has been signed and 
dealing with the subject matter of international obligation of the UK, are to be 
construed, if they are reasonably capable of bearing such a meaning, as intended to 
carry out the obligations and not to be inconsistent with it. A fortiori this is the case 
where the treaty obligations arise under one of the Community treaties to which 
section 2 of the ECA applies. '" 
The result of the judgements in Macarthys Ltd v. Smith and Garland v. British RailwUs 
Engineering give the impression of a subtle shift in the theory of Parliamentary sovereignty. 
42 [198312 A. C. 75 1. 
43 ( 198312 A. C. 75 1. at p. 771 bcd. 144 [199312 A. C. 751, at p. 77 lab. 
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As Allan notes, in an extended paragraph, commenting on Garland v. British Railwgys 
Engineenng, 
If the courts are prepared to strain the language of statutes in order to prevent 
conflicts with Community law, and so avoid the constitutional problems which such 
conflicts might cause, it seems only one step further to change the language 
completely (or ignore it) when there is no sign that Parliament foresaw of intended any 
conflict with Community law. The supremacy of Parliament is, of course, preserved 
since Parliament can always legislate in contravention of the Community law by the 
adoption of express wording to that effect. The result, however, is an interesting 
recognition by the courts of a special requirement for form of legislation of a certain 
type. In other words section 2(l) of the ECA 1972, providing for the recognition of 
directly applicable Community law as part of English law, has been entrenched by the 
stipulation in section 2(4) that 'any enactment passed or to 
ýý 
passed ... shall 
be 
construed and have effect subject to the foregoing provisions of this section. ' 
Maughan L. J. 's dictum in Ellen St Estates v. Nfinister of Health that 'the legislature 
cannot, according to our constitution bind itself as to the form of subsequent 
legislation', must now be treated as subject to that (limited] qualification. If that is the 
case, a working solution of the problem according primacy to Community law has 
145 been achieved, and all in the name of interpretation. 
This view has attracted a degree of academic support. 146 There are still, however, a number 
of difficulties. The principal difficult is that, although the national courts are responsible for 
reconciling the supremacy of community law with national principles of law, 147 this approach 
disregards the case law of the ECJ. 149 It does not take account of the internal nature of 
Community law. It relies solely upon national doctrines and the idea that national courts act 
as national courts, not as, Community law courts. Since accession in 1972 national courts are 
1`5 Allan (1992) at pp. 563-564. 
146 See Hood-Phillips (1979) 'and (1980), Gravells (1989), Clarke and Sufrin (1988), and Collins (1990). For a 
contrary view see Ellis (1980) 
147 See above at p. 300. 
149 See above at p. 291 et seq. 
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also European courts. Although this approach appears to give full effect to community law it 
denies the spirit of community law. 
The House of Lords, Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Primacy of Community Law 
The House of Lords, with regard to the relationship between parliamentary sovereignty and 
the supremacy of European law, accepted the approach formulated by the lower courts. 
Garland v. British Railways Engineering is an obvious example of the express words idea of 
Macarthys Ltd. v. Smith being taken a stage further. Subsequent cases addressing the 
interpretation of domestic legislation in the light of Community law, further developed these 
ideas. The body of case law, which can be classified as touching this matter, when considered 
in toto, shows signs of a new UK. judicial attitude towards Parliarneýtary legislation, and the 
constitutional positions of Parliament and the judiciary and their relationship inter se. 
In Duke v. GEC Reliance'49the House of Lords explicitly addressed the Macarthys Ltd. v. 
Smith/Garland v. British Railways Engineering idea. Lord Templeman affirmed that 
Of course a British court will always be willing and anxious to conclude that the UK 
law is consistent with Community law. Where an Act is passed for the purpose of 
giving effect to an obligation imposed by a directive or other instrument a British court 
will seldom encounter difficulty in concluding that the language of the Act is effective 
for the intended purpose. 'Bui'the'cons'truction of an Act of Parliament is a matter of 
judgement to be determined by British courts and to be derived from the language of 
the Jegislation considered in the light of circumstances prevailing at the date of 
enrolment. 15' 
Once again the emphasis is purely internal, there is little consideration of the principles of 
European law, particularly the primacy of Community law. What is emerging is a question 
that relates back to the ideas -of the manner and'form theorists. The courts are expressing a 
149 [19881 A. C. 618. 
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willingness to give effect to the intentions of Parliament, even if this involves imposing a more 
strained interpretation on the statutory language; however, in order to achieve this objective 
the courts require certainty as to Parliament's intention. The question 'How dor you deterrnýine 
a collegiate body's intentionT again, becorýes significant. This is a difficult question, 
especially in a constitutional structure, such as that of the UK, where the courts are ordinarily 
precluded from considering preparatory materials and legislative discussions and debates. 
The House of Lords acknowledged the difficulty this point raised in Pickstone v; -Er-eemLans"I 
where Lord Oliver summarised the existing constitutional 'rules' thus: 
the intention of Parliament has, it is said, to be ascertained from the words which it has 
used and those words are to be construed according to their plain and ordinary 
meaning. The fact that a statute is passed to give effect to an international treaty does 
not, of itself, enable the treaty to be referred to in order to construe the words used 
other than in their plain and unambiguous sense. Moreover, in the case of ambiguity, 
what is said in Parliament in the passage of the Bill cannot ordinarily be referred to 
assist in construction. 152 
The tenor of this constitutional arrangement is internal: it emphasises the role of the internal 
organs, and plays down the role of any external sources of law or organs of administration. It 
is this background, which the courts had been struggling with since accession. Unless the 
judiciary were willing to adopt a wider perspective and develop the rules which had been 
adequate prior to membership, in order to encompass the entirely novel Community 
arrangements, a collision between national and Community law was inevitable. Lord Oliver 
appears to have recognised this fact. He asserted 
150 (1988] A. C. 618 at p. 635de. 
151 [198911 A. C. 66. 
152 [198911 A. C. 66 at p. 126bc. 
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I thiný however, that it has also to be recognised that a statute, which is passed in 
order to give effect to the UK's obligations under the EEC Treaty falls into a special 
category and it does so because, unlike other treaty obligations, those obligations 
have, in effect, been incorporated into English law by the ECA 1972.15"-' 
A predecessor to the decision in Pepper v. Hart 154 , the situation outlined by Lord Oliver 
is at 
odds with that described by Lawton L. J. in Macarthys Ltd. v. - 
Smith. where the latter 
maintained that "it is not permissible to read into the statute words which are not there or to 
look outside the Act" in order to determine its meaning. "" This demonstrates a fundamental 
change in judicial practice affected as a direct result of membership of the Communities. 
Although it may not seem like a massive change, it is significant in that the position prior to 
Pickstone v. Freemans was aligned with Lord Campbell's judgement in Edinburgh and 
Dalkeith Railwgys v. Wauchope. The principle was that the courts could not took beyond the 
parliamentary roll, that Parliamentary process was beyond the ken of the courts and that 
Parliament's intention could always be determined from the words used in the Act. 
Pickstone v. Freemans is significant in another important way; it admits that the literal 
approach to statutory interpretation is no longer appropriate when dealing with Community 
law. Instead, the correct approach is outlined in von Colson v. Land Nordrhein-Westfale 156, 
where the'European Court stated 
Member States' obligations arising from a directive to achieve the result envisaged by 
the directive and their duty under Article 5 of the Treaty to take all appropriate 
measures, whether general or particular, to ensure the fulfilment of that obligation, is 
binding on all the authorities of Member States including, for matters within their 
jurisdiction, the courts. it follows that, in applying the national law specifically 
153 198911 A. C. 66 at p. 126d. 154 [19931 A. C. 593. 
1 55 197913 All ER 3 25 at p. 3 321. 
156 19841 E. C. P- 189 1. 
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introduced in order to implement Directive No 76/207, national courts are required to 
interpret their national law in the light of the wording and the purpose of the directive 
in order to achieve the result referred to in the third paragraph of Article 189.157 
Thus, Lord Oliver observes that although 
a construction which permits the section to operate as a proper fulfilment of the UK 
obligation under the Treaty involves not so much doing violence to the language of the 
section as filling a gap by an implication which arises, not from the words used but 
from the manifest purpose of the Act and the mischief it was intended to remedy. The 
question [the courts must determine] is whether that can be justified by the necessity 
indeed the obligation - to apply a purposive construction which will implement the 
UK's obligations under the Treaty. 158 
Pickstone v. Freemans Plc. was not difficult to decide. The Equal Pay Act 1970 was 
amended by Equal Pay (Amendment) Regulations 1983 for the expr-'ess'purpose of 
conforming to the ECJ's decision in Commission of the European Communities v. UK of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Case 61/81). 159 Thus, although the amended Act was 
still not effectively incorporating Community law it was possible for the House of Lords to 
deduce that the purpose behind the amendment had been to fulfil the UK's Community 
obligations. 160 This attitude gives more credence to the notion that if Parliament wished to 
derogate from its Community obligations it would have to do so in an unambiguous forrn, 
with clear indications of this intention during the course of the legislation's passage through 
Parliament. The latter would be required in case the courts deemed it necessary to consider 
the Parliamentary debates in order to clarify the legislative intent behind the Act. This 
situation is open to a manner and form interpretation. 
157 [ 19841 E. C. P- 1891 at p. 1909, para. 26. 
158 [198911 A. C. 66 at pp. 125gh-126a. 
159 [19821 I. C. R. 578. 
160 See Lord Templeman's speech at pp. 121-123. 
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Lord Oliver reaffinned this decision in the subsequent case of Litster v. Forth Dry Dock and 
Engineering Co. Ltd.. 161 He stated 
If... legislation can reasonably be construed so as to conform with thosq obligations 
(incumbent on the UK under the provisions of the EEC Treaty], "obligations which are 
to be ascertained not only from the wording of the relevant directive but also from the 
I 
interpretation placed on it by the Court of Justice of the European Communities, such 
a purposive construction will be applied even though, perhaps, it may involve some 
departure from the strict and literal application of the words which the legislature has 
elected to use. 
162 
The significance for the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty is that the courts are now 
willing to look to provisions of Community law in order to determine Parliament's intention. 
Unless Parliament explicitly states that the object behind a statute is to derogate from 
Community law the courts are willing to bend, ignore'or insert intention in order to give 
effect to Community law. For all practical purposes they have redefined the rules relating to 
the determination of Parliamentary intention. 
Manuel v. Attornev-General M9831 I Ch. 77 
In 1983 a number of Canadian Indian Chiefs brought a case on behalf of themselves and a, 0 
number of Indian groups seeking a declaration that the British Parliament no longer possessed 
the authority to legislatively amend the Canadian Constitution in such a way "as to prejudice 
the Indian nations (of Canada] without their consent, and that the Canada Act 1982 was ultra 
163 
vires". They based their argument on the notion that the "'Can'aaa Act'1982 was 
inconsistent with and a derogation from the constitutional safeguards provided for the Indian 
people by the Statute of Westminster 1931 and the British North America Acts". 164 
161 198911 All E. P, 1134. 
1 62 (198911 All E. P , 113 4 at p. I 140cd. 163 [198311 Ch. 77 headnote at p. 77. 1 64 [199311 Ch. 77 headnote at p. 77. 
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This case raised a number of issues pertaining to, sovereignty and the statute of Westminster 
193 1 which hitherto had been purely acadenýc in nature. This case also forced. the judiciary 
to address these questions and also, in part, to explain the impact of European law on the 
constitutional law of the UK. I shall address this latter point as it relates directly to the subject 
matter of this Chapter and may be easily dispensed with. 
Sir Robert Megarry V. C. acknowledged that "the subject matter (of this case]... is 
constitutionally fundamental. " He continued to state 
it is also subject to much theoretical speculation and contention which would be out 
of place in a judgement ... 
My duty is merely to reach a decision in this case and not to 
explore side issues, however interesting they are. If I leave on one side the European 
Communities Act 1972 and all that flows from it, and also the Parliament Acts 1911 
and 1949, which do not affect this case, I am bound to say that first to last I have 
heard nothing in this case to make me doubt the simple rule that the duty of the court 
is to obey and apply every Act of Parliament, and that the court cannot hold any such 
Act to'be ultra vires. 165 
In this simple and purely legalistic fashion, 1.66 Megarry V. C. neatly side-stepped the potentially 
-I 
difficult question of whether membership of the European Communities has instituted a 
fundamental change in the nature of Parliamentary sovereignty. However, what he has, 
tacitly, admitted is that matters of Community law should be treated in a specific fashion and 
considered to be different to the remainder of the body of British law. This, in itself, is a 
recognition that membership of the Communities has altered the nature of British 
parliamentary sovereignty, albeit in designated areas. 
163 [198311 Ch. 77at p. 86efg. 
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Megarry V. C. then continues to discuss the traditional notions of parliamentary sovereignty, 
and the constitutional position of the Statute of Westn-dnster 193 1'. He continues to review 
the case law. He accepts the authority of Edinburgh and Dalkeith Railway Co. - v. 
Wauchope. "7 and suggests that Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke 1611 provides clear guidance 
for situations where Acts purportedly apply outside the territorial limits of the United 
Kingdom, as weH as situations where a state of revolt exists. 169 Megarry V. C. felt compelled 
to consider the judgements made by Lord Sankey in British Coal Corporation v. The King. 170 
and Lord Denning MR in Blackburn v. Attomey-General 171 , during which they express 
views concerning the feasibility of repealing legislation that bestowed freedom upon external 
territories. 172 Megarry V. C. continued, "I think that it is clear from. the context that Lord 
0 
Denning was using the word 'could' in the sense of 'could effectively'; I cannot read it as 
meaning 'could as a matter of abstract law. ) iv 
173 He continues to state 
Perhaps I may add this. I have grave doubts about the theory of the transfer of 
sovereignty as affecting the competence of Parliament., In my view, it is a fundamental 
of the English constitution that Parliament is supreme. As a matter of law the courts 
of England recognise Parliament as being omnipotent in all save the power to destroy 
its own, omnipotence. Under the authority of Parliament the courts of a territory may 
be released from their legal duty to obey Parliament but that does not trench on the 
acceptance by English courts of all that Parliament does. Nor must validity in law be 
confused with practical enforceability. 174 
This is a reaffirmation of the traditional doctrine of Parliament sovereignty. However, it is 
only possible to reconcile the reality with the theory through ignoring the influence of 
1 66 See Chapter One, above at p. 25. 167 [184211 Bell 252. See Chapter 3 above at p. 200- 
168 [19691 1 A. C. 645. 
169 (198311 Ch. 77 at pp. 87-88. 
170 [19351 A. C. 500 
1 71 [197112 All E. P- 1380, see above at pp. 308-3-309. 1 77' [198311 Ch. 77 at p. 89. 
173 [198311 Ch. 77 at p. 89d. 
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European law, and certain other statutory changes, on the constitutional framework of the 
United Kingdom. It is also interesting to note that Megarry V. C. employs the term 
omnipotent, whereas Bentham invented the term omni-competent to describe the powers that 
should be attributed to the British Parliament. 175 The two words have very specific meanings 
and Bentham felt moved to invent a new word rather than employ omnipotent, which he felt - 
did not describe the constitutional position of Parliament. 
Conclusions 
Early judicial pronouncements on the relationship between national and Community law were 
confused. What emerged was a notion of Community law primacy based on interpretation 
and construction of the ECA 1972, rather than acceptance of the ECJ's reasoning and 
rejection of the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty. Manuel v. AttomgY-General reveals 
that the potential impact of Community law was strictly defined. Further, it shows that the 
British judiciary were not willing to re-evaluate their notions of the relationship between 
Parliament and themselves, despite the fact that mere membership implied that the traditional 
tenets of the theory were no longer appropriate to modem constitutional governrnent. 
In Pickstone v. Freemans p1c. the House of Lords clearly relied on this rule of interpretation. 
However, as Collins recognises in Litster y. Forth Dry Dock and Ent, ri IZ L ginee n Co. td. -they 
went far beyond the normal techniques of. statutory interpretation ... in implying complex 
provisions into a statutory instrument in order to comply with a directive as interpreted bY the 
174 [198311 Ch. 77 at p-89ef. 
175 See Chapter Three, above at p. 15 9. 
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European Court. " 176 This should not, however, be interpreted to mean that the Courts have 
necessarily altered their view of Parliament's sovereignty. Collins suggests that 
at present, whatever may be the position in the future, the correct positign in UK 
constitutional law is the orthodox one, that the courts must and will give effect to 
subsequent UK legislation, even if it is inconsistent with Community law, subject to 
the important rule of construction in s 2(4). 177 
Clarke and Suffin express the same view. They state that 
The English courts have shown no inclination to assert Community law's view of itself 
. ... 
Community rules have effect here by virtue of Sections 2 and 3 ECA. Such an 
approach, inevitable from the constitutional framework, results in the conclusion that 
any direct repeal of the sections of the Act would result in English courts denying 
effect to Comrnunity law. Lip service is paid to Community law, but the spirit is 
denied. 178 
In a 1991 article McCaffrey writes "Their Lordships have had several opportunities over the 
years to consider the demands of Parliamentary Sovereignty as against the claims of 
Community law. To date their approach has veered on the side of caution and towards 
sovereignty. "179McCaffrey, commenting on Lord Diplock's decision, in Garland v. British 
Rail Engineering Ltd. 
., 
to refer the matter for an article 177 reference, writes: 
cynics may suggest that making such a reference is a tactic for avoiding a clash 
between parliamentary sovereignty and EEC supremacy. Once the European Court has 
given its ruling, the UK courts are bound to give it effect under the provisions of the 
1972 Act, the actual decision as to priority having been taken out of their hands. "' 
"6 Collins (1990) at p. 38. 
177 Collins (1990) at p. 39. 
173 Clarke and Sufrin (1983) pp. 61-62. 179 MCCaffjq (199 1) at p. 112.1 would note that this conclusion is not valid in the light of the R. y. Secretary 
of State for Transport. ex parte Factortame (No. 2) decision, but I would concur that it is valid in relation to 
the pre--R. v. Secretary of State for Transport. ex parte Factortame (No. 2) decision. 'so McCaffrey (199 1) at p. 113. 
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There does appear, when confronted with 'difficult cases' concerning the issue of supremacy, 
to be predisposition to make such references. It is true that references are not made in every 
case; no reference was made during Duke v. GEC Reliance Ltd.. 
"' References were made, 
however, during the course of Marshall v. Southampton and Southwest Hampshire Area 
Health Authorijy (No. 2). 182 and R. v. the Secreta1y of State for Transport. ex Parte 
Factortarne. 183 In the latter case there was a strong argument for the House of Lords was 
able to come to the same conclusion as that reached by the ECJ, without recourse to an 
Article 177 reference. 184 Consideration of national courts' attitudes, particularly those of the 
higher courts, towards the basis of Community law is critical to the evolution of Community 
law for the simple reason that the ECJ is not a traditional court witý traditional judicial 
functions. The dispute resolution role of the ECJ, central to the constitutional position of 
most national courts, is, to a great extent, devolved to the national courts. "' Thesenational 
courts are also responsible for'much of the case law the ECJ addresses, through the Article 
177 procedure. National courts profoundly affect the development of Community law. 
What emerges from the cases considered, and the comments noted, is the incontrovertible 
fact that the British courts, in reaching their decisions, have persisted in pursuing an 
introspective approach. They have steadfastly refused to consider, and adopt, the European 
Court's approach outlined in the cases cited at the start of this Chapter. 186 Rather, they have 
based all their decisions on the provisions of the ECA 1972. Whilst the position in the late 
1980s was that the British courts were effectively upholding Community law, they were doing 
"' [19881 A. C. 618. 
182 [19941QB 126. 
113 [199012 A. C. 85, see Chapter Six, below at p. 329 et seq. 
184 See Chapter Six, below at pp. 363-364. See also McCaffrey (1991) at p. 118, for a partial justif] tio 0 ca nfr 
the referral. 
I's Chalmers (1997) at p. 166-167. 
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so whilst denying the spirit of Community law'and ignoring the ECJ's interpretation of the 
foundations of Community law. Although accommodating community law supremacy - as 
defined by the ECJ - within the UK domestic system was a matter for the national courts, 
"' 
the domestic courts adherence to certain provisions of national law related to parliamentary 
sovereignty were ultimately going to cause problems of reconciliation. The doctrine of 
implied repeal may have been circumvented by Macarthys Ltd v. Smith but express repeal 
would remain as a potential pitfall. Similarly where the purpose of parliamentary legislation 
was clearly expressed and was inconsistent with community law the national courts would be 
in a dilemma. When the question of which provision of law should be followed arose, the 
ECJ would be likely to intervene in order to ensure that the national courts' attempts to 
reconcile domestic legal principles with the supremacy of community law were effective and 
in accordance with the overriding doctrine of the supremacy of community law. Thus, 
according to British law, so long as a statutory provision was introduced with the express 
intention of implementing Community law, no difficulty arises. Such an approach is, however, 
now inconsistent with Community law. According to the judgement delivered in Marleasing 
188 SA v. La Commercial Intemational de Alimentacion SA , 
As the Court pointed out in Case 14/8"), VON COLSON AND KAMANN V. LAND 
NORDRBEIN-WESTFALEN, the member states' obligation arising from a directive 
to achieve the result envisaged by the directive and their duty under Article 5 EEC to 
take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure the fulfilment of 
that obligation is binding on all the authorities of member States including, for matters 
within their jurisdiction, the courts. It follows that, in applying national law, whether 
the provisions in question were adopted before or after the directive, the national court 
called upon to interpret it is required to do so, as far as possible, in the light of the 
18's See above at pp. 299-296. 
187 See above at p. 300. 
188 [199211 C. M. L. P, 305. 
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wording and the purpose of the directive in order to achieve the result pursued by 
latter and thereby comply with the third paragraph of Article 189 EEC. 189 
The principle outlined in this judgement is similar in composition to that outlined by the 
House of Lords in Garland v. British Railwgys Engineering'" and has been followed by the 
House of Lords in Webb v. EMO Air Cargo M Ltd.. 191 It is worth noting that the UK 
courts had already adopted a similar position in relation to pre-existing treaty obligations such 
as the European Convention on Human Rights, GATT and NATO. 192 More recently, 
however, the ECJ has retreated fi7om this strong interpretative approach, emphasising, 
instead, the need for legal certainty. 
189 [199211 C. M. L. R. 305, at pp. 322-323. 
190 (198212 All E. R. 402. Also, see above at pp. 331-332. 
191 [199214 All E. PL929 
192 See above at p. 3 10 where this is explicitly referred to in Parliamentary debate. 
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t 3 
Chapter Six - European Union, Legal Revolution And The Future. 
Introduction 
Political Change and the Communities 
Since joining the Communities, European "issues" have led to intra-political-party splits, of 
dimensions not previously. encountered since the Second World War. As a result, the 
traditional party structures and allegiances have undergone radical transformations. ' 
Increasingly, although not as obviously, European politics and law has had an impact on 
individuals' rights and govenunental obligations. This has had a profound effect on both the 
position of the citizens of Europe vis-d-vis the govequnents of Europe, and the relevant 
positions of the organs of goverrunent and their relationships inter se. The traditional national 
constitutional structures have been challenged through the imposition of a new tier of 
government with a wide remit and new powers. 2 Throughout the years of our membership the 
't, 
UK political and constitutional system has undergone radical change in order to 
accommodate the European Economýic Community, and more recently the European Union. 
Such accommodation has not always been easy within a political system clearly adversarial in 
nature. 3 Changes in the power/authority of the individual organs of government, and their 
relevant constitutional function, necessarily impact on their relationships with the other 
organs of governrnent. This can obviously affect such constitutional cornerstones as the 
doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty. 
Bogdanor (1994) at pp. 27-30. 
Bogdanor (1994) at p. 20. 3 Punnett (1987) at p. 470. 
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The debate surrounding the possibility of the UK unilaterally withdrawing from the 
Communities provides an indication of how far its governmental system has changed as a 
result of membership. This issue was widely'debated during the two decades that followed 
membership. It posed questions about Parliamentary Sovereignty. The legal debate over 
unilateral withdrawal centred on the question of whether Parliament could enact that the LJK 
was leaving the Communities without the agreement of the Communities or the other 
member-states. Although theoretically viable, 4 such a course of action was not practically 
possible. 5 The UK economic structure is too closely tied to the European Communities to 
consider unilateral withdrawalý; it may even be too close to consider a negotiated withdrawal 
unless it were executed over a long period of time. In the same way the social and political 
structure of the UK is now tightly e=eshed with that of the European Union. It may prove 
just as difficult. for the UK to separate itself from the socio-political. structure of Europe, as it 
would be to separate its economy from that of Europe. Political acceptance of, or perhaps 
resignation to, membership of the Communities has emerged. The Labour party of the early 
1980's advocated a policy of negotiated exit from the Communities; 7 this policy has been 
abandoned. Interestingly Labour intended to implement withdrawal through the simple 
mechanism of repealing the ECA 1972. The question of unilateral withdrawal was one that 
haunted the judiciary; there were a number of cases raising the question "what would be the 
legal effect of Parliament enacting, through a simple Act of Parliament, that the UK was 
leaving the European Communities? " The judiciary avoided answering this question, perhaps 
' Such a course of action would, of course, entailed contravening the provisions of the Treaty of Rome, a fact 
recognised by Lord Hailsham. See Lord Hailsham (1978) at p. 175. 
1 The practical impossibility was recognised by Hoffinan J. (as he then was) in Stoke-on-Trent City Council v B&Q Ltd. f 19901C. M. L. R. 3 1, at p. 34, para. 2. 
MacCormick (1993) at p. 3. 
For an outline of the Labour Party's proposals for an agreed termination to membership see Palmer (19S2). 
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the most famous instance being Lord Denning's dictum in Blackburn v Attorngy General. 8 
where he stated 
If Her Majesty's Ministers sign this Treaty and Parliament enacts provisions to 
71 
implement it, I do not envisage that Parliament would afterwards go back on it and try 
to withdraw from it. But, if Parliament should do so then I say we will have to 
consider that event when it happens. We will then say whether Parliament can lawfully 
do it or not. 9;, 
This statement deserves further comment for it reveals a number, of insights. Firstly, Lord 
Denning obviously saw the decision, as one which once made, would not be open to reversal. 
Secondly, it also reveals that Lord Denning was willing to consider the notion that Parliament 
could be. found to be incapable, in law, of repealing the implementing legislation. 
Today, to all intents and purposes, membership of the European Communities has evolved 
into one of the foundations of our politico-legal system; our future appears closely tied to the 
future of the Communities and Union. I should note that Oliver suggests the problem of 
withdrawal may not be dead. Although governments seem committed to continual 
membership, Private Members could introduce legislation to effect withdrawal. 10 
A System within a System - The Domestic Constitution within a European Context 
The political structure erected within the system of the Communities and Union (hereafter 
European Union'is taken to refer to both the European Communities and the European 
Union) has become an aspect of the UK's domestic political system. Aspects of government 
traditionally within the purview of the Westn-dnster Parliament have been accreted to the 
decision-making bodies of the European Union. This shift has been accompanied by a 
8[ 197112 All ER 13 80. 
9 At p. 1037. See also Lord Diplock in Garland v. British Railways Engineering [199212 All E. R. 402 in 
Chapter Five, above at pp. 330-332. 
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movement in order of significance: as the European Union has become increasingly significant 
in particular areas (for example labour relations) so the domestic system has become 
decreasingly significant. This movement in political significance has had an important impact 
on the nature of government within the member states. An alternative source of authority and 
political power has emerged and with it new problems and practices. " With the introduction 
of an additional 'layer' of government the relationship between the organs of government 
have changed; so have the structures of authorisation and control. The Government, 
previously subject to the control only through International Law, and certain Treaty 
provisions, is now subject to an authority that can dictate policy and issue directions that are 
enforceable before domestic and European courts. In Dicean terms the Government and 
legislature are obliged to render habitual obedience to another political body. Further, the 
commands issued by that body are enforceable through judicial sanctions. Diagrammatically, 
the relationship between the traditional UK organs of government and the new European 
structures looked sometEng likefigure 1. 
10 Oliver (199 1) at p. 446. 
" The issue of democratic control over the actions of the European organs of government - the so-called 
democratic deficit - is an obvious example. 
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Figure I 
European Communities' Organs 




British > British 
Parliament Judiciary 
Indicates the traditional flows of control (again the 
executive controls the judiciary via its control over 
Parliament) 
Represents the flows of control - the Community institutions exert 
these flows of control over the British organs of government - i. e. 
they, from time to time control the activities of Parliament. and the 
Courts and the executive 
Represents new flows of influence -flowing from the 
British institutions to the Community institutions i. e. the 
courts exert influence through the manner in which they 
apply Community law, and through the cases referred 
through article 177. 
Figure I is a simplistic representation; it does not break down the Community governmental 
institutions. Its purpose is to demonstrate that the governmental structure of the UK is now 
more complicated than at any prior time, and operates within the boundaries of Community 
law and influence. We should not fall into the trap of viewing the European system as 
exerting control downwards, from wholly independent supra-national institutions. In fact, the 
governments of the Member States provide the members of the Council (representing one 
element of the "legislature" of the European system). These governments play a part in 
selecting the Commissioners (the "executive") and the party machinery - at least in the UK - 
plays a huge part in the election of members of the European Parliament (the other element in 
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the "legislature" of the European system). Of these, historically the most significant has been 
membership of the Council where the larger member states have been able to exert great 
influence as a result of the system of voting. The constitution of the European-bnion is such a 
complex subject, with so many facets that it is impossible to consider it in detail within this 
thesis. 12 It is also, arguably, irrelevant to a consideration of a domestic doctrine such as 
Parliamentary Sovereignty. Although I feet that it is of great importance for it demonstrates 
how sovereign power, in traditional Dicean terms, can be shared between different organs of 
government 13 and that the judiciarY are important in the development of a constitutional 
system. 
Just as the European Union "political" structure has become an aspect of the UK's domestic 
political structure, so the domestic legal system has been greatly affected by membership of 
the European Union and the existence of its independent and sui generis legal system. Not 
only has a new source of legislation appeared, so a vast body of new case law with new 
procedures and principles has had to be incorporated into the UK system of judicial 
administration. This has placed a massive burden on the domestic judiciary who have been 
asked to apply and develop this system ývithin the UK's system. The judiciary have managed 
this process admirably at times, tolerably at others and inadequately on occasions. However, 
one thing they were adept at was avoiding the constitutional mire represente d by the issue ()f 
Parliamentary Sovereignty and its relationship with the primacy of European law. As 
demonstrated in the preceding Chapter the courts evaded this question for over a decade, 
ultimately though they were going to encounter a case where the issue could not be dismissed 
12 For an introduction to the community institutions, see Part H of Lasok and Bridge (1994). 
13 In a way similar to the Benthamite idea see p. 124 above. 
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as not relevant to the case in question, but would be central to the question posed. This case 
was R. v Secreta1y of State for Transport. ex parte Factortame and Others. 14 
14 [198912 C. M. L. P, 383. 
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The Factortame Litigation 
Background 
As in so many of the "constitutional cases" of this century, the substantive question raised in 
R v. Secretajy of State for Transport ex parte Factortame's is of less constitutional relevance 
than the secondary question. The litigation centred on the rights of Spanish fishermen using 
trawlers registered in the UK. The substantive question asked whether the Merchant Shipping 
(Registration of Fishing Vessels) Regulations 1988 C'the Regulations") which were issued 
according to the provisions of Part H of the Merchant Shipping Act 1988 C'the 1988 Act") 
were compatible with European law. During the course of the case's history the various 
courts were asked to consider such issues as the availability of injunctive relief against the 
Crown, the suitability of the American Cynamid Co. v Ethicon'6 guidelines governing when to 
grant such relief, and the question of damages. 17 The most interesting constitutional issue, the 
one directly addressing the question of Parliamentary Sovereignty, was whether or not the 
courts could grant interim relief pending a decision on the substantive question and whether 
this interim relief could take the form of a disapplication of an Act of Parliament. In fact it 
was still a moot point whether the courts could, where an Act of Parliament was found to be 
incompatible with the provisions of European law, override the former in order to give effect 
to the latter. The UK national courts had avoided the issue of compatibility through the 
Macarthys Ltd v. Sn-ýith interpretative approach; however, this only really worked where an' 
inconsistency between the domestic and community law had been established. 
" [198912 C. M. L. R. 353. 
16 [19751 A. C. 396. 
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In R v. Secretaly of State ex parte factortame the position was different: the re had been no 
decision as to the compatibility of the Act of Parliament with the provisions of European law. 
The Divisional Court correctly decided to seek the opinion of the European C6urt of Justice 
C'ECF'), according to the provisions of Article 177 of the Treaty of Rome, on this very 
question., There could, however, be a long delay between the reference being made, and the 
ECJ's opinion being delivered to the Divisional Court. This'delay would, according to the 
applicants, cause irreversible damage to their business if the 1988 Regulations were, pending 
the E. C. Ps opinion, enforced by the court. There would be no difficulty if the opinion of the 
ECJ was that the Regulations were compatible with European law, for the situation would be 
that the courts had correctly enforced the law and the applicants clai! n would be without basis 
ab initio: justice would have been done. However, if the opinion was that the Regulations 
were contrary to the provisions of European law and should not be enforceable then the 
_ 
applicants would have been placed in a position whereby their rights had been infringed. They 
would have suffered irreversible loss through the illegal actions of the government as 
enforced by the courts, a position that would be unacceptable and unjust. 'a 
In order to gain an understanding of the complexity of the problem facing the judiciary in R v. 
Secretajy of State for Transport ex parte Factortame and in order to demonstrate the 
spectrum of opinions held within the judicial community, it is necessary to consider the 
judgements of each of the courts involved individually. 
Divisional Court - [198912 C. M. L. R 353 
Neill L. J. and Hodgson J. 
17 For an introductory discussion of these issues see Oliver (199 1) at p. 442 et seq. " For a concise and lucid consideration of this issue see the judgement of Hodgson 1. In the Divisional Court 
(198912 C. M. L. P- 353 at p. 394. paras. 76-80. 
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Neill L. J. summarised one of the key arguments, for this thesis the most important argument, 
raised in the Factortame litigation thus 
The Solicitor General has referred us to the speeches in the House of Iýýrds in 
Hoffinann La-Roche v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industjy19 in support of the 
proposition that, unless and until a statutory instrument is declared to be invalid, it 'S 
effective and has the full force of law. The proposition must also apply, even more 
strongly, in the case of an Act of Parliament: unless and until an Act of Parliament has 
been disapplied the court cannot make any order which has the effect of preventing 
the law as declared by Parliament being enforced. It may be, it was said, that in certain 
circumstances the court will not grant an injunction to enforce a statutory instrument 
which is impugned as being contrary to Community law, but this does not mean that 
an English court can take some step by way of injunction or otherwise to prevent the 
enforcement of a statutory instrument let alone the enforcement of a statute. 20 
Neill L. J. continues to assert that 
I find this a very formidable submission. I am not satisfied, however, that this 
approach takes sufficient account of the new state. of affairs which came into being 
when the UK became a member-State of the European Community in January 1973 ). 
Twenty years ago the idea that the High Court could question the validity of an Act 
Parliament or fail, having construed it, to give effect to it would have been 
unthinkable. But the High Court now has the duty to take account of and to give 
effect to European Community law and, where there is a conflict, to prefer the 
Community law to national law.... (He continues to cite Simmenthal SpA v 
Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato (hio. 
-If 
judgement of the ECJ] ... The 
reason for this is that since the European Communities Act 1972 came into force 
Community law has b, een part of English law: where it applies it takes precedence 
over both primary and secondary legislation. ... [He continues to cite sections 2(1) and 
2(4) of the ECA 1972]22 
19 [19751 A. C. 295. 
'0 [198912 C. M. L. R. 353 at p. 372, para 40. 
"I [ 197813 CMIR 263. 
22 See Appendix F for the terms of this Act. 
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The effect of (the] central part of subsection (4), together with section 2(l) is this, as I 
understand it: that directly applicable Community provisions are to prevail not only 
over existing but also future Acts of Parliament (that is, Acts subsequent to 1972) in 
so far as these provisions may be inconsistent with such enactments. 23 
Neill L. J. clearly believed that the ECA 1972 had instituted a new legal rule, the supremacy of 
Community law. This idea, in turn, required acceptance of the notion that the Community 
law making bodies are capable of issuing 'higher' law than the Westn-dnster Parliament, in 
those areas where the Communities are deemed to be competent. This interpretation is 
contrary to the traditional Dicean notion of Parliamentary sovereignty with its emphasis on 
the absence of a superior body to which Parliament habitually defers (the negative mark). 24 
However, in the areas where the Communities are competent, according to, NeiU L. J., 
Parliament now owes a duty to abide by Community decisions and obey Community laws. 
Parliament discharges this duty by not enacting domestic legislation incompatible with 
community law provisions. Where Parliament fails to discharge its duty the duty of the courts 
is to apply Community laW and disregard domestic legislation. According to this 
interpretation, the relationship between ther British courts and Parliament has obviously been 
altered, albeit only in certain legislative fields. This is sufficient for Wade to assert that there 
has been a legal "revolution". 25 
Neill L. J. 's assertion that the Solicitor General's approach does not take sufficient account of 
the state of affairs instituted by membership of the Communities is interesting. The Solicitor 
General relies on the House of Lords decision in Hoffmann La-Roche v. Secretary of State 
for Trade and Industry, cited by Neill L. J., decided in 1975. The judgements in Hoffinan La- 
23 [198912 C. M. L. P, 353 at pp. 373-373, para. 42. 24 See Chapter Three, above at pp. 186-187. 
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Roche v. Secretajy of State for Trade and Indust do not make any reference to an 
exception to the rule they forward, indeed membership of the European Communities is not 
considered within that case. Neill L. J. could have easily distinguished Hoffinan-La-Roche v. 
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry from the case confronting him. Rather, he choose 
to ignore, or did not notice, the fact that the case relied on by the Crown was decided after 
the event he was suggesting changed the nature of the constitutional systen% and that this 
produced a fonn of paradox. He suggested that a change had occurred and that the Crown's 
submission did not take sufficient notice of the change, which had occurred. In fact, the case 
relied upon by the Crown did not even mention, or concern, matters Of Community law. Thus 
although Neill L. J. was correct in his outcome, his reasoning could ýave highlighted the fact 
that membership of the Communities had altered the constitutional system, but only in 
specific legislative fields: those where the European Community was vested with competence 
to legislate. 
Neill L. J. should be cornmended on his consideration of Simmenthal SpA v. Arnrninstr4LIonq 
26 delle Finanze dello Stato (L4o. 21 and the ECJ's judgement. However, following his 
consideration of this case, Neill L. J. falls into the British judicial habit of looking to 
Parliament for a justification of this state of affairs, a process at odds with the ECJ's 
reasoning in Simmenthal SpA v. Amminstrazione delle Finanze dello Stato (No., ) 2). Worse still 
follows when Neill L. J. refers to Lord Denning's judgement in Macarthys Ltd v Smith 27 
where Lord Denning asserted that the priority of Community law is derived from the ECA 
Wade (199 1) at p. 2. 
See Chapter Five, above at pp. 294-295. 




28 This line of reasoning falls firnýy within the arena of reflexivity and relies on a form 
of construction and notions of express repeal in order to be logically acceptable. Logical 
consistency is, in fact, beyond this line of reasoning so long as the traditional notions of 
Parliamentary Sovereignty are employed. The argument Neill L. J. advances is that there has 
been a change in the constitutional system, originating from Membership of the Communities. 
However, rather than explore the basis for such a change, Neill L. J. relies on the idea which 
underpinned the system that existed prior to the change to which he refers. By implication 
this denies the change that he refers to. 
Hodgson J. 's judgement considers the arguments reliant on Hoffman La-Roche v. Secreta[y 
of State for Trade and Industry:, he continues to observe the differences outlined above. He 
uses these differences to distinguish the situation which faced the House of Lords in 1975 
from the situation which faced the Divisional Court29in R v. Secreta[v of State for Tranapog 
ex parte Factortame. Again, however, he relies on the ECA 1972 to demonstrate why 
supremacy should be ascribed to Community law . 
3' Hodgson I deduced, from the authority 
vested in the courts to disapply the provisions of an Act of Parliamerit, once it had been 
I 
adjudged incompatible with European law, that the same courts must be vested with the 
power to grant'interim relief and temporarily disapply the Act pending the decision as to 
compatibility. 3 ' This argument is particularly strong when it is combined with the issue of 
irreversible damage that Hodgson I commented on later in his judgement. 32 
The conclusions of the Divisional Court, as cited by Lord Donaldson M. R., were that: 
's [198111 Q. B. 180, at p. 200. 29 [198912 C. M. L-P, 353 at p. 380, para. 63. 30 [198912 C. M. L. P, 353 at p. 391. para. 63. 
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(a) it was 'necessary to enable (the court] to give judgement' on the applications to 
seek certain preliminary rulings from the European Court of Justice; and 
(b) in the circumstances of (the] case the court was competent to grant-and should 
grant interim relief in the form of orders that: 
1. Pending final judgement or further order herein, the operation of Part II of the 
Merchant Shipping Act 1988 and the Merchant Shipping (Registration of Fishing 
Vessels) Regulations 1988 be disapplied, and the Secretary of State be restrained from 
enforcing the same, in respect of any of the applicants and any vessel now owned (in 
whole or in part), managed, operated or chartered by any of them, so as to enable 
registration of any such vessel under the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 and/or the Sea 
Fishing Boats (Scotland) Act 1886 to continue in being ...... 
Judgement was given accordingly and, unsurprisingly, the Secretary of State appealed, 
against the Divisional Court's judgement, to the Court of Appeal. 
The Court of Appeal - [198912 C. M. L. R. 353 
Lord Donaldson M. R., Bingham L. J., Mann L. J. 
A strong Court of Appeal allowed the appeal. The Court of Appeal employed a traditional 
interpretation of the UK constitution. Lord Donaldson MR, stated: 
The ultimate question is ... whether the courts of this country have any power to 
interfere with the operation of the 1988 Act..., either by modifying its operation or 
striking it down, and of doing so not on a permanent basis founded upon Community 
law of the British European Communities Act 1972 but on a temporary basis pending, 
a ruling by the European Court of Justice. The answer to this question, I have no 
doubt, is in the negative, whether we base ourselves on national or on Community law 
or both. 
He continued to expand, stating 
11 [198912 C. M. L. R. 353 at p. 381, para 66. 
32 [198912 C. M. L. P, 353 at p. 384, paras. 76-80. 
33 [198912 C. M. L. R. 353 at p. 394. para 7. 
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Looking at British national law without reference to the European Communities ct 
1972, it is fundamental to our (unwritten) constitution that it is for Parliament to 
legislate and for the judiciary to interpret and apply the fruits of Parliament's labours. 
Any attempt to interfere with primary legislation would be wholly unconstitutional. 34 
This is a fascinating statement. Considering that the appeal was principally concerned with 
rights claimed under European law, an exan-dnation of the constitutional structure that 
ignored the ECA 1972 is difficult to comprehend, particularly as there is no stated rationale 
for the exclusion. Equally, although this question concerns the'constitution of the UK it also 
tntimately concerns the constitution of the European Communities, but again there is no 
consideration of this matter, and no explanation for its omission. Through these omissions, 
Lord Donaldson ignores the approach adopted by Neill L. J. in the Divisional Court that the 
ECA 1972 might, somehow have altered the UK constitution where matters of European law 
were concerned. Lord Donaldson gives no consideration to the nature of European 
"constitutional laV', or to its evolution through the development of the role of the national 
courts. Instead, he relies on the idea that the European Court of Justice is the only body 
capable. of granting interim relief to the applicants. 35 In doing this he is denying one of the 
most significant aspects of European law, the role of the domestic courts as European courts 
capable of delivering judgements on all matters of European law. 
Bingham L. J. 's approach is more reasoned in that it considers, in a cursory and dismissive 
fashion, the history of the doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty concluding, "the grant of 
relief such as the applicants obtained'would not before 1973 have been thinkable. , 36 He 
continues to examine the European law, citing Algemene Transport-en Expeditie 
34 [198912 C. M. L. P. 353 at p. 397, para 19. 35 [198912 C. M. L. R. 353 at p. 398, para 21. 36 [198912 C. M. L. R. 353 at p. 400, para 27. 
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Ondememing van Gend & Loos N. V. v Nederlandse adniHstratie der belastin 
7 Caosta v 
E .L . 
38- and Simmenthal SpA v. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato (h! o. 2). He ý. 
N. El-' 
concludes, from these judgements, that: 
In the face of this jurisprudence the Solicitor General was bound to accept, as he 
readily did, that if the answer given by the European Court to the question referred to 
it by the Divisional Court under Article 177 proves unfavourable to him the Divisional 
Court will be obliged to give effect to that ruling by upholding any rights the 
applicants might be shown, in accordance with that ruling, to have and this it will be 
obliged to do even though its decision involves dispensing with (or disapplying) 
express provisions of the statute. 
(30]1 have no doubt that this is the law. Where the law of the Community is clear, 
whether as a result of a ruling given on an Article 177 referýnce or as a result of 
previous jurisprudence or on straightforward interpretation of Community 
instruments, the duty of the national court is to give effect to it in all circumstances. 
Any rule of domestic law which prevented the court from, or inhibited it in giving 
dfect to directly enforceable rights established in Community law would be bad. To 
that extent a UIK statute is no longer inviolable as it once was. " 
It is necessary to consider this passage before continuing to consider the issue of interim relief 0 
in more detail. The emphasised sentence states that the nature of a UK statute has changed. 
The nature of the change suggested, that it is no longer inviolable, implies a change in the 
nature of the body issuing it, Parliament. The change in the nature of Parliament is 
characterised by a denial of the ongoing sovereignty of Parliament, as traditionally defined in 
the UK context, and a suggestion that there is now a body of law defining other constitutional 
bodies vested with the power Parliament once enjoyed. This amounts to a major 
constitutional development, perhaps a "revolutionary" development in its own right. There i. S 
an acceptance in the Court of Appeal, as there was in the Divisional Court, that the doctrine 
37 [19631 E. C. RL 12. 
39 [19641 E. C. PL 585. 
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of Parliamentary sovereignty has undergone change. The question the courts are struggling 
with is the degree of that change. Bingham L. J. continues to explain that 
the point upon which the Solicitor-General takes his stand is that a statute remains 
inviolable unless or until it is shown to be incompatible with the higher law of the 
Community. A statute does not, he argues, lose its quality of inviolability enshrined in 
our domestic law so long as it remains unclear, as it does in this case or in any other 
case which is not acte clair, whether the statute is incompatible with Community law 
or not. 40 
The issue has become a question of whether the courts in the UK are vested with the power 
to disapply the provisions of an Act of Parliament only where there is a clear breach of 
European law, or whether their authority is greater than that. Do they have the constitutional 
right to temporarily disapply an Act pending a decision as to compatibility with European 
law? The latter role would imply a greater degree of constitutional review than the former, 0 
and would consequently involve a greater abrildgement of Parliamentary authority and power. 
Bingham L. J. concludes this argument by stating that his "initial view" had been successfully 
overcome by the Solicitor-General's contentions, and that the Divisional Court was not 
vested with the authority to grant relief in these circumstances. 41 
In the shortest of the judgements Mann L. J. declared his agreement with Lord Donaldson 
M. R. and Bingham L. J., adding 
The Merchant Shipping Act 1988, Part II, was enacted in accordance with our 
constitutional procedures. It was brought into force by regulations which were within 
the regulation-making power. This court is obliged to defer t6the Sovereignty of the 
39 [ 198912 CMIR 3 53 at pp. 403 -404 Para 29 (sic)-30. Emphasis added. 40 [198912 C-MIR 353 at p. 404, para 30. 41 [198912 C. M. L. R. 353 atp. 404, para. 30-31. 
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Queen in Parliament. We can only not so defer where legislation is inconsistent with 
the UK's obligations under the Treaty of Rome. 42 
The key element in this quotation is the first sentence. The whole case rests on whether or not 
the legislation was enacted in accordance with our constitutional procedures. Since 1972 one 
of those procedures is that the Westminster Parliament cannot enact legislation that 
contravenes European law. If Parliarnefit acts outside those bounds it is not conforming to, 
our constitutional procedures and is effectively acting unlawfully. 43 Parliament is not 
empowered to enact legislation within those fields governed by European law, and is not 
empowered because of the terms of an Act of Parliament. This fact supports the claim that it 
is possible for legislative enactments to influence, either directly or indirectly, the nature of 
sovereignty. 44 
The key issue in the appeal confronting Mann L. J. is less about the sovereignty Of Parliament 
and whether the 1988 Act conformed to the constitutional procedures surrounding it, but 
rather addresses the issue of dffective protection of rights conferred and protected by 
European law. 
The House of Lords [199012 A. C. 85. 
Lord Bridge, Lord Brandon, Lord Oliver, Lord Goff and Lord Jauncey. 
Lord Bridge delivered the judgement of the House of Lords. In a lengthy passage he Outlines 
the pith of the argument 
the difficulty which confronts the plaintiffs is that the presumption that an Act of 
Parliament is compatible with Community law unless and until declared to be 
42 [198912 C. M. L. R. 353 at p. 408, para 43. 
43 In such circumstances the legislation is subject to review - to ensure compatibility with Community law 
by either the national courts or the ECJ. 
See Chapter Seven, below at pp. 425-427. 
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incompatible must be at least as strong as the presumption that delegated legislation is 
valid unless and until declared invalid. But an order granting the applicants the interim 
relief they seek will only serve their purpose if it declares that which Parliament has 
enacted ... not to 
be the law until some uncertain future date. Effective relief can only 
be given if it requires the Secretary of State to treat the applicants' vessels as entitled 
to registration under Part II of the Act in direct contravention of its provisions. Any 
such order, unlike any form of order for interim relief known to the law, would 
irreversibly determine in the applicants' favour for a period of some two years rights 
which are necessarily uncertain until the preliminary ruling of the E. C. I. has been 
given. If the applicants fail to establish the rights they claim before the E. C. J., the 
effect of the interim relief granted would be to have conferred upon them rights 
45 directly contrary to Parliament's sovereign will ... 
Lord Bridge concludes this section of his judgement by declaring "k. Arn clearly of the opinion 
that, as a matter of English law, the court has no power make an order which has these 
consequences". 46 He does recognise that European law may vest such powers in the 
domestic courts and he discusses"this idea later in his judgement. 
Lord Bridge's arguments are persuasive and certainly fit with the traditional doctrines 
governing the courts' attitude towards Parliament's legislative power. The relief that the 
applicants sought was, however, intrinsic to their enjoying a community law right: a right 
ý without recourse is not really a right at all. It is interesting and reveals an entrenched attitude 
that Lord Bridge's initial'foray is into domestic law when the plaintiffs are seeking protection 
for a right derived from European law. 
Having concluded that there were no grounds for upholding the plaintiff s claims under 
domestic law Lord Bridge turned to the issue of Community law, 
45 [ 198912 W. L. R. 997 at p. 142-143a. 
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Mr Vaughan [counsel for the plaintiffi], in a most impressive argument ... traced the 
progressive development of these principles (that an effective remedy arose from the 
directly enforceable nature of certain Community law rights] ... through a 
long series' 
of reported decisions on which he relies. I must confess that at the conclusion of his 
argument I was strongly inclined to the view that, if English law could provide no 
effective remedy to secure the interim protection of the rights claimed by the 
applicants, it was nevertheless our duty under Community law to devise such a 
remedy. But the Solicitor-General, in his equally impressive reply, and in his careful 
and thorough analysis of the case law ha's persuaded me that none of the authorities on 
which Mr. Vaughan relies can properly be treated as determinative of the difficult 
question, which arises for the first time in the instant case, of providing interim 
protection of putative and disputed rights in Community law before their existence has 
been established. 47 
Lord Bridge declines to consider the relevant case law. He suggests that the House of Lords 
is not seized of the authority to decide the issue, but should refer the whole question to the 
European Court of Justice under the provision of Article 177. This is exactly what they did. 48 
This attitude displayed by the House of Lords has been criticised as "unimaginative i249and 
C4 
parochial. "50 Lord Bridge certainly was not willing to decide the matter of his own accord; 
the reference could be interpreted as dodging responsibility. 51 This would be unfair, however, 
for such criticism "ignores the delicate position in which the House of Lords found itself' 
The House of Lords was compromised by its joint role: as the highest court in the domestic 
- 
system, and as a European court responsible for protecting the fights granted to the citizenry 
46 [199012 A. C. 85 at p. 143 B. 
47 [199012 A. C. 85 at p. 13 IDEF. 
48 The terms of the reference are cited in Appendix G. 
49 McCaffrey (199 1) at p. 118. 
so Gravells (1989) at p. 585. 
51 See McCaffrey above at Chapter Four at p. 314. 
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under European law. 52 As both systems enjoyed an arguable claim for supremacy over the 
other the House of Lords was caught in a difficult situation. This situation was a product of 
the vacillations surrounding the parliamentary debates on the wording and meaning of the 
ECA 1972 and the attitude of the British judiciary during the 1980's. 
Opinion of the Advocate General [199111 A. C. 603. 
Advocate General Tesauro (Tesauro A-G) 
Tesuaro A-G refers to Simmenthal SpA v. Amminstrazione delle Finanze dello Stato (hio. 2) 
stating that 
the'Court of Justice affirmed that, in view of the supremacy of the Community law, 
the relevant provisions having direct effect 'not only by their entry into force render 
automatically inapplicable any conflicting provisions of current national law' but also 
'preclude the valid adoption of new national legislative measures to the extent to 
which they would be incompatible with Community provisions' 53 
Howeveri he declines to enter into a "sterile dialectic discussion on the theoretical basis of' 
the firn-dy established principle of the supremacy of Community law. 54 Rather he accepts that 
it existence is sufficient for the courts. This is a clever approach to the question: there is 
sufficient case law asserting the supremacy of Community law and it would not have been an 
unacceptable approach for the House of Lords to quietly assert the existence of the judicial 
authority claimed by the Divisional Court. It was when they started to seek a theoretical 
justification for the supremacy of Community law that they encountered difficulties in 
justifying the granting of interim relief. Such relief is, after all', an essential element in ensuring 
effective judicial protection of rights in a system such as that of the European Communities, 





are hypothetically valid and operative in the alternative (or invalid and -inoperative) 
and to both is attached what is commonly called a presumption of the validity, whilst 
what is postponed, owing to the time taken by the proceedings, is merely the point in 
time at which the final determination is made. 57 
Tesauro A-G continues to make reference to the existence in all of the other Member-states, 
with the partial exception of Denmark, of a system whereby interim relief could be granted. 
He allies this argument to the fact that the national courts are vested with the power to 
declare national law incompatible with Community law and disapply those national law. 
Tesauro concludes that the national courts "must also be able to disapply (a] law 
provisionally. "' g This argument is similar in form to the view expressed by Toth: that if there 
is a power to disapply an Act of Parliament, absolutely, then the "legser" power of disapplying 
it temporaffly must also exist. 59 
Tesauro A-G recommended that the Court of Justice reply to the questions posed by the 
House of Lords thus:, 
(1) The obligation imposed by Community law on the national court to ensure the 
effective judicial protection of rights directly conferred on the individual by the 
provisions of Community law includes the obligation, if the need arises and where the 
factual and legal preconditions are met, to afford interim and urgent protection to the 
right claimed on the basis of such provisions of Community law pending a final 
determination and any interruption by way of a preliminary ruling given by the court 
of justice. (2) In the absence of Community harmonisation, it is the legal system of 
each member state which determines the procedural methods and the preconditions 
for the interim protection of rights vested in individuals by virtue of provisions of 
Community law having direct effect, on condition that those methods and 
preconditions do not make it impossible to exercise on an interim basis the rights 
57 (199 111 A. C. 603 at p. 63 3 AB. 
58 [199 111 A. C. 603 at p. 635D. 
59 See below at p. 377. 
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claimed and are not less favourable than those provided to afford protection to rights 
founded on national provisions, any provision of national law or any national practice 
having such an effect being incompatible with Community law. " 
This conclusion is emphatic in its positioning of Community law as the "higher source" of 
law. Tesauro A-G's entire opinion clearly demonstrates that the Court of Appeal's attitude 
was untenable in the face of Community law. There is a central reliance on Simmenthal SpA 
v. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stat-o-(No. 2 1, not merely on the express judgement 
but also on the implications flowing from the constitutional arrangement envisaged by the 
Court of Justice. It becomes apparent that the English courts, in their references to 
Simmenthal SpA v. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello-Stato (No. 2), are more inclined to 
accept the express judgement but are not acting in accordance with the spirit of that 
judgement. This is explicable through the relative histories of English and Community law. 
English courts have adhered to the doctrine of stare decisis with its emphasis on the ratio 
decidendi of each case and the ability to distinguish subsequent cases on the grounds of slight 
factual differences or through categorisation of statements as obiter dicta. The Court of 
Justice follows the continental ideal of resjudicata where there is no binding precedent but, 
rather, subsequent courts are willing to follow the spirit, of preceding decisions, if applicable. 
This allows for greater flexibility in applying the previous decision to a changed set of 
circumstances. " ' 
60 [199 111 A. C. 603 at p. 640ABCD. 61 For a general discussion of the differences and similarities between the two jurisdictions see Toth (1991). 
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Court of Justice [199111 A. C. 603. 
As is its wont the E. C. J. delivered a single, brief, judgement during which it relied greatly on 
the previous decision in Simmenthal SpA v. Amministrazione delle Finanze deflO Stato 
(hjo. Q. A significant point, as recognised by Toth, is that the E. C. J., having cited in full the 
questions posed by the House of Lords, continued to summarise and reformulate them thus: 
It is clear from the information before the Court of Justice, and in particular from the 
judgement making the reference and,... th 
'e' 
course taken by the proceedings in the 
national courts before which the case came at first and second instance, that the 
preliminary question raised by the House of Lords seeks essentially to ascertain 
whether a national court which, in a case before it concerning Community law, 
considers that the sole obstacle which precludes it from grarýting interim relief is a rule 
62 
of national law, must disapply that rule. 
Through doing this "the Court of Justice avoided defining the substantive criteria to be 
applied by the national courts in deciding whether or not to grant interim protection. Nor did 
the Court elaborate on the nature of the possible relief that might be ordered. ""' Further, 
through adopting this approach it is arguable that the E. C. J. did not satisfactorily answer the 
questions posed by the House of Lords. 64 Through re-formulating the questions and 
providing the answer they did the E. C. J. decision is far less analytical than the opinion of the 
Advocate-General, they did, however, follow his general line of reasoning. " 
At the conclusion of its reasoning, the E. C. J. issued the following 
reply to the question posed to it for a preliminary ruling by the House of Lords, by 
judgement of 18 May 1989, (the Court of Justice] hereby rules: Community law must 
be interpreted as meaning that a national court which, in a case before it concerning 
62 [ 199013 WIR 8 18 at p. 643DE. 
63 Toth (1990) at p. 595. 
64 Toth (1990) at p. 586-7. 
65 Gravells (199 1) at p. 184. 
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Community law, considers that the sole obstacle'which precludes it from granting 
66 interim relief is a rule of national law must set aside that rule. 
Although the E. C. J. followed the long history of case law asserting both the supremacy of 
Conununity law and that effective judicial protection of Conununity law rights must be 
available through the domestic courts, one is left with a feeling of dissatisfaction when the 
Court's judgement is read carefully. The Advocate-General declined to consider the 
theoretical basis of the principles he relied upon; the Court hardly even considers the 
foundations of the supremacy of Community law and the need for effective remedies. The 
reliance on Simmenthal SpA v. Amminstrazione delle Finanze dello Stato (No. 2) is revealing. 
In the case law that culn-dnated in Simmenthal SpA v. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello 
Stato (hio. 2) the Court was willing to explore the theoretical basis of Community law and 
was happy to lay out a foundation for its application. Much of what they had said was 
contentious but it was frequently responsible for driving the evolution of a corpus of 
European constitutional law. R v. Secretaly of State for Transport ex parte Factortame 
represents a retreat from this dynamic role, and represents a missed opportunity for the 
further development of the theory of European constitutional law. 67 As Allott states 
Sooner or later, the Court will have to grasp the theoretical nettle and insist that EC 
law is a source of law throughout the Community in the fullest sense of that 
expression, having the full force of law everywhere, with all necessary national and 
Community remedies. The national legal systems are systematically integrated into a 
Community legal system, with particular legal relations arising from both sources. The 
remarkable section 2(1) of the European Communities Act 1972, unparalleled 
anywhere else in the Community, could have been the point of departure for much 
useful system-completing doctrine. " 
66 [199013 WIR 8 18 at p. 644EF. 
67 Allott (1990) at p. 178. 
68 Allott (1990) at p. 378. 
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The House of Lords (No. 2) [199111 A. C. 603. 
Lord Bridge, Lord Brandon, Lord Oliver, Lord Goff, Lord Jauncey 
Gravells observes that 
The response of the House of Lords to the ruling of the European Court demonstrate 
an unqualified acceptance of the Community law principles of direct effect and 
supremacy and, in particular, a readiness to comply with the requirements of the 
principle of effective protection as expressed in, or to be inferred from, the ruling of 
the court. This attitude, which was conspicuously absent from the earlier hearing 
before the House of Lords, is most clearly evidenced in the speech of Lord Bridge. 69 
Of the panellists in this hearing, only Lord Bridge really considers the theoretical impact of 
the judgements delivered on the constitutional position of Parliament. Of the other 
judgements delivered, Lord Goff gives the most detailed consideration of the events 
preceding the second judgement of the House of Lords and how they affect the applicants, 
legal position and assesses the applicants' claims in the fight of the decision of the House of 
Lords in American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd., and Lord Jauncey delivers the most 
considered interpretation of the impact of the Court of Justice's answer on the granting of 
interim relief (i. e. how and whether such relief should be granted). 
In a key passage from his judgement Lord Bridge, notes that 
Some public comments on the decision of the European Court of Justice, affirming the 
jurisdiction of the courts of member states to override national legislation if necessary 
to enable interim relief to be granted in protection of rights under Community law, 
have suggested that this was a novel and dangerous invasion by a Community 
institution of the sovereignty of the UK Parliament. 
" Gravells (199 1) at p. 187. 
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He continues to explain that 
--- such comments are 
based on a misconception. If the supremacy within the 
European Community of European law over the national law of member states was 
not always inherent in the E. E. C. Treaty (CMND 5179-H) it was certainly well 
established in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice long before the UK 
joined the Community. Thus, whatever limitation of its sovereignty Parliament 
accepted when it enacted the European Communities Act 1972 was entirely 
voluntary. 
70 
This final sentence is ambiguous. Firstly it implies that there has been a limitation of 
Parliamentary sovereignty as a result of membership of the Communities. However, it then 
iMP'lies that this limitation is, actually, a self-limitation effected through the ECA 1972. This 
brings , the limitation firn-dy within the scope of self-limitation and rekerence . 
71 This in turn 
. perpetuates the questions surrounding repeal of the ECA 1972. This view 
has been described 
as "contractarian"72and clearly relies on the notion that the UK Parliament has agreed to 
some limitations of its sovereign power as a result of its membership of the Communities. 
Craig suggests that the rationale behind this "contractarian" approach is that it denies that the 
courts had to make any political choice, or that they had assumed a political role under the 
"new" Community system of government. 73The idea that the House of Lords wanted to 
avoid making a political decision is one explanation for why it actually referred the case to the 
ECJ in the first place. 74 This interpretation explains the reluctance of the House of Lords to 
involve itself in a theoretical discussion of the relative position of the supremacy of European 
law and the Sovereignty of Parliament. It is similar to the position surrounding the Statute of 
Westminster: a political decision had been made and there was a resultant fundamental change 
'0 199 111 A. C. 603 at p. 658GH-659A. 
71 See Chapter Four above. 72 Craig (199 1). 
73 Craig (1991) at P. 252. 
74 Maher (1994) at p. 226. 
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in the constitutional position/arrangement of the various organs of Governrnent in the UK. 
However, the courts were not willing to examine those political changes in a legal context, 
their practical impact on the actual functioning of the constitution, and the subsequent need 
for change in the legal theory to reflect the "new, " constitutional settlement. Rather, they 
prefer to accept that the practical position may be one thing and the legal position is 
another. 7' 
Lord Bridge continues to state that 
Under the terms of the Act of 1972 it has always been clear that it was the duty of a 
UK court, when delivering final judgement, to override any rule of national law found 
to be in conflict with any directly enforceable rule of Community law. Similarly, when 
decisions of the European Court of Justice have exposed areas of UK statute law 
which failed to implement Council directives, Parliament has always loyally accepted 
this obligation to make appropriate and prompt amendments. Thus there is nothing in 
any way novel in according supremacy to rules of Community law in those areas to 
which they apply and to insist that in the protection of rights under Community law,, 
national courts must not be inhibited by rules of national law from granting interim 
relief in appropriate cases is no more than a logical recognition of that supremacy. 76 
Tlis statement demonstrates a number of points. Lord Bridge, once more, bases his 
observations on the provisions of the ECA 1972, he recognises that Parliament has accepted 
the defacto superiority of Community law through making such amendments as are required A 
by the Community institutions in order to bring UK statute law into line with the terms of 
Community law. He further observes that there is no major change involved in the House of '! * 
Lords judgement in this case and that any rule of national law obstructing the effective 
application of Community law should be disapplied. What he does not emphasise is that the 
75 See Lord Sankey in British Coal Corporation v The King [19351 A. C. 500 above, at p. 242. 
71 [199 111 A. C. 603 at p. 659ABC. 
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rule of national law we are talking about is considered by many to be the fundamental rule 
within the UK legal structure, the so called Grundnorm, and that any change to this rule 
would constitute a major constitutional development. At the same time it is naunreasonable 
to suggest that the decision in R v. Secreta1y of State for Transport ex parte Factortarne 
(hlo. 2)77did no more than give legal recognition to a rule which had already been amended 
through the fact of membership, but which had not been recognised as such. This in turn 
could explain the relatively low profile the Law Lords attributed to the theory of 
Parliamentary sovereignty. They recognised that it was no longer the central tenet of UK law 
and were astute enough not to make an issue out of it and risk the accusation that they had 
usurped the power of Parliament and instituted a radical constitutiopal change with the help 
of the European Communities. Had they been seen to adopt such a stance considerable 
pressure and criticism could have been brought to bear upon them through adverse media 
coverage and attacks from the Euro-sceptic members of the political elite. 
The second House of Lords judgement may well represent 
the clearest indication yet that the British courts accept the full implications of the 
constitutional fundamentals of the Community legal order: and that the British 
constitutional doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty can no longer be relied upon in 
the British courts to frustrate the application of Community law. 's 
However, according to the above interpretation, it would also represent a clear indication that 
the House of Lords is acutely aware of the sensitivity surrounding its constitutional position, 
and the relationship between the courts in general, Parliament and the European Community. 
17 [19911 1 A. C. 603. 
78 Gravells (199 1) at p. 19 1ý. 
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Effects of the Decision %I 
Despite the approach adopted by the House of Lords, the reaction to the ECFs decision was 
sensationalist. Influential broadsheets led with headlines such as "EC 'rewrites' British 
constitution, "79, 'EC given priority over British laws. "80 and "Landmark ruling gives EC, power 
over UK law. "81 Members of Parliament were equally, if not more, 'alarmist'. Tony Marlow 
MP said "This presents the greatest risk to the House of Commons, greater even than Guy 
Fawkes, "82 Richard Shepherd stated "this ruling of the European Court has set aside the 
British constitution as we have understood it for several hundred years. , 93 Teddy Taylor, 
claimed that 
The European Court has taken upon itself the right to declare that an Act of this 
Parliament (the Westminster Parliament] becomes null and 
ýbid if it receives what it 
regards as a justifiable complaint of damage or loss until such time as the Court makes 
a decision. If hon. Members do not think that this is a serious matter, let them 
remember that, until yesterday, no court has ever told this Parliament to suspend or 
nullify the law. 84 
The Independent quoted "an EC law expert" as stating 
It is clearly a fundamental case. It says for the first time that it is a principle of UK law 
as influenced by the European Court that Parliament is not supreme in every 
circumstance; if action by Parliament or by the Government through subordinate 
legislation is contrary to EC law, the UK courts have the power to suspend it. 
That gives the House of Lords a similar function to that of the Supreme Court in the 
United States with the difference that we are applying a system of law, which is 
superior to Parliament. " 
'9 Independent Wednesday 20th June. 
80 Guardian Wednesday 20th June. 
81 Times Wednesday 20th June. 
82 H. C. Deb., Vol. 174,20th June 1990, Col. 936. 
93 H. C. Deb., Vol. 174,20th June 1990, Col. 926. 
84 H. C. Deb.. Vol. 174,20th June 1990, Col. 923. 
85 Michael Hutchings of Lovell White Durrant, Wednesday 20th June 1990, 
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This approach represents what I shall describe as the maximalist interpretation" of the effect 
of the Factortarne decisions. 
Academic support for this view can be found in the comments of Wade and Allott, amongst 
others. Wade maintains that the ECA 1972 constitutes a "legal revolutioif', an Act that is 
vv87 entrenched and has "succeeded in binding its successors. Wade continues that the "old 
rule" of parliamentary sovereignty "must therefore give way, as a matter of necessity, and 
every Act must be read subject to the tacit condition that it takes second place to Community 
law. The only remnant of the old unqualified sovereignty is Parliament's ability to legislate in 
deliberate breach of the Treaty. "88 He also suggests that on reading the various judgements it 
becomes apparent that the Divisional Court exhibited a clearer understanding of the effect of 
the ECA 1972 than did any of the other British courts. 89 
Allott's approach considers the theoretical basis for the decision suggesting that the 
opinion (in Fact'o'rtame of the House of Lords may be the judicial affirmation of a 
fundamental change in the British constitution which must have occurred on I January 
1973. At the level of legal theory, it amounts to a transfer of allegiance by the courts 
from Austin to Hart. 90 
He continues 
In Factortame we can see the House of Lords recognising a new source of law and a 
new hierarchy of rules. And, more important, we can see the House recognising that it 
is doing so and that thereby something fundamental has changed. There is a fleeting 
reference to "Parliament's sovereign will" (at p. 703), but only in relation to the 
'6 Employing the nomenclature applied to Dr Bonham's Case 8 Co. Rep. 107a see Chapter Two above at 
P. 100. 
87 Wade (199 1) at pp. 3-4. 88 Wade (199 1) at p. 3. On the latter point see the comments above at P. 346. 89 Wade (199 1) at p. 2. 90 Allott (1990) at p. 379. 
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situation where the applicants faed to establish their EC law rights after having 
obtained interim relief F_actortame can only mean that the courts now regard the 
question of the sources of law as itself a matter of law to be determined by the courts, 
not as a matter of fact which has been determined by history. 
91 
Wade's reliance on the notion of legal revolution taking place in 1972 has its weaknesses. 
Foremost amongst these is the fact that Parliament is not, according to Wade's earlier 
hypothesis, capable of formulating a legal revolution, that role is reserved to the judiciary. '- 
This is backed up by the House of Lords judgement; Lord Bridge clearly refers to the ECA 
1972 as the source of the curtailed sovereignty of Parliament. 92 Allott's view that the rule 
must have changed in 1972 also implies this idea, and his suggestion that the Hartian 
explanation of legal systems provides the better explanation of the UK constitutional 
structure, accords with Ross's idea. 
Wade says, regarding Lord Bridge's statement, 
The truth is, apparently, that so far from containing 'nothing in any way novel', the 
new doctrine makes sovereignty a freely adjustable commodity whenever parliament 
chooses to accept some limitation. The effect may be similar to implying limitations 
into future statutes, as Lord Bridge himself explains. But voluntary acceptance goes 
much deeper into the foundations of the constitution, suggesting by its very novelty 
that the courts are reformulating the fundamental rules about the effectiveness of Acts 
of Parliament. " 
At the other end of the spectrum is what I shall call the minimalist view: that the Court of 
Justice and House of Lords decisions impose no changes on the doctrine of the Sovereignty 
of Parliament. This view is represented in the academic arena by commentators such as Toth 
who asserts 
91 Allott (1990) at P. 380. 
92 See pp. 376-377 above. 
93 Wade (1996) at p. 573. 
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Given the fact that both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords recognised that 
by virtue of Sections 2(1) and 2(4) of the European Community Act 1972 rights 
derived by individuals from Community law should prevail over contrary provisions of 
an Act of Parliament and the courts already had the necessary power t6"give effect to 
these rights it is clear that the Factortame decisions did nothing to increase the powers 
of the courts at the expense of the sovereignty of Parliament. There is no logic in the 
argument that the power temporarily to suspend the operation of an Act of 
Parliament, now confirmed, is larger or more extensive than the power definitively to 
disapply an Act of Parliament, which has existed since 1973. There is equally no 
convincing force in saying that the decisions of the European Court establishing the 
principle of the Supremacy of Community law, in general, or the Factortame decision 
applying that principle to a given situation, in particular, have, the effect of impairing 
or even overriding the sovereignty (or supremacy) of Parliament, whatever the 18th 
and 19th century conce , pt may mean in modem, end-of-the-20th-century 
circumstances. 
94 
Having referred to Sections 2(1) and 2(4) and. 33 (1) of the ECA, 1972 Toth explains why there 
has been no change to the doctrine of the Sovereignty of Parliament. He states 
when a court in the UK sets aside an Act of Parliament, whether temporarily or 
definitively, which is incompatible with Community law, acting in accordance with the 
rulings of the European Court, then far from placing itself above Parliament, such a 
court merely obeys a "command" given to it by Parliament itself which "command" 
continues to bind the courts as long as the 1972 Act remains in force). " 
This view finds support in the House of Lords' judgement, with its emphasis on the ECA 
1972, but it is inconsistent with the statements, that the constitutional structure of the UK has 
undergone change as a result of membership, made by the Divisional Court. " It does not 
take sufficient account of the Court of Justice's reliance on its prior case law, particularly the 
judgement delivered in Simmenthal SpA v. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato (No. 2), 
94 Toth (1990) at pp. 584-585 
95 Toth (1990) at p. 585. 96 See above at pp. 353-354 and'pp. 356-357. 
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and the theoretical basis for this case law: that European law is Sui generis, that its 
independent nature and its simple existence are responsible for its supremacy and that 
obedience to European law stems not from national law, but from the nature of European law 
itself 
The decision in R v. Secretaly of State for Transport ex parte Factortame (Eo. 2) represented 'I 
I 
the most significant, institutionally accepted, change to the constitutional structure of the UY, 
and contrary to Lord Donaldson M. P, and Toth, it does represent a departure from 
traditional parliamentary sovereignty. Its true significance will not be known for some time - 
until it is interpreted by subsequent cases - although provisional indication is that it will herald 
some fundamental changes. One decision already referring to R v. Secret of State-for 
Transport ex parte Factortame (hlo. 2) is R. v. Secretary of State for Employment. ex-parte 
Egual Opportunities Commission . 
97 This case is significant in a number of areas, for example 
equal pay and discrimination law, other than constitutional, law. 98 The constitutional law 
question was whether the courts could use "judicial review to attack primary legislation on 
the grounds of its incompatibility . yith European Community law. ""' The House of Lords 
followed R v. Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factortame (hio. 2) and effectively' 
disapplied primary legislation thus demonstrating the fundamental 'nature of the supremacy of 
Community law. "' This case may appear radical and unconstitutional to those who were not 
aware of the Factortame litigation. However, as Napier notes, once the authority of Rv. 
Secretajy of State for Transport ex parte Factortarne (No. 2) is accepted the decision cannot 
97 [199412 W. L. P, 409. 
98 Mclean (1994). 
99 Napier (1994) at p. 396. 
100 Wooldridge (1994) at p. 18 1. 
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be in doubt. "' R v. Secretarv of State for Emoloment. ex narte Eaual Oovortunitie 
Commission goes further than R v. Secretary-of State for Transport ex parte Factortame 
No. 2). In the former, unlike the latter, the House of Lords was asked to consider if primary 
legislation was objectively justified, 102 this question moves the constitutional position of the 
courts towards one of a merits court and protector of fundamental rights. However, although 
The House of Lords, in a bold decision, granted a declaration to the effect that 
national law was incompatible with Community law. [They] did not go so far as to 
rule that the English provisions were void, rather, the House confined its ruling to the 
compatibility issue - thus avoiding any potential conflict with Parliament and the 
concept of sovereignty. 103 
1 01 Napier (1994) at p. 396. 1" Wooldridge (1994) at p. 18 1. 103 Bamett (1998) at p. 345. 
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Comprehensive Programme of Constitutional Reform: Impact on Parliament 
Sovereignty 
Introduction 
The Labour Governments "comprehensive programme of constitutional reforrrý' 104 is likely to 
furthýr alter the role of the courts. This programme includes a number of proposals that will, 
potentially, affect the notion of Parliamentary sovereignty. This includes, particularly, the 
devolution of power to Scotland, and the incorporation of the European Convention of 
Human Rights (Convention) into domestic UK law. 
There is a great deal of potential for changes in the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. 
The degree of change wiU not be certain for some years yet - we win need to see how the 
courts approach the legislation instituting the changes. I shall consider the proposals and 
potential for change in the nature of sovereignty for the Human Rights and Scotland Acts 'in 
tum. 
Human Rights Act 
Within their Election Manifesto for the 1997 General Election, the Labour party asserted that 
Citizens should have statutory rights in the UK courts. We will by statute incorporate 
the European Convention on Human Rights into UK law to bring these rights home 
.ýI and allow our people access to them in their national courts. The incorporation of the 
European Convention will establish'a floor, not a ceiling, for human rights, Parliament 
will remain free to enhance those rights. "5 
By means of fulfilling this pledge the Labour party published a White Paper outlining a 
Human Rights Act, and introduced a Bill into the House of Lords. The White Paper 
identified Parliamentary sovereignty as an issue. The matter was fiercely debated in the 
10' See the Preface to CMN 3782, at p. 1. 
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House of Lords. The views expressed demonstrate a number of points made previously. One 
of the clearest is that ihe'Govemment is happy to introduce legislation that may profoundly 
affect the constitutional relationships between the organs of government, and yet insists that 
r. 
there will be no abridgeffient of, or change in, the sovereignty of Parliament. The willingness 
of the Goverment to effectively institute a profound change in the relationship between the 
role of the judiciary and that of Parliament, and do so through artifice, in order to ensure that 
the traditional doctrine of Parliament sovereignty is seen to be maintained, appears confusing. 
Despite the introduction of the ministerial declaration that subsequent legislation does not 
breach any of the Rights laid down in the Convention, which arguably changes the manner of 
the parliamentary process by which legislation is enacted, there is ng consideration of the 
manner and form theory. The reason for this omission may be similar to the reasons behind 
the statements made during the process of accession to the European Communities, the 
Government wanted to play-dow'n the likely constitutional impact of the reforms. There was a 
need to counter the fears possessed by many, including the previous Lord Chancellor, 106 that 
the incorporation of the Convention anddevolution of power would *result in politicisation of 
the judiciary, undermining of Parliament's governmental position, and that there would be an 
accompanying transfer of power to the executive arm of government. 
t For these reasons it is important to consider the provisions of the Bill, and the explanation of 
ihose 'Provisions, as provided in the White Paper and the Parliamentary debates. 
105 "new Labour because Britain deserves better", at p. 35. 106 For a comment on Lord Mackay's views on the incorporation of the convention see Kentridge (1997) at 
p. 96. 
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White Paper RIGHTS BROUGHT HOME: YEIE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT CM 3782 
The first Chapter of the White Paper lists the Case for legislative incorporation of the 
Convention into UK law. It states the impact of. 
non-incorp oration on the British people is a very practical one. The rights, originally 
developed with major help from the UK Government, are no longer actually seen as 
British rights. And enforcing them takes too long and costs too much. ... Bringing 
these rights home will mean that the British people will be able to argue for their 
rights in the British courts - without inordinate delay and cost. It will also mean that 
the rights will be brought much more fully into the jurisprudence of the courts 
throughout the UK, and their interpretation will be far more subtly and powerfully 
woven into our own law... 107 
This paragraph lays down that the nature of the Rights bestowed by. the Convention is to 
change: they are to be enforceable in the UK courts, by TJK judges. 
Incorporation of the Convention has, in the past, been opposed on the grounds that the 
positive granting of such rights was unnecessary as they were already protected by the 
Common law. The current willingness to accept incorporation acýnowledges that 
circumstances change and that the traditional protection may no longer be appropriate to a, - 
modem and "civilised" society. This represents another example of legal development, this 
time regressive: rights once deemed inherent within the 'constitution' of the UK are not as 
efficacious as they once were. There is a perceived need for the reinforcement of these 
traditional rights. The most effective means of reinforcing these rights is deemed to be the 
issuing of positive rights rather than reaffirmation of the implied rights inherent within the 
existing UK system. The significance of this proposal, as far as this thesis is concerned,, lies in 
the question: whether the incorporation will affect the relationship between the judiciary and 
107 CM 3782, at p. 6, para 1.14. 
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Parliament, and whether this will involve an express abridgement of, or change in, the 
doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty. 
This question centres on the process by which a court may enforce a right vested by the new 
Human Rights Aci, that the court deems incompatible with subsequent Parliamentary 
legislation, either primary or secondary. If the courts were vested with the authority to "cast 
down" the inconsistent legislation a major change in the relationship between the two organs 
would have occurred. The continued applicability of the doctrine of Parliamentary 
sovereignty, as the foundation of our constitution, would be openly questionable. However, if 
the courts were not vested with the power to "cast down" Parliameptary legislation that 
proved incompatible with the rights vested by the Human Rights Act, then the principles 
underlying the Convention and the rationale behind their incorporation into British law would 
be undermined and pointless. 
The mechanism by which the Goverment proposes to resolve this issue has been described 
as brilliant'" and ingenious. "9 Apparently it reconciles the notion of parliamentary 
sovereignty with effective judicial protection of rights through the use of a relatively simple 
procedure. The White Paper states 
If the courts decide in any case that it is impossible to interpret an Act of Parliament in 
a way which is compatible with the Convention, the Bill enables a formal declaration 
to be made that its provisions are incompatible with the Convention. A declaration of 
incompatibility will be an important statement to make, and the power to make it will 
be reserved to the higher courts. They will be able to make a declaration in any 
108 Per Lord Borrie, H. L. Deb., Vol. 582,3rd November 1997. Col. 1275. 
109 Per Lord Windlesham, H. L. Deb. Vol. 582,3rd November 1997, Col. 1282, and Baroness Williams of 
Crosby, H. L. Deb.. Vol. 582,3 rd November 1997, Col. 1300. 
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proceedings before them... The Government will have the right to intervene in any 
proceedings'where a declaration is a possible outcome. 
"O 
Such a declaration will not, of itself, change the law, "but it will almost certainly prompt the 
Government and Parliament to change the law. ""' This process denies the courts the power 
to set aside primary legislation, reserving that power to the Government and Parliament. The 
White Paper explains 
I 
I t 
The Government has reached the conclusion that courts should not have the power to 
set aside primary legislation, past or future, on grounds of incompatibility with the 
convention. This conclusion arises from the importance which the, Government 
attaches to Parliamentary sovereignty. In this context, Parliamentary sovereignty 
means that Parliament is competent to make any law on any matter of its choosing and 
no court may question the validity of any Act that it passes. In enacting legislation, 
Parliament is making decisions about important matters of public policy. The authority 
to make those decisions derives from a democratic mandate. Members of Parliament 
in the House of Commons possess such a mandate because they are elected, 
accountable and representative. To make provision in the Bill for the courts to set 
aside Acts of Parliament would confer on the judiciary a general power over decisions 
of Parliament which under our present constitutional arrangements they do not 
possess, and would be likely on occasions to draw the judiciary into serious conflict 
with Parliament. 112 
This paragraph refers to other concerns over the incorporation of the Convention; that such a 
course of action would inevitably politicise the judiciary, and that the judiciary are not the 
best people to decide what rights should be conferred upon the populace as they are 
unelected and unrepresentative. Again the proposals put forward in the White Paper address 
these concerns. They reserve the power to legislate to Parliament and the Government and 
I 
are designed to protect the judiciary from accusations of politicisation. The White Paper 
110 CM 3782, at p. 9, para. 2.9. 
111 CM 3782, at p. 9, para. 2.10. 
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explicitly refers to the doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty, to one of its underlying 
principles: entrenchment. The White Paper says 
On one view, human rights legislation is so important'that it should be ýiven added 
protection from sýbsequent amendment or repeal. The Constitution of the United 
States of America, for example, guarantees rights which can be amended or repealed 
only by securing qualified majorities in the House of Representatives and the Senate, 
and among the States themselves. But an arrangement of this kind could not be 
reconciled with our constitutional traditions, which allow any Act of Parliament to be 
amended or repealed by a subsequent Act of Parliament. We do not believe that it is 
necessary or would be desirable to attempt to devise such a special arrangement for 
this Bill. 113 
Interestingly this Paragraph does not make any reference to the theoretical impossibility of 
such action that theorists such as Austin and Dicey have relied upon 114 
There can be no doubt that incorporation of the Convention will affect how Acts of 
Parliament are interpreted and applied, "' allowing for subsequent Acts of Parliament 
to be interpreted as far as possible so as to be compatible with the Convention (a 
-stance which] goes far beyond the present rules which enables the courts to take the 
Convention into account in resolving any ambiguity in a legislative provision. The 
Courts will be required to interpret legislation so as to uphold the Convention rights 
unless the legislation itself is so clearly incompatible with the Convention that it is 
impossible to do So. 116 
This final sentence allows for the possibility of express repeal, or legislation that is intended to 
be incompatible with the Convention rights, but which should prevail. However, the most 
, significant change affecting subsequent 
legislation is that 
1 "-' CM 3782, at p. 10, para. 2.13. 113 CM 3782, at p. 11, para. 2.16. 
See'Chapter Three above. 
CM 3782, at p. 11, para 2.17. 116 CM 3782, at p. 9, pam. 2.7. 
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The Bill provides for a fast-track procedure for changing legislation in response either 
to a declaration of incompatibility by our own higher courts or to a finding of a 
violation of the Convention in Strasbourg. The appropriate Government Minister will 
be able to amend the Legislation by Order so as to make it compatible with the 
Convention. The Order will be subject to approval by both Houses of Parliament 
before taking effect, except where the need to amend the legislation is particularly 
urgent, where the Order will take effect immediately but Vill expire after a short 
period if not approved by Parliament. 117 
The traditional position of the judiciary is maintained through the clever use of the declaration 
process - they are not involved in the amendment or disapplication of legislation - however 
the relationship between the executive and Parliament has changed. The executive wiU be 
vested with the power to amend primary legislation through the usý-of secondary legislation', 
albeit utilising the positive resolution procedure. The White Paper recognises this fact, but: ý. ýý 
cites the existence of similar powers by way ofiustification, an argument echoed in the House 
of Lords debate. It then states that Ministers will only use these powers where absolutely 
necessary, that the power is circumvented by the necessity for compliance with Convention 
rights: that there will be no "carte blanche to amend unrelated parts of the Act in which the 
breach is discovered. " 118 There were still anxious voices, as well as strident opposition, 
regarding this aspect of the Bill, in the House of Lords debate. 
Parliamentary Debate on the Human Rights Act - House of Lords 
A Bill designed to introduce the procedures outlined in the White Paper was introduced in the 
House of Lords. It provoked heated debates, in the course of which many of the issues 
outlined above were addressed by both proponents and opponents of the Bill. There were a 
1" CM 3782, at p. 11, para. 2.19. 
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number of assurances to the House that the traditional constitutional positions of the judiciary 
and Parliament were not to be altered by anything included within the Bill. In a lengthy but 
key statement the Lord Chancellor, Lord Irvine, countering the major criticisril levelled 
against incorporation of the Convention, said "We are not ceding new powers to Europe. The 
UK already accepts that Strasbourg rulings bind. Next, the Bill is carefully drafted and 
designed to respect our traditional understanding of. the separation of powers. "119 Lord Irvine 
continues to assert that the Bill "maximises the protection of human rights without 
trespassing on parliamentary sovereignty. " 120 
This view is echoed by Lord Lester who claims that the Bill 
involves no challenge to the English dogma of absolute parliamentary sovereignty. 
Rather its enactment involves the much needed exercise of parliamentary sovereignty, 
giving our courts proper authority to perform their duty of interpreting and applying 
common law and statute law in accordance with the UK's international obligations 
under the convention. True to the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, as the noble 
and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor said, the courts must defer to existing and 
future Acts of Parliament if it is impossible to read and give effect to them in a way 
which is compatible with the convention. '21 
The senior judiciary, past and present, were actively involved in this debate and their 
interpretation of the impact of the Bilý, mirrors that outlined above. Lord Bingham stated 
I am aware of a number of objections in principle to incorporation. The first is that it 
involves, so it is said, a major transfer of power from Parliament to the judiciary. 
WMe I respect those who advance that argument, it is not one I accept. The mode of 
incorporation does not empower judges, as the noble and learned Lord the Lord 
118, CM3782, at p. 11, para. 2.19. 119 H. L. Deb. Vol. 582,3 rd November 1997. Col. 1228. "'0 H. L. Deb., Vol. 582,3 rd November 1997, Col. 1229. 121 H. L. Deb., Vol. 582,3 rd November 1997. Col. 123 9. 
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Chancellor made clear, to overrule, set aside, disapply, or - if one wants to be even_, 
more dramatic - strike down Acts of Parliament. That 
is a power which throughout 
the recent debates the judges have made clear they do not seek. The mode of 
incorporation adopted is that which most fully respects the sovereignty-of Parliament. 
Following incorporation, nothing will be decided by judges. The difference is that 
British judges will in the first instance have an opportunity to provide a solution. 
22 
Lord Scarman said "the Bill has stood up for parliamentary sovereignty. " 123 The only 
dissenting judicial voice is that of Lord McCluskey who states: "By incorporating into our 
domestic law vague, imprecise and high sounding statements of legal rights, we have moved 
what is truly legislative power away from a democratic and accountable Parliament to an 
appointed, unelected and unaccountable judiciary. " 
124 He continues to state: 
We should not run away from the fact that this (Bill empow6rs] judicial legislation. of 
course the judges will not possess quite the same power as they do in the United 
States or in other places, but the effect will be exactly the same. ... 
it is made 
abundantly plain (in the White Paper] that in almost every case - and I know of no 
exception - Parliament will at once move to bring the law into line with what judges 
say the convention says it i S. 125 
Lord Renton addresses this question of judge-made law by reminding the House that 
Ourjudges have been making new law since the beginning of time. Indeed, our 
common law is mainly judge-made law; and our modem, recent statutes often require 
difficult judicial interpretation either because they are ambiguous or sometimes 
because they have conflicting provisions. But the important point is that Parliament 
always has the last word. Parliament often has to amend, and over the years has 
amended, judge-made law. So there is nothing new about that; it goes on all the 
time. 126 
Lord Waddington acknowledged that the judiciary had always made law, but asserted that 
122 H. L. Deb.. Vol. 3 82,3 rd November 1997, Col. 1246. 
123 H. L. Deb., Vol. 582,3 rd November 1997. Col. 1256. 
124 H. L. Deb., Vol. 5 82,3 rd November 1997, Col. 1266. 
125 H. L. Deb., Vol. 582,3 rd November 1997, Col. 1267. 
126 H. L. Deb., Vol. 582.3rd November1997, Col. 1299. 
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I 
when we ask the judges to get to work on some of the vague and imprecise concepts 
in the convention,,.... when we give the judges the opportunity to put whatever 
construction they like on these concepts, we will be giving an immense new impetus 
to the judges' law-making power, for good or ill. Furthermore we will be doing so at 
a time when the judges have not exactly been backward in coming forward, having in 
any event been demonstrating an increasing e. nthusiasm to make new laws, particularly 
new laws to fetter the Executive. 127 
Equally the'view that incorporation would unnecessarily politicise the judiciary 128 received an 
unequivocal answer: there would be no politicisation of the judiciary above the existing level. 
Lord Donaldson, a late convert to the side of incorporation, astutely acknowledged that 
It is an occupational hazard for a judge to be accused of reaching a political decision. 
Those who have worked in the field of judicial review know perfectly well that, 
whichever way they decide a matter, they will be accused of: playing politics. Ii may be 
wrapped up a little but, essentially that is what is at stake. '29 
In an express answer to Lord Mayhew, Earl Russell stated 
Judges have always had to make political choices. If the noble and learned Lord would 
read Rex v Hampden (the ship-money case) he will see that that was inevitably a 
political judgement whichever way it went. That is an inevitable f esult of judges being 
empowered to ensure that the Executive governs according to law. It is tough on the 
judges, but I do not think that we should propose giving it up. I do not see that it will 
become more the case as a result of the Bill than it was before. It is merely going to be 
rather more in the open and rather more recognisable. I do not regard that as an 
evil. 
130 
These observations once again centre on the meaning of political. Lord Mayhew appeared to 
equate it with partial; 01 it is, of course, central to any legal system that the judiciary should 
be, and should be seen to be, impartial. However, this is not the same as being political. It is 
H. L. Deb., Vol. 482.3rd November 1997, Col. 1253-1254. 
121 See the speeches of Lord McCluskey H. L. Deb., Vol. 582,3 rd November 1997, at Cols. 1266-1267 and Lord 
Mayhew, at Col. 1260. 
"'9 H. L. Deb. Vol. 582,3rd November 1997, Col. 1292. 
130 H. L. Deb., Vol. 582,3 rd November 1997, Col. 1297. 
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possible for the judiciary to be party political again this should be avoided; however, in the 
sense that they are an important element in the constitutional and governmental structure of 
the UK the judiciary do possess a political function. Lord Mackay asserted 
Incorporation of the European Convention or a Bill of Rights as the yardstick by 
which Acts of Parliament are to be measured would inevitably draw judges into 
making decisions of a far more political nature, measuring policy against abstract 
principles with possible implications for the development of broad social and 
economic policy... "2 
The question is now centred on how involved the judiciary should become in the political 
process. This question will only be answerable after we have reviewed how they accept tWs 
new role, and will be partially detern-dried by our ideological standpoint. 
Human Rights, The Court and the Future 
Lord Irvine, extra-judicially, acknowledges that the traditional basis forjudicial review of 
executive actions has been predominantly based upon the notion of reasonableness found in 
the Associated Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation 133 judgement. He further 
accepts that in cases concerning the Convention this will change. A "more rigorous scrutiny 
[of actions] than traditional judicial review will be required" in cases concerning Convention 
rights. 134 He continues to question whether "the courts will restrict their review to a narrow 
Wednesbu approach in non-Convention cases, if used to inquiring more deeply in 
Convention cases? " 135 In a similar way that European law has affected the working patterris 
of the domestic UK judiciary, so incorporation of the Convention wifl affect these same 
131 H. L. Deb., Vol. 582,3rd November 1997, Col. 1261. 
132 Cited in Kentridge (1997) at p. 106. 
133 [194811 K. B. 223. 
134 Irvine (1998) at p. 234. 
135 Irvine (1998) at p. 234. 
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patterns. 136 It is a widely held view that the Wednesburv principle Lord Irvine talks about, 
was under going metamorphosis prior to the Human Rights Act, the decisions in such cases 
as C. S. S. U. v, Minister for CM Service (G. C. H. Q. )137 and R v. Secretaly of State for the 
Home Department ex parte Brind. 
138 
are cited as evidence of this change, the question has 
come to be how will the Human Rights Act affect this change, and how quickly will such 
changes OCCUr? 
139 
Throughout the parliamentary debate on incorporation of the Human Rights Act there are 
oblique references to the effects of the ECA 1972, and I feel that the parliamentary events 
surrounding the Human Rights Act are similar to those that surrounded the European 
Communities Bill in 1972. During the progress towards membership of the Communities 
White Papers declared that there would be no change to the doctrine of Parliamentary 
sovereignty, NEnisters also made it explicitly clear to Parliament that there would be no 
abridgement of that doctrine. Today the situation is widely accepted to be different. 
Following the events outlined in the preceding sections of this Chapter and those outlined in 
Chapter Five, Parliament's sovereignty has been altered, albeit in prescribed areas and 
situations. It is possible that "conventions" will arise and case law will evolve making 
goverrunental or parliamentary refusal to implement changes in line with a declaratory 
judgement a matter for constitutional review; there are complex questions surrounding this 
issue, not least that of remedies. 140 It is also possible that the judicial function will evolve in 
such a way that they will grant interim relief, in the form of suspension of legislation, to a 
136 rvine (1998) at p. 234. 
137 [19851 A. C. 374. 
1 311 [199111 A. C. 696. 
139 Laws (1998) 
* 1 40 Irvine (1998) at p. 230. 
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claimant pending parliamentary action to rectify the situation, protecting rights as they 
did. in 
R v. the Secretajy of State for Transport ex parte Factortame. 
Incorporation of the Convention will result in changes in the judicial function and the maimer 
I 
of adjudication; increased emphasis will be placed on substance and not form, driving forward 
the move from literal to purposive interpretation. 141 This movement does, itself, imply a rnove 
away from the Dicean notion of sovereignty and takes note of the questions raised by Pollock 
et al: What is Parliament? And how do you determine its will? The outcome of the whole 
debate is that in order to determine the exact impact of the Human Rights Act we need to 
wait for future interpretation, judicial and political, of the effects of the Human Rights Act. It 
may be a long time before we can state authoritatively what the practical constitutional impact 
of this legislation will be. 
Within the field of theory, and the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty in particular, it is 
easier to make certain observations. The notion of an enforceable body of international 
human rights is wholly inconsistent with Austin's notion of sovereignty, no individual could 
receive protection under international law, for national law could always supersede it. Indeed 
Lord Irvine suggests, "the acceptance by lawyers [of Austin's notion ofl state sovereignty a 
did much to hold back the development of international norms of human rightS. 12142The point, 
implicit in this statement, is that the situation has changed and we no longer advocate an 
Austinian doctrine of sovereignty, this reinforces Allott's view 143 that there is an institutional 
acceptance that Austin's theory is inappropriate to modem government. It also accepts that 
reliance on Austinian theory has hampered constitutional development through not allowing 
141 Lord Diplock noted that this trend was evident from a consideration of House of Lords decisions back irl 
1975: Carter v. Bradbeer 119751 1 W. L. R- 1204, at pp. 1206-1207. 
142 Lord Irvine (1998) at p. 222. 
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for international law rights that are enforceable over the provisions of national law. This view 
could be extended to cover the European Communities. The enactment of the Human Rights 
Act marks an abandonment of Dicey's notion of negative rights - the citizenry pf the UK is 
free to do anything the law does not prohibit. It may also lend credence to the manner and 
form arguments. There is a requirement within the Act that relevant Nfinisters will have to 
make a declaration of compatibility when new legislation is introduced to the House. This 
procedure could profoundly affect the judicial attitude, to the legislation and may enable them 
to interpret the legislation as conforming to the Convention, even if the primafacie meaning 
of the language is inconsistent with this approach. This marks a very clear movement towards 
purposive interpretation. The effect of not making a statement is yet to be judicially 
determined, but it certainly does introduce a new form of legislation: if any subsequent 
government wanted to repeal the Human Rights Act it is almost certain that they would have 
to ensure.. that the Nfinister made such a declaration to Parliament before it would be 
considered to be effective. '" 
I should like to conclude this section with three quotations; one from Lord Borrie who, whilst 
supporting the Bill, expressed certain concerns including the following: if the fast-track 
procedure 
works as seems to be intended by the Bill, the political reality will be that, while 
historically the courts have sought to carry out the will of Parliament, in the field of 
human rights Parliament will carry out the will of the courts. I realise that the Bill does 
not say that NEnisters must follow the fast-track procedure if the High Court has 
declared that a statute contravenes the convention; it does not say that Parliament, 
through its two Houses, must pass the affirmative resolution put before it; but the 
1 43 See Chapter Seven, below at p. 433. 144 See Chapter Four, above at pp. 259-260 for a discussion on why this new form of legislation is significant. 
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intention of the Bill surely is that government and Parliament will faithfully implernent 
any declaratory judgement made by the IEgh Court. I quote from paragraph 2.10 of 
the White Paper: 
'A declaration ... will almost certainly prompt the 
Government and Parliament to 
change the law. ' 145 
Secondly, Lord Irvine, who in a 1996 Article, cited by Lords Waddington, 146 and Henley., 147 
wrote "Incorporation will involve a very significant transfer of power to the judges. vi 149 
Finally, from Sydney Kentridge (from a pre-incorporation article) - this quotation appear-ed 
after a consideration of incorporation along the fine of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, which employed the "notwithstanding" clause to reserve ultimate power to the 
Canadian Goverment - who states: 
Needless to say, even if a "notwithstanding" provision were to be inserted in the 
legislation incorporating the Convention, it would be a fiction to say that the 
sovereignty of Parliament would remain unimpaired, just as it is a fiction to say that 
section 2 of the European Communities Act does not amount to an impairment of 
Parliamentary sovereignty, albeit a revocable one. 149 
This all seems to support Ross's 'solution' to the problem of reflexive basic norms. "0 
145 H. L. Deb., Vol. 582,3 rd November 1997, Col. 1275. 146 
H. L. Deb., Vol. 582,3 rd November 1997, Col. 1253. 147 H. L. Deb., Vol. 582,3 rd November 1997, Col. 1306. 149 
Irvine (1996). 
149Kentridge (1997) at p. 104. 
'50 See Chapter Four, above at p. 24 1. 
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Scotland's Parliament 
Devolution of power to Scotland has been a central tenet of Labour Party policy since the 
ýniddle of the 1970s. The desire for devolution of power within Scotland has b-een growing 
over the past decades and with the result of the referendum being overwhelmingly in favour 
of a Scottish Parliament with tax raising powers, the Government was under a manifesto 
pledge to institute the relevant constitutional reforms. This they have done through the 
introduction of the Scotland Act. Under the provisions of this Act a Scottish Parliament will 
be established, and the Westminster Parliament will "devolve wide ranging legislative powers 
to the Scottish Parliament". Under the ensuing constitutional arrangement "Scotland will 
remain an integral part of the UK', and "the Queen will continue t6. be Head of State of the 
United Kingdom. "'s' Significantly the White Paper that preceded the Act asserted that: 
The UK Parliament is and will remain sovereign in all matters: but as part of the 
Government's resolve to modernise the British constitution Westn-ýinster will be 
choosing to exercise that sovereignty by devolving legislative responsibilities to a 
,,, 
Scottish Parliament without in any way diminishing its own powers. 152 
This statement clearly reaffirms the traditional doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. It 
rationalises the exercise of power by the Scottish Parliament through the notion that the 
Westminster Parliament is thefons et origo of that, power and the Scottish Parliament 
continues to exercise the power at the Westminster Parliament's pleasure. The White Paper 
continues to state: "The Government recognises that no UK Parliament can bind its 
successors. The Government however believes that the popular support for the Scottish 
Parliament, once established, will make sure its future in the UK constitution will be 
'51 CM 3658, at p. 12, para 4.2. 152 CM 3658, at p. 12. para 4.2. 
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secure. 99153 Again this constitutes a reaffirmation of a traditional tenet of English 
constitutional theory: the only limitation on Parliament's power is that fact that it cannot 
impose any limitation on its successors. The concluding clause, however, suggests that this 
theoretical impossibility is subject to political limitation. The implication is that through the 
passage of time the expectations of the populace will be such that no government would be 
practically inclined to repeal the legislation for fear of the political reaction. Because of this 
the Act would be safe from repeal in a similar way to the Statute of Westminster. It would be; ý, 
theoretically possible for the Government to enact repealing legislation, but it is questionable 
whether the political populace of Scotland would pay heed to such legislation, just as the 
political populace of the Dominions would not have paid heed to a ýepeal of the Statute of 
Westminster or the Rhodesian courts a decision of the British judiciary after U. D. I. 154 As 
Lord Denning noted a freedom once given cannot be taken away. 155 If this process occurs, 
The Scotland Act would be similar to Bodin's Salic law. '56 
We must be careful in drawing analogies between the Statute of Westminster and the 
Scotland Act. There are substantial differences between the political situations pertaining to 
the enactment of the two pieces of legislation. The Statute of Westminster was enacted, in 
reality, to give legal effect to an existing political settlement and the Scotland Act is being 
enacted to give political and legal effect to a future political settlement. The one reflected the 
reality, the other is a catalyst for changes to the reality. 
153 CM 3658, p. 12, para. 4.2. 
154 See Chapter Four, above at p. 275 et seq. 
155 See Chapter Five, above at pp. 3 19-320. 
" See Chapter Two, above at pp. 73-74. 
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The White Paper, rather than delimiting the powers which are to be devolved through 
explicitly listing them, lists those powers that are to be reserved to the Union Parliament. This 
provides certainty in some ways, those powers explicitly reserved will be uncontentious, 
however there may arise questions as to where competence ties in some more marginal cases, 
this will involve adjudication. The provisions of the Scotland Act make it clear that the courts 
will act as arbiter, although often acting in the form of the Privy Council, and this matter 
formed the basis of much parliamentary debate/comment on the Bill. 
Before considering specific aspects of the Parliamentary debate, one further point is worth 
making. The process by which the Bill was introduced included a pýecursory referendum. 
Within the Bill there is a provision enabling another referendum prior to any consideration of 
separation from the Union. There is an implication that, were any subsequent Parliament to 
attempt to repeal the Scotland Act, there would be a requirement for a referendum as a stage 
in the process of repeal. Questioning whether such a requirement would be judicially 
enforceable is speculative for there is no requirement, within the provisions of the Scotland 
Act itself, for such a referendum. However the nature of the sovereign has, arguably, been 
altered by devolution - albeit at the behest of the sovereign - and according to the Dixon line 
of reasoning, as well as that of T. R. S. Allan's' and Sir John Laws, 158 the nature of the 
sovereign and its legislative processes can be altered by implication and the demands of the 
democratic process by which the Scotland Act (and the ECA 1972) were enacted. This view 
is enforced by the judiciary being vested with the responsibility for protecting the new 
constitutional settlement, as well as adjudicating on questions of vires. If this is so then the 
judiciary may feet justified in insisting that the process for dissolving the Scottish Parliament 
151 See Chapter Seven, below at pp. 425-427. 
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would necessarily incorporate the same steps as that which created it. Speculative as it may 
11 
be, this is an interesting idea for it outlines a new legislative process for amending aspects of 
the constitutional settlement, a type of manner and form requirement, and an idea that 
accords with Ross's model of changing the basic norm. 139 A large number of countries 
already employ a different system for reform of the constitution than that which is employed 
161. in reform of other "normal" legislation , it 
is also worth recalling the dictum of Dixon 
regarding the constitutional standing of referenda. 161 These points were not considered 
during the course of the parliamentary debate and remain speculative. 
Parliamentary Debate 
One of the surprising aspects of the parliamentary debates is the relative lack of debate cin the 
issue of sovereignty. More consideration was given to the issues of the Block Grant and the 
West Lothian question. This is strange when the following statement is considered: 
The role of the Scottish Parliament will be to make laws in relation to devolved 
matters in Scotland. In these devolved areas, it will be able, by virtue of the devolution 
legislation, to amend or repeal existing Acts of the UK Parliament and to pass new 
legislation of its own in relation to devolved matters. 162 
There can be little doubt that this involves an abrogation of Parliamentary sovereignty. 
Although the power is technically vested by an expression of the Westminster Parliament, s 
will, the reality is that a power to amend primary legislation, correctly enacted, is being vested 
in a body theoretically subordinate to the Union Parliament. In this way there is a similarity 
between the effect of the Statute of Westminster and the Scotland Act. ' The Dominion 
158 See Chapter One, above at pp. 26-28. 
159 See Chapter Four, above at p. 241 and 220. 
160 The most obvious example being the United States of America and the provisions laid down in Articlev of their Constitution. 
I 
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Parliaments were vested with the power to amend, repeal Or disregard Imperial legislation - 
provisions of the Colonial Laws Vafidity Act were repealed as regards the legislatures in the 
Dominions. A similar power is vested in the Scottish Parliament, with the undeFtaking that the 
Westminster Parliament can always, theoretically, effect any changes it wishes. It is possible 
that this power may be more theoretical than politically viable. 
Sovereignty and the Parliamentary Debate 
Within the Parliamentary debates one of the questions relating to sovereignty was where it 
would be located after the enactment of the Bill. In the House of Commons NEchael Ancram 
NP noted that 
For all the Prime Minister's protestations ... about sovereignty remaining with 
him 'as 
an English NP at Westminster' and a somewhat half-hearted. reassertion in the Bill at 
clause 27(7) of the power of the Parliament of the UK to legislate for Scotland, the 
long term position of the Westminster parliament and its members is far from clear. 163 
He continued to demand the position of the Westminster Parliament 
be robustly clarified by a firm statutory affirmation that, notwithstanding the 
establishment of the Scottish Parliament or anything in the Bill, the supreme authority 
of the TJK wiU remain unaffected and undiminished over all persons and things in 
Scotland. 164 
Closing the debate for the Government, Sam Galbraith NP, the Under Secretary of State for 
Scotland, stated 
I must ... tackle the question of sovereignty, about which the right hon. Member for 
Devizes (Ancram) and the Hon Member for Banff and Buchan (Mr. Salmond) had 
opposing views. The fight hon. Gentleman said that absolute sovereignty must be 
written into the Bill. The hon. Member for Banff and Buchan said that we should not 
do anything about it. We want to avoid both those ridiculous extremes. We propose 
1 61 See Chapter Four, above at p. 25 1. t '2 CM 3658, p. 3. para. 2.3. 163 ELC. Deb., Vol. 304,12th January 1998, Col. 41. 164 H. C. Deb., Vol. 304,12th January 1998. Col. 4 1. 
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devolution not federalism or independence and it is written unambiguously and 
factually into clause 27(7) and that is all that is required. 163 
And, reacting the to the question "Surely the hon. Gentleman would admit that either this 
Parliament is sovereign or it is not? ", Galbraith replied, 
That is one of the other things that has amazed me in this debate. Perhaps it is because 
the conservatives have come to this subject late in the day, unlike Labour Members, 
who have been at it all these years. Neither the Liberals nor ourselves have ever 
disputed the fact that this Parliament should remain sovereign. It is written intc) clause 
27(7). 166 
Resolution of Disputes over r1res 
This matter deserves close consideration because the vesting of adjýdicative powers in the 
judiciary has led some parties to suggest that the nature of the judiciary could be profoundly 
affected, particularly if the Scotland Act is considered, not in isolation, but as a part of a 
greater constitutional reform, including the incorporation of the Convention, amongst 
others. 167 Donald Dewar NP claimed that the Government's 
aim is always to minimise friction, via a settlement which achieves that. The BiU 
includes a fair and open system for resolving disputes over vires. The Law Officers 
either of the UK Government or of the Scottish Executive will be able to refer a 
Scottish Bill to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council if they have doubts about 
its competence. The Judicial Committee, for these purposes, will be composed of 
people who are or who have been Lords of Appeal in Ordinary, or who otherwise 
hold, or have held high judicial office. 161 
165 H. C. Deb., Vol. 304,12th January 1998, Col. 114-115. 
166 H. C. Deb., Vol. 304, No. 95, Col. 115. 
167 The Constitutional Programme of reform includes: Scottish Parliament, Welsh Assembly, the 
incorporation of the Convention, a new elected mayor and authority for London, a proposal for freedom of 
information, reform of the House of Lords and a referendum on the voting system for the House of Commolls. 
See Preface to CM 3782, Rights Brought Home: The Human Rights Act, at p. 1. 
168 Donald Dewar, H. C. Deb. Vol. 304, No. 95, at Col. 29. 
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Opposition to this idea centres around the effect it will have on the judiciary; Lord 
McCluskey observes that 
As a result of this piece of legislation, taken along with the Human Rights Act 1998, 
the obligation ofjudges to step into what has hitherto been the political field is greatly 
increased. My noble and learned friend Lord Hope of Craighead mentioned Schedule 
6. He is right to say - and your Lordships should note - that the devolution issues are 
very widely defined. The judges will have to detern-dne delicate and difficult questions 
which the legislature cannot possibly foresee about where the boundaries are to be 
drawn between the legislative competence of a devolved parliament and that of 
Westminster. 
Similar questions arise in relating to the acts of the executive and that includes the first 
minister. He or she is bound to be exposed to the same temptation as American 
Presidents have been exposed to for the past 200 years and particularly this century. 
Eveda man whom we all adn-dre, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, sought to pack the 
Supreme Court of the United States because that Court was striking down as 
unconstitutional legislation which he wanted to hurry through. He did not in fact 
succeed, but all modem presidents have packed the court with their nominees who 
reflect their political and philosophical views. That temptation is bound to face 
NEnisters. It may lead to the politicisation of the judiciary. 169 
There is no mention of the fact that a potentially huge power is vested in the judiciary, or that 
the use of the Privy Council is tantamount to creating a constitutional court, albeit with the 
same personnel as the standard higher courts. 
Lord Hope of Craighead recognises this fact, and in an interesting passage, in which he 
suggests another meaning for the word sovereignty, "0 he notes that the issue of sovereignty 0 
seems to have been approached by some of the Government's critics ... on te asis 
that there was a. choice between retaining parliamentary sovereignty at Westminster 
169 H. L. Deb., Vol. 590, No. 169 
' 70 See Chapter One, above at p. 29. 
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and transferring parliamentary sovereignty to the people of Scotland in their own 
Scottish Parliament. That certainly is how the argument has been presented in 
Scotland, and I suspect that there is now a widely held belief... that the Scottish 
Parliament will enjoy the same sovereignty and all the privileges which -go with 
sovereignty, as the Parliament here at Wesiminster. But such a belief... would be 
profoundly mistaken. In that mistake would lie the risk of dissatisfaction, and thus of 
instability, as the true nature of what has happened was revealed when the work done 
by the Scottish Parliament was brought under scrutiny in the courts. 
The fact is that there is to be created for Scotland a new kind of sovereignty. It is not 
parliamentary sovereignty but constitutional sovereignty. Parliamentary sovereignty 
will continue to reside here at Westminster. ... A devolved parliament cannot be a 
sovereign parliament in the sense that Parliament here is sovereign. The essential 
characteristic of a parliament which enjoys parliamentary sovereignty is that its power 
to legislate on whatever matter it chooses cannot be called ifito, question before the 
courts. But the essential characteristic of a devolved parliament is that it can only 
legislate within the powers which have been devolved to it. Any legislation which is 
enacted outside those powers is vulnerable to attack on the ground that it is ultra 
vires. My point is this. It is the judges, not the devolved parliament nor even the 4 
executive, who will have the last say as to whether or not it is within the powers of the 
parliament. 171 
Lord Lang of Monkton stated his fears thus: 
many of us argued for years that a devolved parliament for Scotland within a 
sovereign state with no federal structure could not remain stable in the long term; that 
it would unbalance the UK; that it would lead to friction and conflict; and that with no 
chance of going back once it had been started Scotland could only move with fits and 
starts towards separation. 172 
It would appear that the Government's objective is to use a judicial mechanism to resolve 
such conflicts as cannot be settled politically. This approach clearly involves an expanded 
judicial role. In the light of this it is hard not to agree with Lord Sanderson of Bowden, who 
"' H. L. Deb. V01.590, No. 169, Cols. 1637-1638. 
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claimed: "As a result of the Bill being enacted, the structure of the UK constitution will never 
be the same again. " 
173 
Conclusions to be drawn from the Comprehensive Programme of Constitutional 
Reform 
At this point it is difficult to definitively assert that any particular changes will be instituted as 
a result of the proposed reforms. There are other elements proposed which I have not 
discussed, increased devolution of power to the regions of England, the Welsh Assembly and 
the proposed freedom of information legislation are all planned reforms. The Scotland Act 
and the Human Rights Act are the most significant individual pieces of legislation and will 
have the largest impact on the constitution, in their own right. The irue significance of the 
programme of constitutional reform however will not be quantifiable until the entire 
programme has been enacted. The impact of the two elements considered above will be 
substantial and they will both, potentially, affect the judicial position and constitutional 
function. However, again the nature and degree of change will not be obvious until some 
time after enactment. 
172 RL. Deb. Vol. 590. No. 169 No. 169, Col. 1603. 
173 Lord Sanderson of Bowden, H. L. Deb. Vol. 590, No. 169, Col. 1640. 
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Conclusions 
in many ways the legal and political conflicts that have occurred concerning the UK 
membership of the Communities and Union have thrown into relief the relationships between 
our organs of government and their constitutional functions in a similar fashion to the 
seventeenth century conflicts. This process will continue with the incorporation of the 
Convention and devolution of power. The sum of all these events will be to re-define the 
positioning and constitutional function of the various organs of government. 
Constitutional evolution, the Courts and Theory 
According to Wade's theSiS174a change such as that which has occurred as a result of 
membership of the communities - the introduction of an ever-increasing area where 
Parliament is no longer the sovereign body - is possible and constitutes a legal revolution 
However, the judicial evidence runs against his thesis, emphasising, as it does, the significance'-- 
of the ECA 1972. According to Wade the ECA 1972 could not have instigated the changes 
for it is beyond the power of Parliament to make such changes, it is vested in the courts. So, 
either the courts are rejecting Wade's thesis, the revolution was effected by Parliament and 
the courts acting together, or the courts are using the ECA 1972 as camouflage for the legal 
revolution they have implemented. If the latter is correct then an intriguing question is when 
did the revolution occur? It was obviously not in 1972: judgements of the courts clearly 
indicate that they still adhered to the notion that Parliament's sovereignty was as 
unconstrained after membership as it had been prior to membership - although they had - 
admitted procedural limitations. 17' A more obvious answer might be 1989 when R_yK.. the 
Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factortame was first decided, but this seems at odds 
174 See Chapter Four, above at p. 223 et seq. 
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with everything the courts actually say. They maintain that the authority has existed since 
membership was effected. My solution would be to suggest a gradual revolution with the 
courts, the executive and Parliament A willing participants, to a degree, in the-process with 
its final victory being announced in 1989. The revolution amounts to the rejection of the 
traditional theoretical and impractical ideas of Dicey. The 'revolution' was only made possible 
by the executive's willingness to accept the courts approach. Although many commentators 
play down the significance that should be attributed to the R v. Secretajy of State for 
Transport. ex parte Factortame (hio. 2) decision, any degree of inconsistency with Dicey's 
absolutist formulation will evidence its unsustainability. An absolute that is shown to be 
'false' in some fashion necessarily loses a disproportionate degree of viability and logical 
consistency. 
Lord Irvine asserts that 
The most significant eff6ct of the European influence in constitutional terms, has been 
the recognition of the European Communities Act as a species of fundamental law, 
which unless and until it is repealed pursuant to a political decision to withdraw from 
the European Union, accords precedence to Community law over all inconsistent 
provisions of domestic law, past and future. Acts of Parliament may therefore be 
suspended , 
disapplied, or declared to be illegal, to the extent that they conflict with 
the precepts of Community law. Furthermore, following the Francovich case, the 
British courts must now provide a remedy in damages for loss caused by the impact of 
"illegar' primary legislation. E. C. law therefore requires our courts to perform a 
number of tasks which would have been unthinkable even 20 years ago. 176 
Such recognition is critical to this thesis. It may be contended that everything which has 
occurred in the realm of European law has been sanctioned and implemented by Parliament's 
175 See Chapter Five, above at p. 326. 176 Irvine (1996) at p. 75. 
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will, but it is undeniable that the traditional Dicean doctrine of sovereignty has been 
disavowed through acceptance that unless and until repeal of the ECA 1972 is effected, in an 
likelihood following a prescribed political process, Parliament's sovereignty has been 
abridged. To persistently maintain that it is only abridged because Parliament says it is 
abridged is to deny the reality and also to ignore the theoretical basis of Community law as 
expressed by the ECJ, and recognised in debate during the passage of the ECA 1972.177 
This abridgement has been effected by a change in the relative position of Parliament to the 
courts. The national courts have assumed a new character, they have become European 
courts, enforcing European Community law, and in the process of 4oing this they have 
disapplied Acts of Parliament, 179 temporarily disapplied Acts of Parliament'79and declared 
Acts of Parliament to be illegal. 'so These powers, unimagined by previous generations of 
judges, are the reality within which our current judicial figures must work. There is no 
question that this exposure will promote spillover: that the notions applicable to Community 
law will slowly be transplanted into non-Community national law. Lord Irvine recognises this 
fact and notes 
The effects of these new developments have been felt outside the field of application 
of European law. The decision of the House of Lords in M. v. Home Office to uphold 
the grant of an injunction against the Home Secretary in a matter which had no 
European element followed directly from Factortame (No. 2) Pepper v. Hart is 
arguable another example of this spillover effect... "' 
171 See Chapter Five, above at pp. 291-296 and p. 308. 
178 Marshall v. Southampton and South West Area Health Authority (No. 2) [199313 CNER 293. 
179R. v. Secretary of State for Transport. ex parte Factortame [ 199 111 AC 603. 
180 R. v. Secretary of State for employment ex parte Egual Qpvortunities Conunission [199412 WLR 409. 
Irvine (1996) at p. 75. 
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These cases Lord Irvine cites are practical manifestations of the spillover. There is however, 
another form of spillover and this is at the theoretical level. There are a number of judges who 
have, in extra-judicial writings, suggested that the courts would be willing to sirike down 
Parliamentary legislation on the grounds that it was contrary to fundamental principles of 
law. 182 British judges, on such a regular basis, have not employed such language since the 
times of Sir Edward Coke. 193 It is also certain that the views expressed by these judicial 
figures, most notably Sir John Laws, go far beyond anything most academics have 
suggested. 184 The manner and form theorists assert that there are rules determining the nature 
of the sovereign power and the manner and form legislation may take, but "they have no 
substantive content, i. e. they do not limit the power of the legislature operaiing in 
accordance with those rules. ... 
[They] 'defined the sovereign, not sovereignty. 117185 
Laws' claims are akin to those of Coke, with his emphasis on real limitations imposed by 
fundamental law. Although many commentators, Irvine included, '" have maintained that the 
judicial attitudes that existed prior to 1688 are no longer appropriate, they seem to forget that 
the judicial attitudes prior to 1972 may be equally inappropriate. Simply because there has 
been no great political upheaval does not preclude, according to Wade, "7a legal revolution. 
Equally a legal revolution may not require reference to a single event but may be effected 
through a process of change. The most important changes may be attitudinal. There is no 
reason why a legal revolution should not see a return to principles expressed by Coke 
particularly if there is a perceived need for a judicial check on the actions of a strong 
1 82 Laws (1995); Woolf (1995), Sedley (1995) and Cooke (1988). 
1" See Chapter Two. 
184 See Laws at Chapter One, above at pp. 26-28. 
1 85 Forsyth (1996) at p. 138. 
186 See Irvine (1996). 
18' See Chapter Four. above at pp. 226-227. 
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executive, owing to the relative weakness of the other organs of govenunent. A similar 
situation provoked much of the constitutional conflicts of the seventeenth century. 
Lord Irvine's objections to the suggestions that the judiciary possess the power to cast down 
Parliamentary legislation, if it were adjudged to be in breach of fundamental principles, 
include the following- 
g it has to be made plain that those judges who lay claim to a judicial power to ne ate 
Parliamentary decisions, contrary to the established law and usages of our country, 
make an exorbitant claim that could only even be advanced were the courts ever to be 
presented with parliamentary decisions that were inconsistent with the fundamental 
tenets of a free democracy and therefore unworthy of judicial respect. "' 
This assertion is reminiscent of Dicey's notion of internal limitations. 189 The tenor Of Irvine's 
statement is that such events are unlikely. Even if that is the case it is not a strong argument 
against providing adequate protection against such an eventuality- Equally, although Irvine 
makes frequent use of the notion of popular mandate and democratic process it is a widely 
accepted view that modem democracy not only involves the notion of representation of the 
majority view, but also necessaffly includes an element of adequate protection for the 
minority view. This protection prevents tyranny of the majority. It is possible that a majority 
of Parliament, and correspondingly the country, may support a course of action, which is 
detrimental to the rights of a minority of the population; however, it would represent a breach 
of widely accepted Human Rights to allow this course of action to lead to legislation 
persecuting the minority. The courts may then find themselves in a position where the 
44principles" of democracy call for opposing courses of actions. In this situation the recently 
emerging judicial attitude of fundamental rights may be employed to provide effective 
188 Irvine (1996) at p. 77 
189 See Chapter Three. above at pp. 195-197. 
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protection to those denied protection through the traditional political means. The effect of the 
Human Rights Act will be interesting in this domain. How the courts will interpret this 
legislation, which undeniably confers a wider constitutional role upon the judidary, '90 is not 
apparent at this juncture. It probably will not be clear for many years to come. 
Many of the statements relied upon by those opposed to an increased constitutional role for 
the judiciary were made at a time when the constitutional structure of the UK was 
fundamentally different to that of today. Lord Irvine relies on statements made in Liversidge 
v. Anderson, '" and Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke. 192 with the most recent of these 
quotations being nearly three decades old, and having been made piýp-accession and in relation 
to a legal revolution of the most obvious nature, their relevance to the modem politico-legal 
system, with its European character and with radical changes in the constitutional framework 
being proposed, must be questionable. In a similar way Coke's pronouncements, in their 
simple terms, are inappropriate to the constitutional structure of today. Many commentators 
maintain that Coke's judgements are of limited value because they have been superseded by 
the events of 1688; 193 in reality they have been superseded because of a process of change, 
the events of 1688 forming but one element of this process. 194 In addition, although Coke's 
statements may not be directly relevant to the current constitutional settlement, the ideas 
underpinning them are still pertinent. 
The events that are outlined in this Chapter, and the preceding one, should be viewed as 
elements in a process of change. Thus although Allott states it was the events of 1972 which 
1 90 See Chapter Six, above pp. 387-388,391 and 394-395. 191 [19421 A. C. 206. -ý 192 [196911 A. C. 645, see Chapter Four, above at p. 275 et seq. 
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brought about changes in our co nstitutional framework, it is more accurate to say that, the 
process of change, of which the Act of 1972 was a critical element, and which the Hurnan 
Rights Act and the proposed devolution of power also form potentially significant elements, 
has brought about constitutional change. I use the word "'potential" for the same reason that 
I 
I feel it is more appropriate to portray the ECA 1972 as an element in a process, for it is only 
through the subsequent work of the courts that the meaning and impact of any legislative 
measure can be truly appreciated and understood. 
. 0. 
193 Irvine (1996); See Lord Reid in Pickin v. British Railways Board, at 1092 194 See Chapter One. above at pp. 13 and 17. 
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Chapter Seven - Conclusions 
Changeable Nature of Sovereignty 
Problems of comparability 
The main difficulty in comparing the Works of those theorists considered in the preceding 
chapters is that there is no commonly accepted model of government. The earlier theorists, 
such as Bodin and Hobbes, described a system based on two organs of government: a law- 
making sovereign and the courts. The later theorists, however, emphasise the inter-play 
between three organs of government: the executive, the legislature and the courts. This 
makes any attempt at comparability inherently difficult. For example, Hobbes employed the 
notion of 4 fused executive and legislative function, and to try to transpose his theory in the 
modern UK would encounter the problem of distinguishing between his sovereign powers 
vested in Parliament and those vested in the executive. 
James I and Coke are more reflective of the modem reality in that their theories consider the 
roles of Parliament, the courts and the sovereign as the executive. However, the separation 
of powers into the three entities was only really explicitly formulated from Locke and 
Montesquieu onward and even Locke fused the executive and judicial functions. 
For the sake of clarity, comparability and applicability to the modern system of government, 
intend to accept the proposition that the chief mark of sovereignty is the power to issue 
binding laws. According to most theoretical conceptions, this power is vested in the UK 
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Parliament - our legislative branch of government Further, most conceptions allow 
for -- 
powers to be delegated by Parliament to any body it chooses. Frequently, the body recelvmg 
delegated authority will be the Government - our executive branch of government - this 
arrangement represents the so called Westminster Parliamentary democratic model of 
govermnent. 
Consistent Themes in Notions Relating to Sovereignty 
Despite the problem of consistency comparisons between all the above theorists are possible. 
They all formulate conceptions relating to the law-making power/authority and the judicial 
power/authority, and how they should be arranged within a systern. Following Jennings's 
assertion regarding sovereignty in the UK, that it has come to take a particular legal meaning 
relating to the relationship between the courts and Parliament, ' it is possible to chart the 
attitude of each of the preceding theorists towards this relationship. All we have to do is 
consider how each of them would have interpreted the relationship, according to their 
individual models. A useful tool to enable such comparison may be to chart each of the 
theorists' attitudes on the constitutional roles of the courts and the law-n-aking body (UK 
Parliament) on separate fines of continuurn. This would only be possible through employing 
broad but distinct defu-ýitions. 
Thus we could distinguish between theorists who believe that 
the legal power/authority of Parliament should be unconstrainedý and 
2. those who believe that it should be constrained. 
1 See Chapter Four, above at p. 207. 
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We could also plot theorists' attitudes towards the courts. The two extremes woqld be 
1. the courts should strictly apply the literal meaning of laws made by Parliament 
(disavowing any law-making function of their own, or at least subordinating it to that of 
Parfiament), and 
2. the courts should possess powers of constitutional oversight, protecting fundamental 
principles/laws, and striking down Parliamentary legislation that is inconsistent with these 
principles/laws. 
Thus we get two lines looking like these' 
Figure 1: 
The legal powerlauthority of Parliament 
Constrained , Unconstrained 
and 
Figure 2: 
The role of the courts 
Strict literal 
interpretation 
Constitutional review and 
protection of fundamental rights 
We can make this simple form of analysis more sophisticated, and useful, through merging the 
two lines through the means of a graph. Attributing the legal power/authority line to a y-axis 
and the role of the courts to an x-axis, allows for the plotting of a position (x, y). Such an 
action will give an accurate meaning to each theorist's ideal constitutional arrangement in the 
UK 
The result would took something like this: 
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Figure 3. 
overlay of The role of the Courts and The Legal Powerlauthority of Parliament 
Unconstrained /-L- 
Strict Application 
of Law made by 
another 






AU = Austin 1= Dr. Bonham's Case (Chapter Two) 
BE = Bentham 2= Edinburgh & Dalkeith Railmys Ltd v. Wauchoce Chapter Three) 
BO 'Bodin 3= Pickin v, British Railways Board (Chapter Four) 
CO = Coke 4= Manuel v Attorney-General (Chapter Five) 
DI = Dicey 5= R-'v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Facto me 
(Chapter Six) 
HA = Hart 
HO = Hobbes Represents the movement from Austinian theory to Hartian 
theory 
JA = James I 




The constraints represented by the y axis may be limitations imposed by fundamental law 
which control the subject matter of legislative acts; equally they may be limitations as to the 
form such legislation must take, and the procedures which must be conformed to if such 
legislation is to be considered binding. At the zenith of the y-axis is a fully unconstrained law- 
maker who enjoys the luxury of having no limitations on the subject matter, form or 
procedure of law making or the law making process. 
On the far left of the x-axis is a judiciary who have no power other than that of applying, 
according to very strict tenets of interpretation, the law that is handed 
I 
to thern. They do not 
possess the authority to question the validity of a law, or even the process by which a law 
becomes a law. To the far right the judiciary enjoy a very different function. They are the 
custodians of process and authority. They enjoy the authority to strike down the n-dssives of 
the lawmaker as iflegitimate if any aspect of due process or competence has been exceeded. 
If a 5iH of Rights exists they are the guardians of those rights, ensuring that no law 
contravenes a right vested in the citizenry. 
It is impossible, in terms of the above axial headings, to exactly quantify how constrained a 
lawmaker is, or the exact role of the judiciary. However it is possible to assess, at the very 
least, in which quadrant the various bodies would he. Often it will be possible to place the 
body somewhere within the quadrant depending upon the extremity of the situation and its 
relation to all other bodies. A body may, also possess more than one position depending 
upon the constitutional scenario, for example the UK judiciary would be assessed to have 
different roles for purely domestic matters and those matters governed by Europe. Again this 
Page 416 
is not a significant difficulty, for the use of the graphic depiction above is as a tool to assess 
the relevance and fit of any theory to the reality. 
Having plotted the relative positions of the theorists, you can then repeat the process plotting 
the position of the practical reality within the systern. The method I have chosen, to plot the 
practical realities of the constitutional system, is to place certain key cases on the same graph; 
this allows for a comparison between theory and practice. Placement of a single case, or a 
group of cases from a particular point in time, will allow for a snap shot comparison between 
theory and practice. However it is un&ely that there wiR be any exact matches, in fact I 
I 
would be surprised if there were any. This should be expected, it simply reflects the lag 
between the practical reality and theory evolving in order to explain it. However, I would 
always expect a theory that adequately rnaps the practical reality to appear within the same 
quadrant as that practical reality. Where such a coincidence does not occur the theory does 
not adequately map the reality. It will be of limited use to constitutionalists and may actually 
present an inhibition to meaningful discourse on the nature of the constitutional systern. 
It is unlikely that a system will appear at any of the axial extremes, particularly in its practical 
manifestation. Rather, it will figure towards the mid point. This reflects the moderation of 
theory through application; few theories are practically employed in their totality as modem 
constitutions are designed with the notion of checks and balances for the avoidance of 
tyramy. Within the graph it is unlikely, but not impossible, that any system will figure in the 
quadrant described (-x, -y), as there would be little goverrunental direction within the 
constitutional framework of this system, and no judicial oversight; the political situation 
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would be one of little direction and leadership. However, it is clear that both Bodin and 
Bentham have been situated in this quadrant. 
The reason for Bentharn' s siting within this quadrant is that although he accepted the 
possibility of limitations on sovereign authority. 2 he did not explore how such limitations 
could be enforced' and insisted that the judiciary should not possess a power of constitutional 
review. " This latter standpoint can be explained by Bentham's distrust of a British judiciary 
that he viewed as perpetrating the legal fictions he rebelled against and criticised Blackstone 
for extolling. 5 However, once Bentham had rejected the judiciary as enforcers of legal 4 
limitation, he was left without alternatives and thus left the question of who would fulfil the 
role of enforcer open. 
Bodin is situated in this quadrant for a simýar reason. Bodin accepted that timitations on a 
sovereigds competence did exist, but he could not say who should enforce these limitations. 6 
Bodin's frame of reference - the politico-legal practice of mid-sixteenth century France - did 
not allow him to put forward a viable candidate for oversight and enforcement of the existing 
tin-dtations. The courts were not in a position to challenge the French King's actions and 
Bodin's formulations of sovereign power' played down the constitutional significance of the 
judiciary. $ 
See Chapter Three, above at p. 149 et seq. 
See Chapter Four, above at p. 155. 
See Chapter Four, above at p. 146. 
See Chapter Four, above at pp. 142-143. 
See Chapter Two, above at p. 71 et seq. 
See Chapter Two, above at pp. 66-67. 
See Chapter Two, above at pp. 69-70. 
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Just as it is unlikely that theorists will fall within the (-x, -y) quadrant, so it is also unlikely that 
they will fall within the (+x, +y) quadrant. The reason for this is that an unconstrained law- 
maker and a court structure vested with powers of constitutional oversight are likely to 
produce a system so beset by inter-governmental organ conflict that it is amended very 
quickly as it becomes grid-locked as disagreements emerge. There is a second, logical, 
reason for this unlikelihood: if a law-rnaker is wholly unconstrained there is no basis for 
finding it to be in breach of any rules - substantive or procedural - that would render its 
pronouncements void, or voidable. Therefore, there would be no reason to vest the courts 
with a power of constitutional review. 
Plotting those theorists who have figured in the preceding Chapters reveals the most obvious 
use of such a diagram: it plots movements and changes. Therefore, plotting a single case or 
group of cases does not contribute to the graph's most obvious use. It is far more useful to 
plot a number of cases taken over a period of time and thereby chart movements in the 
practical structure of the constitutional system. At this point the graph is fairly sophisticated: 
we can plot the theoretical standpoint of each of the theorists and, knoWMg which ones have 
proved dominant at certain times enables researchers to chart the movement from one 
theoretical explanation'd sovereignty to another. This illustrates the changing nature of 
sovereignty over time and also allows for a comparison of the practical manifestation through 
consideration of the cases that have reflected the reality. A word of caution is required at this 
point; although cases may be charted it is necessary to bear in mind their treatment by 
subsequent courts. Thus, although I have plotted Dr. Bonham's Case this is not to say that it 
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reflected the constitutional reality during the 1600's, it represented the constitutional model 
of Sir Edward Coke. You do need to import a degree of external knowledge, but-this 
knowledge enables constitutional commentators to chart changes, as well as continuations in 
the theory of sovereignty, a practice that has been lacking to date. 
The Executive's Place in this Structure 
Although I have been principally concerned with the relationship between the courts and the 
legislature, I have acknowledged the significance of the executive's constitutional position 
Ws-ti-vis the relationship between the courts and the legislature. The executive's positioning 
may affect the function of either, or both, of the other two organs of goverment, as I suggest 
it does, in the United Kingdom, today. 9 It is onlY through the addition of this third element 
that we can really expose the inconsistencies between the traditional Westminster model of 
parliamentary democracy, with its Dicean emphasis on parliamentary control over the 
executive, and the modern political settlement. Then, within this structure, the significance of 
the judicial function may be seen as an element, along with Parliament, in the balancing of 
control over the power of the executive, a feature, it might be recalled, of the seventeenth 
century constitutional conflicts. 
An unportant point to bear in mind when attempting to incorporate the role.. and power of the 
executive is that mentioned above, that many earlier theorists did not formulate'their notions 
in terms of three constitutional bodies. 
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1 
However, to truly demonstrate modern constitutional models, advocated by any theorist, it 
would be necessary to include a third, z, axis in the diagram outlined above. I would 
represent it with the +z axis representing a dominant executive, and the -z axis representing 
an executive effectively controlled by the legislature (and/or rnaybe the courts). This is not 
possible, within the boundaries imposed by time and space, but would represent an interesting 
project for the future. 
Inclusion of a z-axis would allow for more detailed analysis of the movement in the notion of 
sovereignty. It would present a more detailed model of the movements in the relationship 
between aU three organs of government and how the movements bet, ýeen the courts and the 
executive and the legislature and the executive affect the relationship between courts and the 
legislature. 
The Changing Nature of Sovereignty Theory 
Analysis of the notions of sovereignty promulgated since the seventeenth century 
demonstrates that the use of theories of sovereignty has changed. Bodin produced a model of 
sovereignty that was essentially a justification for secular monarchical governrnent although it 
was partly reliant on clerical notions'O and, in order to justify the authority and power of the 
monarch, he insisted on an unlimited sovereignty. However Bodin had to incorporate and 
accept those limitations that were obvious and undeniable in the French systern. It is through 
I See Chapter Four, above at p. 212-213. 
"Rosenblum (1978) at p. 76. 
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his acceptance of limitations that Bodin justifies location in the -y region of the graph, albeit 
closer to the mid-point than many of the other theorists. 
James I and Hobbes went further than Bodin in seeking to justify the supremacy of the secular 
monarchical model of absolute government over the clerical model of the medieval era. Their 
theory was further divorced from religious notions than was Bodin's; they admitted to no 
possible limitations. Both James I and Hobbes rejected the common law interpretation of 
Coke, with its emphasis on the role of the courts as the defender of fundamental rights, 
including the notion of the balanced constitution. James I is, by all acqpunts, probably the 
most extreme of all the theorists considered. His belief in the domination of all aspects of 
government by the sovereign monarch locates him in the top left of the (-x, +y) quadrant of 
the graph. ' Although Hobbes delved deeper into the theoretical basis of sovereignty, 
employing the notions of personal sovereignty and social contract (ori&al contract), he too 
is located in the (-x, +y) quadrant of the graph. 
Bentham and Austin repudiated the original contract and monarchical absolutism models of 
sovereignty, but shared similar views to Hobbes in their attitudes towards the courts. They 
created a model advocating absolute sovereignty and located it in the legislature, rather than 
the monarch. They also based their models on a different social fact, habitual obedience. In 
addition, they approached it from a different ideological perspective; rather than justify the 
exercise of sovereignty on the simple basis of sovereign pleasure" Bentham and Austin 
sought to justify the existence of sovereign power through use of the principle of utility. 
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Bentham and Austin also elaborated on the relationship between sovereignty and law-making 
powers. The result of their formulations presents us with a quandary: Austin certdinly 
presented a theory located in the (-x, +y) quadrant, probably towards the extremes of both 
axes. Bentham's positioning however, is less clear. He certainly did not believe in vesting the 
judiciary with powers of control over law-making-, his formulations over limitation, however, 
would locate him in the (-x, -y), albeit towards the midpoint of they axis, possibly not too far 
from Bodim 
Dicey gave the notion of sovereignty a far more distinct legal meaning, explicitly explainiýng it 
in terms of the relationship between the British courts and Parliament. Dicey proposed the 
notion of an unlimited sovereign legislature and stated that the courts were obliged to apply 
the will of-Parliament. This produced a settlement located in the (--x, +y) quadrant, although 
not as extreme as Austin's. 
More recent formulations have emphasised that the imperative model of law is an 
unsatisfactory basis for a legal systern, and have concentrated on the notion of rules and, 
more recently principles, as the foundations for a legal system and as the justification for the 
existence of valid law. Once this move has been made it is no longer necessary to insist on the 
illimitability of the sovereign power. This allows for the movement of theory from quadrant 
(-x, +y) to quadrant (+x, -y). Such movement is reflected in the decisions in R- v. Secretary 
of State for Transport. ex parte Factortame where the House of Lords appears to have 
accepted a move towards the notion of a constrained Parliament. 
"Tel estmonplaisirbeing the traditional manifestation of why a pronouncement is to be admitted as a law. 
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Why has the Nature of Sovereignty Changed? 
All of these perceptions have been created through the existence of external stiradli affecting 
the ideological standpoint of the theorists. Related to this is the nature of the constitutional 
settlement at the time of writing. As our political system has evolved there has been a call for 
I 
dfferent and specific forms of protection. The traditional common law theory of Coke was 
employed to emphasise the role of God and Divine law, it emphasised the role of the clerical 
and downplayed the role of the secular, reflecting the clericalism of the medieval world. 
During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries there was a perceived need for strong and 
stable government able to resist the claims of clericalism12 and avert rtvoluiiorL The most 
plausible means for this was to emphasise the monarch's sovereign position and resultant 
constitutional dominance, a role that did not allow for the existence of fundamental law and 
judicial powers of oversight. As democracy evolved the emphasis on the monarch was no 
longer appropriate. The people were viewed as the fountain of authority and so it was 
necessary for the people to be vested with absolute authority. The earliest notions of 
democracy'can be'seen in the revolutionary settlement of 1688. Loveland has articulated this 
thus: 
The dominant streams within seventeenth century English society accepted that only 
the king, the aristocracy, the Church, and the affluent merchant and landowning class 
which elected the House of Commons, had any legitimate role to play in fashioning the 
laws within which society was governed. Orthodox political theory argued that the 
Commons, the Lords and the Monarch formed the three Estates of the Realm, and 
these estates, acting in concert, were presumed to the only legitimate arbiters of the 
national interest. The 1688 Revolution might thus be seen as an attempt to create an 
anti-majoritarian source of sovereign legal authority. It is this essentially political 
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purpose, Craig suggests, which underlay the acceptance of Parliament as the highest 
source of law. To put the argument simply, Blackstone and those whose views he 
represented endorsed the principle of parliamentary sovereignty because they could 
conceive of no more broadly based mechanism for ensuring that laws en oyed the j 
consent of the people. Parliament was "sovereign" for political or moral reasons " -. - 
namely that it minimised the possibility that the English people would be subjected tc) 
factionally motivated legislation. 
The evolution of democracy also necessitated thý emphasis on positive law, law emanating 
from the people and not God, or an unrepresentative group such as the judiciary. This 
explains Bentham and Austin's approach and also, partly, their confusion: democracy was irl 
its infancy and their essentially immature ideas reflect the immaturity of the system of law and 
government they were seeking to explain. 
Today, we live in a more fully evolved democratic system. We are aware of the dangers 
inherent within democracy and the potential for tyranny by the majority to emerge. "' As Allan 
observes: "If the most plausible explanation of our continued adherence to the general rule of 
obedience to statutes invokes a principle of democratic legitimacy, the conception of 
democracy on which we rely will impose constraints on the scope of the general rule. " He 
continues to explain that: 
It would clearly be absurd to permit a parliament whose sovereign law-making power 
was justified on democratic grounds to exercise that power to destroy democracy, as 
by removing the vote from sections of society or abolishing elections. Moreover an 
appropriately sophisticated conception of democracy will be likely to recognise the 
12 Rosenblum (1978) at p. 99. 
13 Loveland (1996) at p. 534. 
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existence of certain 6asic; individual rights, whose importance to the fiindamental idea 
of citizenship in a free society, governed in accordance with the rule of law, will 
properly place them beyond serious legislative encroachment. In stressing the 
importance of fundamental rights to the survival of democracy Sir John Laws observes 
that 'the doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty cannot be vouchsafed by parliamentary 
legislation; a higher order law confers it, and must of necessity limit it. '" 
The product of this reasoning is the conclusion that: 
An adequate constitutional theory, appropriate to current circumstances, would 
recognise limitations on legislative power in order to ensure an adequate separation of 
powers ... essential to the prevention of tyranny. The validity of traditional assertions 
of absolute sovereignty can only be determined by analysis of their normative 
grounding in political theory. When constitutional debate is ooýned up to ordinary 
legal reasoning, based on fundamental principles, we shall discover that the notion of 
unlimited Parliamentary sovereignty no longer makes any legal or constitutional 
sense. 16 
, 
The essence of this argument is that constitutional legal theory should move away from a 
grounding on traditional political theory and embrace notions of fundamental "I-ýgher" law as 
a theoretical explanation for the constitutional structure of the UK 
The constitutional history, outlined in the preceding chapters demonstrates that not only have 
the notions of sovereignty changed, in content and objective, but the relationship between the 
courts and law-makers has changed as well. This' relationship has been one of the deýining 
elements of the constitution, and the relationship today is substantially different to the one 
that existed 40 years ago, and almost completely different to the one that existed three 
hundred years ago. According to Allan's notion there would have to be a fundamental change 
" See Lord Hailsham (1976), and Lord Hewart (1929). 
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in this relationship, or at least the theory explaining it. If notions of fundamental law were. - -- 
embraced as an explanation of the constitutional arrangements the courts would l5e required 
to exercise an extended role of policing these arrangements. 
Such changes as have been outlined above have been driven by political factors; these include 
the notion that it is no longer politically important to define the power of the sovereign. 
Today it is far more important to define the rights of the citizen. Those commentators who 
advocate the separation of the legal from the political not only deny the symbiosis, which has 
been demonstrated, but also produce an environment in which constitýitional evolution has 
been stifled and which allows the perpetuation of outdated notions explaining our 
constitutional system. 
The Failure of Theorists to Accommodate Change Within Their Theories to 
common failing in the work of many of the theorists outlined above is that they fail to 
recognise the changeable nature of sovereignty. Many of them rely on historical evidence to 
support their theories. Despite this they fail to recognise that there are substantial differences 
in almost all systems and that differences exist over time, as well as between different nations. 
Stephen, noting this weakness in Hobbes's work, stated that Hobbes's 
fundamental assumption is that of the continuous existence of an established 
government in a state of stable equilibrium. ... The existence of a stable govenunent is 
his postulate throughout, and, assuming the existence of such an institution, he 
enquires what position right, liberty, law and rulers should occupy in it. ... The real 
's Allan (1997) at P. 449. 
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es' views on government would seem to be in his apparent weakness of Hobb' 
unconsciousness of the fact that they are limited, and leave entirely out of account 
what in our days would be called the dynamics of government. U 
The same criticism may be levelled against Austin, Dicey and, to a lesser extent, Bentham. 
In fiLiling to recogniseihat changes occur they also fail to recognise that their own theory 
should be robust enough to accommodate potential changes. *Dicey in particular may be 
picked out as'c'ulpable for not "adequacy checking" his theory against developments which 
were happening throughout his life. He may be further criticised for not proving his theory 
9 Bentham may have a 'ainst the'developments, as they occurred'. Of the theoristi fisted only 
really aftempted to imagine future developments and produce a theory robust enough to 
accommodate them. 
In part this failure is due to *the fact that constitutional lawyers have not really been involved 
in formulating theories relating to constitutional fundamentals. They have 6een involved in 
describing existing 'constitutional systems. li hýs been the ju-rists who have'contributed 
theories explaining the founda'fions of constitutional systerns. " Strauss and Corbin explain the 
differences between theory and description thus: 
theory uses concepts. Similar data are grouped and given conceptual labels. This 
., means placing 
interpretations on the data. Second, the concepts are related by means 
of statements of relationship. In description, data may be organised according to 
themes. These themes may be conceptualisations of data, but are more likely to be 
16 Allan (1997) at p. 449. 
11 Stephen (1892) at pp. 9-11. 
18 Compare the theories promulgated by "constitutional lawyers", for example Dicey and Jennings. with those 
of Bentham, Austin and Hart. 
Page 428 
pricis or summaries Of words taken directly from the data. There is little, if any, 
interpretation of data. " 
The Nature of Sovereignty Theory Today 
Governmental Attitudes and Constitutional Orthodoxy 
Despite major developments in methodological practice, the political settlement and the 
relationships between the organs of government, modern constitutional theory, is still 
dominated by absolutist notions of Parliamentary Sovereignty. " The distribution of power 
within the UK is substantially different to that prescribed under the W6stminster model of 
parliamentary government. The Executive dominates almost all the functions of the 
legislature and pays only lip service to the idea that it is Parliament that issues laws. 7' The 
importance of secondary legislation, to the government of the country, cannot be 
overestimated. Further, the executive has initiated many of the most momentous 
constitutional changes through employing its prerogative powers. 22 This fact alone should 
render Dicean notions of Parliamentary Sovereignty, with their reliance on notions of 'unitary 
self-correcting democracy, P23 inappropriate, or at least open to review. 
Thus, although the traditional Dicean based theory falls into quadrant (-x+y) ((-x, +y, -z) if 
we were to attempt to incorporate az axis) the reality is that the executive element is the 
dominant body in the constitutional settlement. Further, there are real and effective 
" Strauss and Corbin (1990) at p. 29. 
'0 Francis (1980) at p. 540. 
21 See Chapter Four, above at pp. 212-213 and 284-285. 
22 See Chapter Four, 'above at p. 282-283. 
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constraints, upon the actions of both Parliament and Governrnent. These constraints are 
particularly obvious where they are imposed by the legislative and executive comoetence 
vested in the governing bodies of the European Union. The judiciary have accepted this fact, 
as illustrated in the case law outlined in Chapters Five and Six Membership of the 
Communities has had a spillover effect: 24 the changes in the judicial function that were 
required by membership of the Communities are increasingly being reflected in the 'purely 
domestic' relationship between the judiciary and Parliament. 25 There is increasing evidence 
that the senior judiciary view their constitutional function in a different light than did their 
predecessors of the past two hundred years, including many of those of more recent vintage. 
I. 
Indeed there are echoes of Coke in the clainis of Laws. 26 
The outco. me of the changes in the relative positioning of the legislature, courts and executive 
would, I believe, be the location of the political reality in quadrant (+x, -y). If we were to 
employ a z-axis the reality would be represented by (+x, -y, +z). This demonstrates a 
fundamental difference between the reality and the institutionally accepted theoretical 
explanation of it. 
So the question remains why, when there is real cause to amend and develop sovereignty 
theory, do we persist in referring to the doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty? It does not 
provide an adequate map for navigating through the reality. It certainly does not adequately 
explain the position of Parliament, either in relation to the executive or the courts, neither 
23 See Chapter Three, above at p. 184. 2' See Chapter Six. above at p. 406-407. 25 See Chapter Six, above at p. 407. 
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does it provide an explanation for the role the executive currently play in the narrow I 
legislative, and wider constitutional, processes. There is no coincidence between the 
placement of the theory of parliamentary sovereignty, and the practical functioning of our 
constitutional system. Part of the reason for the continued use of parliamentary sovereignty is 
its institutionalised acceptance amongst the organs of government. 
I believe that the current Labour Government's endeavours to "modernise British politics" 
v927 through a "comprehensive programme of constitutional ra, orm. may help to explain the 
persistent institutional reliance on the notion of parliamentary sovereignty. Although the 
Government persist in asserting that Parliamentary sovereignty is intact, " this does not seern 
to match their legislative programme of constitutional reforrn. The White Papers and 
parliamentary debates include comments that suggest that parliamentary sovereignty is not as 
firmly embedded today as it has beerL29 
t'C -- 
The fact that Europe appears to be treated as a subject apart, and that the Human Rights Act 
proposes a new process for legislative enactment, including an express declaration of 
compatibility, suggests that our constitution is evolving into a system of distinct legislative 
processes. There are different judicial procedures and powers for matters governed by 
European Law and there will be a different structure for issues failing under the provisions of 
the Human Rights legislation. Both of these developments involve the use of Henry VIII 
26 See Chapter One, above at p. 26 et seq. 
2' See preface to White Papers CM 3658 - Scotland's Parliament - and CM 3782 - Bringing Human Rights 
Home. 
28 See Chapter Six, above at p. 387-388 and p. 401. 
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clauses, a mechanism that is at odds with the spirit of Parliamentary sovereignty, even if it 
may be reconciled to the theory. Consideration of the proposed devolution of poýier to 
Scotland 30 shows that although the Government is not attempting to expressly entrench the 
legislation, they wish for that to be the effective outcome. 31 
No government has openly admitted that one of its legislative provisions will result in an 
abridgement of Parliamentary Sovereignty. I suggest that this is, in large part, due to a 
governmental fear that the British press would present such an admission as a betrayal of the 
British public, as they have done over Europe. 32 The result could potentially be, political 0: 
embarrassment, loss of popular support, and possibly loss of political power. The challenge to 
the Government is to implement modernisation and retain popular support for what it does. 
One method of achieving this is to enact the necessary legislation for their programme, whilst 
insisting that the traditional system will remain as before. This allows the politico-legal system 
to evolve over a number of years and relies on the judiciary to interpret the legislative 
measures introducing changes in line with the government's intention, rather than according 
to the traditional tenets of constitutional law. The House of Lords decision in R v. Secret= 
of State Af_rjransport. ex parte Factortarn reflects and evidences this process. In short, the 
Goverrunent utilises the lag that exists between reality and theory. It allows the reality to 
become embedded in the constitutional structure, presenting it to the public as a positive 
improvement to the constitutional settlement, maybe through the attendant social and 
29 See Chapter Six for a discussion of the Government's White Papers and the attendant Parliamentary 
Debates. 
30 White Paper CMD, 3658 1997 "Scotland's Parliament". See Chapter Six for discussion of these provisions. 
31 See Chapter Six, above at p. 398. 32 See Chapter Six, above at pp. 374-375. 
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economic advancements, as in the case of Europe. In this way they divert attention from the 
changes in the constitutional arrangement. The only downside to this process is that theorists 
persist in advancing the claims of traditional theories which politicians maintain have not been 
abrogated through constitutional policies pursued. 
There comes a point, however, when a theory is wholly unsustainable in the light of factual 
evidence. I believe, with regard to notions of parliamentary sovereignty that this point has 
arrived. The events surrounding membership of the European Communities demonstrate the 
unsustainability of Dicean notions of sovereignty as a map for the UK constitution. Allott 
cormnenting on of R v. Secretary of State. ex parte Factortame (No. 11 stated the "opinion of 
the House of Lords may be judicial affirmation of a fundamental change in the British 
constitution which must have occurred on I January 1973. v933 He continues to assert "at the 
level of legal theory, it amounts to a transfer of allegiance by the courts from Austin to 
Hart. 04 However, it is possible that subsequent judicial interpretations of R- v. Secretary of 
State for Transport. ex parte Factortame (No. 2) may reassert the Dicean modeL in which 
case, as Allott notes, its authority may be no more significant than its illustrious predecessor 
Dr. Bonham's Case. 35 
Having asserted that the British courts have moved to accept a Hartian interpretation of the 
legal systern, Allott continues to suggest that the next step for the courts is to accept the 
33 Allott (1990) at p. 379. 
34 Allott (1990) at p. 379. 
35 Allott (1990) at p. 379. 
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Dworkinian proposition36 "that principles and not'rules are the fundamental building blocks of 
a legal order" that "these principles are not just norms of a higher level of generarky than 
rules. Rather they are higher order items which govern the meaning and application of 
rules. 07 In many ways this notion involves a return to principles set out by Coke and the 
common law lawyers of the seventeenth century and may be seen in Bodin's notions relating 
to property and constitutional laws. There is a strong argument that this is the direction the 
judiciary wiU be forced to take with the incorporation of the European Convention on Human 
Rights with its emphasis on the existence of fundamental human rights that should supersede 
national legislation. 3' This whole debate accords with Allan's notionsof higher order law. 39 
It does, however, also demonstrate a weakness in Allan's argument. Allan maintains that 
If it is possible to recognise limits on the power of parliament to enact legislation 
which conflicts with European Community law, even if only to the extent of requiring 
express words, it is equally possible to countenance other limits on parliamentary 
sovereignty which reflects the demands of constitutional principle. Since the 
requirements of judicial obedience to statutes constitutes a principle of common law it 
clearly cannot itself have, a statutory foundation - its nature and scope are matters of 
reason, governed by our understanding of the constitution as a whole. 40 
However, as Allan notes, the conunon law rule he refers to has changed as a direct result of 
. parliamentary legislation: the ECA 1972. There are two possible explanations for the 
influence of legislation: either Acts of Parliament can change this common law rule, or the 
36 Allott (1990) at p. 379. 
37 LougMin (1992) at p. 238. 
39 See Chapter Six above. 
39 See p. 427 above. 
40 Allan (1997) at p. 449. 
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common law rule has changed independently of the legislative enactment. In the 
latter case, it 
is possible that the enactment has influenced the change albeit not in any authorita7five way. 
Considering the example of the ECA 1972 and the subsequent case law, especially R v. 
Secretary of State for Transport. ex parte Factortame (No. 2)41 there is a strong case for 
maintaining that the common law rule Allan refers to has been changed as a result of 
parliamentary legislation. The strongest evidence for this view is found in the judgement of 
Lord Bridge. 42 The real question that this statement raises is the question of the degree of 
influence the legislation exerts: whether the legislation directly changed the rule itself or was 
merely a persuasive event in the process of change. The language of 
Lord Bridge's 
judgements suggests that the legislation directly changed the rule. However, a more realistic 
interpretation may be that the ECA 1972 represented an indication that parliament would 
accept those limitations that the courts - both European and national - imposed at a later date. 
The Challenge to Contemporary Constitutional Commentators 
Contemporary theorists are faced with a confusing situation. They have been, and continue to 
be, faced with consecutive govermnents asserting that parliamentary sovereignty remains the 
foundation of our constitutional system. However, there is a large body of evidence 
repudiating this clairn. The challenge constitutionalists face is to reconcile the traditional 
doctrines underpinning constitutional law, particularly parliamentary sovereignty, with the 
41 (1991] 1 A. C. 603. See Chapter Six, above at p. 376 for a detailed consideration of this case. 
41 See Chapter Six, above at p. 376 et seq. 
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practical reality of a modern political structure with a high degree of supranational 
obfigations. 
If this is not possible then it is incumbent upon constitutionalists (I deliberately refrain from 
addressing this solely to constitutional lawyers) to develop new theories that will necessarily 
address the fundamental questions relating to the existence and operation of law, authority 
and power. Constitutional lawyers must disavow the descriptive practices of their forebears. 
When confronted with theories unsustainable in the fight of factual evidence, theorists must 
43 be willing to heed the words of Bagley and discard cherished notions. It is then necessary to 
seek new theoretical explanations of the reality. In order to achieve thýis end it may be 
necessary to reconsider earlier notions of the theory in order to find a new starting point. 
Loughlin maintains that: 
o- ur theories must be rooted in the practices of goverrunent and, in particular, should 
be sensitive to the impact which social and econornic changes have wrought on our 
systems of government and law. We might also maintain an open mind about the 
overall effects of modernization on society; history should be detached from purpose. 14 
It is only through adhering to these ideals that we may produce a theory that clearly maps out 
the legal position and, as a result, clarifies and explains the political reality. 
43 See Chapter One, above at p. 14. 44 Loughlin (1992) at p. 24 1. 
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Future Developments In Sovereignty 
Sovereignty Theory in the Twenty-First Century 
By sovereignty, in this context, I mean the relationship between the judiciary and the law 
making bodieS. 43There is a high degree of probability that the function of the judiciary will 
expand in the forthcoming decades. The role afforded to them through UK membership of the 
European Union and the proposed reform package, being introduced by the Labour 
Government, promises a more constitutionally significant judiciary. Increasingly the judiciary 
are being invested with the power to determine legislation's conformity with the politico-legal 
envirom-nent within which it is enacted and must operate. This is not to say that they are 
adopting the same powers as the Supreme Court of the USA, this would not be possible 
unless, and until, a fomial constitution was developed, which entrenched and expressly 
apportioned governmental functions. Criteria for validating legislation are evolving: does it 
impinge on the domain of European Law, if it does, does it conform to European Law? Soon 
there wiU be criteria such as does it conform-to the European Convention on Human Rights? 
and if it does not there will be a power to recommend reforrn. The impact of devolution of 
power is unclear at this stage. 
Although the Governrnent has stated that there will be no abridgement of the Westminster 
Parliament's sovereign power, there is a considerable body of case law relaiing to the Statute 
of Westminster that might be considered as providing precedent for interpreting Scottish 
devolution. The case law suggests that once autonomous authority within a defined arena is 
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granted to a state, that autonomy may not legitimately be taken back by the grantor without 
the grantee's agreement. In effect the grantor surrenders the authority to unilaterally take 
back the autonomy. the enabUng legistat, iOn may be repealed, but that will not affect the 
grantee's status or autonomy. There are distinguishing features between the situation 
surrounding the Statute of Westminster and the proposal for Scottish devolution; the attempts 
of the Goverriment to protect the constitutioml framework of the UK may weU prove to be 
effective. However, there is a real possibility that the effect of the legislation will be to 
emplace the foundations of a federal system within the UK constitution; this may, ultimately, 
lead to the abandonment of the unitary structure currently in place. Were such a federal 
system to evolve, the emergence of a rigid constitution 46 determining spheres of competence 
would, in all likelihood, be necessary. At this point there would need to be a clearer 
, 
demarcation of governmental functions. Under such a system the role of the judiciary would 
become more like guardian of the constitution. They would ensure that nobody exceeded 
their competence and that the provisions of the constitution were upheld. 
Some of these potential developments would be more dramatic and immediate than others. 
However, they are all significant in that they alter the relationship between judiciary and 
Parliament. They integrate the senior judiciary into the legislative process. 
'5 These do include the judiciary themselves in their law making capacity. 46 Such a constitution would not need to be codified in a single document-, it could be constructed of disparate 
pieces of legislation and official agreements, which would be interpreted as creating a single system. This 
system and could be supported by a large body of case law clarifýirig and defining the structure and 
responsibilities of the organs forming the governmental framework.. 
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Having considered some of the more obvious possible developments in the constitutional 
structure of the UK, consideration of the current theoretical explanation of Parliament's 
relationship to the judiciary shows that it would not adequately explain a constitutional 
structure such as that which may emerge. It may be possible to interpret the events of the past 
few decades as according with the traditional doctrinal understanding of the constitutional 
framework of the UK However, the fact that it is not capable of adequately explaining 
possible, and yet realistic, developments indicates that it does not fit or explain the current 
goverrunental structure adequately enough to be adhered to without question. 
A far better explanation, if one were to continue to utilise the languagi of Parhmentary 
Sovereignty, would be found in the manner and form arguments forwarded earlier in this 
century. 17 It would be possible to house the provisions of the Human Rights Act within this 
structure and it might be possible to explain the position of European Law as a manner and 
form arrangement: Parliament would have to expressly decree we are leaving the European 
Community in statutory form. At this point the judiciary would be presented with the ultimate 
dilemma, it is highly l1ely that the Government of the day would have to have an express 
mandate from the political populace for such a course of action prior to the judiciary giving 
effect to such a provision. If such a mandate were held, then the courts would, according to 
current theory, have to give effect to the statutory Provision. The difficulty facing them 
would be the E. C. J. 's decrees that European Law does not rely on national law and 
supersedes it, and how to reconcile the two views. I suspect that this is a moot point unlikely 
See Chapter Four, at pp. 216 et seq. for a full discussion on the tenets of the manner and form arguments 
and those theorists who forwarded them. 
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to arise, and that the decision facing the courts would not be as easily solved, as the doctrine 
of Parliamentary Sovereignty would indicate. 
Were a manner and form system to emerge to replace the old absolutist rule of recognition 
with a newer variant of sovereignty, it would underline the shortcomings of the traditional, 
Austinian, doctrine. The emergence of a manner and form system would indicate either that 
the traditional interpretation was not strictly accurate, or that it might have been true for a 
time, but that sovereignty is actually a dynamic and changeable phenomenon and what may be 
true at one point will not reflect reality at another. 
The Way Forward 
McRae's quotation, cited below, encapsulates what has happened to the notion of sovereignty 
over the past four hundred years. It also carries the essence of what is necessary, from 
constitutional lawyers, if we are to develop our notions of constitutional law in a manner 
reflective of political reality today. 
... even today, even in those countries where legislative sovereignty is restricted the 
least, we are not yet free of the notion of a few basic restraints upon sovereignty 
which arise out of the very nature of the sovereignty authority itself. And this, it seems 
to me, was the way in which Bodin viewed the few undeniable constitutional restraints 
surrounding the French monarchy, in order to fit them into his theory of sovereignty. 
But his conception of a few basic leges imperli was progressively obscured, first by 
the theories of popular sovereignty developed primarily by Calvinist writers, later by 
Hobbes's and Spinoza's concentration upon the philosophical problem of power, later 
still - and most effectively - by Austin's restatement of sovereignty in terms reflecting 
the unquestioned legislative supremacy of nineteenth-century British parliaments. The 
influence of Hobbes and Austin held sway for a long time, but in recent years theorists 
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have been re-examining the concept of legislative sovereignty, particularly in the 
English-speaking world. Their writings suggest that Bodin's pioneer theory-should be 
reconsidered with some care, for we'are undoubtedly closer today to his onginal 
conception of leges imperii than at any time in the past three hundred years. In placing 
the sovereign under the laws of God and nature Bodin was following medieval 
tradition. But in defining and restricting the sovereign by means of basic "laws 
concerning sovereignty" he was being more sophisticated than Hobbes, more modern 
than John Austin. He was in fact, developing a theory of sovereignty strikingly similar 
41 to those of the present time. 
I do not advocate a return to Bodin's conception of sovereignty, nor that of Hale, for that 
would be contrary to the dynamic nat'ure of sovereignty. However, the. ir ideas represent a 
form of sovereignty that emphasises the supremacy of the lawmaker, but allows for the 
imposition of legal limitations. Such a model allows for protection against executive and 
legislative tyranny and for the existence of higher order law, in this case the law of supra- 
national organisations. This would involve a model appropriate to the modern British political 
context, with its emphasis on supra-national organisations and democratic principles. Bodin's 
model, with its emphasis on limitation, and its focus on constitutional theory reflecting the 
political reality, is a good starting point It is significant that students of law are not 
introduced to Bodin's ideas. If they were exposed to such notions, along with those of Dicey 
and Austin, they might recognise more similarities between the British ideal and Bodin's 
works, rather than with the theories of Dicey and Austin, and this would allow increased 
debate on the fundamental ideas underpinning constitutional and democratic theory. 
"' McRae (1962) at p. A19. 
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If membership of the European Communities and Union has introduced an element of higher 
order law and Labour's new constitutional settlement - including the incorporation of the 
European Convention on Human Rights - does the same then the objectives of those people 
who framed the Revolutionary Settlement may be realised. The chances of tyranny, be it 
executive, le&lative or in any other form would be much reduced. Loveland recognises this 
and emphasises that: 
The EC Treaties stand in marked contrast to our domestic lawmaking process. Their 
terms are not the pro duct of majoritarian or even super-majoritarian law-making. 
Their every provision has been arrived at through a consensual negotiatorY process, 
demanding the unanimous approval of a growing number of nzýions - nations which 
themselves represent differing political philosophies and a multiplicity of cultural 
inheritances. And as the Treaties have been successfully amended by the same 
protracted, negotiatory, consensual lawmaking process, so the innovative 
jurisprudence of the European Court and the member states' domestic courts have 
implicitly been granted a unanimous cross-nati. onal seal of legislative approval. The 
prospect of EC law being narrowly majoritarian, and hence oppressive or irrational, 
has been reduced almost to vanishing point. In that sense it is a 'higher' form of law 
than can be produced by any of the EC's member states within their own legal 
systems. It thus represents a modern manifestation of the ideal for which the 
seventeenth- century 'revolutionaries' strove. For the UK courts to deny our modem 
parliament the power either expressly to breach EC law, or to leave the Community 
altogether, would not therefore be to challenge the sovereignty of Parliament but to 
restore its original purpose. A revolution perhaps - but in the sense of turning a full 
circle rather than embarking on a wholly new and uncharted political adventure. " 
Loveland (1996) at p. 535. 
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Appendix A- Chronology- 
Henry Bracton 
died 1268 
De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae, first pubfication date unknown 
Jean Bodin 
born 1530, died 1596 
S's x. Livres de la Republique published in'1576 
James I 
bom 1566, died 1625 
King of Eneland 1603 to 1625 
Sir Edward Coke 
bom 1552, died 1634 
Solicitor-General 1592 
Speaker of the House of Commons 1593 
Attorney-General 1594 
Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas 1606 to 1613 
Chief Justice of the Court of King's Bench 1613 to 1616 
Coke's Reports published between 1600 and 1615 
Coke's Institutes published between 1628 and 1644 
Thomas Hobbes 
bom 1588, died 1679 
ne Elements ofLaw, Natural and Politic published in 1640 
De Cive published in 1642 
Leviathan published in 1651 
Dialogue between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws ofEngland published in 
1681 
11 
Sir Matthew Hale 
bom 1609, died 1676 
Lord Chief Justice qf the Court of the King's Bench 1671 to 1676 
John Locke 
bom 1632, died 1704 
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Two Treatises on Government published in 1690 
Charles-Louis cle Secondat (Baron cle la Brede et cle Montesquieu) 
I 
bom 1689, died 1755 
LEsprit des Lois published in 1748 
Sir William Blackstone 
bom 1723, died 1780 
Vinerian Professor of Law 1758 to 1766 
Commentaries pubfished between 1765 and 1769 
Jeremy Bentham 
bom 1748, died 1832 
Fragment on Government published in 1776 
John Austin -'10 
born 1790, died 1859 
Province ofJurisprudence Determined published in 1832 
Lectures on Jurisprudence published between 1861 and 1863 
Albert Venn Dicey 
bom 1832, died 1922 
Vinerian Professor of Law 1882 to 1909 
Introduction to the study of the Law of the Constitution published in 1885 
H. L. A. Hart 
bom 1907, died 1993 
Concept ofLaw published in 1961 
Sir William Wade 
bom 1918 
77je Bmis ofLegal Sovereignty published in 195 5 
-, a 
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Appendix B- Socio-economic Background of the Senior u iciaty 
"Over the whole period the dominance of the upper and upper middle classes is overwhelming. They 
account for 75.4 per cent to which may be added proportionally, 10 per cent from those not known. 
Moreover the total per-centage of these'first three groups in the most recent period is 76.8, which is 
higher than the overall pýrcentage. Over the whole period covered by this analysis the dominance of 
the first three classes is unchanged. ' 
Period of 1820- 1876- 1921- 1951- 1820- num- 
appointment 1875, 1920 1950 1968 1868 ber 
Social Class % % % % % % 
I Traditional 17.9 16.4 15.4 10.5 15.3 59 
landed upper 
class 




IH Upper middle 40.6 50.5 47.3 52.3 47.4 183 
Class I 
IV Lower middle 11.3 9.7 8.8 8.1 9.6 7 
Class 
V Worldng Class 2.8 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 6 
Not Known 18.9 7.8 112 14.0 13.5 52 






91 86 386 386 
1 
"School education is a good indicator of social and econorrýc class background, particularly as the 
relative cost of attendance at one of the independent "public" schools has changed little, until very 
recently. It must also be remembered that University education at Oxford and Cambridge before 1945 
(when those who are now judges attended) was also very largely a middle class activity, witffm the first 
"'From an Unpublished M. Phil dissertation by Jenny Brock quoted in'the The Judicia , the report of a 
justice 
subcommittee" 
Griffith (199 1) at P. 30-3 1, 
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three groups of the table set out above.... In 1986,29 out of 34 Law Lords and Lord Justices of Appei 
had attended public schools and Oxford or Cambridge Universities. ,2 
"They are drawn from a particular class, educated in a particular way, and members of a particulu 
profession such that they are very likely not to appreciate the rights of people from very differeil 
classes 0 
"What may be said with hindsight was that the innovatory activities of Lords Reid and Denning, taken 
together with the acadernic consensus as represented by these writers, had contributed to an atmosphere 
receptive to the change. It required but a catalyst ,4 
2Griffith (1991) at P. 31-33. 
3 Dworkin (1980) at P. M. 
4 Paterson (1982) at P. 149. 
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Appendix C- Commentaries on the meeting between Sir Edward Coke and 
King James I 
Caesar's Notes (Lansdowne MS. 1609 ff. 4239 424) 
The Kings Speech. That he'come not to m*e or heare orations. That he expected arf--answere from the 
Judges after tuesday touching the 4 shires whether in the Jurisdiction of the Marches of Wales. This no 
lesse matter than robbing the Prince of Wales of his Jurisdiction, if the 4 shires bee denied to belong 
thereunto. 
Now to the prohibitions against the eccliasticaU Courtes. The question whether in a cause of tithes any 
prescription or contract for tithes being alleged by the Defendant the cause bee then removable to the 
domon lawe. 
Questions short. Deliberations long. Conclusions pithy. 2 E. 6. touching tithes. Articuli Cleri. 
circurnspete agatis. .3)E. 6. the statute of 2 E. 6. expounded. 
If these instant causes be tried at comon lawe, no cause of tithes wU be held in the ecclesiatical Courtes. 
The judges are Eke the Papists. They alleadge scriptures and will interpret the same. The judges alleadge 
statutes and reserve the exposition thereof to themselves. 
The comon lawe protecteth the King, quoth the L. Coke, which the King said was a traitorous speech: 
for the King protecteth the Lawe and not the lawe the King. The King maketh Judges and bishops. If the 
Judges interprete the lawes themselves and suffer none else to interprete, then they may easily make of 
the laws shipments hose. 
The King would have both sides to seake out theire presidents touching the causes of like nature 
heretofore; and then he will ear all at his corning. " 
John Henry's letter to the Earl of Shrewsbury 
On Sunday before the King's going to Newmarket (which was Sunday Sennight) my Lord Coke and 
all the Judges of the Common law were before his Majesty to answer some complaints made by the civý 
lawyers for the general granting of prohibitions. I heard that the Lord Coke amongst other offensive 
speaches should say to his majesty that his majesty was defended by his laws. At which saying with other 
speeches then used by the Lord Coke, his majesty was very much offended and told him he spake 
foolishly and said that he was not defended by his laws but by God, and so gave the Lord Coke in other 
words a very sharp reprehension, both for that and for other things, and withal told that Sir Thomas 
Crompton was as good a man as Coke, my Lord Coke having by way of exception used some speech 
against Sir Thomas Crompton. Now not having time and also for that (it being so long since) I partly 
Page 448 
think your Lordship before this by some other hath heard thereo& I forbear to inform you of all I have 
heard; but had not my Lord Treasurer-most humbly on his knee, used many good words to pacify lis 
Majesty, and to excuse that which had been spoken, it was thought his I-Eghness would have been much 
offended. In the conclusion, his Majesty, by the means of my Lord Treasurer, was well pacified, and 
gave a gracious countenance to all the other judges, and said he would maintain the common law. This 
cause, it is said, is again to be heard before his majesty in the week before Christmas, at his I-jighnesgs 
return to Whitehall. " 
Sir Rafe Boswell to Dr. Milbourne 
Besides I must tell you the Archbishop of Canterburie resolved to try the validitie of our letters 
patentes: Whereof Sir Christofer (Parkins] did fayfully assure me, and which I understand likewise from 
many others neerest my to. grace. Whereunto I presume his Lp. might be the rather encouraged in 
regard of the late high Grace shewed to him on Sunday at last at Whitehall before the King, where the 
Prohibitions were Debated by the Common lawyers. There the Lo. Coke, humbly prayed the Idng to 
have respect to the common Lawes of his land etc. he, prayed his Majesty to consider that the 
ecclesiastical Jurisdiction was forren. After which his Majestie fell into that high indignation as the like 
was never knowne in hin-4 looking and spealdna fiercly with bended fist, offering to strike him etc., 
' 
which the Lo. Cooke perceauing fell flatt on all -fower, humbly beseaching his Majestie to take 
compassion on him and to pardon him, if he thought zeale had gone beyond his dutie and allegiance. Hs 
Majestie not herewith contended his indignation. Whereupon the Lo. Treasurer, the Lo Cookes uncidel 
by marriage, kneed down before his majestie and prayed him to be favourable. To whome his Majestie 
replied saying, what hast thou to do to intreate'for him. He answered in regard he hath married rny 
nearest kinswoman, etc. " 
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Appendix D -, Statutes relating tO the Manner and Form Argument 
The Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865 
2- Any colonial law which is or shall be in any respect repugnant to the provisions of any Act 
of Parliament extending to the colony to which such lawmay relate, or repugnant to any order 
or regulation made under authority of such Act of Parliament, or having in the colony the 
f6rce and effect of such Act, shall be read subject to such Act, order, or regulation, and shall to 
the extent of such repugnancy, but not otherwise, be and remain absolutely void and 
inoperative. 
3- No colonial law shall be or be deemed to have been void or inoperative on the grounds of 
repugnancy to the law of England, unless the same shall be repugnant to the provisions of some 
such Act of Parliament, order, or regulation as aforesaid. 
5- Every colonial legislature shall have, and be deemed at all times to have had, full power 
within its jurisdiction to establish Courts of Judicature, and to abolish and reconstitute the 
same, and to alter the constitution thereof, and to make provision for the administration of 
justice therein; and every representative legislature shall, in respect to the Colony under its 
jurisdiction, have, and be deemed at all times to have had, Ul power to make laws respecting 
the constitution, powers, and procedures of such legislature; provided that such laws shall have 
been passed in such manner and form as may from time to time be required by any Act of 
Parliament, letters patent, order in council, or colonial law for the time being in force in the said 
colony. 
The Statute'of Westminsier 1931 
2. (1) The Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865, shall not apply to any law made after the 
commencement of this Act by the Parliament of a Dominion. 
(2) No law and no provision of any law made after the commencement of this Act by the 
Parliament of a Dominion shall be void or inoperative on the ground that it is repugnant to the 
law of England, or to the provisions of any existing or future Act of Parliament of the United 
Kingdom, or to any order, rule or regulation made under such Act, and the powers of the 
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Parliament of a Dominion shall include the power to repeal or amend any such Act, order, - 1 
rule or regulation in so far as the same is part of the law of the Dominion. 
3. It is hereby declared and enacted that the Parliament of a DornHon has full power to make 
laws having extra-territorial operation. 
4. No Act of a Parliament of the United Kingdom passed after the commencement of this Act 
shall extend, or be deemed to extend, to a Dominion as part of the law of, that Dominion, unless 
it is expressly declared in that Act that that Dominion has requested, and consented to, the 
enactment thereof. 
The Ceylon Constitution 
18. Save as otherwise provided in subsection (4) of section 29, any question proposed for 
decision by either Chamber shall be determined by a majority of votes of the Senators or 
Members; as the case may be, present and voting 
29 - (1) Subject to the provisions of this Order, Parliament shall have power to make laws for 
the peace, order and good government off the Island. 
- (2) No such law shall - (a) prohibit or restrict the free exercise of religion 
- (3) Any law made. in contravention of subsection (2) of this section shall, to the extent of 
such contravention, be void. 
- (4) In the exercise of its power under this section, Parliament may amend or repeal any of 
the provisions of this Order, or any other Order of Her Majesty in Council in its 
application to the Island: 
Provided that no Bill for the amendment or repeal of any of the provisions of this Order shall be 
presented for the Royal Assent unless it has been endorsed on a certificate under the hand of 
the Speaker that the number of votes cast in favour thereof in the House of Representatives 
amounted to not less than two-thirds of the whole number of Members of the House (including 
those not present). 
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Every certificate of the Speaker under this subsection shall be conclusive for all purposes and 
shall not be questioned in any court of law. 
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Appendix E- History of Parliamentary Votes on Membership of the European 
Communities 










Con. 282 39 249 8 
_Lab. 
69 198 137 145 
_Lib. 
5 1 12 - 
Other - 6 - 19 
. ... .... 
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Appendix F- Tenns of Sections 2 and 3 of the European Communities Act 1972 
2 General Implementation of Treaties 
(1) AU such rights, powers, UabUities, obfigations and restrictions from time to time created or arisingby 
or under the Treaties, and all such remedies and procedures from time to time provided for by or 
under the Treaties, as in accordance with the Treaties are without further enactment to be given legal 
effect or used in the United Kingdom shall be recognised and available in law, and be enforced, 
allowed and followed accordingly; and the expression 'enforceable Community right' and similar 
expressions shall be read as referring to'one to which this subsection applies. 
(2) Subject to Schedule 2 to this Act, at any time after its passing, Her Majesty may by Order in 
Council, and any designated Minister or department May by regulations, make provision - 
(a) for the purpose of implementing any Community'obligation of the United Kingdorn, or 
enabling any such obligation to'be implemented, or of enabling py rights enjoyed or to be 
enjoyed by the United Kingdom under or by virtue of the Treaties to be exercised; or 
(b) for the purpose of dealing with matters arising out of or related to any such obligation or 
rights or the con-dng into force, or the operation from time to the, of subsection (1) above; 
and in the exercise of any statutory power or duty, including any power to give directions or to 
legislate by means of orders, rules, regulations or other subordinate instrument, the person entrusted 
with the power or duty may have regard to the objects of the Communities and to any such 
obligation or rights as aforesaid. 
In this subsection 'designated Minister ordepartment' means such Minister of the Crown or 
government department as may from time to time be designated by Order in Council in relation to 
any matter or for any purpose, but subject to such restrictions or conditions (if any) as may be 
specified by the Order in Council. 
(3)There shall be charged on and issued o'ut'of the Consolidated Fund or, if so detem-dned by the 
Treasury, the National Loans Fund the amounts required to meet any Cornmunity obligation to 
make payments to any of the Communities or member States, or any Community obligation in 
respect of contributions to the capital or reserves of the European Investment Bank or in respect of 
loans to the Bank, or to redeem any notes or obligations issued or created in respect of any such 
Community obligation; and, except as otherwise provided by or under any enactment, - 
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(1) any other expenses incurred under or by virtue of the Treaties or this Act by any NEnister of 
the Crown or government department may be paid out of moneys provided by Parliarnent 
and 
(2) any sums received under or by virtue of the Treaties or this Act by any Minister of the 
Crown or government department, save for such sums as may be required for 
disbursements permitted by any other enactment, shaU be paid into the Consolidated Fund 
or, if so deterniined by the Treasury, the National Loans Fund. 
(4) the provision that may be made under subsection (2) above includes, subject to Schedule 2 to tilis 
Act, any such provision (or any such extent) as might be made by Act of Parliament, and any 
enactment passed or to be passed, other than one contained in this Part of the Act, shaU be construed 
and have effect subject to the foregoing provisions of the section; but, except as may be provided by 
any Act passed after this Actý Schedule 2 shall have effect in connection with the powers conferred 
by this and the following sections of this Act to make Orders in CounciI and regulations. 
(5) and the references in that subsection to a NEnister of the Crown or government department and to 
a statutory power or duty shall include a Minister or department of the Govemment ofNorthem 
Ireland. and a power or duty arising under or by virtue of an Act of the ParUament ofNorthem 
Ireland. 
(6) A law passed by the legislature of any of the Channel Islands or of the Isle of Man, or a colonial law 
(within the meaning of the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865) passed or made for Gibraltar, if 
expressed to be passed or made in the implementation of the Treaties and of the obligations of the 
United Kingdom thereunder, shall not be void or inoperativeby reason of any inconsistency with or 
repugnancy to an Act of Parliament, passed or to be passed, that extends to the Island of Gibraltar or : 
any provision having the force and effect of an Act there (but not including this section), nor by 
reason of its having some operation outside the Island or Gibraltar; and any such Act or provision 
that extends to the Island or Gibraltar shall be construed andhave effect subject to the provisionsof 
any such law. 
Page 455 
3 Decisions on, and proof of, Treaties and Community instruments, etc. 
For purposes of all legal proceedings any question as to the meaning or effect of any of the Treaties, 
or as to the validity, meaning or effect of any Community instrument, shall be treated as a question of 
law (and, if not referred to the European Court, be for the determination as such in accordance with 
the principles laid down by and any relevant decision of the European Court (or any court attached 
thereto]). 
(2) Judicial notice shall be taken of the Treaties, of the Official Journal of the Communities and of any 
decision oý or expression of opinion by, the European Court (or any court attached thereto] on any 
such question as aforesaid; and the Official Journal shall be admissible as evidence of any instrument 
or other act thereby communicated of any of the Communities or of any Community institution. 
(3) Evidence of any instrument issued by a Community institution, including any judgement or order of 
the European Court [or any court attached thereto], or of any document in the custody of a 
Community institution, or any entry in or extract from such a document, may be given in any legal 
proceedings by production of a copy certified as a true copy by an official of that institution; and any 
document purporting to be such a copy shall be received in evidence without proof of the official 
position or handwriting of the person signing the certificate. 
(4) Evidence of any Community instrument may also be given in any legal proceedings - 
(a) by production of a copy purporting to be printed by the Queen's printer, 
, 
(b) where the instrument is in the custody of a government department (including a department 
of the Government of Northern Ireland), by production of a copy certified on behalf of the 
department to be a true copy by an officer of the department generally or speciafly authorised 
so to do; 
and any document purporting to be such a copy as is mentioned in paragraph (b) above or an 
instru ment in the custody of a department shall be received in evidence without proof of the official 
position or handwriting of the person signing the certificate, or of his authority so to do, or of the 
document being in the custody of the department. 
Page 456 
(5) in any legal proceedings in Scotland evidence of any matter given in a manner authorised by this 
section shall be sufficient evidence of it. 
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Appendix G- Questions referred to the European Court of Justice by the 
House of Lords in Rv Secretary of State for transport, ex parte Factortame 
'T Where: (i) a party before the national court claims to be entitled to rights under Community law 
having direct effect in national law ("the dots, claimed"), (ii) a national measure in clear terms will, if 
applied, automatically deprive that party of the rights claimed, (iii) there are serious arguments both for 
and against the existence of the rights claimed and the national court has sought a preliminary hearing 
under Article 177 as to whether or not the rights claimed exist, (iv) the national law presumes the 
national measure in question to be compatible with Community law unless and until it is declared to be 
incompatible, 
- 
(v) the national court has no power to give interim protection to the rights claimed by 
suspending the application of the national measure pending the preliminary ruling, (yi) if the preliminary 
ruling is in the event in favour of the rights claimed the party entitled to those rights is likely to have 
suffered irremediable damage unless given such interim protection does Community law either (a) oblige 
the national courts to grant such interim protection of the rights claimed; Q. r (b) give the court power to 
grant such interim protection of the fights claimed? 2. If question I(a) is answered in the negative and 
question I(b) in the affirmative, what are the criteria to be applied in deciding whether or not to grant 
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